



# Understanding FATA:

Attitudes Towards Governance,  
Religion & Society in Pakistan's  
Federally Administered Tribal Areas

Volume IV

Naveed Ahmad Shinwari

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**Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP)**

**Understanding FATA:**

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Volume IV

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## **Volume IV**

Naveed Ahmad Shinwari

Dedicated to the people of FATA

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
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# List of Acronyms

1. TNSM-Tehrik e Nifaz e Shariat e Mohammadi
2. TTP-Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan
3. MMA-Muttahidda Majlis e Amal
4. FATA-Federally Administered Tribal Areas
5. IDPs-Internally Displaced Persons
6. FC-Frontier Corps
7. NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization
8. FCR-Frontier Crimes Regulation
9. PA-Political Agent
10. NWFP-North West Frontier Province
11. PPP-Pakistan People's Party
12. JUI-Jamiat e Ulema a Islam
13. DDR-Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconstruction
14. FS-FATA Secretariat
15. FDA-FATA Development Authority
16. KP-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

# MAP OF PAKISTAN AND FATA



# PREFACE

This report is the result of CAMP's mission to serve the people of FATA and Pakistan in general. Part of the mission has been to foster and facilitate the understanding of the *Pakhtun*, their tribal politics, and their religious and cultural sentiments. By highlighting the numerous issues that the poor and marginalised people of FATA face, in their opinion, it is hoped that they will be better served by both national and international agencies so that CAMP's goal of working toward peace and progress will be achieved.

The production of the 'Understanding FATA' series would have never been possible without the active involvement and intellectual insight of people of FATA who are the most informed and aware of the opportunities and challenges of life in FATA. They have been extremely helpful in sharing their knowledge and insight, which helped to develop a perspective on various issues of FATA. The 4000 male and female respondents who spared their time and extended their hospitality to the CAMP team during the interview process deserve our gratitude and appreciation.

All fifty enumerators, male and female, hailing from FATA, deserve special recognition for their dedicated work carrying out the survey component. They courageously visited some very remote and difficult areas. Their contribution is certainly worthy of praise.

The author is equally grateful to the key informants from FATA as well as the guest speakers and experts who shared their knowledge and experience of FATA during focus-group discussions and stakeholders' consultations.

It would be unjust not to acknowledge the support of CAMP's programme managers, Tahir Ali and Mariam A. Khan, who relieved the author of most of the CAMP management responsibilities during the preparation of this report. Special thanks to Mariam A. Khan, Ayesha Zia-ul-Qamar [M & E Coordinator] for conducting and taking notes of women focus-group discussions. The project officers, Rabia Jahangir Khan, Ibne Ali, Hamid Jan and Hamid Jan, did a great job of organising, coordinating field work and taking

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All views, mistakes, and errors expressed in this report are mine.

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2010

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP) has been conducting opinion polls of the people of FATA since 2007. That work produces the 'Understanding FATA' series. The goal of this series is to reveal the thinking and the opinions of the people so that policy makers and influential actors in government, civil society, the international community, academics, journalists and the broader Pakistani citizenry will have useful, actionable information. This 2010 edition of 'Understanding FATA' is a comprehensive assessment of perceptions that the people of FATA have in several key policy areas including governance, society, religion and politics.

The descriptive material has been expanded to provide the reader with a more detailed understanding of contemporary FATA and the people living there. The statistical work is more than a dry compilation of opinions; the data is woven into the culture, the historic background, the national changes in policy and the ever changing historical currents coursing through and around FATA. The goal is to convey the opinions so that their aspirations and frustrations can be known from the people's perspective.

The first part of the book places the opinions in the context of the transition of the administrative structure from the British Colonial system to the Pakistan Constitutional system. Prior to this, little effort has been made to understand how the archaic, Colonial administrative system has helped the emergence of militancy in the tribal areas. A complete chapter is devoted to the administrative structure and the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) that came from the Colonial era and came to be imbedded in the Pakistani Constitution.

The second part of the book continues the theme of the *Pakhtun* in the cross currents of history being made with the focus on the international conflict. The opinions of the people concerning conflict and terrorism, internal security, personal security, the

source of suicide bombers, the lack of development as a cause of conflict, the importance of military operations, drones and their impressions on international training for the Frontier Corps are covered. Militancy and religion is an important chapter as is the chapter on Afghan refugees.

FATA has a unique strategic importance in terms of its impact on the security and stability of its neighbouring Afghanistan and on the 'War on Terror'. Pakistan and the international community are extremely concerned about how to deal with the situation inside FATA. The ongoing militancy in FATA seems to be contributing significantly to sustaining the Taliban resistance against the US-led forces in Afghanistan. Poverty, difficult terrain, an archaic system of administration, cross-border tribal and ethnic ties with Afghanistan, *Pakhtun* traditions and the presence of *Jihadi* militants create a set of overlapping challenges for the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as for the US and the international community. This volume of 'Understanding FATA' sheds additional light on all of these issues.

To deal with the Pakistan Taliban and foreign fighters, including Al Qaeda, the Pakistani military conducted 15 operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda militant groups since 2002. However, it failed to remove the militants from FATA. Most of the military operations against local militants ended up with compromises and, sometimes, agreements. In the recent times, much has been debated and written about insurgency in FATA, but most of the focus has been on the number of military operations and how these military operations have been conducted. The agreements between the Pakistan government and the militant groups have been analysed and severely criticised in the national and international media. The survey provides a different 'picture' based on the sample statistics, instead of anecdotal evidence, of the landscape of militant groups, their strengths, agenda and

image in the eyes of the people of FATA.

The inability to end violence created frustration within the Pakistan society and the then US administration of G.W. Bush, as well as the international community, that raised serious concerns on the will and capacity of the Pakistan military to counter this unique insurgency. More recently successful operations in the Swat valley and South Waziristan have enabled the Pakistan Army to earn reasonable credit and praises from the US and Western countries. The findings in this survey show that within FATA the people have supported these operations in spite of the displacements that they have experienced.

FATA has been described as a mysterious borderland for historians, writers, travellers and journalists. Much written about it is based on misconceptions. When bad things happen, the Frontier fascinates the world. When wars are won, for example the Soviets vanquished, then attention falls elsewhere. The goal here is to remove the mystery and avoid misunderstandings. Part of our theme is that the *Pakhtun* are not a quaint and isolated people; they have been and are related to the historical currents of the region and the world and, importantly, they are both a rural and an urban people with Peshawar, Quetta, Kabul and Qandahar being their major cities. We will make the argument that it is the *Pakhtun* who have been the buffer between empires and not Afghanistan.

'Understanding FATA' 2010 is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. Each chapter presents qualitative background material from multiple sources and the experience of CAMP. The statistical findings are presented with reference to the qualitative substance.

To strengthen the qualitative information, ten focus-group discussions and two-day consultative dialogues were used to gather the opinions. Minutes were recorded, analyzed and utilized to write this report. Background and historical material used in the report came from a review of historical books, newspapers, reports, articles, journals and the experience of CAMP programmes in FATA.

The quantitative data was collected through structured questionnaires. The objective was to sample adult males and females to ascertain their opinion on key issues related to the people of FATA. Because gender plays such an important role in public opinion, the sample was designed to interview equal numbers of males and females in each village. Although there may be slightly unequal populations of males and females due to seasonal migration and also emigration, exact, current statistics were not available to guide a deviation from this 50/50 approach. Expanding from its limited scope in 2007 and building upon previous surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009, the 2010 survey continues to track core appraisal areas while revising its nuances and methodology to meet contemporary constraints and demands. The 2010 FATA poll was conducted from 25th February - 3rd April 2010, with face-to-face interviews of 4,000 residents of FATA.

A hierarchical sampling strategy was used to poll adult opinion over the geographical area of all six Frontier Regions and the seven Agencies. The first level of sampling was to select 400 villages from the 960 villages in FATA. The second level was to select a representative sample of adult males and females from each village such that they would add up to a robust sample that would minimise the margin of error as described in Appendix III.

Because the latest Census (1998) is out of date, it was assumed that the total population of FATA is less than 4 million people. In order to achieve the desired margin of error of less than 2% within a 95% confidence interval for 'yes/no' type questions, four thousand adults were interviewed. This is an extremely robust sample because the opinions polled are for adults and not the population of children who would be approximately half of the total population. Thus we are very confident when comparing, for example, overall male and female differences of opinion as well as differences in multiple choices.

There are two areas of sampling bias that have to be pointed out. The first has to do with the inaccessibility of the villages. Because 42% of the 960 villages were not secure enough for the



interviewers, the sample of 400 villages was drawn from the remaining 557 villages. This introduces a bias of undetermined implications because there isn't a way to know the opinion of the people inhabiting insecure villages. Nevertheless, one can hypothesize that they may have different opinions with regard to militancy, the military tactics, law and order, etc. If one wished to be cautious in conclusions, one would have to add, 'In secure areas at this time, the people of FATA believe...'

The second area of bias has to do with the starting point method used to sample in each village. The technique of selecting a starting point to count off houses and then to knock on a sample of doors is a standard used in many household surveys. The starting point bias comes from an important cultural fact, that the more influential families are closer to the *Hujra* or Mosque (or in the case of the *Shia* areas, the *Imam Bargah*) that were the starting point. When large samples of population in selected towns are conducted (not in this case) the sampling criss-crosses the village taking in people of all ranks and stations. In this survey, however, the interviewers counted off in four directions (two for males and two for females) to sample a total of five males and five females in each village by taking two and then three houses according to the direction. Hence the bias is toward more urban and better off families in each village. This bias also leads to hypotheses as to differences between rural and urban adults in the sampled areas. In the analysis of occupations of the respondents we do note a greater proportion of professionals and merchants than would be expected for the rural areas. These findings may also bias areas of interest such as educational and occupational aspirations for their children, but, again, we do not know the facts from the rural inhabitants.

In summary, the social image of the respondents that should be kept in mind is that they are in relatively secure villages and that they are village dwellers and not representative of isolated farm families. We say with caution, 'relatively secure' because we do not want to underestimate the risk and effort by the interviewers in undertaking the work. It took courage and care for them to enter many of the areas.

Because the only viable future for FATA will be the one that takes into account the people's views on religion, politics, society and governance, we hope that this report will generate a fruitful debate about the future of the FATA; a debate that includes the people from the FATA itself, regardless of their status; a debate that includes policy makers in Peshawar, Islamabad, Kabul, Washington and London.

The 'Understanding FATA' series is a sincere attempt to inform those debates. Some of the answers to some of the key issues are in this series; it may not provide all the answers but it does underline an important principle: that the people of the FATA are encouraged to speak for themselves and to be heard.

#### Key findings of the polls are:

- 2010 survey shows that the people of FATA are more optimistic about the direction of the country. In 2009 only 16.7% people of FATA were of the opinion that things in Pakistan were going in the right direction. Now, in the 2010 survey 38% believe that it is going in the right direction. This swing suggests that the ongoing efforts by the government are seen as steps towards improvement.
- Concerns for deteriorating 'law and order' in Pakistan continues. In both 2010 and 2009 approximately one third of the FATA respondents identified the lack of law and order as the biggest problem facing Pakistan.
- In 2009, 26.6% of the respondents identified 'unemployment' as a major problem; that dropped to only 6.6% in 2010.
- Although it varies by Agency/FR, it is surprising that despite the ongoing militancy and military operation in most parts of FATA, the people of FATA continue to prefer living in FATA. For both years, 2009 and 2010, over half of the FATA respondents confirm that they would not leave FATA if given the opportunity.

## Understanding FATA 2010

- On the justification of US drone attacks, the 2010 data shows that 58.8% of the respondents believe that such attacks are 'never justified'. 24.4% of the respondents opined in a qualified manner that sometimes these attacks are justified if they are properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided. Only 4.4% believe that such drone attacks are 'always justified'. However, when examined by Agency the variation of the 'never' category ranges from 99.3% in North Waziristan to 12.9% in Kurram.
- As opposed as the respondents are to outside military intervention increasing support is found for international trainers, over local trainers, for strengthening the Frontier Corps against militants.
- 'Education and schools' (56.0%) followed by 'security' (51.7%) and 'health services/hospitals' (50.7%) were the most important services that the Government of Pakistan should be providing. In the 2009 poll, 'security' was felt as the top most needed service by 62.9% respondents, suggesting that this year the FATA respondents seem to feel less threatened and have focused on development services for their well-being.
- Regarding the future status of FATA as a political unit of Pakistan, we see variations over the last four years. Nearly one third, 30.7%, want FATA to be fully integrated into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP), and 24.9% want to have a separate province. Those who wanted to keep the current governing arrangement was a steady 23% (2008) to 21% (2009) during the previous two surveys, but last year only 7.9% of the respondents stayed with the 'status quo.'
- During the last four years, CAMP has been interacting extensively with the elite, well-informed local leadership of FATA who advocated for a separate FATA Council. Therefore, this option was introduced in 2010. Only 2.9% of the people, who may have been by chance members of the elite class of FATA, supported a FATA Council with an elected assembly. The idea was that such a council can decide the future of FATA gradually and, in the meanwhile, the President of Pakistan would retain his Article 247 powers under the constitution.
- Support for allowing the Political Parties Act of 2002 has not varied from the 2008 and 2009 polls. Nearly 60% of the respondents welcomed President Asif Ali Zardari's announcement of a political reforms package for FATA in 2009.
- Support for military operations against militants increased dramatically over the last year. In 2009 only 16.8% respondents supported the Army/security force operations in Swat, but this year 66.8% of the respondents supported the operation. Apparently, the success of the Swat military offensive and the repatriation of over 2 million IDPs to Swat moulded their opinion in favour of the military offensive.
- Approximately 25% of the respondents had been displaced people. This condition significantly influenced their opinions on military strategies and the use of drones; they generally support these operations more than do the non-displaced in their respective Agencies.
- Suicide bombing was seen as 'never justified' by 42% in 2009 poll, but this year 57.1% condemned suicide bombing.
- On human rights, there have been substantial changes in priorities from one year to another. In 2010 the 'state's inability to provide basic amenities of life' (38.4%), and 'democracy' (30.8%), were the most important human rights issues in Pakistan. In contrast, in 2009 'democracy' (22.8%), 'independence of judiciary' (18.58%) and 'women rights' (18%) were the main issues. We cannot explain the swing.
- 41% of the respondents identified 'terrorist attacks' as the main threat to life; their description and opinion on the Taliban are important findings. It is notable that the people distinguish between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban. The reasons for the causes and sources of the Taliban are very illuminating and they are too complex to summarize here except to say that two-thirds of the respondents, 64.2%,



have unfavourable opinions about Pakistan Taliban while only 36.2% believe that Afghan Taliban are terrorists. The idea that the Afghan Taliban are Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation in Afghanistan has dropped from 40.35% in 2009 to 20.2% in 2010 poll.

- In the 2010 poll, half of the respondents did not know about Al Qaeda and out of those who knew, overwhelming majority, 72.58%, have an unfavourable opinion about Al Qaeda. A contrast that gives pause to ponder is that more than 85% of the respondents have an opinion about the US and the UK, but respectively, 68.5% and 56.6% of the respondents have an unfavourable opinion about US and UK policies.
- Responding to a question about what should happen to foreign Muslim fighters living in FATA, 42.7% believe that they should be forced to leave by the Pakistan Army; 25.3% think that they should be asked to leave by host communities; and only 2.7% said that they should be allowed to stay.
- A question on whether Afghan refugees' should return to Afghanistan, an overwhelming 89.1% said they should. This is an upward change in sentiments since 2008. The factors of increased tensions and economics because of refugees are described.
- Gender differences were revealed in the answers to the questions about what parents (Males and Females) wanted most for their male and female children. One finding was that the opinion for boys did not change much from 2008. More education, more employment opportunities and more security were constants. For girls however, although more security and more education were at the top, the need for *pardah* went up by 20% since the 2008 opinion poll. Women, by two-fold, wish for more education for girls than do men. That being said, women support for education for girls as a priority is still less than 25%.
- The radio is the most valued among the sources of information, followed by television and newspapers. It is notable that foreign prepared listening content is as popular as Pakistani Programming with BBC running at the same level as Pakistani national radio and the Voice of America via 'Dewa' coming in at third place with a fourth of the listeners. The international interest by the people of FATA is not surprising considering that they are and have been in the cross currents of history for centuries. It reflects the tradition during the Silk Road days of listening to news-bearing story tellers in Peshawar.
- An important chapter delves into the opinion about other countries and the importance of concepts that they stand for. The countries are divided into neighbours, other Islamic, Western and then the US and the UK are dealt with in a comparative manner. The findings are diverse and contrast with the overall unfavourable opinion stated above about the UK and the US. When it comes to the development and military assistance and training, the people are in favour of support from the UK and US in spite of their unfavourable ratings.

These findings are but glimpses of the results of the survey. It is important to study these statistics in the context provided by the qualitative section of each chapter. The chapters could be used alone, but the findings from one area of inquiry to another provide a more comprehensive understanding of the people of FATA.

There are important changes of opinion by the people of FATA between 2008 and 2010. However it is clear that security, governance, socio-economic development are the main issues that need to be prioritized if stability and peace are to be brought in to FATA.



# CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO FATA: PAST AND PRESENT

# CHAPTER - 1

## INTRODUCTION TO FATA: PAST AND PRESENT

### Past - The borderland *Pakhtuns*

People living in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) are predominantly *Pakhtuns*. The origin of their language, *Pakhtu*, is not clear in spite of the tireless efforts of linguists and historians. Their history comes from a laborious reconstruction, pieced together from coins, inscriptions, occasional glimpses of fragmentary records written by envoys and geographers.<sup>1</sup>

Two different theories, one based on religion and the other posited by ethnologists, are used to explain the origin of the *Pakhtun*.

*One group of religiously oriented historians claims that Pakhtuns are the descendents of 'Qais, the thirty-seventh Lineal descendent of Saul of Israel'.<sup>2</sup> Pakhtuns generally believe in this theory and speak of themselves as 'Bani Israel'.<sup>3</sup> Qais was a saintly warrior who lived near Ghur in Afghanistan in the seventh century. He converted to Islam and received blessing from the Holy Prophet Mohammad (PBUH). After his death his descendents moved to Qandahar. Qais had three sons namely Sarbani, Ghilzai and Ghurghusht, from which the three great branches of the Pakhtun race evolved.*

*A second group of historians and ethnologists believe that Pakhtuns are the descendents of Aryans who laid the foundation of this new culture in around 1500 B.C.<sup>4</sup> Most of the modern researchers of this theory agree on the birth place of Aryans lying in between the Pamirs and Oxus which is known as Bakhtar.<sup>5</sup> The Dravidians, the residents of the area, rather than submit to Aryan subjugation, fled the area and migrated to other parts of India. At that time Aryans gradually settled in parts*

*of India, Afghanistan and Iran. It is also believed that Aryans formed three parts. The group living in Bakhtar are the ancestors of Pakhtuns and settled in Balkh, Hirat, Kabul and Gandhara.*

### The *Pakhtun* as a buffer between empires

In order to understand present-day FATA it is important to look into the pages of history to know the tribal *Pakhtun's* constant struggle against invaders from Alexander the Great to the British India and then the present-day Pakistani state. The present border has evolved through centuries of political struggle between the British Empire in India and the empires of Western and Central Asia.<sup>6</sup> The frontier region has never been stabilised due to the continuous invasions from the West, which resulted in the shifting of the region from one empire to another.

From this history we are aware that the lands that are now Afghanistan and the North West Frontier of Pakistan have seen perhaps more invasions in the course of history than any other country in Asia or indeed the world.<sup>7</sup> At some point the area remained part of India, then Persia, then again India, then Afghanistan and finally British India. Over long periods the line of the Indus, or the escarpment of the mountains west of it, has represented the boundary of constantly shifting kingdoms or empires.<sup>8</sup> During those shifts the *Pakhtun* were sometimes overcome and at other times the *Pakhtun* were the tribal basis for the establishment of a small empire ruling over other ethnic groups.

### The invasions

When Alexander the Great invaded India in 323 B.C., he conquered Afghanistan and then advanced through western



part of the sub-continent where he faced resistance from the *Pakhtun* tribes. Alexander's Army, under the direction of Gen. Seleucus, subdued the *Pakhtun* tribes and this region became part of the Macedonian Empire. Ashok the Great, in 250 B.C., also ruled over what is present-day Afghanistan and Western Pakistan.

In the ninth and tenth centuries A.D. there were Muslim invasions from Central Asia and Afghanistan. At that time these areas were under the control of Hindu Rajputs. Raja Jaypal was the last Hindu to rule over the *Pakhtun* when he was defeated by Mehmud Ghaznavi in Peshawar. Mehmud Ghaznavi followed the traditional invading route from Central Asia through the Khyber Pass. Although he invaded India on seventeen occasions between 1000 - 1026 A. D., he never consolidated an empire in India.<sup>9</sup>

In 1186 Mohammad Ghori from Afghanistan attacked Punjab and Benares and defeated Rajputs and laid the first foundation for a Muslim state in India. The same route was followed, first by Chengez Khan (Genghis Khan) in 1212 A.D. when Sultan Altutmish was ruling India, and then in 1398 by Amir Timur Lane who wrought enormous destruction before being expelled. In 1526 Zaheeruddin Babar, the first Mughal Emperor, came from Afghanistan and defeated Sultan Ibrahim Lodhi in the battle of Panipat and laid the foundation of the Mughal Empire in the Indian Sub-continent. That empire lasted until 1764.<sup>10</sup>

### The Durrani federation and empire

The Mughal Empire started to erode with the death of the last powerful Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir in 1707 because his weak successors were unequal to the task of holding the empire together. Thus began the first, modern, *Pakhtun* consolidation known as the Durrani Federation. In the early 1700s the military leader of one of the principal *Pakhtun* groups, the Sadozai, led by the military leader Ahmad Shah Durrani brought a second *Pakhtun* group, the Ghilzais, into the federation. They went on to conquer and form what has been

called the Durrani Empire that consolidated not only the other *Pakhtun* tribes on both sides of the *Hindu Kush*, but they also went on to try to conquer and hold parts of present day Iran, Northern Afghanistan, Kashmir and South into present day Sindh and Delhi in India. This vast empire was not possible to hold because the Sikhs, the Uzbeks, the Tajiks and others rebelled and pushed back in the late 1700s, and, internally, leaders in Kabul, Qandahar, Herat, Quetta and Peshawar were always contesting power.

In 1826 Dost Mohammad of the Mohammadzai family took the throne of Kabul. According to Fraser-Tytlar, during his struggle to regain territories lost to the Sikhs and to liberate his fellow men from the Sikh yoke,<sup>11</sup> in 1837 therefore, Dost Mohammad sent troops under his eldest son, Mohammad Akbar Khan, through the Khyber to attack the Sikhs.<sup>12</sup> Aided by *Pakhtun* tribesmen, Akbar's army defeated the Sikhs under Hari Singh outside the walls of Jamrud.<sup>13</sup> The first Afghan War (1839-42) was the result of the lack of cooperation by the British with Amir Dost Mohammad in his struggle to capture Hirat from Persians. Four years earlier the Russians had promised Amir Dost Mohammad that they would help him in capturing Hirat as well as to regain territories of Peshawar from the Sikhs, because they belonged to Afghanistan.

### Splitting the *Pakhtun* cultural area

These struggles show how the *Pakhtun* areas on both sides of the *Hindu Kush* served as a buffer zone between the ancient cultures. Later, the *Pakhtun* culture area was not seen as a nation and only 'Afghanistan' north of the *Hindu Kush* became the buffer between British India and the Russians in what became known as "The Great Game". In order to counter the Tsarists designs on 'Afghanistan' and to protect the North-Western flank of India, the British made an alliance with Sikhs and the deposed Shah Shujah<sup>14</sup> against Dost Mohammad. Shah Shujah was promised the throne of Kabul while possession of Peshawar would go to the Sikhs. In a short time the allied forces captured Kabul and other parts, and Shah Shujah was made

Amir of Afghanistan for a very short time. By January 1841, both the British and Shah Shujah were driven completely from the country.<sup>15</sup> By 1843 Dost Mohammad had returned from his exile and had regained the control of his country. From then on Dost Mohammad never cooperated with British India in relieving the pressure of the fellow *Pakhtun* hill tribes on the Frontier.

The Second Afghan War 1878-1880 was fought under the command of Brigadier General Sir Neville Chamberlain. By that time British India had annexed most of the remaining independent parts of India. The subcontinent had become substantially the same geographically and administratively. It remained this way through to the time of independence and partition in 1947.<sup>16</sup> The Second Afghan War, like the First, was considered a fiasco by many Englishmen. However from the stand point of the Frontier, of course, the most important result of the Second Afghan War was that the British were now in possession of the Khyber, the Kurram and the Bolan Passes.<sup>17</sup> Note that these passes continue to be links between the major routes of the old Silk Road that consisted of two routes: 1) the Kabul to Qandahar route and 2) the Peshawar to Quetta route. These routes were the highway system during the Durrani Empire and continue to be for the *Pakhtun* culture of Afghanistan and Pakistan; they also connect the rural and urban *Pakhtun* areas.

Both the Amir<sup>18</sup> of Afghanistan and the British Government of India were desirous of settling the frontier of Afghanistan. Therefore on 12 December 1893 the Agreement was signed by Sir M. Durand and Amir Abdurehman. This line, bearing Durand's name, was drawn and can be considered one result of the Second Afghan War. This agreement brought the Khyber Pass and the highlands around Quetta within the British Indian sphere.<sup>19</sup> The culture area of the *Pakhtun* and the Durrani federation was split, and, to this day, the *Pakhtun* are a buffer between nations.<sup>20</sup>

## Present - The structuring of FATA

### The Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)

The agreement between Afghanistan and the Britain may have settled the international discussion, but there remained the internal problem for the British Colonial rule. The frontier area was a continuous source of trouble and a threat to the stability of British India including access to the passes through the *Hindu Kush*. To try to check this threat, British India formulated a policy of persuasion, control, and armed interventions in these areas. Between 1849 and 1939, there were approximately 58 military campaigns against the *Pakhtun* tribes by British India.<sup>21</sup> The conflict finally was resolved in the following way. In return for free road access by the British the tribal areas along the Durand Line were given a semi-autonomous status with allowances (*Mojib*) and subsidies to the tribal *Maliks* and elders.

Several implementing agreements were added. One important arrangement was the introduction of the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in six occupied Frontier districts of the *Pakhtun* in 1848. Initially, the ordinary civil and criminal law, in force in British India, was extended to such districts. However, the rate of conviction under the ordinary criminal law was too low.<sup>22</sup> This led the British administration to devise special law for the whole *Pakhtun* region, and, in 1871, a more encompassing set of FCR was enacted. They were modified in 1873 and, again, in 1876.<sup>23</sup> These modifications continued through 1901 when, the entire North-Western Frontier region of British India was placed under the rule of the Governor-General of India, who governed it through the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab Province and his Political Officers of the British Civil Service.

In summary, the FCR<sup>24</sup> has been operative for more than a century as a special law prescribing trial procedures for offenses and civil disputes in the tribal areas.<sup>25</sup> The judicial system enshrined in the FCR of 1901 has been described as a hybrid of Colonial-era legal framework and with traditional customs and norms to which executive direction has been added.<sup>26</sup>

Because of its repressive set of rules that violate basic human rights such as freedom from collective punishment the FCR is regarded as a 'Black Law' or 'Draconian Law' when judged by present-day international human rights standards and principles. Nevertheless, it is basically the system of justice in place today. As will be described in the following section, this system has become institutionalized in the present Constitution of Pakistan.

### The British Colonial administrative structure

In order to implement the FCR, the British Colonial rule included a system of administration. That is, a system by which the Governor-General of India, through the Chief Commissioner for the Punjab, engaged the local *Pakhtun* leaders through a 'Political Officer' who dealt with the *Maliks* and *Lungi* holders of the tribes. Because the British Colonial structure was so similar to the present Constitutional structure, the parallel details will be described below.

### Constitutional status of FATA

The Indian Independence Act of 3 June 1947 abrogated all the special treaties. Pakistan opted not to base troops in the FATA region because 200 *Maliks*, during a *Loya Jirga*, signed an instrument of accession with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and first Governor-General of Pakistan, in return for continued allowances and subsidies.

On 14 August 1947, when Pakistan was created as a sovereign Muslim state, it also recognized the semi-autonomous status of the *Pakhtun* tribes of FATA and the instrument of accession. With very few changes the 1956, 1962 and 1973 constitutions of Pakistan retained the same agreements recognizing the special status of the FATA.

In Article 1 of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, FATA is included as one of the territories of Pakistan and Article 246 stipulates some 13 Agencies and frontier regions that comprise the FATA. Article 247 prescribes the manner and method of administering

FATA, which states that the executive authority of the Federation extends to FATA and that it shall be administered by the Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as per the direction of the President of Pakistan. Most of the laws civil, criminal, electoral and fiscal have been extended to FATA and the President may, subject to ascertaining the views of the tribal *Jirga*, abolish the status of a given FATA region/Agency and convert it into a settled area.<sup>27</sup> The President may, from time to time, issue directions to his agent, as stipulated in Article 145 of the Constitution. No Act of Parliament or any part thereof is extended to FATA unless the President so directs. Clause 7 of the Article 247, bars the extension of superior courts, including Supreme Court and High Court, to FATA unless the Parliament so provides under a law.

The President may make regulations with respect to any matter for the peace and good governance of FATA or any part thereof. FATA is represented in the Lower (National Assembly) and Upper (Senate) Houses of the Parliament by 12 and 8 members, respectively. However, because the parliament has no jurisdiction over FATA it is not clear what importance the FATA representatives have. FATA is geographically contiguous with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; however, it has no representation in the provincial parliament.

The Constitution of 1973 does not allow the people of FATA to fully participate in the political process. Only in 1996, the Adult Franchise Act was extended to FATA, while the Political Parties Act of 2002 has yet to be extended. This has kept the people of FATA away from the mainstream politics of the country.

Hence we see how the Constitution substitutes the President of Pakistan for the 'Governor-General,' and then created a Secretariat headed by the Provincial Governor instead of a 'Chief Commissioner of the Punjab,' and, finally, the title of Political Agents replaced the 'Political Officer' as the link to the tribal *Maliki* and *Lungi*. In that way, aside from the upper and lower house members with questionable powers, the Constitution retained the nondemocratic structure of appointees.

The recent renaming of the NWFP to ‘Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’ (KP) corrects two historical perspectives: 1) the North West Frontier perspective was based on the British Colonial view from central India as to the relative location of the area, and 2) the perspective that relegated or only recognized the *Pakhtun* as the people living in the region. When the Pakistani National Assembly approved this name change,<sup>28</sup> they recognized the extent of the culture area and implicitly the link between the rural and urban areas of the *Pakhtun*.

## The structure of FATA administration

To implement the Constitutional provisions described above, the President, through PA, must be linked to local, tribal structures. In most Colonial structures where pre-existing tribal societies existed, the external structure takes control of, or coöps, the local leadership and hence annexes the tribal structure. A leading legal scholar summarizes the administrative situation of the last hundred years in this way. ‘The region has a peculiar system of administration. The people are governed through their local chieftains called *Maliks*, through financial compensation controlled by Federal Government and exercised by a Political Agent.’<sup>29</sup> It is this structure that has made the transition from Colonial to Constitutional times intact.

The local administration in each Agency is managed by the Political Agent, who is a federal civil servant. Each sub-division (*Tehsil*) is headed by his Assistant Political Agent. The PA performs several functions at the same time. He acts an executive, a judge and revenue collector. He also heads the Agency Council and overseas development projects and all line departments come under his authority.

The link between the PA and the tribal structure is through local leaders holding the titles of *Maliki* and *Lungi*. They play a vital role in maintaining the status quo in the tribal areas, which was introduced in the Colonial period of Indian sub-continent. These *Maliks* and *Lungi* holders are paid with allowances

(*Mojib*) so that they remain loyal to Political Agents. Political Agents grant *Maliki* or *Lungi* status with the consent of the Governor and can withdraw, suspend or cancel the same status when he deems the individual is not serving his purpose.

The PAs, through the *Maliks*, have at their disposal the *Khasadars* as local police-like agents from tribal tradition and they also can convoke *Lakhkars*, another tribal tradition by which tribal members can be called together as a posse to defend the community or to apprehend criminals.

## Social and legal justice under the FCR in FATA

The Constitution in Article 247(7) states that the jurisdiction of the higher judiciary, that is, the provincial High Courts and the Supreme Court, does not extend to the FATA. Nevertheless, based on the FCR, the Political Agent is a judge in addition to his other executive functions. The FCR also provides for a system of collective territorial responsibility and collective punishment.

Importantly, a PA who has acted without regard to local justice and also without due process undermines the credibility of governance as well as justice. This poor governance system has impacted the local life very dearly where the concepts of proper and timely justice, and the insurance of human security. Ironically, this lack of justice has created a huge gap that has been filled by Islamist militants and law as imposed by the Taliban.

The situation is not that simple because the administration of justice in FATA drew upon the *Pakhtun* traditional processes for justice and the resolution of local conflict in the form of a modified ‘jirga’ that will be described below.

In many parts of the world, traditional ways of justice or locally integrated conflict transformation/resolution institutions are being used to resolve conflicts in order to ensure peace and stability within local communities or tribes. Such institutions are often useful and suitable under the circumstances in which they operate because they satisfy the local cultural and religious sentiments.

## The *Qoomi* and *Sarkari Jirgas*

The '*Jirga*' is a traditional justice system that is practiced by the *Pakhtun* in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The concept or format of the *Qoomi jirga* goes back to centuries old traditions. Basically, the *Qoomi Jirga* is convoked by a *jirgamaar* after the disputing parties agree that a *jirga* be held to resolve their conflict. Usually the weaker of the two disputing parties goes to the *jirgamaar* who is an elder and wise person to explain the complaint. The *jirgamaar* then goes to the other party to gain their agreement to be a party to a *jirga*. If there is agreement, then both parties agree to submit to the consensus of the elders who will listen to the dispute and then decide the resolution. Note that the cultural goal is to resolve the dispute or conflict so that the parties, families, tribes and so forth will return to a harmonious relationship. Conflict is as dysfunctional to tribal life as it is in non-tribal societies. Hence, culturally, the traditional '*Qoomi jirga*' is still a preferred form of justice/dispute resolution mechanism in many *Pakhtun* dominated areas of Pakistan.

A modified form of *jirga* (*Sarkari*) was adopted for use by the PAs as a formal mechanism for dispensing justice and resolving conflicts in the FATA under the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). The State in this case plays a very distinct role. The aggrieved person goes to the PA, or, if the PA suspects a crime, the PA charges a person. The PA then can call a few elders or adults of his choice to investigate and make a recommendation. Note that the person charging the defendant, in this case the PA, may select the '*jirga*' and then act as the judge. The lack of fairness in this process is not lost upon the *Pakhtun* and the *Sarkari Jirga* is considered another of the injustices imposed by the FCR.

## The limitations of traditional or common law based on culture

In the FATA region, ensuring social justice is quite a daunting task. The traditional *Qoomi jirga* deals with varying issues in the tribal areas including conflicts on land and property,

inheritance, alleged violation of 'honour killings', and intra-tribal disputes. In cases of murder, a traditional or *Qoomi jirga* may recommend direct vengeance or *badal*, or *swara*.<sup>30</sup> According to the 2001 annual report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, 'The speed with which the *jirga* system is expanding makes the need for strengthening the justice system all the more pressing.' On the international front, Amnesty International has recommended that Pakistan 'take all possible measures to ensure that tribal councils do not take the law into their own hands and assume quasi-judicial functions.' Although decisions are considered objective because the facilitator, the *Jirgamaar*, is nominated by both sides, the decisions made by the elders convoked by the *jirgamaar* are based on culture and religion plus previous decisions that make up the oral tradition or jurisprudence of the culture. Critics of *jirgas* charge this cultural basis, many times, includes a bias against women and minorities.

Under international human rights law however, Pakistan is obligated to ensure the enjoyment of rights to everyone living in its jurisdiction. Both the *Qoomi* and the *Sarkari jirga*, as practiced in the FATA, infringe upon these rights. In order to fulfil its obligations to all its citizens, the Government of Pakistan must ensure that if the *jirga* system is allowed to function as they do today, then they must comply with the human rights standards in the Constitution of Pakistan and international human rights treaties that Pakistan has ratified.

## Participation in democratic governance

The dated political and governance system in FATA does not allow the popular participation of local communities in the political and governance process. The political vacuum paves the way for obscurantist elements to fill the gap and exercise the authority that, otherwise, belongs to the state. This is exactly what has happened in FATA. Decades of seclusion from the mainstream socio-political and economic development have alienated the people of FATA.



As we can see, the impact of revived ancient tribal codes, compounded with a Taliban-like interpretation of Islam, has been so forceful that it forms the core of local collective psyche. Religious, political and social dissent is unacceptable; a total disregard for others' rights (especially when the victim is a woman) and a general tendency to resist change have become the defining characteristics.

On the other hand, both parties [Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League (N)] have lost their credibility in the eyes of Taliban and Al Qaeda. In Pakistani domestic politics both parties have been highly pragmatic, even opportunistic, forming formal or informal alliances with all major political players, no matter military, civilian, or secular. None of them has ever used the path of violence in their political struggle, but they have supported *Jihad* and militant Islam politically.

The constitutionally provided representation of FATA in the Upper and Lower Houses has not been developed so that not only meaningful representation is gained, it remains a hollow status because the houses cannot pass legislation that is not intervened by the executive structure described above. The extension of the Political Parties Act passed in 2002 is one of the ways to strengthen the Pakistani political system into FATA, but the fact that it is awaiting Presidential orders for implementation belays the non-participatory structure of governance.

## Conclusion

This historical background provides the context for the following chapters as we examine the survey opinion data with regard to the FCR, FATA Secretariat, confidence in life in FATA, the prospects for the future and so forth.

In the second half of the book, there will be an extensive chapter entitled, 'FATA in the Context of International Conflict.' That chapter is related to this historical material and is accompanied by specific surveyed opinion regarding military tactics, esteem of neighbors and other nations and security.



# CHAPTER 2

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF FATA

## CHAPTER - 2

# CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF FATA

### Introduction

The previous historical chapter ended with a description of how the Colonial judicial and administrative structures of FATA were transferred into the present constitution of Pakistan. We now turn to the survey results of the opinions of the people of FATA with regard to the themes outlined above under the general heading of the Constitutional Status of FATA.

### Mainstreaming FATA - Future status of FATA

The first, general question posed, with seven options, was, 'Should Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas?' The responses are shown in the figure 1.

In spite of long debate on the subject of FATA's status, 19.4%

(2010) of the population does not know or have an opinion as to what should be done. What is also clear is that only 7.9% do not wish for change. The responses regarding the future status of FATA offered the following options: Reform the FCR (13.8%); full integration into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [former NWFP] (30.7%) and one quarter (24.9%) believe that it should be established as a separate province of Pakistan.

For some of the options there is data from the 2007 survey, as well as the intervening years, so these responses can be examined for trends or stability. The table 1 shows the results from all four years with one exception. During the last four years, CAMP has been interacting extensively with the elite, well informed and local leadership of FATA who constantly demanded a separate FATA Council. Therefore, this option (the

Fig 1. Future status of FATA




Table 1. Future status of FATA

Future status of FATA	2007	2008	2009	2010
Be fully integrated into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP)	20.8	34	19	30.7
Keep its current governing arrangements		23.4	21.8	7.9
Bring more amendments in the FCR		0.2	0	13.8
Be established as a separate Province of Pakistan	34.3	19.8	16.7	24.9
Be established as a FATA Council	NA	NA	NA	2.9
Other (Specify)				0.5
Don't know				19.4
Total	55.1	77.4	57.5	100.1
NA = Not Asked in that year				

exception) was introduced in the 2010 survey. However, just 2.9% of the people, who may have been by chance members of the elite class of FATA, believed that FATA should be given a status of FATA Council with an elected assembly that can decide the future of FATA gradually and, in the meanwhile, the President of Pakistan would retain his Article 247 powers under the constitution.

Consistently 35% to 55% of the people are seeking substantial change, that is, either the full integration into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or the separate province options would imply the end of the FATA Secretariat and Presidential decrees. In the latter case FATA then would be directly under Constitutional rights and guarantees.

The inverse of substantial change, that is, keeping the current arrangement or simply amending the FCR, has also been consistently held by 21.8% to 23.4% of the people. However, the sole question of keeping the current arrangement has declined immensely from 23.4% in 2008 to just 7.9% in 2010. In the broadest sense, these responses indicate majority popular


sentiment supporting governance reform in FATA.

There is one recent political caveat that may explain the increased support for FCR amendments between 2009 and 2010. The results from the 2008 and 2009 surveys suggested that amending FCR was not the best choice for the respondents; however, the demand went up in 2010 survey when 13.8% respondents selected the option. The August 2009 (after the 2009 survey) announcement of the first, major amendment since 1901 by President Asif Ali Zardari was welcomed overwhelmingly by the FATA tribes. The amendment announced in August 2009 has yet to be implemented, and during the 2010 survey the respondents believed that at least these amendments should be implemented without further delay. The popularity of this act is measured in the next two sections.

### Support for the Government of Pakistan on FCR reform

The 2010 survey attempted to measure the support of the respondents for the Presidential decree of August 2009 in

Fig 2. Support for the Government of Pakistan on FCR reform




general.<sup>31</sup> The enthusiasm in general (42.8%) did not match the 59.7% support for the political parties. Some 17.1% respondents 'fully supported' and 26.7% partly supported the notion. However, 15.6% and 6.9% respondents 'fully' and 'partly' opposed the idea, respectively. Again, approximately a third of the respondents are undecided or do not know the answer.

### Future of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)

In 2010 the question of the future for the FCR was asked directly. As indicated in the figure 3, the support for the FCR is only 3.4%. A sizable majority (69.1%) desires either abolition (45.4%) or fundamental reform (23.7%). Partially reforming the FCR remained low with just 8.4% of the responses. Again, a sizable number of respondents, 16.3%, still do not know the answer or undecided.

The opinion of the people of FATA on the two key governance aspects of FATA, The FCR and the Administrative Structure, is similar. There is an overwhelming desire for change even

Fig 3. Future of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)




though the exact nature of the change has to be decided and, if there is to be a vote, there will have to be a public education programme explaining the options so that the approximate one third without an opinion will become engaged.

### Extending the Political Parties Act of 2002 to FATA

The 2010 survey attempted to gauge the level of agreement with President Asif Ali Zardari's decision of August 2009 extending the Political Parties Act 2002 to FATA. An overwhelming 59.7% of the respondents agreed that the Act should be extended to FATA while 9.6% respondents oppose this decision. There remained a sizable percentage of respondents, 30.8%, undecided or did not know the answer. Clearly the popularity of this act may have influenced people and favoured reform rather than substantial change. Nevertheless, by introducing the practice of political parties and membership, the way can be prepared for more local

Fig 4. Extending the Political Parties Act of 2002 to FATA





participation and perhaps, substantial change. At this time the people of FATA have elected officials in both houses. Party affiliation may help them to leverage the party agendas for change and development, and that would advance the needs identified by the people of FATA.

### Admiring a living national politician

As shown above, although the Political Parties Act has not been extended to FATA, the people of FATA support the extension of the act and the political parties have established their local, FATA Agency chapters with a low profile. In order to gauge the interest and awareness of the people in the political life of Pakistan, the 2010 survey attempted to identify the politician most admired by the respondents.

The most dramatic finding was that the majority (54%) either did not know of a national politician or declared 'None.' As shown in the table 2, this finding holds for the last three years which began with the 2008 elections. Clearly there is a great deal of work to be done to draw the people of FATA into the political process and, conversely, draw the political leaders to FATA.

It is not that there aren't known politicians, for example, Imran Khan, the former cricketer and Chairman of Tehrek e Insaaf party (TI) is admired by 13.1% respondents and that makes him the most popular of the politicians. The actual President and the co-chair of Pakistan People's Party, Asif Ali Zardari, received 4.4%. Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, chief of his own faction of Pakistan Muslim League, was named by 3.9% of the respondents, but, clearly, the majority of the people polled were not impressed by them.

Looking at the past two surveys of 2008 and 2009, we see a dramatic change in the respondents' perception about these

Table 2. Admiring a living national politician

Responses	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Imran Khan	4.1	12.9	13.1
Asif Ali Zardari	9.9	8.4	4.4
Nawaz Sharif	10.3	14.9	3.9
Fazal ur Rehman	1.6	3.1	3.1
Qazi Hussain Ahmad	1.8	2.9	2.6
Yousaf Raza Gillani	1.2	1.3	2.1
Asfandiyar Wali Khan	4.9	1.6	1.4
Bashir Ahmad Bilour		0.2	1.3
Mian Iftikhar Hussain Shah			1.2
Parviz Musharaf	1.1	1.6	1.2
Hameed ullah Jan		0.2	0.9
Altaf Hussain		0.1	0.8
Akram Khan Durani			0.7
Faisal Karim Kundi			0.6
Sheikh Rashid			0.6
Shahbaz Sharif			0.5
Kashmala Tariq			0.5
Amin Faheem		0.2	0.3
Chudhry Nisar Ali			0.3
Mahmood Khan Achakzai		0.4	0.3
Mufti Muhammad Ijaz			0.3
Syed Munawar Hassan			0.3
Afrasyab Khattak			0.3
Farooq Lughari			0.3
Fehmeeda Mirza			0.3
Other (Specify)	8.6	1.2	5.0
None	42.3	38.8	43.8
Don't know	14.4	12.3	10.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

main politicians. Mian Nawaz Sharif remained the most admired politician in 2008 and 2009 surveys, with support from 10.3% and 14.9% of the respondents, respectively. However, admiration for him dropped to just 3.9% by 2010. There are

allegations coming in the media that Nawaz Sharif is playing the role of friendly opposition therefore, people counted on him to oppose the government's decisions that the people don't consider in their interest. Similarly, the support for President Asif Ali Zardari has gone down from 9.9% in 2008 to 8.4% and then to just 4.4% in 2010. The decline in admiration is obvious because the government, under Asif Ali Zardari, could not yet address the issues of inflation, energy, security and foreign policy, etc.

Interestingly, Imran Khan, Chairman TI, seems to be more admired by the respondents gradually with every passing year. Being out of the parliament, Imran Khan still is able raise his voice on several national and international issues. Admiration of respondents for Imran Khan gradually increased from 4.1% in 2008 to 12.9% in 2009 and, in 2010, he became most admired politician for 13.1% of the respondents.

Respondents' admiration for Asfandyar Wali Khan, head of Awami National Party, who leads the coalition government in KP, has dramatically declined. He was the second admired politician in 2008 survey but his statistics dropped down to just 1.6% in 2009 and then 1.4% in 2010.


On the other hand, the religious leadership is gaining popularity gradually but with a slow pace. Fazal ur Rehman who received just 1.6% respondent's support in 2008 survey has gradually gone up to 3.1% in 2009 and then remained with the same support in 2010. Similarly, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, former Amir of Jumaat e Islami (JI), received 1.8% votes of respondents, and then up to 2.9%, but then he dropped down a little to 2.6% in 2010. It is doubtful that there are significant statistical differences from year to year for this sample methodology.

As pointed out initially, those who believed 'none' of the listed politicians are worth admiration or voted 'Do not know' represent the majority year after year. This suggests that the majority does not like any of Pakistani politicians and shows that the local tribal people have little trust in the polity of Pakistan. Of course, these statistics also show that the political parties need to reach out to the people of FATA and show that their needs are relevant to the national debate.

### Participation in the decision making process

In spite the fact that the people of FATA have been excluded from the decision making process throughout the history of

Fig 5. Participation in the decision making process



Pakistan, the local people still express a desire to be involved in different democratic decision making processes. Since 2008 the survey focused on the perception of the respondents of various political and developmental decision-making processes. The results are shown in the figure 5 of responses to the question. 'What would you be willing to participate in?'

Because there is a great need for development based on participation, one third (32.8%) of the people feel that they should be involved in the development process by the government as well as the civil society sector. Why this was the only category of response to jump up dramatically in 2010 at the expense of other types of participation, remains to be seen. Since before 2008 there has been constant talk and events stressing participatory development, but even the participation in the 'citizen forums to discuss their local issues' declined. Perhaps the people have become tired of discussion and express the desire for the action of development.

### Conclusion

The survey data shows the extent of the desire for change from the long established Administrative model (Executive non-representative) and the regulatory system (FCR) to another system more in keeping, but not yet defined, with the governance enjoyed by other Pakistanis. The lack of definition, as well as the lack of knowledge of the political actors, indicates that well defined options must be derived and presented to the people so that they can move from being an 'Administered people' to a people who make their own decisions and chose their representatives.

The next section explores the opinion of the respondents with regard to the administrative institutions, specifically, the FATA Secretariat, its functionaries and the FATA Development Authority.





# CHAPTER 3

ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND  
DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

# CHAPTER - 3

## ASSESSMENT OF GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES

### Introduction

The chapter 1 described the carry over of the structure and style of administration from the Colonial era to the Constitutional era. This chapter focuses on the governance or administrative system of FATA just as the previous chapter 2 focused on the judicial system and FCR.

### The FATA Secretariat and Development Authority

The FATA Secretariat (FS) and the FATA Development Authority (FDA) are two different government entities engaged in development programmes in the region. The FS was established in 2002, first under the Planning and Development Department of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government, and then, in 2006, an independent Secretariat was established. The FS has administrative authority for health, education, security and the general well-being of the people.

The FDA was established as a specialised development organisation in 2006 through a Presidential Ordinance. The goal was to promote a more innovative, fast moving and participatory approach to replace the conventional straight jacket development system that they perceived the Secretariat to be.<sup>32</sup> The goals of the FATA Development Authority, as enshrined in its Statutory Regulations, are to plan and execute sustainable development projects in minerals, industries, skills development, small dams, township development and tourism. The aim was to harness the abundant human resources, exploit and add value to equally abundant natural resources of the area so as to create more economic and employment opportunities in FATA.<sup>33</sup> However, as will be shown from the survey data, not many people in FATA are aware of the existence of either organisation or the work that they do in FATA.

Both agencies, in very few years, have had to overcome the perceptions formed during the last sixty years of neglect by successive governments in Pakistan in addition to the legacy of the Colonial period. Both eras left FATA one of the most under-developed areas of Pakistan. However, the unique insurgency in FATA after 9/11 and the expulsion of the Taliban from the governance of Afghanistan has compelled the government of Pakistan to attempt dramatic and massive development schemes in the region.


For the 2003-04 fiscal year the government, through the FATA Secretariat, had allocated Rs. 3256 million to the development sector in FATA. That effort was more than doubled in the 2008-09 budget when it was increased to Rs. 8662 million, an annual increase of 266%. For the fiscal year 2010-11 the budget has gone up to Rs. 15 billion, almost double the previous year's budget.

The international community, especially the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, United Nations and the World Bank, have shown their interest investing in FATA development and some of them followed-up humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps by initiating development projects in FATA. However, the question of the capacity to implement such mega projects remains unanswered.

Unfortunately, accompanying the increase in development funding is the potential for corruption and diversion of state and donor resources by government agents and *Maliks*. The survey results presented below show the standing of these two administrative structures in the opinion of the people.

### Performance of FATA Secretariat (FS)

As described above, the FATA Secretariat was established in 2002 to provide the people of FATA with health and education




services. The results of the 2010 survey summarize the people's assessment of the performance of the FS. See accompanying figure 6.

The most dramatic finding is that a third (34.4%) of the respondents could not appraise the performance of the FS. One must ask, why hasn't the FS, with its resources and direct links to local, traditional leadership, become well known among the citizens? The interpretation of 'fair' is difficult to interpret, but one has to assume that it does not connote appreciation. We can conclude that 21.6% (3.1% plus 19.5%) approve and 22.2% (14.6% plus 7.6%) do not approve, but the 34.4% who do not know should be of concern.

What is clear is that there is a need for the FS to reach out to and respond to the people of FATA. It is probable that both the style of management could be improved by more wide spread use of participatory planning, implementation and monitoring of development efforts, and the structure (appointed personnel and privileged local elites) need to be reformed.

## Performance of FATA Development Authority (FDA)

As shown in the figure 7, the responses for FDA are not so different from the FS. Again, approximately a third of the respondents (35.8%) were not able to assess the performance. The conclusions are the same as for the FS: more contact and response to the people's needs are needed. It could be that the same structure of management isolates the knowledge of what the FS or FDA really do.



## Closest interaction with leadership

In all three years the survey offered a multiple-choice question to measure the level of interaction of the respondents with different leadership figures in FATA. As shown in the table 3<sup>34</sup> below, two important trends evolved: 1) A decline in regular contact with the Political Agent, and 2) A decline in contact with the *Mullahs*. The first finding is probably the result of the opinion on the effectiveness and presence of the FATA Secretariat as described above. The second finding reflects the decline in the prestige of the local religious leaders who

Table 3. Closest interaction in FATA

Responses	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Political Agent	28.3	15.2	13.5
Military	4.0	1.3	4.8
Frontier Corps	3.5	1.6	4.6
MNAs		8.6	0.6
Teachers		19.1	17.4
Doctors		5.7	4.1
Senators		1.5	0.1
Tribal elders			14.7
Mullahs	35.2	37.2	10.9
NGOs	6.3	4.0	1.6
Government officials		3.1	3.0
None	9.4	22.4	14.5
Others (specify)	4.4	4.1	3.0
Don't know	5.9		7.4

previously were important locally for advice and guidance. Events in FATA have influenced the thinking of the local

population significantly and 'Mullah' is seen to be someone who did not openly criticise terrorist attacks of TTP and Al Qaeda. The 2010 survey results may indicate a widening gulf between the local masses and 'Mullah' community.

We note, however, that 'tribal elders' did not figure in the past, but now they do. Teachers command respect in most studies and here a respectable number of community members consult with them at 19.1% to 17.4%.


The decline in NGOs mentioned probably reflects the withdrawal of NGOs as the security situation deteriorated.

### Most trusted in institution/leader in FATA

The multi-year surveys measured the level of trust of the respondents through a single choice rather than multiple response form used in the previous question. The data in the figure 8 below confirm the information obtained in the previous question.

In the case of the FATA Secretariat (Political Agent), the trust was low to begin with in 2008 and it declined further. The decline in contact noted above with the *Mullahs* is even more substantial.

Fig 8. Most trusted in institution/leader in FATA





## Understanding FATA 2010

The people expressed increased trust in both the Military and the Frontier Corps. Polls show an increased trust in tribal elders. Disturbingly, the level of distrust ('none' or 'don't know') remains between 14% and 20%. This is not healthy for societal solidarity. This level of distrust is manifest in other indicators throughout the survey as will be pointed out. A segment of the society this large can support insurgency and extremism by simply not supporting the leadership and the institutions of state.

### Conclusion

This chapter brings to close the examination of the opinion of the people with regard to the administrative system of FATA. It also shows, from various perspectives, the overall displeasure of the people of FATA with the main systems under the constitution for governance that we have seen throughout the surveys. Although some of the trends in who is trusted are encouraging, the dispersion of trust among so many authority figures shows a lack of trust in governance as institutionalized. The increasing trust in military leaders will be explored in a later chapter.



# CHAPTER 4

SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE AND  
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN FATA

# CHAPTER - 4

## SOCIO-ECONOMIC LIFE AND DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN FATA

### Introduction

The previous chapter closed with the opinion of the people toward the administrative system that has been charged with providing for the well-being of the people. In this chapter the economic, health, education and physical infrastructure will be described. Then the survey data on these needs, willingness to stay or migrate and areas of attraction for work in Pakistan will be presented.

Rough topography, limited arable land, arid areas, poor education and health facilities and scant public infrastructure define a mammoth gap between the people of FATA and the rest of Pakistan as summarized with the following statistics: 1) 60% of the population lives below the national poverty line,<sup>34</sup> 2) Per capita income is 50% of the national per capita income and 3) per capita development expenditure is approximately 33% of the national average.<sup>35</sup>

### Agriculture

According to the 1998 Census, the majority of the largely rural population in FATA depends heavily on forestry, livestock and subsistence crops (maize, wheat, rice and vegetables) and some orchard crops. Less than 10% of the land is arable; an exacerbating factor is that out of approximately 450,792 arable hectares only 184,825 hectares are under irrigation (1998 Census Report). The most common sources of irrigation are the canals, tube wells, wells, rivers, streams and lift irrigation schemes; the proper marketing of farm produce is limited by the lack of roads and cold storage.

### Underemployment

Because the natural resources have not been properly exploited, and because the agricultural land is small compared

with the population, the majority of the population depends on other, non agricultural activities for survival such as: transport, arms manufacturing and trade, drug trafficking, cross border trade (or the so called smuggling), shop keeping, etc. Employment opportunities are so limited that entire families depend mostly on a single person's income.<sup>36</sup> In the case of extended families living in compounds more than one generation may have these types of income. The absence of employment opportunities results in many youth becoming involved in non-productive activities leading to crimes and domestic violence.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, as will be shown in the section on security, the people of FATA believe that unemployment is a source of people involved in extremism.

Private employment is scarce and government or public service employment opportunities are limited. The lack of employment opportunities compels many young adults to migrate to other cities of Pakistan, or abroad, in search of work. People in some of the areas relatively close to major towns and cities outside of FATA commute daily at great expense and time. As described earlier, FATA is the rural part of the *Pakhtun* cities. The ever expanding urban areas slowly have included parts of the Agencies and are now called 'Settled areas.'

### Infrastructure

According to the Pakistan Census Report of 1998, the communication inventory of FATA consisted of **2499.70** km of 'High Type' or improved roads; **1927.60** km is of 'Low Type' or farm to market roads; 6 telegraph offices and 46 telephone exchanges in all of FATA.

### Education

According to the FATA Census Report 1998, there are 2567 primary schools, 278 middle schools, 201 high schools and 9

colleges (inter and degree). The nine colleges are for males only. These infrastructural limitations result in low rates of educational achievement and literacy: overall 17.42% of the population is literate, but among females the rate is less than 3%. The differential between males and females is explored in detail using the survey statistics.

### Health services

The health sector includes 41 hospitals; 190 dispensaries, 5 Rural Health Clinics (RHC) 6 T.B Clinics; 16 MCH centres; 167 Basic Health Units (BHU); 5 Leprosy Centres and 3 Sub Health Centres. Private doctors also practice in the area and provide additional medical facilities. In the absence of road communication people resort to traditional treatments or are at the mercy of quacks.<sup>38</sup>

### Gender issues

In the education section it was pointed out that women have not been included in the effort for literacy. The gap between the opportunities for women and men in FATA is as great as the development gap between FATA and the rest of Pakistan, but, from a policy perspective, the gap is exacerbated by the internal, FATA culture.

The internal culture is that of traditional *Pakhtun* and Muslim beliefs where the male is dominant. Women are generally restricted to their homes and agricultural work in the fields except when guided by family males. Not only is the women the unfortunate member of the conservative *Pakhtun* society who is not given her due status under the *Pakhtun* code of honour, but her limited education and skill development deprives her children and family of well being such as health, education and improved family business management.

Women in FATA are vulnerable to economic, social and psychological poverty. Economic poverty is due to a lack of assets and the low educational endowment of human capital. Because the woman in FATA is kept under-educated or uneducated, she is economically dependent on the male

members of the family. She cannot make key decisions for her life; she cannot use her right to vote during general elections; she has no say in the family matters; she is never asked her choice for marriage; in some areas of FATA, she is sold to her husband in the name of *Walwar*; to resolve conflicts her hand is given in marriage to the victim's son or brother or relative in the name of '*Swara*'; and women are killed in the name of honour. On the other hand, women are utilized in the field; to fetch water and fire wood from distant places; she takes care of her children and cooks and cleans for the family.

Having briefly described the socio-economic context, we will turn to the opinion of the people of FATA to describe their assessment of the services. The chapter will close with the reasons for preferring to live in FATA and then, given the hypothetical chance to live outside of FATA, we explore where they would go to live and work.

### Most important services needed in FATA

This question elicited a mixture, from security and justice to health and educational services that are needed. In general the interest of the people of FATA is a secure environment with health and educational services. The survey results from 2008, 2009 and 2010 as shown in the table 4:

'Education' and 'health' have been consistently identified as the basis for resolving many problems faced with the people of FATA. Year after year these services are at the top of the list of needs on a par with or above justice, security and dealing with terrorism.

In 2009 'security' and 'tackling terrorism' peaked as top priorities and then dropped. There were military operations underway in various parts of FATA and Swat simultaneously. In addition, that was the year when Talibanisation or militancy was spilling over from South and North Waziristan Agencies to other tribal Agencies/FRs influencing the respondents' opinion.



Table 4. Most important services needed in FATA

Responses	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Security	37.0	62.9	51.7
Justice	73.3	46.3	46.5
Policing	0.0	11.0	3.8
Education/schools	64.6	52.1	56.0
Health services/hospitals	52.1	42.5	50.7
Water and sanitation	42.4	33.2	19.4
Roads	35.5	32.2	12.4
Tackling terrorism	48.0	53.6	26.9
Food supply	28.0	32.8	8.7
Electricity supply	48.9	56.2	21.0
Political education of the masses			4.0
Good governance			9.4
Don't know			1.0
Other (specify)	3.0	0.3	0.4

Note: The question allowed multiple choice, the percents are of the % of respondents and not % of responses.

## Essential services for children

The 2010 survey delved into what essential services the people of FATA want for their children. The question was asked separately for male and female children. The responses reveal a great deal of the often discussed issues of gender. That is, differences in what mothers and fathers wish for their children and hence their differential support for policies such as education and work opportunities.

The table 5 compares male and female children by what their mothers and fathers considered to be the most important essential service for their child.

Table 5. Essential services for children (male, female)

Desired essential service	Wanted for male children		Wanted for female children	
	Gender of respondents		Gender of respondents	
Responses	Male	Female	Male	Female
More education	61.6	50.4	18.7	25.4
More security	6.8	6.3	16.5	16.0
Employment opportunities	26.4	35.2	2.1	3.3
Marriage	1.2	1.8	13.6	18.0
Religious education	3.7	5.4	23.8	17.7
Pardah (veil)	n/a	n/a	24.4	17.9
Other (specify)	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Don't know	0.2	0.9	0.7	1.7
Total (Percent)	100	100	100	100

The tables require reflection, but they show major differences between what is expected of males and females in the culture. The information also shows the differences in aspiration between mothers and fathers. For example, both mothers and fathers put more emphasis on education for boys (61.6% and 50.4%) than for girls (18.7% and 25.4%). However, it is notable that mothers (25.4%) put more emphasis on girls' education than fathers do (18.7%).

When one looks over the comparison line by line one sees that marriage and religion (*Pardah* included) are much more desired for girls than for boys by both mothers and fathers. This is in keeping with the protective nature of the *Pakhtun* (and most cultures) toward the women as keepers of virtue and faith.


Employment opportunities are the second most important desire for boys by both mothers and fathers, but mothers (35.2%) more so than fathers (26.4%). The role of girls in the work place is seen to be very low by both fathers (2.1%) and mothers (3.3%) as priorities.

In summary, there is definitely a difference between the male and female desire for their daughters and sons. The mothers wish for more education and employment opportunities, plus marriage, than the fathers. The fathers seem to opt for the conservative religious and cultural traditions for their daughters than the mothers. These are significant differences that have implications for education in the community and for the opportunities offered to and expected by future generations.

### Opportunities over time

**Males:** Analysing the last three years survey data (shown in the figure 9), 'more education' remained the top priority of the respondents for their male children, but the decline is of concern. It appears that a more urgent need at this time has moved toward 'employment opportunities.' That wish moved from approximately 20% to 30.7% making it the 2<sup>nd</sup> highest priority for the respondents.


Fig 9. Opportunities over time-males



In Pakistan it is believed, generally, that there is an early marriage trend in conservative tribal society, discouraging education. However, the last three years' surveys show no such trend, with just a small percentage of people indicating that they want their male children to get married. A plurality in all three years surveys identified 'more education', which is quite encouraging and eye opening evidence for the rest of Pakistan.

**Females:** Following the presentation above, using the results of the last three survey's, we again, find that the priority of 'more education' declined from 2008 to 2010 (36.9% to 22.1%) for female children. This is quite discouraging, not only because the rate is 1/3 the rate for male children, but also because, as opposed to males, there is not a corresponding increase in support for more employment opportunities or other opportunities.

Fig 10. Opportunities over time-females



The rumoured trend toward earlier marriage is not seen in the data on girls. Although about 13% of the respondents favoured marriage over education for female children, this has not increased or declined. These figures show the difference in cultural expectations between males and females.

Interestingly, there has been a systematic and dramatic drop in the percent of the parents who felt that more security was needed (from 53.0% to 16.3%). Why this drop? It is hard to explain why this level became on a par with what was wanted for male children. That being said, religious education and *pardah* (separation of genders) increased from insignificant to one-fifth of the respondents. Why *pardah*, one of the important *Pakhtun* cultural traditions became the third most important desire is not clear. It could be that the latest events in FATA and the Taliban militancy have influenced the mind-set of the local people, but, at the same time, as will be explained in the chapter on security, the people indicated a feeling of greater security.

## Development priorities in FATA through international assistance

Various foreign countries, including the US and the UK, have expressed their interest in providing development assistance for FATA. The 2010 survey asked the respondents to identify areas for developing FATA through international assistance or whether any international assistance is needed. Keeping in mind that the current humanitarian crisis<sup>39</sup> in FATA arises out of military operations, it is not surprising that 15.0% respondents identified 'humanitarian assistance' as the main need in FATA. If considered as one and the same, then the combination of 'Livelihoods' and 'Supporting Employment' total 22.2%. Infrastructure ('Roads' and 'Electricity') is, again, with 17.6%, a key area of need. Health and Education, the key FS responsibilities, total 15.3%. Looking at the development situation in FATA, the respondents have rightly identified the above-mentioned services needed for the people of FATA.

However, 8.3% respondents believe that no assistance is needed from US and UK and 3.5% believe that no international assistance is needed for developing FATA.

## Human Rights issues in FATA

One of the governance themes can be in the area of human rights. Recall that because of the structure of governance the protection of human rights is a responsibility of the FATA Secretariat and the FCR. The situation of violence today is so grave and due to outside influences that the Central Government has both the authority and the responsibility for safeguarding the people.

Throughout all of the 'Understanding FATA' surveys the issue of human rights has been a constant area of inquiry. The figure 12 shows the evolution of this subject over the last three years.

In the 2010 survey the main (38.4%) human rights issue was 'The State's inability to provide the basic amenities of life.' Why

Fig 11. Development priorities in FATA through international assistance





Fig 12. Human Rights issues in FATA



or how this response evolved, and why it was not mentioned in previous surveys, is difficult to explain, but its appearance may be due to a major policy or program that used that term. Its meaning is not clear, but it sounds like basic services for living. If that is correct, then it would fall under the FS's responsibility for development in general.

The theme of the Independence of the judiciary can be seen in two contexts: 1) the situation in FATA where the Political Agents also have the authority to judge crimes as per the FCR, and 2) the struggle of the Supreme Court to be independent of Executive Branch of the government of Pakistan. In either case, between 23.6% and 18.6% of the respondents considered the 'Independence of the Judiciary' to be a major human rights

issue. In the first context (FATA) the desire for restructuring has been amply noted elsewhere. In the second context (national), the issue is being worked through the new government for reincorporating the judges who had been excluded from the Supreme Court. It is a national issue and not a FATA specific problem.

Freedom of Expression and Democracy were noted, in total, by a third of the respondents. These are, again, grievances about the system of governance of FATA and expression of the desire for more participation in decision making. It is important to point out that the press does not have free access to FATA. Their movements are controlled by the PAs and also the military.

'Freedom of Movement' appeared as a concern this year and is

probably a reflection of the complaint of 2009 'Violence by the Military.' These two complaints may be limited to very specific areas of FATA.

More specific concerns are seen when approximately a quarter of the respondents believe that Pakistani is faced with 'women's, or children's or minority rights' issues. As we saw in the section on the desires that parents have for their children, there is a distinct gender rights issue and some of the desires could be seen by some as limiting the rights of the children. The minority rights issue may be specific to Kurram and Orakzai Agencies where there has been internal strife between *Sunnis* and *Shia*, but that remains to be analyzed.

Some of these main human rights issues are linked to culture (as was described in the different desires of the parents) and the perception of some of the respondents that the way of life needs to change. Development and changes by the central government or the FS could provide the opportunity for these changes. Forcing changes by law would be antagonistic and be seen as outside imposition. Moreover, changing laws would be meaningless if the opportunity were not provided. For example, the desire for more education for boys and girls is considered a basic human right. A law could be passed requiring all youth to study up to a given grade, but if those schools and teachers are not provided, then the opportunity to change would be hollow.


### Preference for living in FATA

The 58.1% of the respondents who responded that they wanted to remain in FATA were asked a follow-on question as to why they prefer to live in FATA.

55.1% believe that 'they like to live within their own village and community' while 41.5% thought that 'they like the way they live in their tribal culture and tradition'. 11.5% 'felt more secure living in FATA' however, 1.1% did not know the answer.

The results of 2009 survey show identical trends but the frequency was low. The majority (26.3%) of the respondents 'like to live within their own village and community' while 2.6%

Fig 13. Preference for living in FATA



think that 'they have been living in FATA for a long time' and 22.3% 'like to live the way they live in their tribal culture and tradition'. Only 7.0% 'feel more secure in FATA' however the 2010 results show that more people (11.5%) felt more secure in FATA. In 2009 more people were undecided and did not know the answer (7.7%).


Trends of the respondents' behaviour for both years show conventional reasons preferring to live in FATA. Respondents feel more at ease in their villages and communities with their several centuries old culture and the way life in FATA that is quite acceptable to them.

### Living outside FATA, if given a chance

The lack of economic incentives also forced a major portion of the FATA population to migrate to other cities in Pakistan and to foreign countries, especially Middle East. The migration has contributed significantly to the local economy and prosperity from the remittances sent from abroad. This brings us to the subject of living outside of FATA.

As pointed out above, despite the needs expressed 58.1% of the respondents still want to continue living in FATA, but 38.0% of the respondents would leave if given the opportunity.

If we analyse the trend from 2009 to 2010 shown in the figure 14, the people seem to be more decisive (less do not know compared with the previous year), but that undecided group from the previous year seemed to split evenly between staying and leaving. FATA, however, should not be assumed to be a homogeneous area of opinion. The table 6, by Agency, shows the great variation around the average of 38% willing to leave should the opportunity present itself. In the Agencies where more than half of the people would leave they are the poorest and also areas of conflict, but, then again, S. Waziristan would fit the description of poor and conflict, but only 35% of the people would leave. In the case of Kurram with its internal sectarian strife, the second lowest percent (28.8%) of all is found. The conclusion is that FATA is an area of many people willing to leave when the opportunity presents itself. This is a characteristic of rural areas in developing societies and is part of the rural to urban migration to be expected because of the factors that have been identified in this survey. The conflicts only exacerbate the situation.



### Living outside of FATA by age group

The responses to the question of living outside of FATA were examined by age group. The flight of youth versus established, middle aged people is clear. What is unusual is to see the older

Table 6. Living outside of FATA by age group

Age of respondent	Live outside the FATA?			Total
	Yes	No	Don't know	
18 – 29 years	45.7	50.7	3.7	100
30 – 49 years	25.8	69.1	5.1	100
50 – 65 years	36.3	60.0	3.7	100
65 + years	38.0	58.1	3.9	100

Table 7. Living outside of FATA (cross tabulation by Agency/FR)

Name of Agency/FR	Percent who would live outside of FATA		
	Age group of respondent		
	18 – 29 years	30 – 49 years	50 – 65+ years
Orakzai	50.5	25.5	34.1
Bajaur	58.1	45.1	47.9
FR Bannu	84.6	31.3	44.7
FR D.I. Khan	20.0	0.0	18.4
FR Kohat	41.5	36.8	44.1
FR Lakki Marwat	21.2	0.0	23.8
FR Peshawar	26.3	27.3	40.4
FR Tank	63.6	21.4	46.3
Khyber	46.9	19.4	33.3
Kurram	26.2	14.2	25.2
Mohmand	63.9	43.1	50.2
North Waziristan	39.1	12.5	11.9
South Waziristan	38.2	23.8	41.4



generation much more willing to leave than the middle generation. This anomaly may be explained by the sampling, that is, the middle age group was a smaller proportion than expected. It could be that they were the ones who had stayed behind. We did not have the data to test that hypothesis.

The livelihoods programs aimed at employment generation have identified a segment of the population with the greatest propensity to leave. Cross tabulation of propensity to leave by age and then by Agency helps to pin point which Agencies have the most probable youth-flight. As shown in the table above, some Agencies are places from which all generations would leave if the opportunity arose, e.g., Bajaur and Mohmand. One of the conflicted Agencies, Kurram, presents what seem to be positive opportunities in spite of the internal strife because all generations show a low percentage interested in leaving. Other, Frontier Regions show very positive opportunities. One


hypothesis is that those FRs are more urban than rural and, hence, offer opportunities. For example, commuting from FR Peshawar to the city of Peshawar is relatively easy, so remaining at a home residence may make living 'Outside' of FATA not necessary or convenient.

### Most preferred city/country to emigrate to if given a chance

Those who wanted to leave FATA were asked which city/country they would prefer to migrate. Trends from one year to the next are noted. First, as found throughout the survey, the undecided become decisive going from 13.6% undecided in 2009 to only 0.5% in 2010.

Approximately one third (29.3%) of the respondents replied that they would like to migrate to Peshawar, the provincial

Fig 15. Most preferred city/country to emigrate to if given a chance



## Understanding FATA 2010

capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Peshawar is a central commercial and cultural point for the FATA people; they frequently visit Peshawar for many reasons. Other cities of Pakistan were identified by nearly another third, (29.2%). (Note that more than one destination was permitted, but the percent shown is in reference to the number of respondents and not the number of responses thus they sum to more than 100%.

Favoured overseas destinations were Saudi Arabia (22.8%) and Dubai (22.7%). The remainder, as shown in the figure 15 were scattered around the Western World.

### Conclusion

Many internationally known development issues were reviewed in this chapter and although findings are not unique to Pakistan and FATA, the data is useful for signalling or flagging warnings and also for prioritizing development efforts. On the one hand the priorities for education services are clear. And the demand is high for security and human rights. On the other hand, the potential for migration from the rural to the urban areas signals that the urban areas adjacent to the FATA Agencies and Frontier Regions, should alert the nation to the theme of rural urban migration and just what level of impact that is having on urban areas. The indicated desire to work overseas may be a cheerful note to a government wanting and needing remittances from abroad, but then again, some of those destinations are the seat of religious fundamentalism that could change the political direction of Pakistan. Clearly, half of the people of FATA, as content as more than half of them are to live in their home culture, are a population restless for life and work elsewhere.

The next chapter of this research places FATA in the context of international conflict. One of the issues, security, noted in this chapter will be explored in greater depth. The context is as important as the historical chapter with which the book was begun.



# CHAPTER 5

FATA IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

# CHAPTER - 5

## FATA IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

### Introduction

The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), on the Durand Line in Pakistan, lies at the top of the global security agenda. Pakistan and the international community are actively debating policy options to deal with the FATA's development, governance and security issues. Poverty, difficult terrain, a contested system of administration, cross-border tribal and ethnic connections with Afghanistan, *Pakhtun* traditions, and the presence of *Jihadi* militants have all created a set of overlapping challenges for the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as for the US and the international community.

Indeed, the people of FATA, the *Pakhtun*, have been on global agendas involving the East and 'West since' the 'Silk Road' days. As shown in Map I, and amply described in the first chapter, the main trade routes, through Peshawar to Quetta and Kabul to Qandahar, plus the cross links between those main routes are the infrastructure reflecting the cultural ties between the rural and urban *Pakhtun* in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Because of those links and their unique global location, the people of FATA have been exposed to the cross currents of history from before the empire of Genghis Khan, through 'The Great Game' and, more recently, but not yet present, the cold war conflict between Russian and other western ideologies. Presently FATA is one of the refuges and a battlefield for the international *Jihadist* movement as well as the more locally focused Taliban. The cross currents have been cultural, commercial, ideological and religious. Another historical issue is the structure and style of governance between FATA and the government of Pakistan. This was inherited from the British Colonial era and then continued by post-independence Pakistan.

The global interest and awareness of the people of FATA is a

major subject in this volume, and as a first glimpse it is pointed out that in some FATA Agencies 20% of the families indicated that they have members living in countries outside of South Asia and most families have members living in the *Pakhtun* cities mentioned along the old silk road on the Pakistani side of the border. They are not an isolated people; they are, or have to be, interested in global affairs.

The present attention to the people of FATA is because of conflicts unleashed during the last thirty years. Those conflicts have yet to be resolved. Unfortunately for the people of FATA, the conflicts form the context of violence in which they live, work and govern their personal affairs. Other unresolved issues lending themselves to violence are internal conflicts at the community level as well as at the level of tribal leadership.

'Understanding FATA' is a challenge that CAMP and the BHC have taken up with the goal that all interested parties and stakeholders might comprehend the complexity of the situation from the perspective and considered opinion of the people of FATA. They are involved at both the local and international levels on a daily basis, and they have opinions that need to be understood so that the conflicts may be resolved peacefully.

### Qualitative and descriptive material

The following paragraphs come from qualitative sources. They provide specific examples of events framing the context where the surveys have been conducted, and, hence the context for the opinions and responses to the questions posed during the last three surveys.

In most parts of FATA, Pakistani civilian and armed forces are busy trying to force out Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters, foreign militants and Al Qaeda operatives. Although the ongoing politically-supported military offensive in FATA and adjacent

areas of Pakistan has achieved some targets, it has yet to achieve the level of success gained in the Swat valley. The offensive has, however, caused similar dislocations and IDPs from some of the Agencies.

Although there is a high level of anti-US feeling among the general public who generally oppose policies favouring the 'War on Terror,' the constant suicide attacks on innocent civilians, target killings of elders and *Maliks*, kidnapping for ransom, etc. have turned public opinion against extremist groups so that they directly or indirectly support the military option. In this same pro and con questioning of the US-Pakistan military relation is a recent development that has brought some credibility to the US-Pakistan relationship. Pakistani law enforcement agencies, with the help of CIA, arrested a senior Afghan Taliban leader, *Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar*, the Taliban's military chief and second in command.

During the election campaign of 2008, almost all major political parties in Pakistan expressed their concerns over the military option against the militant groups as well as Pakistan's role in the 'War on Terror'. However, after taking oath, the new government of Pakistan People's Party (PPP) understood the new dynamics and international commitment and finally had to continue its commitment for the 'War on Terror' by adopting it as 'Pakistan's war' and not the 'US war.' This 'debate' whether the context of violence is Pakistan's war or the war of the US over simplifies the issues at hand in FATA.

The military offensive against the TTP militants has forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to the adjacent districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) of Pakistan. Those offences have created one of the largest humanitarian crises in Pakistan's history.<sup>40</sup> In response to this humanitarian crisis, the government of Pakistan and international agencies have failed to provide comprehensive services for the well-being of these Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).<sup>41</sup>

Furthermore, the mass exodus of people from FATA also shows that they do not want TTP style of *Sharia* and, as the survey indicates, the people want the military to target these militants

to be rid of the threats.<sup>42</sup>

Initially, civil society in Pakistan and the major opposition political parties have not been supportive of the military operation against the *Jihadi* groups in Pakistan. However, the terrorist attacks against the civilian population have turned the tide against the militants. Media and other civil society organisations have started to believe that it's high time the military should deal with the militants. Importantly, as will be shown, there was a trust deficit on Pakistan army's ability to deal with this insurgency, but the successful Swat military operation served as an 'eye opener' which significantly changed the general public perception in favour of military. This change came about in spite of the human rights violations that have been reported where civilians have been caught in the cross-fire, the use of heavy artillery, the un-necessary use of gunship helicopters bombardments, as well as extra-judicial killings of alleged militants.

The shifting site of conflict from one Agency to another in FATA is part of the context of violence of the people. For example, after several humiliating defeats of Pakistani security agencies by the TTP in Waziristan Agencies, the recently launched military operation 'Rah e Rast' in South Waziristan Agency seems to have achieved some results in terms of capturing the area. When Baitullah Mehsud, Amir of TTP, was killed in a drone attack, most of the Taliban left South Waziristan Agency and took refuge in other tribal Agencies of FATA such as North Waziristan, Orakzai and Khyber.

When the Pakistan military operation was confined only to South Waziristan and against Hakimullah Mehsud, three other Taliban militant groups headed by Molvi Nazir, Gul Bahadar and Haqqani continued operations in other Agencies. These Taliban and *Jihadi* groups are operating from Pakistan and specific Agencies against the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Suicide bombing is one of the subjects of the survey. The TTP is generally credited with responsibility for these attacks, but, as will be shown, substantial segments of the people believe that western nations are the source. Recent operations in South



Waziristan and sporadic targeted operation in Orakzai, Bajaur, Khyber and Mohmand Agencies has, apparently, weakened the TTP. Fewer suicide attacks and bomb blasts have occurred during the last few months, compared with 2009 in Peshawar and elsewhere in Pakistan. With few exceptions these attacks have not been in the FATA, but they have been in the cities where the families of FATA have relatives and where they frequently travel for work and business. Hence the subject is of concern to the people as will be shown.

Unmanned American drone strikes in FATA areas bordering Afghanistan are a debated issue in Pakistan, but sometimes it is an effective tactic against Al Qaeda and local extremist militants. However, it has generally increased the hostility of the people of FATA as well as Pakistanis in general toward the US. During the focus group discussions with FATA youth, elders and women, it was revealed that the majority dislikes this tactic of US and its ally, Pakistan. We heard few voices supporting this among the youth from the North and South Waziristan Agencies.

Undoubtedly, drone strikes have been very successful in targeting some high profile Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban militants. Nevertheless, these strikes have also killed more civilians than militants, including women and children adding to the insecurity of the people. This subject is also explored in the quantitative section with important findings.

## Security apparatus of FATA

It is believed that the current security crisis, both of an international nature and also for local law and order issues in the FATA region, arises out of the century old Colonial system of 'Frontier Crimes Regulations' (FCR). That system recognized the tribal autonomy to form *Lakhhkars* to deal with local crime and also established the position of *Khasadar* who are local people paid by the central government to act as policemen. In addition, the FCR provided for the formation of a Frontier Corps consisting of local men forming the ranks to guard the borders under the direction of Pakistani Army officers who may or may not be of *Pakhtun* ethnicity.

These various security forces are a concern to the people of FATA because they are now supposed to provide security against international extremists as well as common criminals. The government encouraged raising *Lakhhkars*<sup>43</sup> against the militants, however, they were not very successful because of their lack of training and the duration of commitment. *Lakhhkars* are usually raised for a special purpose of a specific, temporary duration. Nevertheless, their formation and willingness to fight extremists removed the misperception that all the tribesmen are terrorists. They also show there is discontent among the people against the TTP, Al Qaeda, and other militant groups that aim to usurp leadership and to bring their own type of *Sharia* law. The formation of *Lakhhkars* helped raise the morale of the army.

In 2009, the government also announced arming the members of *Lakhhkars* with Chinese AK-47s. Such acts on the part of the government were criticised because the increased availability of arms would exacerbate the capacity for civil war. A *Khasadar* foot soldier is paid 3200 Pakistani Rupees (US \$ 40) per month, and he has to bring his own weapon and ammunition.

Because the *Lakhhkars* are not well organised, their lack of ability makes members, especially the leadership, are very vulnerable. There are many instances when several *Maliks*/elders or leaders of the *Lakhhkars* were kidnapped and beheaded or humiliated, making lessons of them for the rest of the population. When the TTP begins fighting against their tribesmen it can become a civil war. The concept of *Badal*/revenge will continue haunting the people for a generation to come because of the split in and among families and tribes. When local leadership is killed in this way, then the formation of *jirgas* as a traditional conflict resolution process becomes difficult because it requires ever higher cultural authority to convoke and lead a *jirga* when the conflict goes from individual and family level to tribal level and beyond.

The Frontier Corps (FC) has come from a long military tradition since the 1800s when the British formed 'scout' and 'rifle' units to both patrol the borders and help when local law and order issues arose. In the early 1900s the Frontier Corps was formally



named and consolidated from the previous, and many, militia, rifles, and scout units. Although the FC is led and trained by officers of the Pakistani Army, it is under the Ministry of the Interior. Both the British and the Government of Pakistan considered the FC troops to be ideal for the area because they are from the same tribal and linguistic groups and thus know the culture and the topography. These characteristics have also been judged by the US military mission to Pakistan to be ideal for fighting local and international extremists. Accordingly, after the Pakistani decision in 2007 to expand the FC from less than 80 thousand to about 100 thousand troops, the US committed more funding to support that effort which included a new centre for training the FC in counter insurgency tactics. From 2002 to 2007 US military assistance to Pakistan was also focused on the FC, but, as described below, reverses on the ground led to the new joint effort in 2007.

During the exercise of some military operations, the Pakistani security agencies have sustained substantial losses as well as embarrassments. For example, in the 2007 case about 250 soldiers, mostly FC, surrendered to the militants; they were released in exchange for 25 militants. On other occasions the FC has proven itself for poppy eradication, rounding up and driving out militants, and also civic activities such as building schools. Nevertheless, large losses have raised serious concerns over the Pakistani military and Frontier Corps's capacity, capability and will to conduct effective operations in FATA against larger and better prepared militant groups. This issue is explored in the survey and also reveals surprises.

At the same time, the Pakistani media and opposition parties view the claims of success in the FATA with scepticism. The claims of killing of hundreds of militants have faced criticism because independent media organizations have not been given permission to cover the military operations in FATA. This has created doubts about the success of the operations. Then too, there are rumours, believed by some political leaders, to the effect that the military has reached secret understandings with the militants and that this has caused the significant decrease in the terrorist attacks. Although there isn't evidence to support

these statements, they, nevertheless, are part of the context of the surveys dating from the years that Parvez Musharraf was President of Pakistan and Army Chief of Staff.

During Parvez Musharraf's period (October 1999-2008), several incongruous strategies were pursued. Sometimes they opted for military might and other times the sought negotiations to reach accords that would reduce the violence.

Furthermore, these accords and agreements with militants and local tribes were perceived by US and other Western countries as Pakistan's lack of capacity to tackle the ongoing insurgency in the FATA and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Concerns have been expressed over the lack of a coherent counter insurgency strategy on the part of Pakistan's military establishment, lack of a proper framework and a lack of coordination at provincial/federal/ international level vis-à-vis peace agreements.

### Traditions and code of honour in the absence of state security

In the context of this state of security the local communities are left with no option but to try to defend themselves with their own weapons and their code of honour.

The code of honour and in the absence of a security apparatus compels the *Pakhtun* to carry a gun to protect his honour and life. The possession of weapons has been a common cultural symbol of the people of FATA for centuries. This is the reason that it is said that a household stove may be allowed to go cold but the barrel of a gun is kept warm. A sophisticated weapon is also considered a status of symbol, and it conveys a message of power to the opponents. The absence of the judicial system, faulty administration, weak writ of government, proximity of the opened border and the Afghan conflict are factors that contribute to the proliferation of small arms in the region.

The proliferation of firearms gained momentum during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-89), when the *mujahideen* were generously supplied by the US and other weapons were captured from the Soviets. That conflict was followed by a long

and brutal civil war and then battles against the Taliban. The diverted weapons from all of these phases of strife were sold on the black market and ultimately found their way into the hands of civilians and militant groups. In general, these arms and the conflicts defined and contributed to creating the current deteriorating law and order situation in the region. The survey explores these issues extensively.

The manufacture of replica weapons in FATA is another contributing factor in fuelling and sustaining the extremists in FATA. There aren't reliable figures related to either illicit or legally held weapons in the country. However, rough estimates are in the multi-millions based on the two million licensed firearms recorded by the 1998 Census. It has been estimated that at least 18 million more are being held illegally.<sup>44</sup> FATA has its fair share of those millions.

This local production is a significant factor in the arming of tribal society. Because the Pakistan Arms Ordinance of 1965 does not extend to FATA, the production of arms is neither legal nor illegal. FATA is a 'Grey Market'. For example, Dara Adem Khel, the main town of Frontier Region Kohat with an estimated population of 100,000 souls, is an area with worldwide notoriety, producing every kind of weapon through reverse engineering. There are five major tribes<sup>45</sup> that inhabit the area and run the business. Over 90%<sup>46</sup> of the arms are conflict orientated, i.e., not manufactured for collectors or sports use. There are an estimated 2,657 arms-related shops,<sup>47</sup> 80% serve as small arms manufacturing units and 20% function as arms retailing shops. The most common firearms produced are the 0.44 bore rifle, the 0.30 bore pistol, the 0.12 bore rifle, the 0.222 bore rifle, the AK-47 assault rifle and the Mekarov pistol. During the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets the business of Dara Adam Khel flourished. Notably, the Dara bazaar once again appears to have been reinigorated by the current crises in FATA and the war in Afghanistan.

## The cost of conflict

*Jihadi* groups turned against the government of Pakistan in reaction to its involvement in the 'War on Terror' and its policy shift against the *Jihadi* organizations. *Jihadi* militants started attacking Pakistani security forces and government officials through various methods such as the use of victim or command detonated explosive devices (the use of IEDs and landmine, etc), attacks on Pakistani military convoys and check-posts, and kidnapping of security force personnel and government officials. They also attacked local leadership, *Maliks*, and targeted girls schools and state institutions. The militant groups have successfully used media propaganda for recruitment, established training camps for new recruits, developing international linkages for funding, and attacking the local culture by suicide attacks on *Jirgas*, funerals, and mosques. Such tactics were never used during in the entire history of the *Pakhtun*.

The terrorists have used suicide attacks as a useful tool against both law enforcement agencies as well as the civilian population. Such attacks by the militants aim to take hostage the entire society and to generate public pressure against military operations in the troubled tribal areas. At times, such attacks have been very useful in generating a discourse within the civil society, especially media, compelling the government to initiate talks with the militants.

During the years 2006-2009, there has been a significant, 48%, increase in casualties from terrorist attacks in Pakistan. A total of 3,816 terrorist attacks occurred during this period resulting in 12,632 deaths and 12,815 injured people, including Pakistan security forces, police, women and children.<sup>48</sup> Of them, 217 were inter-tribal clashes which attest to the way that violence is destroying the networks that are an important part of *Pakhtun* culture. A significant rise in suicide attacks has been seen during the last few years. A total of 87 incidents of suicide attacks were carried out across Pakistan during 2009 killing 1,299 people and wounding 3,633.<sup>49</sup> Notably, the majority (59 of 87) took place in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. The opinions of the people of FATA with regard to suicide and other terrorist attacks will be

described in the next section of this chapter.

Returning to the theme of internal FATA conflicts, they also have a cost to the stability of FATA. The situation in Kurram Agency is totally different from the rest of FATA. In Kurram there have been severe sectarian conflicts between Shiites and *Sunni* during the last two years. The Agency is 58% *Sunni* and 42% *Shia*. The majority of the Shiites lives in Upper Kurram, and the majority of the *Sunni* lives in Lower and Central Kurram. The *Turi*, *Bangash*, *Parachamkani*, *Massozai*, *Alisherzai*, *Zaimusht*, *Mangal*, *Kharotai*, *Ghalgi* and *Hazara* are the major tribes of the Agency. A sizable *Sikh* minority left the area due to the clashes between *Sunni* and Shiites. Kurram Agency is on one of the main cross links between the highways that go from Kabul to Qandahar and from Peshawar to Quetta. Accordingly, the Afghan conflict is also one of the main sources of trouble. According to media reports, during the first months of 2010 more than 1000 people were killed. Roads remained blocked since 16 November 2007, and this has created a humanitarian crisis in the Agency because the supply of food and medicines remained blocked. The route via Afghanistan, which is extremely expensive, hectic and dangerous, has been used for shipment of food and medicines. During the sectarian conflict, the health directorate of FATA would deliver 3000 kg medicine every week by helicopter, which cost them PKR 300,000 per trip. There are still IDPs from this conflict and also from the more recent movement of people and militants from North Waziristan into Kurram.

In summary, the qualitative analysis presented above demonstrates that the people of FATA have been in the cross currents of a violent international and local history for many generations. In the next section of this chapter, based on the representative quantitative surveys done from 2008 to 2010, we will be reporting and commenting on the people's impressions, reflections, opinions, hopes and exasperations with regard to all of the themes mentioned in this context. Usually, when in these desperate straits, people aspire to survive with their families, communities, tribes and culture intact. We plan to present the facts as expressed by the people of FATA so that they may be

understood and the process of conflict resolution may begin.

### Survey findings


This section of the chapter is organized into five themes: 1) the overall direction of the country and FATA specific issues; 2) Security in general; 3) Perceived major threats to individuals; 4) Opinion about the security apparatus; and 5) Support for the military and the tactics employed. The statistical findings are based on random, stratified samples taken in the FATA Agencies using the methodology described in the Methodology Appendix. Where comparable data from 2008, 2009 and 2010 are available, it is used to show changes in opinion. Otherwise single year data is used and described.

### The overall direction of the country and FATA specific issues

#### Direction of the country - optimism and pessimism

During both the 2009 and 2010 surveys we sought to determine how the People of FATA assess the country's overall situation. The question was, 'Do you believe that the country is going in the right or wrong direction?'

The first impression is the substantial reduction in the proportion of the people who do not respond or did not have an opinion. In 2010 the people seem more engaged, and in that shift we note that the proportion indicating that the country is going in the wrong direction has decreased and the proportion saying that the country is going in the 'right' direction has increased. Although the statistics are showing some optimism they are still worrisome because almost half of the people still feel that the country is going in the wrong direction. The results show a mixed impact by the events of the past year.



### Pakistan's and FATA's biggest problem

The survey attempted to record the people's opinion regarding the biggest problems facing Pakistan as well as their opinion regarding the problems facing the people in FATA itself. We have combined the results of the two questions from 2009 and 2010 in the table 8. Logically, some of the problems identified are FATA specific, but some are FATA and Pakistan-wide.

First we note that in 2009, 45% of the respondents offered a diversity of unclassifiable problems at the national level. In one year we find it hard to believe how focused the respondents became.

The main finding, the problem of 'law and order,' is what one would expect given the context. The local people are now becoming more aware of their issues because the world is focused on FATA and involved in their development and conflict. The outside debate and involvement does not escape them, and it is helping them to form their opinions and also to speak out. With every passing year there are dramatic things, positively and negatively.

In the 2009 survey, only 2.6% of the respondents chose 'law and order' as the biggest problem facing Pakistan. However, this has

Table 8. Pakistan's and FATA's biggest problem

Responses	PAKISTAN		FATA	
	Percent 2009	Percent 2010	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Law and order	2.6	39.2	1.6	32.2
Bad governance	6.1	12	1.2	4.5
Social justice				3.1
Human rights violation		2.5		2.9
Corruption	2.5	2.4	0.2	0.9
Political instability	1.4	2.7		
Talibanisation			14.1	15.8
Extremism			0.5	1.3
Presence of foreigners				2.3
Lack of development				3.9
Lack of education and health services			21.6	2.5
Unemployment			27.6	6.6
Bad economy	5.6	3.2		
Poverty	7.2	5.5	8	6.6
Inflation	16.7	10.3		
Energy crisis	8.7	1.2		
American influence	0.3	4.7		
Bomb blasts	2.1	14.6	1.5	5
Drone attacks			6.2	6
Military operation			7.4	3
Frontier Crimes Regulation				0.7
Other (specify)	45.1	0.1		0.4
Don't know	1.7	1.7	0.5	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

increased dramatically to 32.2% in the 2010 survey. This is quite understandable, as law and order has been deteriorating with

every passing day and people's concerns for this problem are valid. Related are the responses about 'bomb blasts', they have risen from 2009 to 2010. In the 2009 survey only 2.1% of the respondents view that 'bomb blasts' are the biggest problem in Pakistan. However, due to rapid increase in the bomb blasts from 2009 to 2010, more people (14.6%) are considering 'bomb blasts' as the biggest problem Pakistan is faced with. Although it did not appear to be a serious concern the previous year (2.1%), it is now a main concern (14.6%). It is indicative of the intensification and the spread of conflict in FATA. Nevertheless, given the years of violence and the intensification in FATA, it is surprising that it is perceived as a greater problem outside of FATA.

The pattern of response to 'Bad Governance' is quite interesting because in spite of all of the tradition and complaint about unjust government and the Frontier Crimes Regulations described in the first half of this report, it is perceived more as a Pakistan national problem than a FATA problem and of small consequence. The issue of Corruption follows a similar pattern.


For the people of FATA Educational and Health services, plus

employment were clearly the top issues in 2009, but there was a radical shift to concern about law and order between 2009 and 2010. Clearly the health, education and employment opportunities did not change so much as did the climate of insecurity. The issue of unemployment and the lack of education will come up again in the section on suicide bombing.

In order to focus more on the specific needs of the people of FATA the following question was asked, 'What are the most important services that the GoP should provide to your district?' (Multiple responses were allowed so the percent response is in reference to the number of interviewees and not to the total number of responses.) The results are shown in the figure 17.

Once again, similar issues are identified, but notice that Education tops the list at 56.0% and that need is followed by Security (51.7%), Health (50.7%) and Justice (46.5%) as desired services. Again, governance is low (9.4%) on the list of concerns. Perhaps all of the effort and concern about governing structures is mis-weighted and that resources and effort into development, as well as the reduction of violence, would bring about the integration of the people of FATA with support and

Fig 17. What are the most important services that the GoP should provide to your district?





respect for the government as well as lay the grounds for future opportunities. Tackling Terrorism at 26.9% is unexpectedly low, and, as will be analyzed in the next section, the perception of threat and danger to the people of FATA terrorism is not as great as outsiders might expect.

### Feelings of security

As noted above, 'law and order' is the major concern along with development services. The development issues will be reviewed in another chapter, but, for the time being we will delve into further into the security concern.

### Security in general

FATA is known as a 'no go area' for non-FATA residents. Nevertheless 4 million people call FATA communities their home. The brutalities of TTP and other militant groups against the local tribes and number of military operations in FATA have driven an important proportion of the local population out of FATA making it appear to be an insecure area. However, as shown in the figure 18, the survey results for 2010 show that the people of FATA have a somewhat different opinion of the



situation.

Surprisingly, over 60% of the respondents (6.2% 'very secure' and 55.2%, 'somewhat Secure'), the majority, express a sense of security rather than insecurity. The refugee camps that are the alternative to remaining in one's community, expose the people to many other risks and challenges (22.3% of the sample said that they had been forced to flee from their homes in the recent past). CAMP personnel saw this in the case of Bajaur Agency IDPs who left IDP camps quite early for their homelands when the military operation was on.

### Improvement in security situation

The survey attempted to seek the respondents' perception about changing security conditions in their respective areas. As shown in the figure 19, over 51% of the respondents replied that the situation is better (10.5% 'much better', 40.5% 'somewhat better').

This observation, combined with the previous question implies a 'sense of security' in spite of the violence described previously. It is difficult to interpret the meaning for 32.2% stating 'no



change' because it would have different meanings for people in peaceful areas or areas of conflict. Only 5.9% think that the security is 'somewhat worse' while 7.5% believe that it is 'much worse' now. The overall results indicate high level of confidence and optimism about the change in the current security environment for at least half of the people of FATA.

In order to delve into the sense of security by Agency the data was tabulated by Agency, and to make visualization easier the

*Table 9. Improvement in security situation in FATA (cross tabulation by Agency/FR)*

Agency/FR	Better	No difference	Worse	No opinion	Don't know	Total
Orakzai Agency	49.3	23.9	24.3	0.4	2.1	100
Bajaur Agency	48.1	38.2	9.9	0.9	2.9	100
FR Bannu	41.3	37.5	7.5	1.3	12.5	100
FR D.I. Khan	51.3	41.3	7.5	0.0	0.0	100
FR Kohat	55.0	15.0	3.1	1.3	25.6	100
FR Lakki Marwat	85.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	100
FR Peshawar	25.0	62.5	7.5	1.3	3.8	100
FR Tank	21.3	70.0	8.8	0.0	0.0	100
Khyber Agency	52.8	31.2	15.8	0.1	0.1	100
Kurram Agency	80.1	14.1	2.4	0.3	3.1	100
Mohmand Agency	65.6	8.9	24.2	0.8	0.6	100
North Waziristan Agency	1.1	73.9	25.0	0.0	0.0	100
South Waziristan Agency	54.6	26.4	12.1	3.9	2.9	100
<b>Total</b>	51.0	32.2	13.4	0.7	2.9	100

table 9 has been reduced to 'Better,' 'No Change,' and 'Worse.'

As a word of caution, it is important to keep in mind what is stated in the Methodology Appendix. That is, that only villages and towns that were accessible from a security perspective were included in the sample. The responses herein may represent that perspective and err on a more optimistic side when compared people who might have been interviewed in the insecure areas of the Agencies.

During the last three years South Waziristan, Bajaur and Mohmand Agencies have been the sites of large conflicts and the source of IDPs, yet we find that from 48.1% to 65.6% of their populations note better conditions. They must conclude that the worst is over.

The three Agencies that stand out with the approximately 25% declaring 'Worse' are Orakzai and North Waziristan. They are known to be areas experiencing the fleeing militants from South Waziristan. Mohmand and Orakzai are anomalies in the sense that such substantial proportions of their people declare that the conditions are 'Better.'

The most surprising finding was in Kurram Agency. It has been one of the most violent areas of FATA due to sectarian conflict and revenge taking. *Sunnis* left *Shia* dominated areas and visa versa during the past few years and that violence created an IDP problem. Since November 2007, roads are blocked in Kurram and people are faced with several challenges. In spite of this recent history we now find that 80% of the people believe that they are more secure. The only interpretation of the data is that there has been a substantial reduction in violence in Kurram of a sectarian nature even though the sectarian problems have not been the focus of a process of conflict resolution.

FR Lakki Marwat was the site of a major suicide bombing in early 2010 in which children at a volley ball match were targeted. That event does not seem to have impacted their sense of security. 85% of the population now feels secure.

## Perceived major threats to individuals

This area of inquiry is new to the 'Understanding Fata' series, hence changes from previous years cannot be analysed.

### Threats to individual's security in FATA

In the previous question the inquiry was at a general level related to law and order. In the following question the focus the threat level posed to individual security in FATA. The initial threat of 'Conflict' is non-specific and only 14.7% respondents identified 'conflict' posing threats to individual security. In fact the region is familiar with the tribal and family feuds that are as old as the *Pakhtun* culture. Related to the culture are the area, 14.4% identified 'sectarianism' as the sole threat to individual security. It should be noted that 14.4% of the respondents, are from Kurram and Orakzai Agencies where *Shia* and *Sunni* sects have been at odds for many years. Terrorist attacks are cited as the main threat by 41.2% of the respondents, and if drone attacks (9.1%) and Army activity (5.8%) are added, then the

weight of the war is felt as a personal threat to 56.1% of the population.

Interestingly, 5.8% of the respondents identified 'Army activity' as a threat to individual security in FATA. This may indicate that there is local support for Pakistani Army. As pointed out above, the Army is gaining more support from the people in FATA.

'Drone attacks' are identified by only 9.1% of the respondents. The use of drones has been concentrated on North and South Waziristan Agencies and the respondents identified 'drone attacks' as something which threatens individual security. The opinions on drone attacks as a tactic will be explored in more detail at the end of this chapter.

### High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan who is responsible?

One of the tactics used in terrorist attacks is suicide bombing. The respondents were asked, "Who do you think is responsible for the high rates of suicide bombing?" The responses are shown in the figure 21.

The most frequent response (25.8%) was that the United States of America was behind the suicide bombings. India, the historic rival was indicated by 13.5% and Israel (11.5%) was the third choice. Since 9/11 and ISAF military operation in Afghanistan the anti-American feelings have risen extremely high, while India is perceived as long time enemy since Pakistan's Independence. Because of solidarity with Palestine on political and religious basis, Israel is despised. That being said, we do not know the logic for ascribing the responsibility to nations that have not been providing support for suicide bombers. Nevertheless, it is a perception that must be taken into consideration.

In spite of the TTP's claim of responsibility for many of these terrorist attacks, it is surprisingly that only 8.7% of the respondents believed that TTP is behind suicide bombings in parts of Pakistan, including FATA. A large percentage of the respondents, 22.7, do not know the answer.

Fig 20. Threats to individual's security in FATA





Fig 21. High rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan who is responsible?



In the 2008 and 2009 surveys ‘Western influence’ was identified by the majority of the respondents (50.9% and 33.7%, respectively) as being responsible for high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan. In 2010 there was a greater diversity of nations that could be classified as ‘Western,’ and if the USA, Western and Israel are added the total is 39.7% for 2010. The response for Al Qaeda also gradually reduced to 3.1% in 2010 from 7.7% in 2009 and 13.3% in 2008. The general perception about Al Qaeda being responsible for suicide attacks is quite low, and it is believed that Al Qaeda is more targeted towards West, especially US rather than Pakistan.

The Pakistan Army was identified as responsible for suicide bombing by 13.1% in 2008 but it was, reduced to 5.1% in 2009 and just 0.5% in 2010. The recent successful military operations against militant groups, especially TTP and its associated

militant groups, may have changed this perception.

It is not surprising that Saudi Arabia received a very low response in terms of its involvement in suicide bombing because Saudi Arabia is known as a centre of religious piety even though the Western media blames it for its role in Talibanising the tribal society since the time of Soviet-Afghan War.

These responses are one of the indications of the impact of the political and also the conspiracies circulating in Pakistan and FATA. One group (TTP) claims responsibility for suicide bombings, but the political promotion and conspiracy theorists prevail with India and Western nations.

## Causes of high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan

The survey attempted to gauge the perception of the factors/actors contributing to the rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan. To explore the opinions of the people the questioning was changed to the 'causes' of the rates of suicide bombing instead of 'responsibility.' The survey then revealed mixed responses, that is, external and internal causes, as shown in the figure 22:


The two main causes identified ('unemployment' 17.5% and the 'Lack of Education' 14.8%) bring us back to the tables in the first half of the report, where the needs expressed included Education and Employment. Poverty was also mentioned by another 7% of the respondents. In brief, the factor of underdevelopment was attributed by 40% of the respondents

as the cause of suicide bombing. This is a contrast with the previous perspective that external actors were predominantly the 'responsible' parties. To this question, however, only 8.7% indicated that the 'West' was the cause.

A second factor, a factor of prevention, was indicated by 21.5% of the respondents (failure of 'intelligence agencies' to intercept - 9.8%; Army incapacity - 7.3%, and Police lack 3.4%). 15.5% of the sample do not know or could not identify any cause for the high rates of suicide bombing.

Both of these factors reflect a set of internal and changeable causes for suicide bombings rather than a fatalistic, blame-it-on-the-outsiders, perspective. This is useful for a programmatic approach to changing the climate of conflict, specifically encouraging the citizens to help root out the 'miscreants.'

Fig 22. Causes of high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan



### Source of suicide bombers

The respondents were asked to identify the source, that is, the geographic origin, of the suicide bombers. Interestingly, over the last three surveys the respondents have become more certain of their answers. The percent of respondents who did not know declined from 63% in 2008 to 31.5% in 2010. The increased certainty was shifted toward India (7.4% in 2008 to 28.7% in 2010) and Afghanistan (16% to 21.2%). The 'West' and the other nations where the 'responsibility' had been attributed now drop to less than 6% as the geographic origin of suicide bombers.

Because India has invested hugely in Afghanistan, some Pakistani politicians, from the government party as well as opposition parties, blame India for using Afghanistan soil against Pakistan; these political expressions have moulded the opinion of the general public against India and Afghanistan as we saw in the responses to the questions on security. Over time these beliefs are becoming stronger and they represent a future challenge for diplomacy with these neighbours.

### Reasons for conflicts in FATA

For a more in depth understanding, the survey focused on the reasons that cause conflicts in FATA. As we know, in FATA there








Fig 25. How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?




are numerous forms of conflicts and the survey in 2010 sought to identify them through the sample. Again, the respondents turned inward toward their personal experience and approximately three quarters of the respondents indicated that local issues rather than 'extremism' were the reasons for conflict. The most common response (28.9%) was 'conflict over land,' while 25.9% opined that 'extremism' is the biggest reason for conflict in FATA. These reasons for conflict reflect what has

been described in the ethnographies, that is, the constant tension between families and tribes.

Conflict over land is an old phenomenon and local tribesmen are well aware and are accustomed to this. However, extremism is something that has only a 30 year history and has been the most severe form of conflict because it has destroyed the very fabric of the tribal and *Pakhtun* culture. It has affected well respected and well guarded institutions like *jirga*, *hujra*, *nanawati*, and *milmastya*, etc. that are the social mechanisms for resolving issues. A probable reason for the destruction of these institutions is that traditionally the disputing parties would submit to the opinion of *jirgas*, but with outside leaders and troops who are not willing to join the culture and submit to a *jirga*, the conflict cannot be resolved. Moreover, some outside forces wish to destroy the very institutions that have brought stability to the *Pakhtun*. Some try this in the name of modernization and others in the name of idealized or radical orthodoxy.

We will end this section on threats with the question "How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan

Fig 26. Opinion about the security providers



these days?"

As shown in the figure 25, two third (69.8%) of the respondents believe that Islamic extremism poses a threat to Pakistan. As we noted above, extremism is perceived to be a threat to the institutions of *Pakhtun* culture. The majority of the people recognize this threat. Nevertheless, 11.1% do not view Islamic extremism as a threat. This small portion of a culture can threaten that culture. It is not to be overlooked.

## Opinion about the security providers


In this section we explore the opinions of the people of FATA toward the Security Providers. One of the introductory questions about trust showed that the components of the military (Army 20.3% and the Frontier Corps 7.9%) are the most and increasingly trusted institutions or leaders in FATA. The figure 26 also shows that although traditional local leadership consisting of the Teachers, Political Agents, and *Mullahs* is appreciated those leaders are declining in stature in contrast to the tribal elders who seem to be gaining.

### Security providers in FATA

The first question posed to the people was, 'Which of the following institutions do you believe should be primarily responsible for security in FATA?'

Recall that the question is in the context of the presence of several militant groups and past Pakistani military offensives in FATA. The context influenced the perception of Pakistani society in general, and FATA in particular. The finding is that trust is in the military institution made up of local men. The respondents preferred 'Frontier Corps' (30.7%), 'tribal communities/*Lakhhkars*' (23.9%) and '*Khasadar* and levies' (23.0%) over the 'military' (15.0%). This finding validates both the Pakistani Army and the US military basis or conclusion to expand and strengthen the Frontier Corps because of cultural strength. This would fit a strategy of decentralized governance and security.

Fig 27. Security providers in FATA




Each Agency has a force of 2000- 3000 *Khasadars* and Levies and 5 to 9 wings of Frontier Corps for maintaining law and order inside each Agency, to provide border security, and to control cross-border smuggling. There are approximately 35,000 *Maliks* and *Lungi* allowance holders, representing their respective tribes, clans, sub-clans, etc who facilitate, as per the administrative system of FATA, the implementation of government policies and the maintenance of law and order in their respective areas.

*Khasadar* and Levies forces consist of local tribesmen and have been operational since the time of British *Raj*. The local tribes are accustomed to them and have never raised any objection. However, Army presence is quite new, especially after 9/11, and has not been welcomed by the local people and tribal leaders.

### Frontier Corps (FC) and security in FATA

Answers to the question, 'Do you think that the FC plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?' reinforce the responses to the previous question. The majority of the respondents (68.9%) say that FC can play a vital role in providing security in FATA. Only 14.1% have doubts on its capacity or role.

Fig 28. Frontier Corps (FC) and security in FATA




### Training FC with international assistance

Insurgent groups in FATA, when compared with the FC, have better training and are better armed, making it difficult for the FC, as well as other security agencies, to face the challenge. This problem has been identified by experts. From this came the issue of what should be the role that outsiders can play in strengthening or participating in Pakistani security providers. As described in the qualitative section, since 2007 the US has funded and played a training role for the expansion of the FC.

As pointed out above, the public has also observed that the FC has not been able to win battles, all of the time, against the militants. A more highly trained FC using more sophisticated weapons and tactical skills is needed. Therefore, the survey also included the following question, 'If trained by international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in their ability to do their job?' This measures the people's perception of the role of international assistance. The majority, 52.4%, feel more confident, while 24.8% feel less confident. However, 22.8% were undecided.

Fig 29. Training FC with international assistance



In summary, the people of FATA appreciate the role of the Army and the FC forces formed of local men. They also recognize the need to strengthen them so that they can provide greater protection against the militants. The presence of outsiders for training is also seen more favourably than one would expect from reading the media and commentary.


### Support for the military and the tactics employed

In the previous section it was demonstrated that, generally, the people of FATA support the various military institutions that have been with them traditionally. Now the survey shifts focus slightly using specific cases of military intervention in both FATA and non-FATA areas to elicit the opinion of FATA residents about those actions and tactics. It is necessary to carefully partition the data by Agency to see if having been involved changes the opinion about the actions and also tactics.

One of the impacts of the conflicts has been forced migration. Those people who suffered forced migration would be one subset to compare with others who had not been forced to leave. This is an important intervening variable in public opinion.

### Forced migration from FATA

Due to ongoing militancy and military operations in parts of FATA people have been forced to flee their homes and settle in the IDP camps; host communities in the adjacent districts; or major cities of Pakistan. The survey measured the percentage of population that had been affected in this way. Out of total sample, 22.3% of the respondents said that they were forced to leave their home towns while 77.7% said they never were forced to leave their homes.



Those who said 'yes' were subsequently asked where they went. The 22.3% of the respondents who were forced to leave their homes identified 32 cities/towns where they were either housed in IDP camps or within host communities. Out of 22.3% percent, 41% respondents identified Peshawar where the major *Kacha Garhi* IDP camp was established for the people of Bajaur and, later on, Mohmand Agencies. 8.5% identified Charsadda district which has a major urban area adjacent to Mohmand Agency. 5.5% of the respondents identified D.I. Khan where refugees of South Waziristan operation are settled in host communities. 5.3% respondents identified Kohat, which is

adjacent to Orakzai Agency where a targeted military operation was underway at the time of the survey. Some respondents identified Karachi, Balochistan, and cities of Punjab.

The degree of dislocation varies by FR and Agency. The table 10 shows these statistics.

Table 10. Forced migration from FATA (cross tabulation by Agency/FR)

Agency	Yes	No	Total
Orakzai Agency	27.9	72.1	100
Bajaur Agency	37.5	62.5	100
FR Bannu	38.8	61.3	100
FR D.I. Khan	0.0	100.0	100
FR Kohat	36.9	63.1	100
FR Lakki Marwat	0.0	100.0	100
FR Peshawar	10.0	90.0	100
FR Tank	22.5	77.5	100
Khyber Agency	30.8	69.2	100
Kurram Agency	3.4	96.6	100
Mohmand Agency	24.2	75.8	100
North Waziristan Agency	0.0	100.0	100
South Waziristan Agency	35.7	64.3	100
<b>Total</b>	22.3	77.7	100

The table 10 above shows that only in FR D.I. Khan, FR Lakki, and North Waziristan Agency have people not been displaced or forced to migrate. In some areas where major conflict and battles have been fought, more than a third of the population has been displaced.


To judge the overall scale of the population dislocated and the impact on host communities we can use both the latest official population estimates for FATA (4 million) and the estimate

provided by local leadership (6 million) Using the respondents' responses the lower and upper estimates are 847,400 and 1,338,000 people were forced to leave their home and became IDPs because of the militancy and military operation. These figures suggest that the people of FATA have been exposed to gigantic challenges and that they are paying a high cost of the militancy. Just what that means in terms of the following types of military operations is important.

### Military offensive in Swat/Malakand

Outside (but adjacent) of FATA a major offensive took place in 2008-09. This question measured the support for the Pakistani military operation in the Swat/Malakand division. Overall, a majority (70.1%) supported the operation (39.7% 'fully support' plus 30.4% 'partly support' it). 16.2% of the respondents opposed the operation (10.4% 'fully Opposed' plus 5.8% 'partly opposed').

However, when the intervening condition of having been a displaced person is brought into consideration, then a differential impact is revealed. This is shown in the summary in figure 31 comparing the opinion of displaced people with non-displaced in the cases of the military offensives in



*Table 11. Military offensive in Swat/Malakand (Cross tabulation)*

Military offensive in Swat/Malakand				
Displaced?	% Support	% Oppose	No opinion Do not know	Total
Yes	52.0	30.6	17.5	100
No	75.3	11.9	12.8	100

Swat/Malakand and South Waziristan.

Note that the people who remained behind overwhelmingly support the operations while the support by the displaced population is much lower.


In the next section on a military operation inside of FATA the data is parsed by Agency and also between displaced and people who remain behind. The specific findings are different as the variable of 'closer to home' is taken into consideration.

### Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA

In 2009 the Pakistani military initiated an offensive in South Waziristan Agency against Tehrek e Taliban Pakistan. There was perception that the people of Pakistan, in general, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, in particular, were against this military

*Table 12. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA (Cross tabulation)*

Military offensive in South Waziristan				
Displaced?	% Support	% Oppose	No opinion Do not know	Total
Yes	46.7	33.7	19.6	100
No	72.6	14.2	13.2	100



operation. Religious parties such as Jamaat e Islamai (JI) and Jamiat e Ulema e Islam (JUI) were holding the view that the government should initiate a dialogue with the militants. Even Imran Khan, Chairman of Tehrek e Insaaf was very vocal in opposing this operation.

The survey documents the views of the men and women of FATA in the above figure 32:

This is the overall impression with very similar proportions to the case of the Military offensive in Swat/Malakand; two-thirds of the people of FATA (37.5% 'fully supported' plus 29.4% 'partly supported') supported the operation. Opposition was expressed by 17.6% (11.7% 'fully opposed' plus 6.9% 'partly opposed').

The military used heavy force to hunt down the militants. Reports from the battle field show that due to the heavy force used by the army innocent people were killed, scarce infrastructure destroyed, and local economies shattered. But, even then, the local people have supported the military operation and wanted to get rid of Taliban style of governance that has tried to hijack *Pakhtun* society.

The following table 13 showing the support or opposition to the operation in South Waziristan, by Agency is quite revealing.

*Table 13. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA (Cross tabulation by Agency/FR)*

Name of Agency/FR	Support	Oppose	No opinion	Don't know	Total
Orakzai Agency	73.2	23.6	2.9	0.4	100
Bajaur Agency	56.8	19.6	10.6	13.1	100
FR Bannu	42.5	53.8	2.5	1.3	100
FR D.I. Khan	72.5	23.8	3.8	0.0	100
FR Kohat	27.5	17.5	44.4	10.6	100
FR Lakki Marwat	7.5	22.5	37.5	32.5	100
FR Peshawar	52.5	12.5	31.3	3.8	100
FR Tank	77.5	20.0	0.0	2.5	100
Khyber Agency	55.7	26.7	7.2	10.4	100
Kurram Agency	97.2	0.6	0.1	2.1	100
Mohmand Agency	60.8	15.0	4.2	20.0	100
North Waziristan Agency	93.9	6.1	0.0	0.0	100
South Waziristan Agency	43.6	46.8	5.4	4.3	100
Total	66.8	18.6	7.1	7.6	100

Again we have collapsed the categories of response to make it easier to visualize. If the heavy force cited were severe, then it would be expected that the people in South Waziristan would be in overwhelming opposition, but the data show that it is an approximate 50/50 split between support (43%) and opposition (46%). In neighbouring North Waziristan there is overwhelming support for the operation (93.9%).

Using the same information, the question can be examined within Agencies such as Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand where



Table 14. Military offensive in South Waziristan Agency, FATA (Cross tabulation by Agency/FR and whether displaced)

	Name of Agency/FR	Support	Oppose	No opinion	Don't know	Total
Yes %	Orakzai Agency	64.1	32.1	3.8	0.0	100
	Bajaur Agency	52.5	22.7	12.9	11.8	100
	FR Bannu	22.6	74.2	0.0	3.2	100
	FR Kohat	37.3	23.7	27.1	11.9	100
	FR Peshawar	0.0	75.0	12.5	12.5	100
	FR Tank	83.3	16.7	0.0	0.0	100
	Khyber Agency	32.1	51.7	11.1	5.1	100
	Kurram Agency	87.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	100
	Mohmand Agency	48.3	12.6	3.4	35.6	100
	South Waziristan	52.0	39.0	6.0	3.0	100
	<b>Total</b>		46.7	33.7	10.0	9.6
No %	Orakzai Agency	76.7	20.3	2.5	0.5	100
	Bajaur Agency	59.3	17.6	9.2	13.9	100
	FR Bannu	55.1	40.8	4.1	0.0	100
	FR D.I. Khan	72.5	23.8	3.8	0.0	100
	FR Kohat	21.8	13.9	54.5	9.9	100
	FR Lakki Marwat	7.5	22.5	37.5	32.5	100
	FR Peshawar	58.3	5.6	33.3	2.8	100
	FR Tank	75.8	21.0	0.0	3.2	100
	Khyber Agency	66.2	15.6	5.5	12.7	100
	Kurram Agency	97.6	0.5	0.0	2.0	100
	Mohmand Agency	64.8	15.8	4.4	15.0	100
	North Waziristan	93.9	6.1	0.0	0.0	100
	South Waziristan	38.9	51.1	5.0	5.0	100
<b>Total</b>		72.6	14.2	6.2	7.0	100

there has been heavy conflict. What are notable are the low levels of opposition and some of the highest level of support for

the operation in these Agencies.

Another way to understand the impact of the conflict is to separate the opinion of those who were forced to leave from the people who remained behind while these operations were taking place. It is a large table, but going directly to the overall comparison of displaced vs. the people who had not been forced to leave there homes there is an inverse opinion with people forced to leave providing less support (46.7%) than people who remained behind (72.6%).

That being said, and turning directly to the case of South Waziristan, the people who had been displaced supported the operation by 52% to 39%. This is the inverse of general population polled. Again, inversely, the people who remained in South Waziristan opposed by 51.1% to 38.9%. Although both groups were impacted by the war, the people who remained behind suffered the most and, perhaps, lost more family members. The themes of collateral damage and the treatment of the people by outside forces are crucial both from a humanitarian and a military-political perspective.

### US drone attacks in FATA

We close this chapter on the subject of a tactic used in the international conflict against militants who may or may not be native to FATA. There is a debate on the legitimacy of the use of




Table 15. US drone attacks in FATA  
(cross tabulation by Agency/FR)

Agency/FR	Always justified	Sometimes justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided	Never justified	No opinion OR Don't know	Total
Orakzai Agency	5.0	38.9	45.0	11.1	100
Bajaur Agency	0.9	26.8	60.0	12.4	100
FR Bannu	2.5	42.5	45.0	10.0	100
FR D.I.Khan	0.0	60.0	36.3	3.8	100
FR Kohat	3.1	7.5	37.5	51.9	100
FR Lakki Marwat	0.0	17.5	32.5	50.0	100
FR Peshawar	1.3	7.5	60.0	31.3	100
FR Tank	0.0	7.5	92.5	0.0	100
Khyber Agency	2.9	11.1	74.5	11.6	100
Kurram Agency	16.9	63.2	12.9	6.9	100
Mohmand Agency	3.1	7.8	71.4	17.8	100
North Waziristan Agency	0.0	0.2	99.3	0.5	100
South Waziristan Agency	0.4	11.1	75.4	13.2	100
Total	4.4	24.5	58.8	12.3	100

US drone attacks in FATA areas, especially in North and South Waziristan, for targeting foreign fighters, Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership as well as local warlords associated with extremists. Drone attacks are criticised because they violate international humanitarian laws are seen as extra judicial killings, violation of Pakistan's sovereignty, and cause collateral damage killing innocent people, including women and children.

As noted in the section on perceived personal threats (in figure 20), 9.1% of the people felt that drone attacks were their major threat. In that regard, the survey was used to gauge the perception of how the men and women of FATA feel about these drone attacks in relation to other perceived threats.

The data in figure 33 showed that 58.8% of the respondents believe that such attacks are 'never justified'. 24.5% of the respondents opined in a qualified manner that sometimes these attacks are justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided. Only 4.4% believe that such drone attacks are 'always justified'.


Now the presentation focuses on that same threat, but it is from the perspective of the respondents by Agency. This follows the underlying theme of proximity to the conflict having a differential impact on the opinion of the respondent. The Agencies where the drone attacks have been constant and increasing during the past two years are South and North Waziristan. A few years ago there were a few drone attacks in Bajaur. Nevertheless, other Agencies without drone attacks have as high or higher rates of 'never justified'; though it is notable that in South Waziristan and North Waziristan Agencies all respondents said that drone strikes were 'never justified'.

The findings from D.I. Khan and Kurram show pragmatism, that is, 'if targeted and civilian casualties are avoided.' This perspective must come from their experience or their perceived threat from extremists, or, perhaps, because they have not experienced drone attacks. Kurram, as we have pointed out before, is different because their conflicts have been sectarian between their own people.

### Nuclear possession and national security

Pakistan, as a nation, is quite emotional about possessing nuclear weapons. The survey sought to explore how secure the respondents feel about possessing these weapons. Considering the history of conflict and rivalry with India the response is not surprising. Three quarters of the respondents (76.9%) believe that possessing a nuclear weapon is vital for national security.

Fig 34. Nuclear possession and national security



This majority level of support for nuclear weapons has, however, declined slightly since the 2008 survey (86.4%); 2009 (78.9%) and now, in 2010 (76.9%). Whether or not this trend will continue remains to be seen.

## Conclusion

The overall subject of this chapter was to make explicit the fact that the people of FATA have been living in a context of international conflict for the last thirty years and that they have been in the cross currents of history from time immemorial.

The long exposure to a diversity of cultures and the linkages of modern commerce and war makes the *Pakhtun* a connected and very aware population in spite of the common error or perception that they are an isolated and remote people. This background presents a unique challenge to the researcher who must inquire, systematically, about their opinion and perceptions so that other people of the world involved in and causing the international context of conflict will understand the people of FATA. The specifics such as the standing of the local military, the hierarchy of development needs, and the comparative importance of security to governance, education,

and health services should all inform policy and strategies for improving the lives and livelihoods of the people while striving for the resolution of the conflict.

Because of the context of conflict the first finding was that half of the people polled believe that the country is going in the wrong direction and the issues of law and order and 'Talibanisation' are the most bothersome. Terrorist attacks are identified as the major threat to individual security.

We have also found differences of opinion on the impact of military operations between having been an IDP or not. These preliminary findings should be the basis for more, in depth inquiry and also the subject of policy and post-conflict strategies.

We found a level of pragmatism in the support of the people of FATA for government military operations. The section on drones also presents important findings for policy and military-civilian relations.

One of the most important findings across a series of questions was that the opinions of the people reflect politically motivated propaganda and conspiracy theories that hinder strategies for counterinsurgency. An example is that, consistently over the last three surveys between 40% and 50% of the people believe that the Western nations are the origins of suicide bombers, and then there are the 15% of the population who believe that India is behind them. Unless images such as these can be turned around, the effort for the people's support will be thwarted. However, once the projection of fault to the outside is passed, the people focus on the characteristics of underdevelopment as factors contributing to extremist behaviour.

As will be described in the next chapter, the dislike for the Western nations is very high (as high as the dislike of Al Qaeda), yet in the chapter on media, the Western news media has a following that rivals national Radio and TV. As we have seen in previous chapters, there is support for international development assistance, but what has been received has not been recognized. An example that shows a positive recognition

## Understanding FATA 2010

toward Western nations was the question that revealed that the people favoured the strengthening of the Frontier Corps by foreigners. In this case, the training centre was a known entity and the Frontier Corps are local men benefiting and knowing the source of the effort. Perhaps the anonymous flow of assistance through the government of Pakistan has been a mistake when it comes to winning the war of perceptions, because, as was shown in the first part of the book, the opinion of the people towards the FATA Secretariat and the FATA Development Authority was one of mistrust.



# CHAPTER 6

ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGION AND MILITANCY



# CHAPTER - 6

## ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGION AND MILITANCY

### Introduction

Religion and militancy have an entwined history in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. We begin this chapter by reminding the reader of the use of Islam by political leaders to rally the people to calls as diverse as the founding of the state of Pakistan to the use of Islam to wage a proxy war between world powers in Afghanistan. In between those uses are the rallying of political parties and the followers of warlords on both sides of the Durand Line. In keeping with the theme of the *Pakhtun* in the cross currents of history and climate of conflict we focus on a review of religion and militancy. Then, in the quantitative section of the chapter, we provide the opinions of the respondents.

### Policy of Islamisation

Historical evidence suggests that the ongoing insurgency is the by-product of Pakistan's official policy towards Afghanistan. During the Afghan War of the 1980s (the 'American *Jihad*') the Pakistani, United States and Saudi Arabian governments organized, armed and financed the Afghan groups fighting the Soviet Union's occupation forces.<sup>50</sup> Rampant warlordism, gun running, failure of the successor Afghan government to gain control on the post conflict problems<sup>51</sup> in a mine-infested terrain with nothing in the way of effective and comprehensive post conflict rehabilitation were but a few of Afghanistan's problems when the Soviet force withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. This acute failure of a centralised power gave rise to a new version of post-Soviet *Jihadis* in the shape of the Taliban who, in their attempt to establish their own version of Islamic *Sharia* with the collusion of the Al Qaeda, proved to be disastrous not only for the country but the entire world in general and Pakistan specifically.

Many of the problems of an unstable state stemmed from the fact that there was no proper Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconstruction (DDR) carried out in the country.<sup>52</sup>

This resulted in a violent reaction by the *Jihadi* militant groups to the Government of Pakistan's decision, under Pervez Musharraf's era, to become a front line ally of the US War of Terror in the wake of 9/11 attacks in US. The North Western part of Pakistan once again became the focus of the Global War on Terror just as it had during the war against the Russians twenty years earlier.

Here, in the remote and mountainous terrain which has frustrated invading armies for centuries, it is presumed that the core leadership of Al Qaeda, including Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri, has been hiding with tacit cooperation of certain local tribes.<sup>53</sup>

The sweeping victory in the 2002 election by the religious parties under the banner of Mutahida Majlis e Amal in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was a clear indication of the public discontent on Pakistan's role as the key state in 'War against Terrorism'. The alliance was mainly headed by Jamiat Ullema e Islam (Fazlur Rehman group) and Jumat e Islami (JI). Both parties represent a radical theological of Islam. They supported Afghan *Jihad* as well as the Kashmiri *Jihad* against India. Their policies have anti-US and anti-Indian orientations that have, indirectly, supported those who take part in *Jihad* against US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Their speeches and statements also helped to mould public opinion against Pakistan's government, that had lost public support because it hunted the Taliban and Al Qaeda in FATA and KP.

On the other hand, both parties have lost their credibility in the eyes of Taliban and Al Qaeda because, in Pakistani domestic politics, both parties have been highly pragmatic, even



opportunistic, forming formal or informal alliances with all major political players, no matter military, civilian, or secular.<sup>54</sup> None of them has ever used the path of violence in their political struggle, while always politically supporting *Jihad* and militant Islam.<sup>55</sup>

During their government from 2002-2007, the militancy in FATA and KP flourished. There is a debate as to why the government of KP did not do anything to stop Maulana Fazlullah of TNSM in Swat who was running his own FM radio and gathering support for his *Jihad* against the government of Pakistan and for demanding *Sharia* law in the Malakand division. FATA is adjacent to the KP and the KP provincial government has no jurisdiction in these areas. However, due to its proximity and homogeneity, one can not deny the fact that MMA could have used its influence in stemming militancy in Swat and FATA from the very beginning.

The stunning defeat of religious political parties in the February 2008 elections should have been an eye opener for the world and Pakistan political observers as a whole. It became clear that the perspective of the people of Pakistan and KP along with FATA had shifted away from radical parties toward parties promising an alternative to the conflicts that they had been experiencing for over 20 years. As a result, the Islamist parties were only able to hold onto 1.8% of the seats in the parliament compared with 11.3% popular votes and 63 National Assembly seats that they held before in the 2002 election. According to some analysts, these parties may never be able to regain the level of support that they received in the 2002 election. However, they still possess a level of public support and could play a significant role in the opposition.

The element of *Jihad* has also existed since the time of independence when Pakistan was created on the basis of Muslim nationhood. There is a debate in the media as to why and how Pakistan was created and over what was the vision of Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and father of the Pakistani nation. However, the establishment of a religious state in the region was neither in the minds of the Quaid e Azam nor

Alama Iqbal its architects.<sup>57</sup> Indeed history suggests that since Pakistan's inception, the country's leaders have played upon religious sentiments as an instrument for strengthening Pakistan's identity.<sup>58</sup>

*Pakistan did not get into this terrible state because of 9/11. The seeds were sown on March 1949. We not only encouraged Jihadism but by changing the laws and school syllabus, we opted to become an Islamic orthodox state. We ended up creating an Islamic generation.*<sup>59</sup>

Islamic groups were sponsored and supported by the state machinery at different times in order to influence politics or support the military's political dominance. The threats to national solidarity in Pakistan's formative years led her to adopt certain policies of survival that made the country's reliance on Islam and *Jihad* essential.<sup>60</sup> In the absence of a broad based movement like the one developed by the Congress party in India, the organizing principles of religion were used in Pakistan and the state was constructed based on this principle for much of its existence.<sup>61</sup> General Zia ul Haq went further than other leaders in 'Islamising' Pakistan's legal and educational system. Thus, this policy of Islamisation was the extension of a more consistent state ideology, not an aberration.<sup>62</sup>

Since 1977, when Zia ul Haq took power, Pakistan underwent a rapid transformation of identity, and amongst other questionable decisions his government undertook was the one to join the *Jihad* in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union on behalf of the US.<sup>63</sup> To fight the Soviets, locals and Afghan *Mujahideen* were recruited and foreign elements brought to join the *Jihad*. Hundreds of *Madrasas*<sup>64</sup> and training camps were established in the FATA, and tribesmen were motivated and recruited for *Jihad* in Afghanistan against Soviets.

The historical role the people of the FATA region played in Kashmir against the Indian Army in the 1948 War is further evidence that supports the thesis that General Zia utilised the ignorant and less-educated tribal people against the Soviets. They tried to strengthen the motivation and mobilization of the

fighters by transforming them from national, regional and tribal resistance groups into a religiously inspired 'Holy war' against the Soviet Union, a *Jihad*.<sup>65</sup> It is important to highlight this change of the *Jihadi* focus. The traditional religious use of the concept is the individual's constant 'struggle' against the temptations of life or against personal sin. This is a theme that is found in many religions. The 'struggle' against others who would change or challenge one's family, tribe and culture is another level of *Jihad* and fits the culture of the *Pakhtun* (*Pakhtunwali*) and the defence of honour. This in, pragmatic terms, is what is the justification for forming a *Lakhkar*. It is also the purpose of a *jirga* to resolve conflicts. Note that this second form of struggle is defensive in nature, i.e. protecting one's immediate culture against outsiders. The third type of struggle is the 'International *Jihad*.' It comes from a political economy perspective of what is wrong with the world and the plight of underdevelopment. It is what some have referred to as the 'far war.' This third conceptualization explains how the basis for the international cold war recruitment of *Jihadis* to fight against the Russians in Afghanistan (in addition to the defence by the *Pakhtun*) led to the formation of Al Qaeda and, presently, the basis for international *Jihadi* movement under the umbrella name or as 'branches' of Al Qaeda. The international Al Qaeda movement has the agenda of removing corrupt heads of Islamic states and also taking the struggle to the non-Islamic states that support the corrupt leadership. The final objective is the establishment of a Caliphate.

Returning to the period of history of the struggle against the Russians, let us not forget that the Russian presence in Afghanistan was not only a version of the 'Great Game' of centuries ago; it was a battle in the cold war between capitalism and communism. As such the internationalization of the struggle was a by-product. Print and electronic communication was used during that *Jihad*. Several monthly journals; magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, etc were published to attract the general masses towards *Jihad*. The US development agency USAID spent 50 million US dollars for producing textbooks for children promoting religious war. Those books are

still in use by the Taliban and are in use today by extremist groups.<sup>66</sup> Until 1989, the number of *Jihad* publications in Pakistan had reached 150. Most of them were published in Peshawar and Quetta. The circulation of these monthlies and weekly magazines was in thousands, and most of these *Jihad* publications project and glorify *Jihadi* activities all over the world, especially in Palestine, Kashmir, Afghanistan and FATA.<sup>67</sup>

*Pakhtuns*, due to their geography, history, and culture have been caught both in the crossfire of the 'War against Terrorism' and the complex web of regional and international politics.<sup>68</sup> The tribes would be consulted through their elders to support a certain initiative and there has never been anything more popular than relying on the name of Islam. The name of Islam and the culture of the *Pakhtun* were exploited from the beginning of the Afghan War in 1979 when the tribes supported *Jihad* and housed the foreigners and Afghan refugees.<sup>69</sup>

The *Jihad* against the Russians was justified and built upon the sense of *Jihad* as defence of family, community and culture so ingrained in the *Pakhtun* culture. Unfortunately, as the radical international Jihadis were coupled with the Wahhabi-based political economy, the movement became detrimental to traditional tribal structure and culture.

The housing of religiously motivated forces from around the world in the 1980s eroded the traditional system and society.<sup>70</sup> Today the people of FATA are dealing with a generation of 30 year-old tribesmen and battle hardened foreigners who have married into *Pakhtun* tribes who form a complete generation of people born and brought up in war and struggle that has become their way of life.<sup>71</sup>

Following the withdrawal of Soviets troops from Afghanistan in 1989, all foreign assistance terminated and the *Mujahideen* were left to their own campaign to find new causes to fight. The 9/11 incident and subsequent American intervention in Afghanistan, followed by stationing of ISAF and NATO forces in that land, became the new cause for the Al Qaeda types as well as their hosts and collaborators i.e. the *Mujahideen* turned

Taliban [TTP] in the *Pakhtun* tribal belt on both sides of the Durand line.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, they have the political economy and international *Jihadi* perspective that includes supporting the 'far war.' The presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, in *Pakhtun* culture areas, reinforces the political economy perspective as well as the sense of local defence of culture.

The synergy between the revived ancient tribal codes and the Wahhabi-like interpretation of Islam by the Taliban and Al Qaeda movements has been so forceful that currently it forms an important core of the local collective mindset. Now that a new and radical ideology has become implanted in the FATA (and also in Afghanistan) religious, political and social dissent is unacceptable. Traditionally historians and anthropologists have described the *Pakhtun* as resistant to change, but, as we have seen in the radicalization process, some *Pakhtun* have changed both their world view and also their vision of how religion and tradition should be enforced.


In the quantitative half of this chapter we shall see to what extent the people support the radical narrative described above. Previously we saw that approximately 20% of the people of FATA described 'Talibanisation, Extremism and Foreigners' as the main problems facing FATA (After the lack of law and order).

### Islamic extremism as a threat to Pakistan

The survey question that goes directly to the subject of this chapter was, 'How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic Extremism pose to Pakistan these days?'

As can be seen in the figure 35, 69.8% of the people believe that Islamic extremism is a very great or fairly great threat to Pakistan. That being said, 11.1% think Islamic extremism is 'not a threat at all' and 10.9% 'do not know'. The survey findings suggest that people living in FATA have concerns for the stability of Pakistan. But caution is required because although it is a small minority, the 11.1% who do not see Islamic extremism as a threat, and another 10.9% who do not know, plus 8.2% who did not respond, all add up to almost a third of the population who might harbour extremism. It is clear that almost a third of the

Fig 35. Islamic extremism as a threat to Pakistan



people need to understand the options. A small minority of committed radicals can make life impossible for the majority.


### Describing the Pakistani Taliban

From the question, somewhat 'loaded' with the word 'extremists,' the survey then focused on two known groups of militants the Taliban and Al Qaeda. When asked 'What do you think of Pakistani Taliban groups?' Immediately, in the figure 36 below we see similar figures to the responses on extremists. 15% are 'favourable' toward the Taliban, and 14.3% 'do not know'. Yes, 64.3% view the Taliban as unfavourable, but it can be seen that a minority could easily support this movement. After all, social movements are not an electoral process that a majority can cancel out by vote. Social movements have 'complaints' that need to be addressed if they are to be defused.

To explore the opinion of the Taliban the respondents were asked how they would describe or characterize the Taliban. 27.4% respondents think that Taliban are terrorists, and 24.2% believe that Taliban are 'uneducated youth.' (As oppose to the word 'Taliban' that means 'student.')

As shown in the figure 36, 18.2% respondents believe Taliban are foreign fighters. Similarly, just 1.4% respondents believe that Taliban are

Fig 36. Describing the Pakistani Taliban



freedom fighters, 5.4% think that Taliban are defenders of Islam and 4.5% as defenders of tribal customs. Overall, the survey results suggest that although the majority of respondents do not have positive feelings for Taliban, there is a minority with a positive view and a worrisome 14.3% who do not know.

### Describing the Afghan Taliban

A similar question was asked about the Afghan Taliban. The results of that question are, in table 16:

Again 19.3% of the respondents do not know. A third of the respondents classify the Afghan Taliban as terrorists (36.6%). More so than in reference to the Pakistani Taliban. They are seen as ignorant but less so than the Pakistani Taliban (14.6% vs. 24.2%). Finally, there is the positive perception of the Afghan Taliban as freedom fighters (20.2%). This is the image that was projected in the written material described above during the struggle against the Russians. These findings present a

contrasting opinion of the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban, they put the presence of the Afghani Taliban in FATA into a new perspective. If there is a significant population that sees them as different and presenting positive rather than

Table 16. Describing the Afghan Taliban

Response	Frequency	Percent
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation	808	20.2
Ignorant of Islamic values/ teaching	585	14.6
A terrorist group	1449	36.6
A political group	173	4.3
An anti-women group	177	4.4
Other (specify)	37	.9
Don't know	771	19.3
Total	4000	100.0


negative consequences, then there would be ample support for providing shelter and, as guests, protection according to the culture of the *Pakhtun* on both sides of the border.

### Likelihood of an Afghan Taliban return to power in Afghanistan

Whether or not the Taliban will return to power in Afghanistan is an important perception especially if the population will move with those perceptions providing support or resisting such a movement. The responses in the 2010 survey are mixed. As shown in the accompanying figure 37: 37.2% of the respondents believe that Afghan Taliban will not return to power in Afghanistan; 28.2% said 'yes' and 34.6%, did not know the answer or they were undecided.

Looking at the data from the last three years, we see some

Fig 37. Likelihood of an Afghan Taliban return to power in Afghanistan




consistency, and also some fluctuation, in the respondents' beliefs regarding the possibility of an Afghan Taliban return to power. The slight decline of the 'Yes' votes is probably not statistically significant, but the increase of the 'No' votes in 2009 is probably attributable to the international perspective in the news this past year that in spite of the military surge of Afghan

Taliban, the chances of them returning to power is limited. The substantial drop (from about half to only one third in 'Do not know' swung toward the 'No' vote. This reflects the decline in support for the Taliban noted above and is a favourable trend for future peace. It is also another example of the increased engagement of the respondents in the subject of these opinions.

### Describing Al Qaeda


The survey 2010 attempted to know whether respondents know about Al Qaeda. The survey findings reveal that 39.5% respondents know about Al Qaeda, however, surprisingly, overwhelming majority (60.5%) professed to not know about Al Qaeda or did not respond. Al Qaeda is so often mentioned in the media and discussed at *hujra* gatherings it may be that the expression of ignorance is in reaction to widespread fear among the local population about the intelligence agencies, Taliban informers, etc.

Fig 38. Describing Al Qaeda



Those who said 'Yes' that they knew about Al Qaeda, were subsequently asked their views about Al Qaeda. A quarter (24.4%) had a favourable view of Al Qaeda and 73% unfavourable views about Al Qaeda. Again there is a substantial minority of support for the militants.

Fig 39. Views about Al Qaeda




### Foreign *Jihadi* fighters living in FATA

As described above, Foreign *Jihadi* fighters were brought in to FATA during the Soviet-Afghan War in early 1980s, and after the war local tribes extended their hospitality and gave them asylum and shelter under the code of *Pakhtunwali*. Apparently, these foreign fighters were not active after the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan. Exactly what their role was in the Taliban and the Taliban struggle against the warlords remains to be studied. However, some probably became active when US led forces ousted the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the 9/11 incidents in New York. It is known that with the US led invasion of Afghanistan the international *Jihadi* call went out again and more internationals came to Afghanistan.

In order to understand the opinion of the people of FATA with regard to the foreign fighters or *Jihadis* the respondents were

Fig 40. Foreign *Jihadi* fighters living in FATA



asked what should become of them. Overwhelmingly 68% felt that the foreign fighters should leave either by being expelled by the Pakistani Army (42.7%) or by having their hosts ask them to leave (25.3%). The second 'being asked by their hosts' reflects the hospitality and also the protection patterns of the culture. That pattern is probably reflected in the 11.4% respondents who believed that they should be allowed to stay but only if they cease violence and the 2.7% who believed that they should be allowed to stay in FATA. Some 6.8% believe that that there are no such people in FATA.


### Role of religion in the lives and beliefs

Because religion has played such an important role in the daily lives of the people of FATA, as well as in the political dynamics of Pakistan, plus it has played an important role in the various stages of *Jihadi* movements, the people were asked to indicate what role, if any, religion should play. Various alternatives were offered, but they were to choose the most important role as far as they were concerned.

The majority (55.3%) believes that religion should provide a moral code that everyone should follow, while a small



Fig 41. Role of religion in the lives and beliefs



proportion of respondents, 10.8%, are of the view that religion should define how governments are chosen. Some 8.8% respondents think that religion should dictate women's rights while 3.8% believe that religion should play no role at all. A sizable number, 17.8% respondents don't know the answer or they were undecided.

The data from the last three years shows some interesting shifts as shown in the figure 41. The provision of a moral code showed ever increasing percentages as the primary role of religion in society.

Analysing the last three years data, it is revealing that there has been a decline in 'others' indicating greater focus, but, then again, the category 'Do not know' increased four fold. The belief that religion should provide a moral code of conduct doubled from less than a quarter to over half of the respondents in three years. The dictation of women's rights steadily declined from 14.5% to 4.6%. Apparently this specific issue has become less so

in this time.


What is clear is the fact that the people firmly believe that religion should play a major role in their daily lives and in the code of civil conduct.

Another way to examine the trends is through specific and important symbolic aspects of the belief that religion is the moral code for living one's culture. Two aspects were chosen: 1) 'Honour killings' is related to one of the fundamental pillars of *Pakhtun* culture and 2) 'Suicide Bombings' is a controversial aspect that is related to extremist Islam.

### Honour killing

From the last three surveys, shown in the figure 42 below, it is revealed that respondents' reaction in favour of the practice is increasing. In 2008 survey, only 18.9% favoured the custom. This rose to 25.5% in 2009 survey, and in 2010 had risen to an

Fig 42. Honour killing



alarming 44.0% in 2010. Inversely, the reaction of respondents opposing the notion is declining.


However, this difference may be partly because in the 2008 and 2009 surveys, 'sometime' was an option which was not repeated in the 2010 survey. If those who believe that honour killing is justified 'sometime' are added to the previous years' 'Yes' then the trend disappears. Nevertheless, it is still a 50/50 proposition of support for the practice.

### Justification of suicide bombing in Islam

This question was not asked in 2008. Accordingly there are only two data points. Small changes from year to year are to be expected, but substantial changes should be examined. From the figure 43 we note that 'justified' suicide bombing went down considerably from 17.0% in 2009 to 10.2% in 2010 survey. But, considering that only a small part of a population has to support such activities for them to happen, this is an alarming proportion. Going with that concern is the steady 14.4% saying 'rarely' because should extreme cases come about, then this segment might also support a suicide bombing effort.

A significant number of respondents, 25.5%, were undecided or did not know the answer in 2009, but that category went down to just 6.2% in 2010, suggesting that respondents started to

Fig 43 Justification of suicide bombing in Islam




realise and understand the issue of suicide bombing and wanted to speak and share their opinion. Fortunately 'never justified' increased from one year to another to over 57.1% of the respondents.

### Religious authority trusted the most

The 2010 survey attempted to find out which religious authority respondents trusted the most. Nearly half of the respondents, 45.1%, did not know or were undecided, while Tahir ul Qadri and Dr. Israr Ahmed, identified by 15.6% each, as trusted the most by respondents. Professor Anees was identified by just 4.4% respondents and Amir Liaqat Ali by 2.4%. Javed Ghamdi identified by 1.8% respondents, as the most trusted religious authority.

Analysing the last years' surveys, Dr. Israr Ahmed continues to be trusted the most by more, i.e. 11.3% in 2008 and 14.0% in 2009 surveys. Tahir ul Qadri received gradual response, which increases from 6.4% in 2008 survey to 6.8% in 2009 survey and ultimately reached to 15.6% in 2010 survey. The level of trust of respondents gradually dropped significantly for Jamaat ud Dawa, which was recently banned by United Nations. The trust

Fig 44. Religious authority trusted the most



level for Jamaat ud Dawa dropped from 10.5% in 2008 to 9.0% in 2009 and ultimately reached to just 1.9% in 2010. This also shows respondents realisation of the sensitivities of the day to day situation after 9/11.

### Religious authority outside of Pakistan trusted the most

With this question the focus shifted to trusted religious authority outside of Pakistan.


The majority, 54.7%, of the respondents trusted Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman, while 16.6% identified Dr. Zakir Naik of India, as the 2nd most trusted religious authority living outside Pakistan. Imam Khamenae received 10.6% responses, and 14.8% do not trust any of the mentioned names.

Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman continues to be trusted the most in the last three years surveys. In 2008 survey he received three quarters (75.4%) of respondents trust while in 2009 survey he was trusted by 59.3% of respondents.

In spite of the absence of coverage of private TV channels in FATA, Dr. Zakir Naik is trusted by a considerable number of

respondents and the trust level goes up every year. In 2008 survey he was trusted by 10.1% respondents which was rose to 15.7% and finally reached to 16.0% in 2010 survey.

Fig 45. Religious authority outside of Pakistan trusted the most.



## Conclusion

The narrative of this chapter began with the reminder that militancy, politics and religion have an entwined history for the *Pakhtun*. As the statistics were presented, it was clear that the people of FATA are devote believers in Islam and over the last three surveys they have become more so to the extent that great proportions believe that Islam should be the moral code for living. Unfortunately, the percentage of respondents who believe in honour killings has also gone up to the extent that the population is evenly split on this custom.

All of these values and cultural attributes were shown to have an important impact on the perception of the people when it comes to militancy. For example, the perceived difference between Afghan and Pakistan Taliban is important for policy and counter insurgency. Also the proportion of the population having a favourable attitude or no opinion about the Taliban (from either side of the border) shows that the information and media impact has not been as complete as it needs to be if the tide is going to be turned against militancy in FATA.

It was also shown that two thirds of the people believe that Islamic extremism is a threat to Pakistan. This level of consciousness is important for linking the people in FATA to the population of Pakistan in general so that they will support the effort to bring about a peaceful solution to the conflict and expel the miscreants. That being said, it was puzzling that the majority of the people did not know about Al Qaeda.

In that context, it is understandable that most of the people believe that foreign, *Jihadi* fighters should leave FATA, but almost half of the interviewees believe that it is the government's role to make them leave. In other words, it is not the responsibility of the hosts to break their culture of hosting and to force the *Jihadi* fighters to leave. In reality a small minority believe that they should be allowed to stay if they cease violence. Again, in this diverse set of opinions there are alternatives for solutions.

In the final section of this chapter the sources of Religious

authority were identified both nationally and internationally. The significance of these leaders will have to be analyzed by scholars who can explain the importance of the schools of thought.





# CHAPTER 7

IMPACT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

# CHAPTER - 7

## IMPACT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES

### Introduction

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the native Afghans fled their country seeking asylum in neighbouring Pakistan. Without being a signatory to the UN Refugee Convention or having a specific national law to protect refugees, Pakistan became a host based on the historic and cultural ties it has shared with neighbouring Afghanistan. In late 1988, a total of approximately 3.3 million Afghan refugees were housed in Pakistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had over 2 million Afghans. Although no formal census of Afghans living in Pakistan was done until 2005, the refugee population was estimated to be over 5 million at the peak of the crisis. In 2010, there are still 1.7 million registered Afghans residing in Pakistan.<sup>73</sup> Out of this number, the largest population of over one million is residing in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.<sup>74</sup> The Islamic spirit of brotherhood, and the *Pakhtun* traditions, played an important role in ensuring that Afghan refugees were housed in camps and received basic assistance including food, health, water, primary education and a range of other services.

In the late 1980s, Afghan refugees were allowed to settle in major cities of Pakistan where they were able to establish themselves in the informal economic sector. Jalozi camp in Nowshera district was one of the largest refugee camps in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Afghans could have returned to their homeland after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, and some did, but then a long and brutal civil war began between the Taliban and the warlords. The consequent takeover by the Taliban established yet another wave of refugees. In 2002, as a result of 9/11 incidents in US, the US and NATO armed forces engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom, that also forced yet other Afghans to flee to Pakistan.

Afghan refugees quickly became a part of the Pakistan's

economy and were allowed to work, start businesses, and some even 'bought' national identity cards and passports. As is the case with all protracted crises, assistance began to diminish in the early nineties and the pressure on Afghan refugees to return to a slowly stabilizing Afghanistan also grew. The presence of Afghan refugees had put an enormous burden on Pakistan's economy, health and education infrastructure. Nonetheless, Afghan refugees contributed significantly in the local economy.

As a result of that, and with conditions in Afghanistan stabilizing, the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the UNHCR signed the Tripartite Agreement in 2002 on the safe and dignified repatriation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Since then, 3.5 million Afghans have returned home with UNHCR's repatriation assistance package.

Recently, the Pakistani Cabinet approved the Management and Repatriation Strategy for Afghan refugees in Pakistan for the years 2010-2012. The Government of Pakistan has pledged to continue supporting the UNHCR and the Government of Afghanistan to find durable solutions for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The government has also reaffirmed its commitment to addressing the issue of undocumented population movement in Pakistan.

Tensions among the Afghan population, the host government and local communities have been common. The Afghans have been considered a burden on the economy, blamed for spreading terrorism and 'social evils', as well as fueling political tension that has been high between the two countries due to the 'War on Terror'.

It is also perceived that Afghan refugees have impacted the Pakistani economy and its society and have been found guilty of creating law and order situations. This issue will be explored with the survey data.



Weapons worth billions of US dollars were transferred to Afghanistan through Pakistan and during shipment, a significant quantity was diverted and sold to the arms dealers, which ultimately found their ways into the hands of Pakistani civilians. We find a general perception within Pakistani society that Afghan crisis is responsible for the colossal amount of weapons in the Pakistani society. These weapons are being used in sectarian, inter-tribal, intra-tribal, political and religious violence. In addition to weapons proliferation, the Afghan crisis also brought the menace of drugs, smuggling of illegal goods across the border, deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan in general. Trafficking of women and children are other issues for which the Pakistani society blames the Afghan.

New trends of internal and external conflicts are presenting numerous challenges to the people of Pakistan, who have started to believe that the internal security dynamics in Pakistan are directly linked to the Afghan crisis and presence of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The sheltering of Afghan Taliban in Pakistan's tribal region is blamed for the 'talibanisation' in Pakistan's tribal region.

In the survey findings presented in the next section we examine how the FATA people perceived Afghan refugees 30 years presence in Pakistan on the themes described above (economy, instability, repatriation, talibanisation) in the qualitative section.

### Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's economy

The 2010 survey repeated the same question asked during the previous surveys. The goal is to assess whether respondents 'agree' or 'disagree' with the notion that 'Afghan refugees living in Pakistan damage Pakistan's economy'.

Overall, the results suggest that majority of respondents support the notion, but looking back over the previous years' results there seems to be a shifting away from strong agreement toward a weaker agreement that there is a damage done to the economy. When both 'agree' and 'strongly agree' are summed, then the total is approximately at the same level (70%) as in the previous question about the repatriation of refugees.

### Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's security

The 2010 survey attempted to assess whether respondents 'agree' or 'disagree' with the notion 'Afghan refugees living in Pakistan undermine Pakistan's security.'

Nearly three quarter of respondents, 73.9%, 'agree', including 40.6% who 'strongly agreed' with the notion. Only 7.1% respondents 'disagree' with the notion, including just 1.4% who






Fig 47. The Impact of Afghan refugees on Pakistan's security



'strongly disagrees'.

Looking at the past three years surveys nothing significant has been noticed however, there has been some fluctuation in statistics, favouring the notion. But overall, findings support the

Fig 48. Afghan refugees creating tension with Pakistani population



notion that Afghan refugees have undermined security in Pakistan. Obviously, this, plus the question of economic damage contributes to the majority supporting repatriation.

### Afghan refugees creating tension with Pakistani population

Another way to assess the refugee crisis was to ask if the 'Afghan refugees living in Pakistan create tension with the local Pakistani population'.


Again, over three quarters (82.9%) of the respondents agree with the notion. Only 5.0% respondents 'disagree' with the notion, including just 1.6% who 'strongly disagree'.

### Repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan

In each of the three surveys the respondents were asked if they thought that the Afghan refugees should be repatriated. As shown in the figure 49, a substantial majority of the respondents believe Afghan refugees should return to their homeland.

Those who opposed the notion remained very small in number, therefore, suggesting the Afghan refugees should be returned to

Fig 49. Repatriation of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan



Afghanistan. Again, we note that the number of unsure or 'do not know' responses has declined.

## Conclusion

All of the survey questions concerning Afghan refugees in Pakistan lead to the same conclusion by three quarters of the population surveyed, and that is, the refugees should be repatriated. Furthermore, issues such as the economy and insecurity are related to tension in FATA, and these issues are related by the interviewees to Afghan refugees. From the previous section on development and the conditions in FATA we know that refugees are one issue of many, but their presence exacerbates the situation.

We also are aware that the expulsion or return of the refugees to Afghanistan will not solve the main problems on either side of the border. Moreover, the refugee problem cannot be solved unless the civil war in Afghanistan ends and the effort for development made. In the last chapter of this report, 'The Way Forward,' one of the recommendations is the development of

economic corridors to stimulate economic activity on both sides of the border. That approach would make the return of the refugees more plausible if on the Afghan side similar strategies such as decentralization were also carried out as part of the strategy to end the insurgency.



# CHAPTER 8

SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND MEDIA USE

# CHAPTER - 8

## SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND MEDIA USE

### Introduction

Since 2008, the surveys have explored how the people of FATA access and receive information. Once again, this year, the survey examined readership of newspapers, listenership of radio, viewership of television, how they value the media and the way they use the media. The survey also assessed what sources of information the people of FATA use and rely upon.


### Sources of information

During the last three years' surveys, through a multiple response question, we documented the male and female FATA respondents' sources of, or their access to, information. The multiple responses in the figure 50 show the comparative popularity of the various media. They are not mutually exclusive responses because multiple responses were permitted.

Generally, more people of FATA have access to Pakistan radio, press and TV than identified in previous years. According to which, the media trends are quite different and variation from year to year is also substantial.

In the 2008 survey, 42.0% of the respondents had access to the Pakistan press, but in 2009 it dropped considerably to 23.6% and then went up again to 33.7% in 2010. Radio listenership was just 29.6% in 2008 and dropped to 22.1% in 2009 before going up astonishingly to 55.0% in 2010.

Because the people of FATA are faced with internal and external conflicts, the increase in radio listenership could be their curiosity to have knowledge of the ongoing militancy as well as national and international news on the topic. Another factor could be that with the passage of time, more people of FATA have access to cell phones with radio facilities built in. That would make it possible for the people of FATA to have



access to radio.


TV is another source of information for the people of FATA and, there too, we see an increase in the responses of the people of FATA.

Another surprising revelation is the increase in mention of friends and family members and neighbours. We see that in 2008 just 11.0% respondents have 'Family and Neighbours' as source of information and that remained almost the same in 2009. However, 'Friends and Neighbours' as sources went up to nearly half of the sample size (49.5% and 41.8%, respectively) in 2010. This is a strange development and it seems that there is no justification for this increase. However, one reason could be forced migration of hundreds of thousands of people from FATA to other adjacent districts/areas of KP where some of them were hosted by the local communities and relatives while others took shelter in the IDP camps where they developed

closer ties with both relatives and neighbours. The increase in communication links between the people of FATA may be the result of becoming IDPs or to keep track of relatives and friends who became IDPs. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the rapid gain in the use of the media. This is a good sign for social solidarity in the communities.

### Most valued sources of information

Through a subsequent single choice question, the respondents were asked which source of information they value the most. Reading from left to right in the figure 51, it is easily seen that the value is in the formal media for close to three-quarters of the population, as opposed to the sources identified in the previous question. The Pakistani Press, Radio and TV at 19.1%, 27% and 26% respectively, led the other sources as the most valued. Literacy probably plays an important role in the type of media valued.





Among foreign sources more people of FATA have identified British radio (as opposed to press or TV) as the most valued source of information. However, the identification for British radio is comparatively low against the BBC listenership. Low response for British TV is mainly because of absence of any cable network service in FATA. Only a very few people have installed dish satellite antennas in their *Hujras* and homes. British press readership is also extremely low, which is understandable.

The data also reveals that American press, TV and radio have very small audiences in FATA.

'Neighbours and family' are valued sources, and the increase in that value over previous years reflects the increase seen in them as sources, for example, 2010 (14.7%), as compared to 2008 (0.0%) and 2009 (1.1%). 'Neighbours' receive again a very good response from the FATA respondents. In 2009, some 5.7% respondents identified 'Neighbours' as the most valued source of information, which has gone up to 9.7% in 2010.

### Newspaper readership

The survey intended to identify which newspaper is widely read by the respondents from FATA. The figure 52 makes the analysis straight forward. From the last three years statistics, 'Mashriq'

Urdu language daily newspaper, is identified by 24.6% respondents giving it the highest readership for all three years. 'Mashriq' is followed by daily 'Aaj', another Urdu newspaper with 20.6% of the respondents in 2008. However, the figure went down to just 11.4%, almost half, in 2009. While in 2010, daily 'Aaj' is identified by 20.3% respondents, receiving the second highest readership in FATA for all three years. The English-language newspapers are probably limited by low English language literacy rates.

The daily Ausaf (Urdu) is the 3rd most highly read Urdu newspaper identified by the respondents in FATA for all three years' surveys.

In the 2008 survey, 12.1% identified Ausaf as the most read newspaper, while it went down in 2009 when only 8.0% FATA respondents identified it, and in 2010 it dropped to just 6.7%.

The main drawback to the findings was that in 2010, 45.3% of the FATA respondents did not identify a paper. This reflects the fact that over half of the respondents are illiterate, and some who could just hardly read a few words identified different newspapers. Respondents identified other options. However, the frequency or percentage of responses are not of statistical importance.





Fig 53. TV Viewers



TV viewers


There are no cable network facilities available to the people in FATA. However, all channels of Pakistan TV are available to FATA viewers through direct transmission. The survey asked about preference of TV channels. For all three surveys Khyber AVT, a private *Pakhtu* channel with coverage inside FATA, was identified as the 2nd most watched channel (13.7%) after the public PTV channel. PTV has been in first place and this year it

moved to 55.3% of the viewers after falling to 25.9% the previous year.

ATV is another government run channel that is watched by 11.3% of the respondents in 2010.

Respondents identified scores of other private and Western TV channels from satellite dishes and other sources. However, those responses are not numerous enough for further analysis here.

Fig 54. Radio listenership



## Radio listenership

According to various statistics mentioned above in this chapter, radio is more popular than the TV and press as a source of information.

Judging by the programming source, BBC is the most popular radio source. Between its *Urdu* and *Pakhtu* language versions, 46.8% of the respondents refer to it compared with 41.9% for Radio Pakistan. The third most popular program content came from the *Pakhtu* language Dewa, the Voice of America (23.4%) in 2010.

Over time Pakistani radio was consistently in second place, BBC in first place and Dewa as third place sources of programming.

The other radio stations mentioned are, for the most part, local stations serving specific market areas or Agencies. One would not expect them to register high over all in a sample beyond their reach or reason.

## Conclusion

One of the findings, the radio audience, reinforces one of the themes of this report and that is that the *Pakhtun* are not isolated and are interested in world events to the extent that they listen to international broadcast stations as much or more than the Pakistan national broadcast.

Another set of findings, increased reliance on family, friends and neighbours, is an indication of increased community solidarity or bonding. We have identified the problem of the Talibanisation as destructive of tribal customs and traditions, but here we see the resilience of ties within the community.

It is difficult to reconcile the attachment to British and US broadcasts with the negative image of both the UK and the US documented in the previous chapter. Clearly these stations should do a better job so that actions (both military and reconstruction) on the ground in both Pakistan and Afghanistan can be comprehended and appreciated.



# CHAPTER 9

**WORLD AFFAIRS:  
THE OPINION ON PAKISTAN'S  
RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES**

# CHAPTER - 9

## WORLD AFFAIRS:

### THE OPINION ON PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

#### Introduction

Pakistan was carved out of British India in 1947 and became an independent and sovereign state. From that time on Pakistan, as an active member of the United Nations, has searched for its place in the world order and aspired to leadership roles beyond the Sub-continent.

In May 1998 Pakistan became the only Muslim state to have gained the status of a nuclear state. When it became the 6th declared nuclear power, Pakistan began to play an important role in this small community. With 175 million souls, it is the second largest Muslim country after Indonesia. Accordingly, Pakistan is an important and active member of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The Kashmir dispute and fear of Indian aggression has been the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy because it is felt that India has not reconciled herself to the emergence of Pakistan. From the time of its independence, Pakistan faced India as its adversary and this view predominates till this day. Both countries fought four wars of different intensities, in 1948, 1965, 1971 and then 1999. The war in 1971 caused the creation of still another new sovereign state, Bangladesh. The main bone of contention between Pakistan and India is Kashmir, where Muslims are in the majority and Pakistan has had claims since the time of its partition from India. Pakistan's feud with India has guided its foreign policy, distorted local politics, and has moulded popular perception against India as was seen in the data presented in the previous chapters.

Pakistan has long-standing relations with its other neighbours - Afghanistan, Iran and China. It has extensive security and environmental interests in the Persian Gulf and a wide-ranging bi-lateral relationship with the United States, United Kingdom and other Western countries. In 1986 Pakistan signed the

Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) Pact.

Pakistan has sought security through outside alliances. During the Cold War era, and especially during the time of the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, Pakistan remained a close friend of United States and China. It maintains these ties to this day. During the Cold War era, Pakistan was also a member of important regional military alliances: CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation).

The 9/11 incident in US redefined Pakistan's role in the region. After extreme pressure from the US, Pakistan became the front line state in the 'War on Terror'. Being an important and frontline state in the 'War on Terror', Pakistan formed a 'Friends of Democratic Pakistan' group which includes important countries such as Australia, Britain, and Canada.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a sense of the perception of FATA respondents on Asian, Middle Eastern and Western relations and also with the Muslim world in particular.

#### Emigration from Pakistan

As described before, and illustrated in the accompanying figure 55, the proportion of people in FATA who have wanted to







Fig 56. Reason for immigration



emigrate has declined during the last three years. Nevertheless, 36.6% would still emigrate if given the chance.

For those who responded that they would emigrate, their choice of destination was asked. Of the 36.6% respondents, who wanted to emigrate from Pakistan, one third of the respondents, 34.9%, identified Saudi Arabia; 17.8% respondents choose the United Arab Emirates; 11.7% respondents chose the United Kingdom; and Iran was identified by 7.5%.

A subsequent question asked 'why,' if given the opportunity, did they want to emigrate to other countries. The results are shown in the above figure 56. Note that there was some misunderstanding of the term 'emigrate' because many of the reasons did not indicate a permanent status, for example, Haj, visit, education, visit holy places, etc. Only 35.7% (Job and Business) indicated permanency. That is 35.7% of the 36.6% (one-sixth of all respondents) were job seekers. The religious



motive for travel abroad was almost as strong as job seeking (28.8%). 1% indicated that they wanted to visit relatives. As pointed out in the general description of the people of FATA, they have an awareness and links to other countries for various reasons.

### Which country should Pakistan aspire to be more like?

The survey attempted to document the affinity of the people for other countries images. They were asked to identify a country that Pakistan should aspire to be more like. A quarter of the sample (25.8%) identified with Saudi Arabia; China (16.9%), Iran, UK and Japan identified by 9.7%, 5.1% and 4.6% respectively.

When asked the reason why they would chose to go to these countries, 29.8% respondents feel that these are Islamic countries, 29.5% feel that these are developed countries, while






8.9% believe that these are peaceful countries.

### Military aid from UK and US

As pointed out in the chapter on security, there is public debate on whether or not Pakistan should accept money from Western

countries such as the UK and USA for the military build-up. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents, 61.9%, said 'yes' while nearly quarter of respondents, 24.0%, said 'no'. A sizable portion of respondents, 14.1%, do not know the answer. Note that the percent in favour doubled over the past year while the

Fig 59. Whether or not Pakistan should accept military aid from UK and US




opposition was halved.

### Development aid from UK and US

The survey also asked a similar question but focused on development funding. The response was more favourable with close to three-quarters believing that Pakistan should accept money from Western countries for development while just 17.8% said 'no'. Only 11.2% are undecided or don't know the

Fig 60. Whether or not Pakistan should accept development aid from UK and US



answer.

As in the case of military assistance the acceptance of funding increased from 2009 to 2010 while those in opposition declined by approximately 50%.

We will return to these positive impressions of US and UK military and development assistance in sharp contrast to the opinions in general toward both the UK and the US, but, before that, the opinions toward neighbouring, other Islamic, and Western nations will be reviewed.

### Opinion of the people of FATA about other nations

One of the themes throughout this report has been that because the people of FATA have been in the cross currents of history for so long, and because the people of FATA travel and have relatives abroad, they have formed opinions about other nations, not only as destinations for emigrants, but also as to the quality of the relationship of those nations with Pakistan. Rather than review the opinions nation by nation, we have grouped the nations into: Neighbours, Other Islamic Nations, and then Western Nations. For the most part these nations have sizable Pakistani populations, but we do not know if or what portions of the respondents have actual contact with those countries and populations.

Because of their historical relation with the people of FATA, a series of specific questions was designed with regard to both the UK and the US. The colonial relation (Durand Line, FCR, the inherited colonial administrative structure) with the UK; the role of the US in support of the *Mujahideen*; and then the role of both the US and the UK in the present conflict, may influence the understandings. It is probable that the general impressions of the people cannot be explained by them either, but in the previous sections we have pointed out their support or opposition to all of these factors from the FATA Secretariat, the FCR, the military offences, the use of drones and the acceptance of military aid and training assistance.


### Opinion about neighbouring countries

The 2010 survey asked the respondents to classify nations on a four-point scale from 'very favourable' to 'very unfavourable'. The results for the neighbouring countries are presented in the following table 17:

Interestingly, both China and Iran hold similar levels of favourable (79.4% and 76.7% respectively) esteem. One is an Islamic country and the other is not. From the emigration question we know that small proportions of the respondents said that they would go to those two countries. Neither countries are contiguous with FATA and neither has been directly involved with development or the past military conflicts.

Table 17. Opinion about neighbouring countries

Country	Very favourable	Somewhat favourable	Somewhat unfavourable	Very unfavourable	No response	Don't know	Total
<i>Percent</i>							
Afghanistan	18.7	26.2	20.4	29.4	1.5	3.8	100
China	49.9	29.5	6.5	3.2	3.9	7.1	100
India	1.6	4.5	13.1	74.4	1.8	4.7	100
Iran	44.4	32.3	8.5	6.3	2.8	5.7	100



The opinions toward Afghanistan and India show completely different perspectives when compared with China and Iran. Again, one is an Islamic nation and the other is not and the histories are completely different. The low level of esteem for India is quite understandable from the history and civil war and the constant use of India as a threat in the internal political dialogue of Pakistan. Afghanistan probably receives a 44.9% vs. 49.8% split between favourable and unfavourable votes because of the perceived underdevelopment and history of conflict, but it does not show the overly negative stance shown toward India or the overly positive stance shown toward China and Iran.

In the cases of Afghanistan and India, there is data for the last three years showing that the figures cited have been fairly stable and not a changing trend.

In the case of Iran there is a slight trend away from the unfavourable end of the scale toward the favourable end, but, as shown in the above table 17, it is slight and may just be an artefact of the sampling.

The Chinese case shows the same stability over time noted with regard to Afghanistan and India.

### Opinion about major Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia

The previous presentations have shown that Saudi Arabia has had a special relationship with Pakistan and especially with the people of FATA. Saudi Arabia is the sight of the two Holy Cities of Islam that are the destination of pilgrims. Making the *haj* to *Mecca* and visiting *Medina* is a life-long goal for Muslims and making that pilgrimage brings a respected title (*Haji*) to one's name. Saudi Arabia is also one of the favoured destinations for emigration and work. During the Saudi support for the struggle against the Russians, training for religious leaders of Pakistan and Afghanistan was provided by Saudi benefactors and the system of *Madrassas* in existence today in Pakistan was started and supported by Saudi Arabia. There is also Saudi support in

Table 18 Opinion about major Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia

Country	Very favourable	Somewhat favourable	Somewhat unfavourable	Very unfavourable	No response	Don't know	Total
Percent							
Saudi Arabia	77.8	10.7	2.5	5.8	1.4	1.8	100
Malaysia	18.6	40.2	9.6	8.4	11.8	11.4	100

most Islamic nations for the construction of Mosques.

Malaysia was chosen to compare Saudi Arabia with another Muslim nation. Although Malaysia is one of the largest Muslim nations with high rates of literacy and good governance it has not been a destination for Pakistanis seeking work.

As shown in the above table 18, there is a marked difference between the two on a scale of favourability. The rather high rate of non-response and 'do not know' in Malaysia's case reflect the lack of contact or ways to form an opinion. Nevertheless, the 50% favourability rating is good compared with the nations above who received low 'favourability' and high 'unfavourable' ratings.

The data from the previous surveys regarding Saudi Arabia and Malaysia are stable and do not reflect trends.

### Opinion about Western countries - Canada, France, Germany, UK and US

The 2010 survey was designed to measure the respondents' opinions about some Western countries where a considerable number of the *Pakhtun* Diaspora have emigrated. All of the five countries selected are the home to large populations of Muslims from other countries, but their being a Western destination for Pakistanis was important to their selection. In the case of the UK and the US, their historical relations are of

Table 19. Opinion about Western countries - Canada, France, Germany, UK and US

Country	Very favourable	Somewhat favourable	Somewhat unfavourable	Very unfavourable	No response	Don't know	Total
<i>Percent</i>							
Canada	7.4	23.6	28.3	13.8	12.8	14.1	100
France	4.3	18.4	29.9	19.5	13.7	14.2	100
Germany	8.7	22.6	25.4	16.9	13.1	13.3	100
UK	8.2	20.6	18.2	38.4	6.7	7.9	100
US	4.3	12.2	18.0	51.5	5.3	0	100

particular interest, but those details will be explored later in this chapter.

The first observation is that approximately 25% of the respondents do not respond or have an opinion about Canada, France or Germany indicating a substantial 'disconnect' compared with the UK and US.

The low favourability classification, however, falls to the US, and that is reflected by 51.5% giving the US a 'very unfavourable' rating. The UK comes close to the US with its sum of unfavourable ratings total (56.6% vs. 69.5% for the US). It is important to point out that the UK has a level of 'favourable' responses similar to Canada, France and Germany. Only France has a slightly less favourable rating than the Canada, Germany, and the UK. This may be because of its recent law against Muslim women wearing veils.

### Opinion on US favourability over time

The availability of data from the last three surveys may be useful to see if there is a trend toward or away from favourability for the US. Clearly, the opinion toward the US has been shifting toward the favourable end of the scale over the last three years

Table 20. Opinion on US favourability over time

Responses US	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Very favourable	3.0	3.9	4.3
Somewhat favourable	6.4	8.6	12.4
Somewhat unfavourable	11.9	7.8	18.0
Very unfavourable	66.2	55.1	51.5
No response	8.2	12.5	5.3
Don't know	4.5	12.0	8.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(9.4% to 16.7% - 2008) and away from the unfavourable end (78.1% to 69.5% - 2010). Perhaps the substantial development efforts in FATA, with the FATA Secretariat, and also the support of the Frontier Corps with military training are factors behind this improvement. These programs are only a year or two old in the field, but perhaps they will change the opinion in the short term as well as long term.

### Opinion on UK favourability over time

The data from the 2008, 2009, and 2010 surveys, in the table 21 below, show a notable shift way from the 'very unfavourable' end of the scale toward the 'favourable end.' In 2008 the UK was on a par with the US-extreme of 2010 in 'unfavourability.'

Table 21. Opinion on UK favourability over time

Responses UK	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Very favourable	5.4	6.1	8.2
Somewhat favourable	11.4	11.3	20.6
Somewhat unfavourable	12.7	9.5	18.2
Very unfavourable	58.0	42.7	38.4
No response	7.8	16.2	6.7
Don't know	4.9	14.3	7.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


Exactly what happened in the last two years to change the reputation of the UK needs to be assessed. One possibility is the change in Prime Ministers in England from Tony Blair to Gordon Brown. That change was avidly covered in the Pakistani media and followed by the people of FATA as well because of the tight link with the 'War on Terror.' The change was viewed as very favourable in Pakistan because it was interpreted as a possible change in the UK position on Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the UK did make changes on both of those positions which were seen as moving away from its previous lock step with the US.

The following series of questions help to put the 'favourable-unfavourable' opinions into a broader appreciate of the UK and its place in the vision of the people of FATA.

### UK's role in making the world peaceful and stable

The 2010 survey endeavoured to know the perception of the United Kingdom's role in making the world peaceful and stable. Only 20.4% of the respondents believe this to be true. Nearly half of the respondents, 47.4%, disagree. A quarter of the respondents did not know the answer, and 7.1% did not respond.

Fig 62. UK's role in making the world peaceful and stable



Here we see steady trends in supporting the notion that UK helps to make the world peaceful and stable. In 2008, only 7.4% respondents believe so which rose up three fold (21.6) in 2009 and remained stable in 2010 (20.4%).

On the other hand, in 2008 nearly two thirds (61.1%) of respondents believed that the UK has no role in making the world peaceful. In 2009 the figure dropped down to 46.6% and then remained stable in 2010 (47.4%).

### The UK values the United Nations (UN)

The respondents were asked if they thought that the UK values the United Nations. The results over the last three years show that a third of the respondents do not offer an opinion. This probably indicates that the concept is not within their area of concern nor on the news. Nevertheless, for those who did offer an opinion, the trend is toward a positive image.

### The UK helps to make the world more prosperous

Another area of opinion was about the role of the UK in helping to make the world more prosperous. Note that more than quarter of respondents remained either undecided or did not know the answer throughout the three years. This is probably because of their lack of knowledge on certain issues. Nevertheless, as shown in the table 22 below, the opinion has been shifting toward a more favourable opinion.

Table 22. The UK helps to make the world more prosperous


Responses UK & UN	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Yes	21.1	21.9	30.5
No	42.8	31.2	28.4
Don't know	27.9	37.7	32.6
No response	8.3	9.3	8.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>



## The UK helps to safeguard the global environment

The three, consecutive surveys endeavoured to measure a trend with regard to whether UK helps to safeguard the global environment.

Fig 63. The UK helps to safeguard the global environment




Again, as shown in the figure above, one third of respondents (33.3%) either do not know the answer or is undecided. Although there is a steady increase in support of the notion, there are more people undecided and against who need to be swung over by actions or news that reaches them in order to make a substantial swing in opinion on this issue.

## Promotes respect for democratic values

The promotion of democratic values has been one of the traditional UK foreign policy stances. From the consecutive surveys the following figure 64 shows the level of opinion on this subject.

Once again, the subject matter seems to be beyond over a third of the people interviewed. Trends are not shown, but it is clear

Fig 64. Promotes respect for democratic values



that the opinion is that the UK is not perceived as playing a positive role because twice as many people say 'No' than say 'Yes.'

## The UK promotes respect for human rights

Another pillar of foreign policy and tradition has been support for human rights, but, as shown in the figure 65 below, the people of FATA do not perceive that to be the case by 2 to 1.

Fig 65. The UK promotes respect for human rights





Fig 66. The UK's relationship with Pakistan



Again, over a third of the respondents do not respond or offer an opinion. After analysing the three years' findings, we see no significant change in the behaviour of the respondents favouring or opposing the notion. The data is self-explanatory.

### The UK's relationship with Pakistan

In this question the subject was the type of relationship that the UK has with Pakistan. Once again, as shown in the figure 66 above, a third of the respondents did not have an opinion.


The trends consistently show a declining relationship toward an unequal relationship, less partnership for progress, diminished allies against terror, and, increasingly 'a left over from colonialism.' These are not positive assessments for positive foreign relations.

### Opinion about the UK

The opinion was approached in another way, that is, whether they are changing or becoming more or less favourable toward the UK. Slightly less than a third of the respondents did not offer an opinion. The results are more pleasant than the previous

finding because there is a decline in those stating that they are becoming 'less favourable' with time, but, that has to be put into the perspective that less than 10% of the respondents are saying 'more favourable.' It is difficult to interpret the 'no change' responses because one does not know if they held a positive or a negative opinion originally.

Fig 67. Opinion about the UK



## UK and US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq

The simultaneous involvement by western nations under US and UK leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq tie these two interventions together, but one is in a neighbouring country and the other in a country with which the people of FATA have had little contact. Nevertheless, the news about both military efforts has received world-wide attention. Data from all three years is used to try to point out shifting opinions or trends.

### The UK's involvement in Afghanistan



In case of UK's involvement in Afghanistan less than a quarter of the people do not offer an opinion. There is a decline in the theme that the intervention is an attack on Islam; that dropped from over a third of the population to less than a fifth. This could be the result of a nationwide media campaign about the legitimate presence of international forces, including UK. That has been an important theme, and it declined to half the 2008 level by 2010. Over the years a steady third of the respondents stated that the UK should not be in Afghanistan at all. The one, small, upward trend is in the belief that the UK is a partner in rebuilding, but it is held by only 11% of the respondents. The other small, but positive segment, is the UK being committed for the long term.

### The UK and US role in Afghanistan

The question now comes closer to the people of FATA with a bordering country in which many of the people involved are also *Pakhtun*. Again we have data from three surveys and the figures are mounted to facilitate comparisons the US figure 68 and UK figure 69.

Immediately the high 'not favourable' classifications for both countries is clear, but they are improving, slightly, from over 80% to 75% and 70% levels in three years. The favourable categories are increasing reflecting the decline in unfavourable opinions. Although the US has a greater unfavourable score, the UK is not that much better. The UK-US alliance in foreign affairs

has been in the press for a decade; it is reflected here in the opinion of FATA.



### UK and US role in Iraq

As shown in the two figures below with the US figure 70 and UK figure 71; the UK has a slightly lower 'not favourable' rating than the US, but neither country is held in high esteem for their intervention in Iraq.

Fig 70. US role in Iraq






Fig 71. UK role in Iraq



### UK and US attitudes towards the Islamic World

We will close this chapter with another general perception. The question posed was 'what do you think the attitude of the US or the UK is toward the Muslim World?' Generally in Pakistan there is a wide spread perception that the West, including UK, is against Muslim World and that policies are made to hurt the feelings of Muslims around the world. The UK is an important player in the War on Terror after the 9/11 incident in US, and is perceived by the Muslim World as a close ally of US.

Fig 72. UK attitudes towards the Islamic World




Data from the three surveys about the perceived attitudes toward the UK and the US are presented below in figures with the UK figure 72 and the US figure 73.

The two figures show statistics similar attitudes toward the UK and the US. Again, the UK is not as 'unfavoured' as the US, but both countries are poorly perceived by the people of FATA.

The people of FATA generally, and elite particularly, respect and relate themselves historically with the British, recalling their

Fig 73. US attitudes towards the Islamic World



interaction with the British officials. The people of FATA believe that British knew them well and interacted with them accordingly. They argue that British would honour their words, comparing them with the Government of Pakistan.

However, when it comes to the question of UK's attitude towards the Muslim World, then the respondents of FATA interestingly remained 'unfavourable', supporting the widespread perception of the people of Pakistan generally. However, in this context, UK remained behind the US, where more respondents believe that US has more unfavourable attitudes towards Islamic World. The difference between the US and the UK is, however, very small.

All three years surveys statistics suggest that the respondents have very unfavourable views of US in any context and the funds that the US has allocated for FATA for the last few years, has not influenced the people's opinion in FATA.

### UK and US immigration policies

The interest expressed in the survey about going overseas, if given the opportunity, included going to the UK and the US. Only a small percentage of the respondents indicated that the US was a destination; more stated the UK as a destination. Nevertheless those small numbers may indicate an ability to compare immigration policies. Of course the impression about

Fig 74. UK immigration policies





Fig 75. US immigration policies



immigration policy may have been formed based on rumours and the experiences of others. The final question concerns judging the favourability of immigration policies in both the UK and the US.

Immediately we see that at least 40% of the respondents do not have an answer. That reflects the small percentage of the people expressing interest in the first place. It may indicate that for many it was simply not a question relevant to their experience or interests. That being said, the main response for both countries was that they were unfavourably disposed to receiving immigrants for over half of the respondents and the trend is more negative. In keeping with all of the other comparisons between the US and the UK, the UK appears to be doing better as far as positive attitudes, but for a few percentage points the UK and the US there is not a substantive difference.

### Conclusion

In this chapter the range of the inquiry into the people's opinions about other nations near and far looked at dimensions as diverse as military and development assistance, attitudes toward the UN, emigration policies, the ideals of other nations and overall impression of these nations. The special relation

## Understanding FATA 2010

with India is flagged as a problematic one with a history of conflict and also of being used politically for internal purposes. The long relation with the UK also generates mixed and negative feelings. The more modern relationship with the US, when compared with the UK, is also a troubled one where trust is not held either.

Although it may be a simplistic conclusion, the most obvious is that these troubled relationships have been the product of poor communication between those nations and the people of FATA and also the product of Pakistani politics where distracting people from internal inadequacies by promoting fear of outsiders or projecting faults upon them is part of the political game.





# CHAPTER 10

WAY FORWARD

# CHAPTER - 10

## WAY FORWARD

### Introduction

In the text of the report we indicated the scale of the effort to respond to the needs of the FATA and it bears repeating here:

Because of the neglect by the governments in Pakistan and previous Colonial rule, the FATA is one as the most under-developed areas of Pakistan. However, the recent incidents have compelled the Government and the international community to take drastic measures in an effort to develop the region. For the fiscal year 2003-04 the Government, through FATA Secretariat, had allocated Rs. 3256 million for the development sector in FATA. In 2008-09 the budget went up to Rs. 8662 million, an increase of 266%. The international community has increased funding substantially: US Government has committed \$750 million over five years (from 2008-13); European Governments such as the EU, Germany and UK; Canadian and Japanese Governments have also invested in FATA development. They are providing financial and technical support to the Government of Pakistan and to the civil society community for poverty alleviation, infrastructure development, industrial development and growth, creating employment (especially targeting the youth) and economic opportunity zones, etc.

We also saw in the survey there is scant local trust in the very government officials and politicians who should channel the funding to support the development and reform efforts. The experience of the people has been that, historically, funds have been manipulated and misallocated. Recently, one of the strategic errors has been the lack of involvement of the community as a stakeholder in developing the FATA Sustainable Development Plan.

Despite all the unrest in the area, government officials and

politicians are behaving in a manner that supports the status quo.

However, if properly managed, then such initiatives could bring prosperity and reduce the space for the militants to justify their acts. To change the approach and to frame the recommendations that follow, CAMP would like to propose three basic concepts for helping mainstream FATA: Cultural Appropriateness; Develop Local Capabilities and Community Participation and Tribal Involvement, but first the recommendation is that the findings should be returned to the people.

### Devolving the findings

The 'Understanding FATA' series, through the generosity of both the BHC and the willingness of the people of FATA to participate, has provided valuable information to interested policy makers and scholars. The next step in this process should be to devolve the information to the people of FATA so that they can see how their fellow citizens feel about these key issues. There is diversity in FATA, therefore the data from this fourth report should be compiled by Agency and FR in charts showing how each one compares with all of the others. Those charts and statistics should be presented and discussed at a workshop, better a series of workshops, in each Agency and FR in the format of a *Jirga* or *Shura*, that is, elder males and, separately, females so that they can judge their present state of opinion and reflect on future decisions. Although individuals have their own opinions, it is important for them to understand where their opinion stands with regard to others. Ideally there would be people from both the surveyed and the inaccessible areas.

This would be the first step toward the inclusion of the people of FATA in the other recommendations. Now the three basic concepts will be presented.

### Cultural appropriateness

This survey has placed a great deal of emphasis on understanding the culture of the *Pakhtun*. The emphasis has been on customs, beliefs and traditions. The key to solving the problems and engaging the people in a grand project of inclusive nationhood is through respect and recognition of their traditions. Moreover it should be assumed that these traditions are a solid foundation for meeting the call for 'law and order' and 'security' identified in this survey as their priority.

### Developing local capacities

In keeping with the recommendation of building upon the culture and traditions it would be crucial to have programmes that develop local capacities, of public and private sectors to assume the responsibilities that are inherent in local governance and justice that should be devolved from present, inherited Colonial structures. Engaging the people of FATA is the key to success (success defined as peace and development). Experience indicates that even in the most challenging situations qualified local capacity has been able to negotiate with the insurgents to continue implementing programmes under certain acceptable conditions.

### Community participation and tribal involvement

The devolution of the findings would be the first step of the recommendations with the goal of starting a process of community participation. As with all development interventions, community participation at the field level is crucial for social change. Tribal dynamics for local political and material gains are a 'known.' The competition between tribal leaders to serve the needs of their people should be recognized for the traditional responsibilities and authorities that they have had. But development partners should ensure that community at large is taken into confidence to ensure ownership of the programme and also so that the community at

large can hold the leadership responsible for the collective priorities established in the proposed participatory planning process.

### Tackling the big issues

The recommendations that follow are focused on the priorities with the opinions from the survey. They are big issues that require dedication to changing the way history has been. FATA cannot stay the same as should be gradually mainstreamed. Governance includes the rule of law and also the way security is managed as will be described.

**Governance:** The Government of Pakistan should recognise the urgent need to introduce far reaching governance reforms in the conflict stricken areas of FATA. The Pakistan People's Party Government has shown one political commitment to do this by proposing amendments to the FCR in FATA, although these have not yet been implemented. These amendments, once implemented, will help address several local grievances and will also help in creating a supporting environment for the stakeholders to undertake development and conflict resolution initiatives. However, there is a need to fundamentally change the governance structure of FATA and its constitutional status. As the survey found, 'It is the need of the day.' The International Community will lend its public support to FATA reform measures, including extension of Political Parties Act and FCR amendments, but the need for change is absolute and cannot be ignored since the people also desire change.

Accordingly and in keeping with the concepts expressed above participation, cultural and tribal structure - we have specific recommendations:

The FATA Secretariat is viewed as a discredited organization. Its employees and agents are held in low esteem and that low esteem is reflected in the opinion of the people toward the *Maliks* and their *Lungi* assistants. Additionally, the merger of the executive branch and the judicial branch of central government, without checks and balances, is not in keeping



with the constitution. The only solution is to continue as quickly as possible with the attitude and program begun as seen in the cultural resolution to form Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the formation of political parties within that area. That is, the formation of one or perhaps more provinces that would integrate rather than divide, administratively and politically, the rural and urban areas. The FS should be seen as an artefact of the Colonial past that was designed to control and not in keeping with democratic ideals of representation.

The FCR, as it is structured, does not provide the system of justice needed. The *sarkari jirga* as a board of inquiry does not fit the cultural traditions nor fulfil the basis of modern judicial principals for a system of justice. If the formation of provinces were carried out, then the system of common law justice would be applied, but there is a cultural gap between common law and the imposition of the state as the aggrieved rather than the victim as the aggrieved. That statement deserves explanation. When a crime is committed, then the state exacts a punishment, fine, jail time compensation, etc. But under the traditional *jirga* system the goal is to compensate the victim and, more importantly, make amends and resolve the conflict between individuals, families and, even, tribes. The goal of the traditional system is to 'heal' the social fabric that has been torn by the crime or transgression. By the *Jirga* the whole community of elders oversees the conclusion. In the common law situation, it is the official of the state who must oversee the conclusion and law enforcement officials are few and far between.

This old and traditional perspective, i.e., to resolve conflict so that the parties and local society can move on in a constructive way is in keeping with modern judicial reform where local, non-courts, offer a venue for conflicts to be aired and resolved by the parties rather than by a magistrate. Fortunately that approach has always been a strong *Pakhtun* cultural tradition. How to harness this more effectively as part of alternative dispute resolution mechanism should be explored.

**Strengthening *jirga* institution:** The recommendation then is to build upon the traditional *jirga* by strengthening the *jirgamaars*, and the elders who are members of *Jirgas*. There would be a need to ensure that participation was representative and fair. Although the work of *Jirgas* has been part of the oral tradition, those traditions form the jurisprudence that needs to be documented and converted into a more formal jurisprudence that can be taught in high schools so that the citizens will know their rights and obligations. This formalized jurisprudence would also help in the formation of *jirgamaars*. This oral jurisprudence as it stands is a combination of *Pakhtun* cultural beliefs, *Sharia* law and a blend of religious beliefs in the cultural context. Once studied in that context and related to common law, then the *jirga* can be seen as a modern, conflict resolution and justice system for the practice of civil and criminal law. The beauty of this approach to reform is that it can depend upon existing, locally prepared and trained talent and has the weight of culture behind it instead of the nebulous weight of the 'State.' Moreover, it is a respected institution.

**Strengthening the Frontier Corps (FC):** There is international, national, and, importantly as found in the survey, local support for the FC as culturally appropriate for the present security situation. Being a member of the FC has been an esteemed and proud profession for over 100 years; it is not a new institution to be inserted. The recruitment and training should continue with the medium-term goal that these men will become local law-enforcement officers in their home areas. They should not become, as counter insurgency trainees have become in other nations, a terror for their own people or as excuses for one tribe to due battle with another. The value of their cultural ties is in their ability to communicate and also to empathize. If the training dehumanizes them so that they no longer relate to their own people, then peace and stability will be elusive.

The Frontier Corps could become the basis for security for new provincial governments. What could become of the *Khasadars*, Guides and so forth? If civil, local governance were to be established under a provincial system of *Tehsils*, then the role of

these positions could be formalized. The formation of *Lakhhkars*, hopefully, would be on rare occasions and then, for meeting natural disasters, but the formalisation of the terms and purposes of a *Lakhhkars* could include training for many useful purposes (Red Crescent, emergency rescue, etc). This would be a humanitarian role. But, as we have recommended through out, the review of these traditions and roles should be conducted by the people in a participatory manner.

Integrating programmes across the Pak-Afghan border: Both in FATA and in Afghanistan, there are substantial international and government commitments for development. The social and economic conditions in proximity to the common border are similar, and just as the security conditions are similar and require coordination, so too is there the need for involving counterparts across the border in Afghanistan. Many of the families living close to the border have close family ties across the unmarked Durand Line. At times development work on one side leads to despondency on the other side. International development partners may either work in consortium or obtain mandates to work on both sides of the border, ensuing holistic impacts. Development corridors are a distinct possibility, and they need to be developed using the recommendation to work with tribal structures because they form links across the border. As was pointed out in the qualitative sections of the report, there are many important trading routes across the Durand Line, the improvement and management of those roads should be organized by local authorities whose citizens have direct social and economic needs for the success of those linkages. Bi-national, local commissions with the authority and responsibility for those linkages would devolve central government to local governance providing the international community with smaller projects that initially generate employment and build local managerial capacity. The improved communication and trade from these linkages would be a stimulus for towns and market centres in most of the Agencies and some of the FRs.

**Pakistan-Afghanistan coordination:** The economies of Pakistan

and Afghanistan have been integrated for centuries both formally and informally. When the formality has broken down or become rigid, then the informal 'sector' has thrived. Nevertheless, the natural resources and the resourcefulness of the people have kept trade flowing both ways across the border. An opened border, which is the trend in the economies of the world, would provide greater opportunities for the people on both sides of the Durand Line and an incentive for both governments to collaborate.

**Military strategies and tactics:** As we have seen in the survey data, the people comprehend and support the Pakistani Army efforts to push out the militants in Swat and South Waziristan, and the displaced people seem to be even greater supporters. The recommendation is that from these findings come the need for more investigation into the specifics of resettlement and also how military operations are conducted. We do not have that information.

When it comes to external military involvement, for example strengthening the Frontier Corps, the people also support this. It may be that the support is for the FC as a favoured local tradition and institution. Why the external help is favoured over local Army training needs to be examined.

The finding on drones echoes what is written in the press, i.e., that they are a perceived threat and, importantly, the people do not see them as justified any more than they see suicide bombing as justifiable. The use of drones may by part of a strategy to remove militant leadership, but one loses the high moral ground among the people. The practice should be ended and the conflict resolution process begun. Given the finding that the people want to be rid of foreign fighters and forces, then the resolution of the local issues with the people and the local Taliban would reduce the areas where foreign Taliban and Al Qaeda would be able to find refuge.

## Conclusion

We have prepared the 'Way Forward' as a substantial agenda for

addressing the development, law and order, and international issues identified by the people of FATA during the survey. Importantly, based on the cultural foundation of the *Pakhtun*, the proposed 'Way Forward' includes the methodology to engage the people of FATA in the solution of century-old governance structures and styles that are not appropriate or efficient for modern Pakistan much less the integration of the people of FATA into the national process.

The agenda proposed is a grand project that, unfortunately, does not have short cuts for success. As described, it will require bold steps on the part of the Government of Pakistan accompanied by dedicated and unwavering support from the international community. As we have stressed in the report, FATA has been and will always be an area of international concern.

The first bold step recommended would be to return the information gathered to the people in each area for discussion. This would be the beginning of many steps toward change. However, devolving the results of the survey is only recommended if the government, supported by the international community, is serious about change and the engagement of the people.

It is clear from the opinions expressed that 'engagement' of the people is desired. The platform for that engagement should be devolution in three key areas: 1) the governance structure and style; 2) the rule of law by formalizing *jirgas* and also the role of *Sharia* law; and 3) strengthening the Frontier Corps. The first recommendation would be a radical change in the FATA Secretariat as it is known today, because, in its place the recommendation is for elected leadership and local administration by elected officials. As described and pointed out in the report, the second and third key areas are important culturally and are respected local institutions.

In keeping with the historical analysis and the strategic role that the cross border transportation routes can and do play in the business and employment of the people of FATA, we have identified development corridors as a geographic framework

for stimulating the economy of the border area and the central places in the FATA. This would be important for the large towns and cities along the old silk roads at the end of these cross-border routes. If development corridors were the geographic focus, then the economies in the tribal areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan would become dynamic and would bring prosperity to the people.

One of the potential side effects of the development corridor strategy as a development tool would be the opportunity for the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan to work together on common problems and to build trust.

Another theme of this chapter has been that both the development strategies and the strengthening of the Frontier Corps should be part of the effort counter the message and violence of insurgency. As shown in the chapters on military strategies, militancy and religion, the people understand and support military activity, but their support is conditional. The military actions against the violent insurgency should be deliberately calculated with the idea in mind that short term expediency will cause disaffection and incur long-term costs.

The 'way forward' may be our concluding chapter, but it could be the beginning of a new chapter in modern history for Pakistan, the international community, and, most importantly, for the *Pakhtun* on both sides of the border.

Views expressed in this chapter are the views of CAMP alone on the bases of the survey conducted.



## END NOTES

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10. Stanley Lane Poole, Mediaeval India under Muhammedan Rule (A.D. 712 1764)
11. Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan, 'The Durand Line its Geo-Strategic Importance 2005, page 48
12. Michael Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947, page 18
13. Michael Barthorp, Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947, page 18
14. Shah Shujah, the deposed Amir of Afghanistan 1802 1809, and from 1939 until murdered in 1842 he lived in India for 30 years after his return to Afghanistan before his death.
15. James W. Spain, 'The Pathan Borderland' 1963, page 132
16. James W. Spain, 'The Pathan Borderland' 1963, page 132
17. James W. Spain, 'The Pathan Borderland' 1963, page 136
18. The title 'Amir' means King of Afghanistan.
19. Sir Olaf Caroe 'The Pathans', 1983
20. In 2006, after the Pakistan government's decision to fence and mine the border with Afghanistan, the Durand Line as the official border was questioned. Although the issue was never raised during the Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation nor during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the government of Afghanistan submitted its claim on the area comprising Pakhtunkhwa to the United Nations Secretary General.
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22. Constitutional Status of FCR paper presented by Dr. Faqir Hussain, Secretary Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan Report of the Consultation Proceedings on the FCR Regulations 1901, organized by Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and TRDF October 2004
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25. The FCR provides for a system of collective territorial responsibility and collective crime committed on its territory by arresting individuals, seizing or demolishing their property and imposing fines on them. Dispute resolution is through Jirga (Council of Elders).
26. Testing FCR on the Touchstone of the Constitution by Dr. Faqir Hussain, Secretary Law & Justice, October 2004
27. International Crises Group 'Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants,' Asia Report No 125, 11 December [statement by Francois Teney-Renaud, 'Post-Colonial Pluralism, Human Rights and the Administration of Criminal Justice in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan', Singapore Journal of Comparative and International Law]
28. Testing FCR on the Touchstone of the Constitution by Dr. Faqir Hussain, Secretary Law & Justice, October 2004
29. The National Assembly passed the 18th Amendment Bill in April 2010. The Awami National Party, Pakhtun nationalist party, rightly claims the credit for undertaking what was until recently considered an impossible task of correcting a 109-year historical wrong and giving an identity to the people of 'Khyber Pakhtunkhwa'.
30. Swara means marriage of a woman from the offender's family/tribe to the victim's close relative without her consent.
31. The Political Parties announcement in the Presidential decree of August 2009 is a specific part of these announcements. Political Parties will be discussed below.
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36. Interview with Engr. Toor Gul Chamkani, historian/columnist and member FATA reform, dated 5 November 2006
37. Views of Col. Amanullah Khan Aurakzai (Rtd), Focused Group Discussion for Aurakzai Agency, dated 27 November 2006
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39. Please note that this survey was completed before the devastating floods of July and August of 2010 made that the main humanitarian crisis that Pakistan has had since independence.
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42. Participants views in Stakeholders Consultative Dialogue, organized by CAMP for Understanding FATA Volume IV, dated June 11-12, 2010
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44. Farhan Bukhari, 'Bhutto calls for th destruction of small arms in Afghanistan'
45. Akhour Wall, Zarghun Khail, Tour Chapar, Sheraki, Bosti Khail
46. Out of 2844 businesses, 2657 are arms related. CAMP's Research in Dara Adam Khel in April 2007 - unpublished
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48. Pakistan Security Report 2009, by Pak Institute of Peace Studies, dated 10 January 2010

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57. Hussain Haqqani, 'Pakistan Between Mosque and Military', published in 2005 page 2
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59. Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, 'UNDERSTANDING FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas published in March 2008 page 40
60. Khalid Aziz, 'Causes of Rebellion in Waziristan', published by RIPOORT in March 2007, page 8
61. Hussain Haqqani, 'Pakistan Between Mosque and Military', published in 2005, page 3
62. 'Is it our war or not?' by Khalid Aziz, The News International, dated 4 October 2008
63. An interview with Samiullah Dawar, journalist from North Waziristan, dated 21 November 2008, Peshawar regarding Madrassas in FATA. There are thousands of Madrassa institutes in Pakistan with hundreds of thousands of students. A small proportion of such Madrassa institutes are accredited by the government of Pakistan. They offer basic education along with traditional religious education. The majority, however, concentrate only on Islamic and religious teachings while some Madrassa offer military training to Jihadi elements. The local population send their children to Madrassas not only because they cannot afford the modern education system but because they give importance to religious education in order to preserve their religious and cultural values. The common perception in FATA is that the modern curriculum will, over time, submerge their distinctive culture and values beneath the dominant Western values and that the modern education is actually a trap designed to Westernize our young people and take them away from their culture and tradition
64. Paper presented by Dr. Jochen Hippler titled 'Violence, Governance and Islam in Pakistan', at the Final Conference on 'Control of Violence' at Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld University, Germany, dated 10-13 September 2008
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69. Interview with Dr. Tashfeen Khan, Secretary, Provincial Government Housing, Department, Government of KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, at Wiston House, London, 7 November 2008. Dr. Tashfeen Khan also remained Political Agent of 5 tribal agencies on different occasions.
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71. Interview with Dr. Tashfeen Khan, Secretary, Provincial Government Housing, Department, Government of KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, at Wiston House, London, 7 November 2008. Dr. Tashfeen Khan also remained Political Agent of 5 tribal agencies on different occasions.
72. FATA: Challenges and Response by Dr. Faqir Hussain, Secretary Law & Justice Commission of Pakistan unpublished paper
73. Updated figures from UNHCR, May 2010.
74. UNHCR Press Report: Pakistan's census of Afghans provides first detailed profile of the population. [www.unhcr.ch](http://www.unhcr.ch)
75. If provinces were formed based on capital cities such as Peshawar, Quetta, and perhaps one between the two with D.I. Kahn or one of those smaller towns as a center,

then the political systems would integrate along the road/market systems the rural and urban interests.

76. For fine details of this approach see 'Towards understanding Pukhtoon Jirga' Hassan M Yousufzai and Ali Gohar, Justice Peace International, Peshawar.
77. *Maliks* mean headmen/chiefs.
78. *Lungi* means turban.
79. James W. Spain 'The Pathan Borderland' - 1963
80. James W. Spain 'The Pathan Borderland' - 1963 page 63
81. James W. Spain, 'The Pathan Borderland,' page 65-66 - 1963
82. Sir Wylly, 'The Borderland, the Country of the Pathans page 10-11 published in 1912
83. S. Ifthikhar Hussain 'Some Major Pakhtun Tribes Along the Pak-Afghan Border', Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, Revised edition 2005
84. *Chopan* - wooden truss roofed with mud and hay, having pillars but no wall.
85. Kind of poem in Pakhtu poetry.
86. *Rabbab* is a musical instrument of *Pakhtu*. *Mange* is a water pot and serves as a drum or '*tabla*'.
87. *Jirga* is an indigenous conflict prevention/resolution tool to resolve personal, family, tribal feuds in a very speedy manner and cost very little as compared to the modern justice system.
88. *Lakhkar* is a *Pakhtu* word which means militia or 'group of armed men' or 'war party' formed for some purpose of fighting against a common enemy or towards a common objective. *Lakhkar* could be of any size in number and melts down when the purpose or mission is accomplished.
89. *Tigah* or *Teega* or *Tiga*: In *Pakhtun* culture *Tigah* describes a truce between two warring parties

following the decision taken by a *Jirga* with the consent of both the parties.

87. All statistics are drawn from 1998 Census reports of Pakistan.
88. Unofficial Reports estimate the population of FATA from 5 to 7 million.
89. S. Ifthikhar Hussain 'Some Major Pakhtun Tribes Along the Pak-Afghan Border', Area Study Centre, University of Peshawar, revised edition 2005
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91. It is noteworthy that after independence, the state of Pakistan continued with the colonial relation and structure with which the British had controlled the *Pakhtun*. That is, the state of Pakistan continued creating agencies and keeping those areas separate from the constitutional protections that other Pakistanis enjoyed.
92. Frontier Region

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# APPENDIXES

- I. Tribal structure and way of life of the *Pakhtun*
- II. FATA Agencies and Frontier Regions
- III. Research methodology and sample plan
- IV. List of villages surveyed
- V. List of key speakers of the two-day stakeholders consultative dialogue and participants
- VI. Questionnaire 2010 Poll
- VII. Target demographics

## TRIBAL STRUCTURE AND WAY OF LIFE OF THE *PAKHTUN*

### Introduction

Because the culture and traditions of the *Pakhtun*, the people of FATA, play a key role in the areas of inquiry presented in this research, it is important that the reader have at hand a brief description of the structure of family and tribe. In addition the way of life, *Pakhtunwali*, in its most basic concepts needs to be described so that the *Pakhtun* perspective can be appreciated when reviewing the opinions expressed by the respondents to the survey.

### Tribe and family

Each tribe is comprised of various clans (or *Khels*), sub-clans and then extended families. Tribal society consists of many characteristics that provide sense of unity and cohesion. It is based on its inter-family linkages that then unite sub-clans, clans and tribes in a web of kinship. The family structure is the most complex feature of tribal society that shares family honour, property and intra-familial hate and love relationships.

Each family is headed by an elder male, who, by ascribed status is respected and his decisions are obeyed by the entire family. Then *Maliks*<sup>77</sup> and *Lungi*<sup>78</sup> holders head each sub-clan and then clan. *Maliks* are hereditary and sometimes Political Agents grant this title with the consent of the Governor. Under the current governance system, the title of *Lungi* holder comes after *Malik* and may be granted by Political Agents. *Maliks* and *Lungi* holders are responsible for maintaining peace in their areas and for providing valuable information about their areas to the Political Administration. In case of any conflict they become responsible and accountable to the political administration. As pointed out in previous chapters, the political administration pays allowances (*Mojib*) and subsidies to these *Maliks* and *Malik* holders for their services.

From these descriptions of the traditional tribal hierarchy and the FATA Secretariat structure it can be seen how Colonial rule was grafted onto tribal structure to become a system for political control and administration.

Household structures are alike; these fortress-like compounds may be comprised of many houses occupied by an extended family. An extended family consists of an elder head of family, married sons and wives, unmarried sons and daughters plus grandchildren.<sup>79</sup> James W. Spain writes:

*“The Pathan is above all an individualist, despite the rigid behaviour standards prescribed by clan membership. Nonetheless, there are important traditional and social factors which guide community life and in many cases influence or even determine the action of individuals. These mores vary considerably in different parts of the Pathan area, and codification of them is virtually impossible. However, certain of them are almost universal, and some knowledge of these is essential to an understanding of what the Pathan is and how he got that way.”*<sup>80</sup>

This un-codified set of rules, which guides *Pakhtun* way of life, is called *Pakhtunwali*.

### *Pakhtunwali*

*Pakhtuns*, living in the hilly areas on both sides of the Durand Line, have preserved their centuries old culture and tradition. *Pakhtuns* are men of guns through which they protect their honour. *Pakhtunwali* the code of honour and an unwritten constitution - is strictly observed and quoted with pride. It guides their lives. *Pakhtunwali* is their dearest value, which conducts and controls their routine lives, behaviour and attitudes. There are three main obligations of *Pakhtunwali* on a *Pakhtun* elaborated in the following lines.

***Milmastya***: Describes the open-handed hospitality and protection to all who may or may not demand it. This custom is

one of the greatest demands of *Pakhtunwali*. Sometime, protection [or hospitality] may be extended to an enemy as long as the enemy remains in the host community. The guest or an enemy is provided with an escort that is called *badraga*. During the British times, the status of *badraga* was later on turned officially into local escorts, called levies. According to the spirit of the term *Milmastya*, the guest is never to be hurt both because of the obligation of the high regard for *Milmastya* and because the obligation of *badal* (revenge), would automatically be placed upon the host if he were to lapse in providing safety. There are numerous incidents where hosts to strangers or even enemies, have died or been injured when defending their guests. James W. Spain, in his book 'The Pathan Borderland,' writes about a British Administrator on the Frontiers who wrote in his official reports: 'For gold, they will do almost anything, except betray a guest'. He further adds: Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe, but will be kindly received.<sup>81</sup>

**Badal:** This concept is the set of customs and actions concerning revenge. The custom imposes an offended person the right to and necessity for revenge by retaliation regardless of consequences. Originally *badal* has to be taken only by the victim or, in case of a murder, by the victim's family against an individual or a family who have committed the hurt or insult. Since *Pakhtun* is a martial race therefore, he believes in revenge in his own way obligatory by the concept of *badal*, but as will be described as *Nanawati* below, there is a counterbalancing concept and way to resolve the conflict.

Because of non-mitigated *badal*, feuds start among the families, among clans and intra-clans, and they may last for years and sometimes for decades from generation to generation. Sir Wyllly writes in his book about the blood feuds of tribesmen in the following manner;

*"The Pathans enlists freely into our services there are at present moment something like eleven thousand Pathans in the Indian Army, and probably the*

*recruiting among the tribesmen was never brisker than during the operations in Tirah of 1897-98. One thing, however, the Pathan recruit does not give up, "but brings with him to his regiment, keeps through his service, must have leave to look after, will resign promotion to gratify, and looks forward to retiring to thoroughly enjoy and that is his cherished feud."*<sup>82</sup>

**Nanawati:** There is a considerable confusion not only among English writers but also among writers from settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as to the definition of this concept. It is also practised in other *Pakhtun* areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Afghanistan. However, with the passage of time the spirit of *Nanawati* has faded in more urban areas, but it is still practised in the rural areas of *Pakhtuns*, especially FATA and Afghanistan.

*Nanawati* means, literally, to enter into one's house and then 'begging for a pardon or forgiveness'. When a person realizes that he has been at fault in a killing, injury or insult of another person, he goes to the *hujra*, house or mosque of the aggrieved family and throws himself at their mercy, confessing his fault and begging a pardon from the person or family whose sense of honour he had injured.<sup>83</sup> On such occasions the offender brings tokens or gifts such as sheep or goats, and is accompanied by his family women, and Qur'an, to show both his humility and sincerity. If the offended person or family forgives the person, then that family will also defend the offender from further punishment by both tribal and also political administrators. Thus *Pakhtunwali* may be at odds with civil law and the formal administration of justice by the state.

**Jirga:** In a few words a *jirga* is a gathering of elders, convoked by an intermediary between contesting parties, a *jirgamaar*, to hear the arguments of the parties. The process is similar to binding arbitration because both sides of the discussion agree to abide by the decision of the elders. The *jirga* is a conflict resolution process. In this report, in the chapter on the structure and style of administration of FATA the *jirga* is

described in the context of the Frontier Crimes Regulations.

**Hujra:** The *hujra*, is a male social centre and a place where the unmarried males sleep. Visitors may be housed in this space, and food and tea will be served there. The *hujra*, as a room or area within a compound, is rooted in *Pakhtun* culture and civilization forever. It is considered as mark of prestige not only as a furnished area but as a social area. The main features of a *hujra* are an opened patio-like area a '*Chopan*'<sup>84</sup> where bed-like seats are arranged, and a couple of rooms. Village folk singers sing *Tapa*<sup>85</sup> on winter nights and during festivities using musical instruments like *Rabab* and *Mangey*.<sup>86</sup> Now a day a television and radio are important components of a *hujra*, some may include internet and computers. A *hujra* may belong to a rich man of a village who happens to be a *Malik* or *Khan*. However a *hujra* may be a common property of a village. In the *hujra* any and all matters of civil affairs are discussed and may be resolved through a *Jirga*.<sup>87</sup> Marriage parties, funerals, and other rituals are celebrated in a *hujra*. *Hujras* are also used for raising *Lakhkars*<sup>88</sup> when needed. The *hujra* is the place where warring tribes or clans meet to agree on *Tigah*<sup>89</sup> to stop further bloodshed.

## FATA AGENCIES AND FRONTIER REGIONS<sup>90</sup>

Map 1 in the introduction to this report is an important reference for visualizing the Agencies and Frontier Regions described in this appendix.

The Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) is located along Pakistan's North-Western Himalaya zone and South-Western chain of the Sulaiman Mountains and runs as a narrow tract along the river Indus with the parallel lines almost North to South. It consists of seven semi-autonomous Agencies or administrative units Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, Kurram, Orakzai, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. In addition, it includes 'Frontier Regions' adjoining the districts of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. This constitutes an area of 27,224 sq kilometres, and it is inhabited by approximately 3.17 million<sup>91</sup> people belonging to different *Pakhtun* tribes. The 1,400 mile (2500 KM) Durand Line, which was drawn in 1893 by the British Colonial rulers of India, divides the *Pakhtun* tribes into two separate areas - Afghanistan and Pakistan. As described in the first chapter of this report, FATA has always been strategically important for Western forces since before the times of 'the Great Game.'

**Khyber Agency:** Because of the importance of the pass through the mountains for military and trade, the British rulers first established the Khyber Agency in 1879. Although initially there was to be a Political Officer as the Administrative Head of the Khyber Agency, in actual fact, it wasn't until 1902 that a full-fledged Political Agent was assigned there.<sup>92</sup> It draws its name from historic Khyber Pass, covers an area of 2576 sq. km. The famous Torkham border links Khyber Agency with Afghanistan's Nangarhar province. It has an estimated population of 546,730 people. The main *Pakhtun* tribes are the *Afridis*, *Shinwaris*, *Mulagooris* and *Shalmanis*.

**Kurram Agency:** This Agency was the second Agency formed. It was created in 1892, a year before the demarcation of the

Durand Line. It has an area of 2,296 sq. km., with a population of 448,310. The major tribes are the *Turi*, *Bangash*, *Parachinari* and *Masozai* - both *Sunni* and *Shia* sects. Kurram Agency borders with Afghanistan's Nangarhar province in the North West and Paktia province in the South West. The Agency bears the name of the pass providing an important trade and military route between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Agency centre, Parachinar, is a major market town on the cross mountain route.

**South Waziristan Agency:** In 1895 two other Agencies were created along the Pakistan-Afghan border North and South Waziristan Agencies.<sup>93</sup> South Waziristan is the largest of all tribal Agencies, 6,620 sq. km. inhabited by a population of approximately 429,841 persons. Major tribes include the *Mehsud* and *Ahmadzai Waziris*. It borders with Afghanistan's Paktia and Khost provinces on the West. In Pakistan to the South it borders with Balochistan province, Dera Ismail Khan district to East and North Waziristan Agency to the North. Two major passes and corresponding trade routes to Afghanistan are in South Waziristan. Wana is the major trading town for the North route.

**North Waziristan Agency:** It is the second largest Agency, covering an area of 4,707 sq. km, inhabited by 361,246 people. The principle tribes are the *Utmanzai Waziri*, *Dawa*, *Saidgai*, *Kharasin* and *Gurbaz*. North Waziristan Agency also borders Paktia and Khost provinces of Afghanistan. There are also two trade routes and passes to Afghanistan on the Western border of this Agency.

**Mohmand Agency:** Mohmand Agency was created in 1951 just four years after the creation of Pakistan as sovereign state in 1947.<sup>94</sup> It covers an area of 2,296 sq. km. with a population of approximately 334,453 people. The major tribes inhabiting the area are *Mohmand*, *Safi*, and *Uthmankhel*. It shares borders with Bajaur Agency on its North, the Dir District to its East, Peshawar District to its South-East, and Kunar province in Afghanistan to the West. Between Mohmand Agency and



Bajaur Agency is a river valley that forms another major pass between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The major Afghanistan towns on that trade route are Asadabad and then Jalalabad and, finally, Kabul.

**Bajaur Agency:** Bajaur Agency, the smallest in size 1,290 sq. km., was created in 1973. It has a population of 595,227 persons; sharing borders with Afghanistan's Kunar province on the North-West. In Pakistan, Dir District is on the North East and Mohmand Agency on its West. Major tribes inhabiting the area include, *Uthmankhel* and *Tarkani*.

**Orakzai Agency:** This is the only tribal Agency that does not share a boundary with Afghanistan. It was created in 1973, covering an area of 1538 sq. km., with a population of 225,441 persons. It is bounded in the North by Khyber Agency, in the East by FR Kohat, in the South by Kohat and Hangu districts, and in the West by Kurram Agency. Major tribes include, the *Orakzai* and *Bangash* both *Shia* and *Sunni* sects.

**FR<sup>95</sup> Peshawar:** This is a small tribal Area adjoining Peshawar District with a total area of 261 sq. km. and a population of approximately 53,841 people. The Afridi tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Peshawar. It is bounded on the North and East by Peshawar District, on the South by FR Kohat and on the East by Peshawar District.

**FR Kohat:** This is a tribal area adjoining Kohat District. The total area is 446 sq. km, with a population of approximately 88,456 people. The *Afridi* tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Kohat. It is bounded on the North by FR Peshawar, on the East by Nowshera District and South by Kohat District and on the West by Orakzai Agency.

**FR Bannu:** This is a tribal area covering 745 sq. km., with a population of approximately 19,593 people. The *Wazir* tribe is the only major tribe. It is bounded on the North by Karak District, on the East by Bannu District, on the South by FR Lakki Marwat and on the West by North Waziristan Agency.

**FR Lakki Marwat:** This is a tribal area adjoining Lakki Marwat

District. The total area is 132 sq. km, with a population of around 6,987 people. The *Bhittani* tribe is the only major tribe. It is bounded on the North by Karak District, on the East by Bannu District and on the West by North Waziristan Agency.

**FR Tank:** This frontier region adjoins Tank District with a total area of 1,221 sq. km., and a population of 27,212. *Bhittani* tribe is the only major tribe inhabiting FR Tank. It is bounded on the North, South and West by South Waziristan Agency, on the North-East by Lakki Marwat District and on the South-East by Tank District.

**FR D.I. Khan:** It is the tribal area adjoining Dera Ismail Khan District. The total area covering FR D.I. Khan is 2,008 sq. km., with a population of approximately 38,990. The *Ustran* and *Sherani* are the major tribes inhabiting FR D.I. Khan. It is bounded on the North by South Waziristan Agency, on the East by Kulachi Tehsil of D.I. Khan District, on the South by D.G. Khan Districts and on the West by Zhob District.

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE PLAN

### Introduction

This research report is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. For the **qualitative** information, ten focus-group discussions and two-day consultative dialogues were used to gather the opinions. Minutes were recorded, analyzed and utilized to both write this report and to inform the questionnaire design. Background and historical material used in the report came from a review of historical books, newspapers, reports, articles, journals and the experience of CAMP programs.

The **quantitative** data was collected through structured questionnaires. The objective was to sample adult males and females to ascertain their opinion on key issues related to the people of FATA. Because gender plays such an important role in public opinion, the sample was designed to interview equal numbers of males and females in each community and, accordingly, it generated equal numbers of males and females in each village, FR and Agency. Although there may be slightly unequal populations of males and females in each Agency of FR due to seasonal migration and also emigration, plus the cultural tendency to keep women from working away, exact, current statistics were not available to guide a deviation from this target of equal numbers of males and females.

### Research methods and instruments

#### I. Qualitative

##### **Focus-group discussions (FGDs)**

The organization of the focus-groups, as a qualitative

research tool, helped in documenting views of key informants. All sections of the FATA society were included in these discussions. Participants were chosen so that they would have diverse political, social, technical and religious backgrounds. They were also chosen because they were respected people within their circles. The technique was to

*Table 23. Region and gender wise FGDs' plan*

Sub-region	Agencies/FRs	Date	Gender	Youth	Elders
Sub-region 1	Kurram Agency, Orakzai Agency and FR Kohat	07 April 2010	Male		√
		08 April 2010	Male	√	
Sub-region 2	North Waziristan, Agency, FR Bunnu and FR Lakki	12 April 2010	Male		√
		13 April 2010	Male	√	
Sub-region 3	South Waziristan Agency, FR Tank and FR D.I.Khan	15 April 2010	Male		√
		16 April 2010	Male	√	
Sub-region 4	Bajaur Agency, Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency and FR Peshawar	23 April 2010	Male	√	
		24 April 2010	Male		√
FATA	All seven Agencies and six FRs	27 April 2010	Female	√	
		28 April 2010	Female		√

provide all of the informants with substantial opportunity to express their viewpoints so that they would help provide informed and representative perspectives on key issues related to the FATA region. An average of 22 participants attended each FGD. A total of ten FGDs were held as per the following plan:

### **Stakeholders' consultative dialogue**

A two-day stakeholders' consultative dialogue was held on June 11-12, 2010 in Peshawar to generate debate on the above mentioned issues.

These events were attended by participants from relevant backgrounds and experience, including government. They were briefed by some well-known speakers who possessed political, tribal, religious and technical backgrounds to facilitate the discussions.

### **Desk review**

As mentioned above, the research report includes: the historical background of the people and the area; facts about the governance system of FATA; constitutional standing of FATA; political impact of FATA on the politics of Pakistan; and the Frontier Crimes Regulations. For this purpose, books, newspapers, reports, articles, journals and the CAMP experience were consulted.

### **Themes for the qualitative discussions and dialogue**

The themes included: the constitutional status of FATA; Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR); Presidential Ordinances/regulations and their impact on the Governance system of FATA; FATA's present social, political, economic and administrative structure; development pace; participation of the people in development opportunities; FATA's current law and order situation; an in-depth analysis of present government's decisions in the aftermath of 9\11; government crackdown on militant groups in FATA and Swat; US Drone attacks in FATA and its impact and the inclusion of women in the decision-making process.

## **II. Quantitative**

In addition to a well structured questionnaire, the key to successful social research is in the sampling frame. If well designed, then the population and segments will be

represented by a manageable number of interviews. The objective was to sample all of FATA with a sample size so that the margin of error would be small. The desired margin of error for the whole of FATA of less than 2% was chosen. This number, in reference to the estimated population of approximately four million, called for a sample of 4,000 interviews. Current population statistics for FATA are not available, so the first assumption was that the 1998 census would be accurate enough.

The sample size of **4000** was drawn from the total FATA population of 3.17 million (1998 Census Report). **3480** people were selected from **7** Agencies of FATA by using a Proportionate Stratified Sampling Method (PSSM) to ensure a representative sample for the entire population as well as each Agency and Frontier Region. The following table 24 shows the sample size by Agency and Frontier Region.

One of the practical advantages of quantitative methods is the use of small samples of people to make inferences about larger groups. The researcher uses information gathered from the survey to generalize findings from a drawn sample about the sampled population and accepts planned limits of random error.

**Margin of error:** The over all margin of error with all interviews pooled under 'people of FATA' for single questions of a 'Yes/No' nature is approximately 1.5% at the 95% confidence level. That is, if a random sample were drawn 100 times, then in 95 of the cases, one would expect there to be less than a 1.5% plus or minus difference around a sample result. That being said, once one begins to partition the data set and look at specific FR or Agency, then, within those units, the margin of error increases because of the smaller population size and the proportional sample size. The right-hand column in the table below summarizes the margin of error.

## Sampling plan and field implementation

### Accessibility

At the beginning of this project CAMP gathered information on the accessible areas within FATA by making a list of villages, towns and tehsils that were not accessible because of security concerns, government imposed curfews, and/or extreme weather conditions. That list was deducted from

Table 24. Area accessibility analysis

S. #	Agency	Population	Sample Size	Margin of error
1	Bajaur	595227	680	3.8
2	Khyber	546730	760	3.6
3	Kurram	448310	680	3.8
4	Mohmand	334453	360	5.2
5	North Waziristan	361246	440	4.7
6	Orakzai	225441	280	5.9
7	South Waziristan	429841	280	5.9
	<b>FATA Agencies Total</b>	<b>2941248</b>	<b>3480</b>	<b>1.7</b>
S. #	<b>Frontier Region</b>			
1	Bannu	19593	80	10.9
2	D. I. Khan	38990	80	10.9
3	Tank	27216	80	10.9
4	Lakki	6987	40	15.5
5	Peshawar	53841	80	10.9
6	Kohat	88456	160	7.7
	<b>Frontier Regions Total</b>	<b>235083</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>4.3</b>
	<b>FATA (Total)</b>	<b>3176331</b>	<b>4000</b>	<b>1.5</b>

the master list of all 960 villages. Of the master list across FATA, 403 (42%) were located in inaccessible areas. The 400 villages sampled came from the remaining 557 villages.

Two stages were used to select the sample. In the first stage CAMP randomly selected among the accessible tehsils. In the second stage CAMP randomly selected 400 villages/towns in the tehsils that were selected in the first stage.

A total of 10 interviews were assigned to each village. The gender balance in the overall sample was achieved by setting gender quotas. In every village and town half of the respondents were male and half were female. Because of the culture of the region female Enumerators interviewed females, and male Enumerators interviewed males.

The resulting sampling frame is shown in the table 25:

**Bias due to inaccessibility:** As pointed out in the description of the selection of villages, access to all villages was limited due to the conflict and the threat of violence. Thus, the sample was biased toward more peaceful areas of each Agency and FATA in general. As will be shown in the comparisons between people who had been Internally Displaced (IDPs) and those who had not, there is a difference in opinion with regard to some of the questions. One would expect, therefore, that by not being able to include people in the conflicted areas that there is a bias in the conclusions. Unfortunately, except for the ex-IDPs, we do not know which way the opinion of those areas would swing the results. Inaccessible villages totaled 42% of the approximately 690 villages in FATA. Unfortunately, the characteristics of those un-sampled villages are not known, but one could assume that they were the more rural and remote villages and that would change the demographics and cultural perspective of the survey.

## Selection of interviewees

### Method of selecting starting points

In villages, the survey universe was divided into four areas i.e. two for male Enumerators and two for female Enumerators. In each area two starting points were selected by male and two by female Enumerators. Male and female Enumerators interviewed three respondents from one point and two from the other point. These starting points were local landmarks such as *Hujra* of a prominent *Malik*, famous shops, mosque, *Imam Bargah* of Shiite community, schools and hospitals, etc. From each point the Enumerators (both male and female) would interview five respondents.

After the selection of the starting points, the male Enumerators selected a household on their left hand while female Enumerators selected a household on their right hand. In some areas where the houses were scattered and this rule could not be properly applied, the survey Enumerators made note of the difficulty on the contact sheet.

**Bias due to 'Starting Point' methodology:** As stated above, the starting points in each village were local landmarks such as *Hujra* of a prominent *Malik*, famous shops, mosque, *Imam Bargah* in Shiite communities, schools and hospitals. From each point the Enumerators (both male and female) would interview five respondents by counting off every third door or compound. This approach biased the sample toward the centre of villages. Typically the wealthy or more established families are located at these locations (for example, the *Hujra*) or in close proximity. These would be the more urban and educated citizens of the community and their status probably influences statistics such as literacy, the use of media, educational status when compared with a more general population in those same villages and, of course, other parts of FATA and Pakistan.

Table 25. Sample plan

S. #	Agency/FRs	Total sample size X villages	Total sample
<b>A</b>	<b>Agencies</b>		
01	Khyber	10 X 76	760 respondents
02	Kurram	10 X 69	690 respondents
03	Mohmad	10 X 36	360 respondents
04	North Waziristan	10 X 10	100 respondents
05	South Waziristan	10 X 28	280 respondents
06	Orakzai	10 X 28	280 respondents
07	Bajaur	10 X 68	680 respondents
<b>B</b>	<b>Frontier Regions</b>		
08	Bannu	10 X 10	100 respondents
09	Tank	10 X 10	100 respondents
10	Peshawar	10 X 8	80 respondents
11	Kohat	10 X 16	160 respondents
12	Lakki Marwat	10 X 7	70 respondents
13	D. I. Khan	10 X 10	100 respondents
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>400 villages</b>	<b>4000 respondents</b>

### Method of respondent selection

Before selecting the interviewees, the Enumerators made sure that the respondents were 18 years old or above, that they were Pakistanis belonging to FATA, and were from the Agency and from that particular village. The survey Enumerators also ensured that the respondents had not participated in any survey in the last six months.

### Guidelines for replacing respondents originally selected if unavailable (substitution)

During the respondents' selection, if a desired respondent was not available, the Enumerators skipped three houses and knocked on the fourth door. Later on, the interviewer would try to contact the person who was not available

initially. After three attempts and the person were still not available, the interviewer substituted the contact person with someone next to the contact person by applying the selection criteria mentioned above.

In summary, the overall sampling was robust and limited the margin of error for FATA-wide statistics. When specific Agencies or FRs are noted the margin of error in the table above must be considered. Overall, the urban and accessibility biases must be kept in mind when reviewing the findings.

### **Questionnaire**

In 2010 CAMP used a structured questionnaire with both opened and closed response possibilities to replicate the methodology used for 2008 and 2009 surveys. After consultation with BHC, the previous questionnaires were revised for use in the 2010 survey.

### **Interviewer training**

Prior to conducting the survey, CAMP Enumerators were trained by independent consultants, under the supervision of CAMP senior management who observed the training and pre-test interviews. The first training was conducted on methodology and pre-testing from 20-22 February and the 2<sup>nd</sup> training was conducted on Security from 23- 24 February 2010.

Pre-testing of questionnaire aimed to:

- Determine the time length of the interview
- Check questionnaire content
- Check the skipping and coding patterns
- Correct and improve translation

The pre-tests were conducted with adult Pakistani males and females aged 18 and above in suburbs of Peshawar on

22<sup>nd</sup> February 2010. The average time of the interview during the pre-tests was 50 minutes. The minimum time taken to complete the interview was 40 minutes while the maximum time taken to complete the interview was 60 minutes. Hence, the general understanding of the Enumerators on the questionnaire was found to be adequate and satisfactory. The Enumerators were able to handle the questionnaire well and they read the questions to the respondents as written on the questionnaire without introduction of bias. Enumerators were also able to comply with the field methodology for data collection. Their understanding of the house skipping pattern and following the left hand/right hand rule was also at par. The supervisors were able to manage the field supervision through different checking methods. Feedback related to the substance and structure of the questionnaire was shared with the senior management of CAMP.

### **Data entry and cleaning**

Upon the completion of the survey, CAMP did the data entry of the 4000 questionnaires using a database entry program. The data was then checked and cleaned using SPSS .

### **Survey management and monitoring**

The CAMP Project Manager coordinated the survey with the Project Officer based in the Peshawar regional office. CAMP's PM and PO coordinated the initial training of the Enumerators, the pre-tests, and the field implementation. During the implementation of the survey CAMP's head office regularly followed up on the PM and his PO at CAMP's regional office in Peshawar. The regional office, in turn, coordinated closely with the field teams to monitor the progress of the survey as well as to make sure that the survey and sampling plan were being implemented properly.

CAMP has field offices in Mohmand, Kurram, Orakzai,



Khyber Agencies, and FR Kohat of FATA. These field offices were used for supervising the survey. Although monitoring and supervision in North and South Waziristan was difficult, CAMP back checked by telephone contact with respondents, where possible.

### **Description of field team**

1. The Enumerators were from the areas in which they interviewed.
2. The content of the questionnaire focused mainly on FATA problems, and respondents appeared willing and happy to participate in this study.
3. Because the sampling plan was based on the feedback received from the field teams, the areas where these interviews took place were relatively safe and accessible to the Enumerators.

### **Back-checking and method of contact**

The table below provides the breakdown of the number of questionnaires back-checked per agency. Back-checking was done by CAMP's five field offices in FATA as well as from the CAMP regional office in Peshawar. The following table is a summary based on the contact sheet used by the Enumerators.

Back-checking of the data collection process were made through different methods. 10.8% of the total interviews were personally observed by the supervisors during the interviews. 69.4% of were back-checked by the supervisors during the data collection process by revisiting the villages and confirmed by the respondents, their family members, or locals. 3.1% of the interviews were back-checked and confirmed by telephone contacts from the CAMP regional office in Peshawar. 16.7% of the interviews were not back-checked. It is assumed that these were actually conducted.

**Note:** CAMP can provide the contact number of the local

*Table 26. Back-checking analysis*

<b>Method of backcheck/Control</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Direct supervision during interview	431	10.8
Back-check in person by supervisor	2777	69.4
Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office	125	3.1
Not subjecto backcheck	667	16.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>4000</b>	<b>100.0</b>

leaders/elders and other resource persons for verification.

CAMP can also call and bring respondents randomly from each Agency/FR for verification to Islamabad.

### **Back-check by CAMP on 15 July 2010**

The CAMP regional office senior staff also made contacts with respondents by telephone on **July 14-15, 2010**. There are a total of **610** questionnaires carrying telephone numbers, that have been recorded in the database. Out of 610 respondents' contacts, **402** respondents were contacted. Out of 402 respondents, 179 confirmed that interviews were conducted with them. 132 respondents telephone numbers could not be reached because of weak network signals or because they were blocked by a military operation in the area. 60 respondents were not at home at the time of the call and **31** refused to confirm either way.

Table 27. Contact analysis sheet

S. #	Agency/FR	Sample	Lock no response / door	Refused to cooperate	Age not required	Gender not required	Nationality not required	Interrupted interview	Successful interviews	Total Contacts
1	Bajaur Agency	680							680	680
2	Khyber Agency	760	16	189	6	6	37	13	760	1027
3	Kurram Agency	680	17	39	5				680	741
4	Mohmand Agency	360	8	13			2		360	383
5	North Waziristan Agency	440	5	17					440	462
6	Orakzai Agency	280	22	27					280	329
7	South Waziristan Agency	280	6	43	2	1			280	332
8	FR Lakki Marwat	40		4					40	44
9	FR Bannu	80	9	15	10				80	114
10	FR D.I. Khan	80		74					80	154
11	FR Kohat	160		54					160	214
12	FR Peshawar	80		27					80	107
13	FR Tank	80	7	9	6				80	102
<b>Total</b>		<b>4000</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>511</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4000</b>	<b>4689</b>

### Issues faced during back-checking

**Network problem:** In Kurram Agency some people are using Afghanistan cell companies that are also difficult to contact. Network signal strength remains the main hurdle in reaching out to these respondents.

**Fear issue:** FATA is going through a tough time, and there is a general perception by the locals that behind this insurgency the ISI is involved. It is understandable that some of the respondents may pretend or refused to confirm that they were interviewed.

In addition, because of the lack of education and exposure to these types of interviews, the respondents do not understand the importance and use of such surveys.

### **Problems during fieldwork and data Entry**

Below is a summary of major issues that emerged during field work resulting in some delay in field completion:

- There was a delay due to the military operation and curfew in parts of Khyber Agency; CAMP had to wait a few extra days for things to become normal before they could complete interviews there.

Table 28. Back-checking by telephone

S #	Name of Agency/FR	Number total contacts	Total calls	Confirmed	Telephone not responding	Not present at home	Refused
1	Orakzai	29	22	6	6	9	1
2	Khyber Agency	233	115	95	12	0	8
3	Mohmand Agency	97	73	49	9	0	15
4	Bajaur Agency	85	47	6	41	0	0
5	Kurram Agency	94	73	8	21	44	0
6	North Waziristan Agency	1	1	1	0	0	0
7	South Waziristan Agency	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	FR Peshawar	25	25	6	13	3	3
9	FR Kohat	18	18	4	11	0	3
10	FR Bannu	20	20	3	12	4	1
11	FR Lakki Marwat	0	0	0	0	0	0
12	FR Tank	3	3	0	3	0	0
13	FR D.I. Khan	5	5	1	4	0	0
	<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>31</b>

- Initially, CAMP had difficulty interviewing women respondents in both North and South Waziristan. CAMP completed the interviews with the male population relatively early in the project schedule. CAMP cited the deteriorating security situation, the local apprehensions regarding a possible military operation in the near future as well as the generally more conservative environment in these two Agencies as the primary reasons for which women were not being allowed to interact with survey teams. However, in our interaction with the field staff we kept emphasizing the need to interview women without jeopardizing the security of the Enumerators. The field teams were eventually able to interview women in North and South Waziristan.

Although there was unrest in Orakzai Agency during the time the survey was being implemented, the CAMP team did not

experience any delays there.

- Intermittent imposition of curfew in North Waziristan resulted in a slight delay in delivery of the completed questionnaires. Road blockades in Kurram led to a substantial delay in the delivery of the completed questionnaires.

#### Conclusion:

The methods chosen produced both the quantitative and the qualitative information desired for ascertaining the opinions of the people of FATA. Although compromises or assumptions had to be made due to a lack of current statistics and also because of the accessibility issue, the sampling frame was executed and this provided the confidence intervals and margin of error desired. When interpreting the results it is important to keep the accessibility and the starting point biases in mind. The

## LIST OF VILLAGES (AGENCY/FR AND TEHSIL WISE) SURVEY -2010

Bajaur Agency					
	List of Villages (Tehsil Khar)		List of Villages (Tehsil Utman Khel)		List of Villages (Tehsil Salarzai)
1	Shandi More Kalay	1	Chenagai Kalay	1	Pashat Kalay
2	Lashora Kalay	2	Ghani Ado Kalay	2	Raz Gan Kalay
3	Ali Jan Kalay	3	Ghar Shamoza Kalay	3	Barani Kadao Kalay
4	Jar Kalay	4	Gardi Kalay	4	Chinar Kalay
5	Haji Lawang Kalay	5	Sikandro Kalay	5	Sheer Shah Kalay
6	Haji Abad Kalay	6	Qazafi Kalay	6	Chargo Kalay
7	Shah Narlay Kalay	7	Mula Kalay	7	Dagai Kalay
8	Yousaf Abad Kalay	8	Qazi Derai Kalay	8	Matasha Kalay
9	Nari Qilla Kalay	9	Mano Derai Kalay	9	Dando Gai Kalay
10	College Kalay	10	Palang Kalay	10	Bar Mai Kalay
11	Farsh Kalay	11	Gosam Kalay	11	Dera Kai Kalay
12	Balo Lai Kalay	12	Loi Baba Kalay	12	Changaro Kalay
13	Dar Shah Kalay	13	Shamozo Kalay	13	Naza Kai Kalay
14	Tangi Kalay	14	Soor Bat Kalay	14	Kochora Kalay
15	Babar Shah Kalay	15	Qilla Cha Kalay	15	Shah Goo Kalay
16	Shamlo Qilla Kalay	16	Gisarlay Kalay	16	Dara Kalay
17	Chapori Kalay	17	Daba Do Kalay	17	Maro Kalay
18	Mamenro Tangay Kalay	18	Loi Jowar Kalay	18	Baro Kalay
19	Muslim Bagh Kalay	19	Koka Kalay	19	Dag Qilla Kalay
20	Changaro Kalay	20	Behram Poor Kalay	20	Talay Kalay
		21	Sha Gai Kalay	21	Kolay Kalay
		22	Mianay Kalay	22	Khazana Kalay
				23	Narwaba Kalay
				24	Dandono Kalay
				25	Hayat Kalay
				26	Serai Kalay

Mohmand Agency					
	List of Villages (Haleem Zai/Ghalanai)		List of Villages (Prang Ghar)		List of Villages (Ekka Ghund)
1	Shati Kore	1	Seray Kalay	1	Sepavi
2	Musa Khel	2	Devo Deray	2	Baba Tabar
3	Ghunda Khel	3	Naway Kalay	3	Lo Lo Kalay
4	Maluk Khel	4	Kerra Kalay	4	Chamyaran
5	Rana Khel	5	Tarakay	5	Rashakai
6	Naway Kalay	6	Babu Kalay	6	Main Kalay
7	Ghundi Kalay	7	Ledan	7	Jumma Khan Korrora
8	Wacha Khawra	8	Chock	8	Musal Kore
9	Sangar Kalay	9	Spena Khawra	9	Pir Qilla
10	Sultan Khel	10	Baday Kalay	10	Aman Tabar
11	Shani Khel	11	Munda	11	Mazi Khel
12	Ghazi Kore	12	Nao Kalay	12	Masho Khawar

Orakzai Agency			
	List of Villages (Lower Tehsil)		List of Villages (Central Tehsil)
1	Kuraiz Largi Tan	1	Manri Khel
2	Ghari Kuraiz	2	Toti Bagh Utman Khel
3	Mera Ko Bala	3	Sabora Khel
4	Dargai	4	Arghunja
5	Suleman Khel	5	Gall
6	Abi Shell	6	Tallay
7	Stara Khapa	7	Gundi Tall
8	Sarabi Ghari	8	Khawaga Serai Ghelgoo
9	Lal Mela	9	Sara Khawra
10	Kalaya	10	Toori Kani
11	Qillat	11	Riba Khel
12	Ahmad Khel	12	Samana
13	Masti Khel	13	Saiful Dara
14	Budh Khel	14	Spiddar

**Khyber Agency**

	<b>List of Villages (Jamrud/Mala Gori)</b>		<b>List of Villages (Landi Kotal /Shalman)</b>		<b>List of Villages (Bara)</b>
1	Jabba Wazir Kalay	1	Haji Gulmadar Kalay	1	Bahadar Khan Kalay
2	Jabba Mulajan Kalay	2	Nazeer Jan KalAy Shalman	2	Jan Khan Kalay
3	Zaib Khan Kalay Jabba	3	Haji Raas Kalay	3	Abdula Jan Kalay
4	Pass Kalay	4	Murad Khan Kalay	4	Paka Tara
5	Braj Kalay	5	Khatir Afridi Kalay	5	Shera Khan Kalay
6	Ajmir Kalay	6	Malak Sawabi Kalay	6	Haji Niazi Kalay
7	Nattu Khel	7	Meera Jan Dorma Khel Kalay	7	Malak Waras Khan Kalay
8	Israr Kalay Jamrud	8	Shah Zaman Kalay Shalman	8	Mian Gano Kalay
9	Spilano Kas	9	Malak Jaffar Afridi Kalay	9	Hussian Gul Kalay
10	Sifat Shah Kalay	10	Lakhkar Kalay	10	Haji Said Rahman Kalay
11	Yar Baz Kalay	11	Muhammadi Gul Kalay Gaagra	11	Inzaro Kalay
12	Naiz Gul Khan Kalay	12	Damak Kalay Ashkhel	12	Karigar Gharay
13	Khanimullah Kalay	13	Nadar Khan Kalay	13	Nala Kajurai
14	Saleem Kalay	14	Haji Zaree Shah Kalay	14	Ismail Abad (Arabi Jumat)
15	Lwara Mina	15	Malak Bosaid Kalay	15	Mashomano Adera(shalobar)
16	Chinar Kalay	16	Janat Gul Kalay	16	Safdar Ali Shaheed Kalay
17	Nekdad Kalay	17	Gulasan Kalay	17	Roshan Abad
18	Abdullah Jan Kalay	18	Zarnoor Afridi Kalay	18	Gul Wazir Kalay Sheikhmal Khel
19	Mian Murcha	19	Haji Aurang Zeb Kalay	19	Mashenai Kalay
20	Gudar Sikandar Khel	20	Speen Haji Kalay Shalman	20	Ali Akbar Kalay
21	Peepal Kalay	21	Rasool Gul Kalay	21	Wazir Khan Kalay Alam Gudar
22	Abbas Khan Kalay	22	Aratoona Shalman	22	Farsh Kalay
23	Jalandar Kalay	23	Jandool Kalay Azamkhel	23	Daolat Khel
24	Sardar Kalay	24	Pirano Kalay	24	Mina Dar Kalay
25	Jalal Din	25	Ziarat Koroona Shalman	25	Arjalinaday
		26	Zargaran		



Kurram Agency					
	List of Villages (Upper Kurram Parachinar)		List of Villages (Lower Kurram Sadda)		List of Villages (Central Kurram)
1	Agra	1	Sadda	1	Tando
2	Shublan	2	Pir Qayyum	2	Sateen
3	Alamshir	3	Manduri	3	Badama
4	Sadara	4	Alizai	4	Marghan
5	Dangila	5	Bagan	5	Makrani
6	Mali Khel	6	Tangi	6	Dagger
7	Ahmad Zai	7	Billy Amin	7	Chenarak
8	Kirman	8	Mandori	8	Mandan
9	Bughaki	9	Maroo Khel	9	Manatoo
10	Badama	10	Makhi Zai	10	Gawaki
11	Ziran	11	Nazari Kalay	11	Warasta
12	Malana	12	Inzari	12	Zarami
13	Luqman Khel	13	Bagzai	13	Sham Kai
14	Shalozan	14	Jelamay	14	Marghan
15	Pewar	15	Balish Khel	15	Marghan Dara
16	Burki	16	Sameer	16	Awai Dara
17	Kharlachi	17	Ibrahim Zai	17	Taki Tangai
18	Shingak	18	Shakar Dara	18	Sar Pakh
19	Nistekot	19	Topaki	19	Koraat
20	Karra Khela	20	Besatoo	20	Tabbai
21	Lalmai	21	Amal Kot	21	Nake Zairat
22	Kach Kina	22	Gharbina	22	Kamal Bazi
		23	Choota Mandori	23	Sra Gurga

North Waziristan Agency	
	List of Villages
1	Hurmaz
2	Musseki
3	Hassu Khel
4	Issurri
5	Zeereki
6	Hyder Khel
7	Eppi
8	Iddak
9	Khaddi
10	Hakim Khail

FR Peshawar	
	List of Villages
1	Jinnah Kor
2	Sama Badah Ber
3	Musa Dara
4	Kohi Hasan Khel
5	Asho Khel
6	Sra Dargai
7	Matani
8	Arhat Baba

South Waziristan Agency			
	List of Villages		List of Villages
1	Wana	15	Jawar
2	Makeen	16	Landi Doog
3	Laddah	17	Laman
4	Jandola	18	Nakho
5	Khaisoor	19	Gasra
6	Joni Mela	20	Piza
7	Bar Mal	21	Tara Nara
8	Kari Kot	22	Raghzai
9	Shakai	23	Shaheed Mor
10	Saro Kai	24	Farjal
11	Hanjar	25	Sherana
12	Azam Warsak	26	Speen
13	Tiar Zaa	27	Tanai
14	Sheen Warsak	28	Loi Khulo

FR Kohat	
	List of Villages
1	Dara Bazar Main
2	Bazi Khel
3	Akhorwal
4	Shah Nawaz Kalay
5	Zor Kalay
6	Suni Khel
7	Sheraki
8	Bosti Khel
9	Tor Chappar
10	Babary Banda
11	Sheen Dand
12	Zhuwaki
13	Azadi Mela
14	Shpalkay
15	Ferozi Mela
16	Molvi Haya ud Din Kalay

FR Bannu	
	List of Villages
1	Beezan Khel
2	Azeem Kalay
3	Mohmand Khel Wazir
4	Narmi Khel
5	Sardi Khel
6	Wali Noor
7	Mameetoon Khel
8	Ali Khel Koohi
9	Hindi Khel
10	Qamar Qilla

FR Tank	
	List of Villages
1	Jandola
2	Manzai
3	Barzai
4	Umar Ada
5	Shah Zamani
6	Kari Haidar
7	Dara Buta
8	Tatur
9	Chesan Kach
10	Kot Piran

FR Lakki	
	List of Villages
1	Masti Khel Upper
2	Masti Khel Lower
3	Ghundi Hussain Khel
4	Hussain Khel
5	Kotka Arab Khan
6	Ghabber Betani
7	Kotka Malik Qutab Khan Betani

FR D.I. Khan	
	List of Villages
1	Kohi Bahara
2	Kari Samozai
3	Dara Zanda
4	Kohi Khawar
5	Damini
6	Mughal Kot
7	Sheikh Mela
8	Sarai Misa
9	Sarai Zarkai
10	Sarai Fateh Ali

### KEY SPEAKERS OF THE TWO-DAY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATIVE DIALOGUE

1. Justice (Rtd.) Mian Mohammad Ajmal, Chair Fata Reforms Committee, Former Chief Justice, Peshawar High Court
2. Sang e Marjan Mehsud, Former Secretary Northern Areas, Pakistan
3. Ambassador (Rtd.) Ayaz Wazir
4. Khalid Mahmood Khan, Manager Industries, FATA Development Authority Peshawar
5. Zubair Mehsud, Assistant Professor, Law College, University of Peshawar
6. Zahir Shah Safi, Advocate High Court, Peshawar
7. Brig (Rtd.) Mahmood Shah, Former Secretary Security FATA
8. Rahimullah Yusufzai, Resident Editor, The News International, Peshawar
9. Ibrahim Shinwari, President Tribal Union of Journalists
10. Hamidullah Khan, Minister for Environment and Member National Assembly from FATA
11. Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Chief Executive, CAMP

## LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE TWO-DAY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTATIVE DIALOGUE

S. #	Name	Agency/FR
1	Alam Gul	South Waziristan Agency
2	Samina Asad	Bajaur Agency
3	NoorZia Afridi	Khyber Agency
4	Farida Afridi	Khyber Agency
5	Laiq Shah	North Waziristan Agency
6	Sami Ullah Dawar	North Waziristan Agency
7	AttaUllah	Kurram Agency
8	Engr M.Zaman Khan	North Waziristan Agency
9	IqbalHussain	Kurram Agency
10	Munir Hussain	Kurram Agency
11	AminUllahJan	FR Bannu
12	S. Shabiul Hasnain	Orakzai Agency
13	Shadi Khan	FR Lakki
14	Khalil Ur Rehman	FR Lakki
15	Ihsan Dawar	North Waziristan Agency
16	Mian Saidur Rehman	Bajaur Agency
17	Sahibzada Bahaud Din	Bajaur Agency
18	Mir Nawaz	FR Peshawar
19	Sultan Hussain	FR Peshawar
20	Akbar Hussain	FR Peshawar
21	Aminzada Afridi	Khyber Agency
22	Nayam Ullah	FR D.I. Khan
23	Gabel Khan	FR Tank
24	Ibrahim Shinwari	Khyber Agency
25	Javed Iqbal Afridi	FR Kohat
26	Faheem Alam	FR Kohat
27	Gul Shah Khan	FR Bannu
28	Umar Khan	FR Bannu
29	Dilawar Khan	Dara Adam Khel
30	Khurshaid Wazir	South Waziristan Agency
31	Qaleem Ullah	South Waziristan Agency
32	AbdulHhaleem	FR D.I. Khan

S. #	Name	Agency/FR
33	Musa Khan	FR D.I. Khan
34	Shamshad Khan	FR Tank
35	Syed Akbar Jan	FR Tank
36	NafiUllahKhan	Orakzai Agency
37	S.M. Sajad Din	Orakzai Agency
38	S. Wasi Syed	Orakzai Agency
39	M. Syed Badshah Hussain	Orakzai Agency
40	Engr Hidayat Hussain	Kurram Agency
41	Najmul Hassan	Orakzai Agency
42	Liaqat Ali Khan	South Waziristan Agency
43	Nisar Ahmed	Mohmand Agency
44	M.Zahir Shah Safi	Mohmand Agency
45	M.Khan Marjan	N. Waziristan Agency
46	Mukaram Khan Atif	Mohmand Agency
47	Muhammad Alamgir	Bajaur Agency
48	Badri Zaman	Mohmand Agency
49	HussamudDin	Khyber Agency
50	Banaras Shinwari	Khyber Agency
51	Malak Said Abbas	Khyber Agency
52	Tahira Bibi	Orakzai Agency
53	Haseeba	FR Kohat
54	Laila Afridi	FR Kohat
55	Nazia Begam	Mohmand Agency
56	Sadia Iqbal	Kurram Agency
57	S.Jehanzada	Bajaur Agency
58	Haji Habib Ullah Khan	Bajaur Agency
59	Khalid Mahmood Khan	FATA Dev. Authority
60	Dr. Naseem Afridi	Dara Adam Khel
61	Niamat Ullah	FR Lakki
62	Shams Momand	Mohmand Agency
63	Uma Kalsom	Kurram Agency
64	Naeem Ullah	FR Lakki

**MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE**  
**Opinion Poll 2010**  
**Section A: Sources of Information**

**(Q.1) What sources of information do you have access to? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

**(Q.2) Which sources of information do you value the most?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Pakistani press	1	Internet, books and films	10
Pakistani radio	2	Friends & family	11
Pakistan TV	3	Work colleagues	12
British press	4	Neighbours	13
British TV channels	5	Friday sermon	14
British radio	6	Communal gathering	15
American press	7	Government officials	16
American TV	8	Tribal elders	17
American radio	9		

**(Q.3) Which newspapers do you read regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Ausaf	1	Express	12
Daily Times	2	Pakistan	13
The Dawn	3	The Post	14
The Frontier Post	4	Aaj Kal	15
Jang	5	Aaj	16
Khabrain	6	Mashriq	17
The Nation	7	Wahdat	18
Nawa e Waqt	8	UK newspapers	19
The News	9	Afghan newspapers	20
Observer	10	Other (specify)	77
The Statesman	11	Don't know	88



**(Q.4) What television stations do you watch regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Aaj	1	Waqf	12
ARY	2	Bolan	13
AVT Khyber	3	CNBC	14
ATV	4	Star	15
Pakistan Television (PTV)	5	Century TV	16
Hum	6	Al Jazeera	17
Dunya	7	BBC	18
Samma	8	CNN	19
Express News	9	Sky News	20
Din	10	Other (specify)	77
Dawn News	11	Don't know	88

**(Q.5) Which radio stations do you listen to regularly? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
BBC Pashtu	1	FM 101	8
Radio Pakistan	2	FM 100	9
BBC Urdu	3	FM 103	10
FM 104 Buraq	4	BBC English	11
FM 88 Lakki	5	Dewa (Voice of America)	12
RADIO Pak MW	6	Other (specify)	77
FM 106	7	Don't know	88

## Section B: Opinion about Pakistan and Current Political & Security Issues

### GENERAL

**(Q.6) Do you think things in Pakistan are going in the right direction?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.7) In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing Pakistan?**

Response	Code
Law and order	1
Bad governance	2
Corruption	3
Political instability	4
Bad economy	5
Inflation	6
Energy crisis	7
American influence	8
Bomb blasts	9
Poverty	10
Human rights violation	11
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.8) In your opinion, what is the biggest problem facing FATA?**

Response	Code
Law and order	1
Outdated governance	2
Corruption	3
Unemployment	4
Drone attacks	5
Military operation	6
Bomb blasts	7
Lack of development	8
Social justice	9
Human rights violation	10
Water	11
Poverty	12
Talibanisation	13
Presence of foreigners	14
Lack of education and health services	15
Extremism	16
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR)	17
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.9) Would you live outside the FATA, if given the option to?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.9a) If yes, where would you prefer to live? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Peshawar	1	Saudi Arabia	8
Other cities of Pakistan	2	Afghanistan	9
USA	3	Dubai	10
UK	4	Other Middle Eastern countries	11
Germany	5	Other European countries	12
Canada	6	Other (specify)	77
Iran	7	Don't know	88

**(Q. 9b) If no, why would you prefer to live in the FATA ? (Multiple responses are allowed)**

Response	Code
I like to live within my own village and community	1
I like the way we live in our tribal culture and tradition	2
I feel more secure in FATA	3
We have been living in FATA since long	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.10) Which of the following are the most important services that the GoP should be providing to your district ?**

Response	Code
Security	1
Justice	2
Policing	3
Education/schools	4
Health services/hospitals	5
Water and sanitation	6
Roads	7
Tackling terrorism	8
Food supply	9
Electricity supply	10
Political education of the masses	11
Good governance	12
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.11) Who are you most in contact with?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Political Agent	1	Tribal elders	8
Military	2	<i>Mullah</i>	8
Frontier Corps	3	NGOs	9
MNAs	4	Government Officials	10
Teachers	5	None	66
Doctors	6	Other (specify)	77
Senator	7	Don't know	88

**(Q.12) Which of the following do you trust the most?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Political Agent	1	Tribal elders	8
Military	2	<i>Mullah</i>	9
Frontier Corps	3	NGOs	10
MNAs	4	Government Officials	11
Teachers	5	None	66
Doctors	6	Other (specify)	77
Senator	7	Don't know	88

**(Q.13) What do you want for your children? (Single response only, divided by gender)**

For boys	Code	For girls	Code
More education	1	More education	1
More security	2	More security	2
Employment opportunities	3	Employment opportunities	3
Marriage	4	Marriage	4
Religious education	5	Religious education	5
Other (specify)	77	<i>Pardah</i> (veil)	6
Don't know	88	Other (specify)	77
		Don't know	88

## POLITICAL ISSUES

**(Q.14) Should Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas:**

Response	Code
Be fully integrated into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1
Keep its current governing arrangements	2
Have more amendments in the FCR	3
Be established as a separate province of Pakistan	4
Be established as a FATA Council	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.15) Do you agree with the President's decision of August 2009 allowing political parties to organise and operate in FATA?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.16) What do you think of FCR?**

Response	Code
It should be abolished	1
Fundamentally reformed	2
Partly reformed	3
Retain in its present form	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.17) What do you think of the Government of Pakistan's current proposals for reform of the FCR?**

Response	Code
Fully support	1
Partly support	2
Fully oppose	3
Partly oppose	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.18) Which would you participate most in the following?**

Response	Code
The activities of political parties	1
Elections	2
Citizen forums to discuss local issues	3
Agency councils	4
Monitoring of government service delivery	5
Process of development	6
None	66
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.19) Are you on the voters register?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2

**(Q.21) Which living politician do you admire the most?**

-----Don't know 88      None 99



## Security Issues

**(Q.22) What can the Pakistan Government do to deal with suicide bombers and other terrorists?**

Response	Code
Use the army to defeat them	1
Negotiate with the terrorists	2
Dialogue with local political/tribal authorities	3
Empower moderate Islamic voices	4
Enforce bans on terrorist organisations	5
Provide employment	6
Stop following the instructions of the West	7
Ask for more help from the West	8
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.23) How much of a threat, if any, does Islamic extremism pose to Pakistan these days?**

Response	Code
Very great	1
Fairly great	2
Not a threat at all	3
Don't know	88
No response	99

**(Q.24) Who/what is to blame for the high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan?**

Response	Code
Afghan Taliban	1
Tehrek e Taliban Pakistan	2
Other Pakistani Taliban groups	3
Lashkar e Toiba	4
Jash e Mohammad	5
Pakistan Army	6
Lashkar e Islam (Mangal Bagh group)	7
Ansar ul Islam	8
Al Qaeda	9
Saudi Arabia	10
India	11
Iran	12
Israel	13
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88
No response	99

**(Q.25) Who/what is to blame for not doing enough to stop high rates of suicide bombing in Pakistan?**

Response	Code
Police department's lack of capacity	1
Intelligence agencies failing to intercept	2
Pakistan's Army lack of capacity	3
Lack of education	4
Unemployment	5
Lack of social development	6
Poverty	7
Lack of political will	8
Western influence	9
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88
No response	99

**(Q.26) Where do the bombers come from?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Afghanistan	1	Punjab	6
Kashmir	2	Other parts of Pakistan	7
West	3	Other (specify)	77
India	4	Don't know	88
FATA	5	No response	99

**(Q.27) Do you think possessing nuclear weapons enhances Pakistan's security?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.28) Which of the following agencies do you believe should be primarily responsible for security in FATA?**

Response	Code
The tribal communities/ <i>Lakhhkars</i>	1
The <i>Khassadars</i> and levies	2
The military	3
The Frontier Corps	4
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.29) Do you think the FC plays a valuable role in providing security in FATA?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.30) If trained with international assistance, would you have more or less confidence in their ability to do their job?**

Response	Code
More confidence	1
Less confidence	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.31) What are the main reasons of conflicts in FATA?**

Response	Code
Conflict over land	1
Family	2
Tribal	3
Political	4
Crime	5
Extremist	6
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.32) How secure do you feel in your daily life?**

Response	Code
Very secure	1
Somewhat secure	2
Somewhat insecure	3
Very insecure	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.33) Compared to last year, do you feel your security is getting better or worse?**

Response	Code
Much better	1
Somewhat better	2
No difference	3
Somewhat worse	4
Much worse	5
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.34) What are the biggest threats to your security?**

Response	Code
Conflict	1
Terrorist attacks	2
Army activity	3
Sectarianism	4
Drone attacks	5
Crime and banditry	6
Inadequate food	7
Inadequate healthcare	8
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.35) Have you been forced to leave your home during the past years?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2

**(Q.36) If so, where did you go?**

---

**(Q.37) What is the most important issue that affects your and your family's quality of life?**

Response	Code
Unemployment	1
Inflation	2
Poverty	3
Access to education	4
Access to health services	5
Access to food	6
Insecurity	7
Access to justice	8
Infrastructure	9
Housing	10
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.38) How do you rate the performance of the FATA Secretariat?**

Response	Code
Excellent	1
Good	2
Fair	3
Poor	4
Very poor	5
Don't know	88

**(Q.39) How do you rate the performance of the FATA Development Authority?**

Response	Code
Excellent	1
Good	2
Fair	3
Poor	4
Very poor	5
Don't know	88

**(Q.40) Various foreign countries, including US and UK, have expressed an interest in providing development assistance for FATA. How do you think that assistance could be most valuable?**

Response	Code
Roads	1
Electricity	2
Education	3
Health	4
Livelihoods	5
Supporting employment	6
Humanitarian assistance	7
Security	8
No international assistance is needed	9
No assistance is needed from US or UK	10
No opinion	55
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88



**(Q.41) What do you think of the Pakistan army's military offensive in South Waziristan?**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Code</b>
Fully support	1
Partly support	2
Fully oppose	3
Partly oppose	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.42) What do you think of the Pakistan army's military offensive in Swat/Malakand?**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Code</b>
Fully support	1
Partly support	2
Fully oppose	3
Partly oppose	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.43) How would you describe Pakistani Taliban?**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Code</b>
Are they freedom fighters	1
Defenders of Islam	2
Defenders of tribal communities	3
Terrorists	4
Uneducated youth	5
Foreign fighters	6
No opinion	55
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.44) Do you know what Al Qaeda is?**

<b>Response</b>	<b>Code</b>
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.45) If yes, what do you think of Al Qaeda?**

Response	Code
Very favourable	1
Partly favourable	2
Unfavourable	3
Very unfavourable	4
No opinion	55

**(Q.46) What should happen to any foreign fighter/*Jihadi* currently living in FATA?**

Response	Code
They should be allowed to stay	1
They should be allowed to stay but only if they cease violence	2
They should be asked to leave	3
They should be forced to leave by the Pakistani military	4
There are no such people in FATA	5
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

**(Q.47) What do you think of US drone strikes in FATA?**

Response	Code
Always justified	1
Sometimes justified, if properly targeted and excessive civilian casualties are avoided	2
Never justified	3
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

## Section C : Religion & Politics

**(Q.48) Which religious authority do you trust the most?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Javed Ghamdi	1	Al Huda	6
Prof. Anees	2	Jamaat ud Dawa	7
Amir Liaqat Hussain	3	Other (specify)	77
Tahir ul Qadri	4	Don't know	88
Dr. Israr Ahmed	5		

**(Q.49) Which religious authority outside of Pakistan do you trust the most?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Imam Kaba Sudes ur Rehman	1	Imam Khumenaee	5
Hamza Yousaf	2	Other (specify)	77
Dr. Zakir Naik	3	Don't know	88

**(Q.50) Is there any justification in Islam for suicide bombing<sup>1</sup>?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Justified	1	Don't know	88
Rarely justified	2	No response	99
Never justified	3		

**(Q.51) What do you think of Pakistani Taliban groups?**

Response	Code
Very favourable	1
Partly favourable	2
Unfavourable	3
Very unfavourable	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

<sup>1</sup>Some people think that suicide bombings and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified.

**(Q.52) Should religion .....**

Response	Code
Provide a moral code that everyone should follow	1
Play no role	2
Dictate women's rights	3
Define criminal and civil laws	4
Define how governments are chosen	5
Other (specify)	88
Don't know	77

**(Q.53) In your opinion what is the most important human rights issue in Pakistan today?**

Response	Code
Violence against women	1
Violence against children	2
Violation of minority rights	3
Freedom of expression	4
Freedom of movement	5
State's inability to provide basic amenities of life	6
Other (specify)	88
Don't know	77

**(Q.54) Do you think that a person has the right to kill a relative to protect the honour of their family?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	77

**(Q.55) What phrase best describes the Afghan Taliban?**

Response	Code
Islamic heroes fighting Western occupation	1
Ignorant of Islamic values / teaching	2
A terrorist group	3
A political group	4
An anti-women group	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.56) Will the Taliban return to power in Afghanistan?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**AFGHAN REFUGEES**

**(Q.57) Should all Afghan refugees living in Pakistan return to Afghanistan?**

Yes  1 No  2 Don't know  88

**(Q.58) To what extent do you agree or disagree that Afghan refugees living in Pakistan?**

*(Ask separately for each statement)*

Response	Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	No response
Make a contribution to Pakistan and Pakistan's economy	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Damage Pakistan's economy	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Undermine Pakistan's security	1	2	3	4	5	88	99
Create tension with the local Pakistani population	1	2	3	4	5	88	99

**(Q.59) What do you think of Pakistani Taliban groups?**

Response	Code
Very favourable	1
Partly favourable	2
Unfavourable	3
Very unfavourable	4
No opinion	55
Don't know	88

## Section D: Opinions on other Countries

(Q.60) If you were given the opportunity to emigrate from Pakistan, would you do so?

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88
No response	99

(Q.60a) If yes, which country would you choose to go?

---

(Q.60b) Why \_\_\_\_\_

(Q.61) Which of the following countries should Pakistan aspire to be more like: (Read list and circle only one)

Response	Code	Response	Code
China	1	USA	9
Iran	2	Australia	10
UK	3	Saudi Arabia	11
Japan	4	Malaysia	12
India	5	Germany	13
Turkey	6	Other (specify)	88
France	7	Don't know	77
Canada	8		

(Q.61a) Why?

---

(Q.61b) Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for military build up?

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88



**(Q. 62) Do you think Pakistan should accept money from Western countries such as the UK and USA for development?**

Response	Code
Yes	1
No	2
Don't know	88

**(Q.63) Thinking now about world affairs, do you have a very favourable, somewhat favourable, somewhat unfavourable, or very unfavourable opinion of the following countries:**

Response	Very favourable	Somewhat favourable	Somewhat unfavourable	Very unfavourable	No response	Don't know
Afghanistan	1	2	3	4	99	88
India	1	2	3	4	99	88
Iran	1	2	3	4	99	88
China	1	2	3	4	99	88
Saudi Arabia	1	2	3	4	99	88
Canada	1	2	3	4	99	88
France	1	2	3	4	99	88
Germany	1	2	3	4	99	88
Malaysia	1	2	3	4	99	88
The United States	1	2	3	4	99	88
The United Kingdom	1	2	3	4	99	88

## Section E: Opinion about Pakistan and United Kingdom relations and policies

**(Q.64) Do you think that the UK:** *(Ask separately for each statement)*

Response	Yes	No	Don't know	No response
Helps to make the world more peaceful & stable	1	2	88	99
Values the United Nations (UN)	1	2	88	99
Helps to make the world more prosperous	1	2	88	99
Helps to safeguard the global environment	1	2	88	99
Promotes respect for democratic values	1	2	88	99
Promotes respect for human rights	1	2	88	99

**(Q.65) Which of the following best describes the UK's relationship with Pakistan?**

*(Read list and circle only one)*

Response	Code
Unequal	1
Partners for peace and progress	2
Close allies in the war against terror	3
A left over from colonial days	4
Partners in development and dealing with emergencies	5
Home of many British Pakistanis	6
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88

**(Q.66) Which of the following best describes the UK's involvement in Afghanistan?**

*(Read list and circle only one)*

Response	Code
Committed in the long term to a stable Afghanistan	1
Will leave Afghanistan as soon as Osama Bin Laden is found	2
Should not be in Afghanistan at all	3
Engaged in an attack on Islam	4
Is a partner in rebuilding and developing Afghanistan	5
Other (specify)	77
Don't know	88
No response	99

**(Q.67) Is your opinion of the UK generally becoming more favourable, less favourable or has stayed the same?**

Response	Code
More favourable	1
Less favourable	2
Stayed the same	3
Don't know	88

**(Q.68) What is your opinion of the UK and USA on the following?**

*(Ask separately for each statement)*

Response	UK	Code	USA	Code
Role in Iraq	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99
Role in Afghanistan	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99
Attitude towards the Islamic World	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99
Immigration policy	Most favourable	1	Most favourable	1
	Less favourable	2	Less favourable	2
	Not favourable	3	Not favourable	3
	No opinion	55	No opinion	55
	No response	99	No response	99

## Section F: Demographics

### D 1: Gender of respondents (On observation):

Male

Female

### D 2: Age group of respondent

Response	Code	Response	Code
18 – 29 years	1	50 – 64 years	3
30 – 49 years	2	65 + years	4

### D 3: Education level of respondent

Response	Code	Response	Code
Not schooled	1	Schooled upto Bachelor level	7
Religious education only	2	Master degree	8
Schooled upto Primary level	3	Specialisation: MBBS/doctor	9
Schooled upto Middle level	4	Specialisation: Engineering	10
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level	5	Those upto professional education	11
Schooled upto Intermediate level	6		

### D 3a: Education level of head of the household

Response	Code	Response	Code
Not schooled	1	Schooled upto Bachelor level	7
Religious education only	2	Master degree	8
Schooled upto Primary level	3	Specialisation: MBBS/doctor	9
Schooled upto Middle level	4	Specialisation: Engineering	10
Schooled upto Secondary Certificate level	5	Those upto professional education	11
Schooled upto Intermediate level	6		

### D 4: Monthly income of respondent's family in PKR?

Response	Code	Response	Code
Upto Rs 3000	1	Rs 7001 – Rs 10000	4
Rs 3001 – Rs 5000	2	Rs 10001 – Rs 15000	5
Rs 5001 – Rs 7000	3	More than Rs 15000	6

**D 5: Occupation of respondent**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Agricultural labourer	1	Provincial civil servant	11
Chowkidar (watchman)	2	Skilled labourer	12
Civil servant of FATA	3	Small business owner	13
Clerical employee	4	Teacher	14
Farm owner	5	Technician	15
Home-based worker	6	Unskilled labourer	16
Lady health worker (LHW)	7	White colour employee	17
Large business owner	8	Unemployed	18
Management/supervisor	9	Other (specify)	77
Military, police, security personnel	10		

**D 6: Marital status of respondent**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Married	1	Single	4
Widowed	2	No response	99
Divorced	3		

**D 7: How many people live in your household/compound?**

Number of People: \_\_\_\_\_

Male (adult)	Code	Female (adult)	Code	Male children	Code	Female children	Code
1-5 persons	1	1-5 persons	3	1-5 children	5	1-5 children	7
6 and above persons	2	6 and above persons	4	6 and above	6	6 and above	8

**D 8: Religion of respondent**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Christian	1	Sikh	4
Hindu	2	Other (specify)	77
Muslim	3	No response	99

*(Ask if answer is 3 in D8)*

Shiite

1

Sunni

2

*(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)*

**D 9: Please tell me whether you regularly, sometimes, or never engage in the following religious practices**

Response	Regularly	Sometimes	Never	Not asked	No response
Pray five times a day	1	2	3	4	99
Fast during Ramadan	1	2	3	4	99

*(Ask if Answer is 3 in D8)*

**D 10: How often do you pray at the mosque?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Five times a day/daily	1	Several times a year	5
Several times a week	2	Once a year or less	6
Once a week	3	Never	7
Monthly	4	No response	99

**D 11: Would you be willing to participate in another survey later in this year?**

Response	Code	Response	Code
Yes	1	No	2
Don't know	88		

**Read closing statement  
to the respondent:**

"Thank you for participating in our survey. Do you have any questions? In the next few days my supervisor may contact you to evaluate the quality of my work and answer any other questions you may have about the interview. To help him do that, could I have your telephone number?"

**Respondent information:**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

Tel No. \_\_\_\_\_

CNIC Number \_\_\_\_\_

**Interviewer certification:** "I certify that I have completed this interview according to the instructions provided to me.

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

**To be completed by the supervisor:**

-----  
**Interview subject to Back-check/Control**

1. Yes
2. No

**Method of Back-check/Control**

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check by telephone by supervisor or the central office
4. Not subject to back-check

**Initial questions (for interviewer only)**

Name of surveyor -----

Date of interview -----

Agency/FR -----

Tehsil -----

[1] Rural

[2] Urban



## TARGET DEMOGRAPHICS

A total of 4,000 adult respondents were interviewed in all seven Agencies and six FRs of FATA region. Following figures and tables provide demographic and socio-economic detail of the respondents. They also provide the employment status, educational status income status and marital status of the respondents.

### Gender of the respondents

The survey was planned to incorporate male and female perception on different issues affecting the life of the people of FATA. The following statistics show that over the surveys we were able to gradually reduce the gender disparity ratio from 2008 (71:29), to 2009 (60:40) and (50.40:49.6) in 2010, male to female respectively. This also shows that in 2010 the circumstances were more favourable for field work and that CAMP gained considerable access to women's opinion in most parts of FATA for this survey.

Fig 76. Gender of the respondents





Fig 77. Age groups



### Age groups

The sampling consisted of people over 18 years of age who agreed to be interviewed and who were residents of FATA. The intent was to interview adults and not a sample of the age profile of adults in the population. Inference is specific to adults of FATA.


As shown in the figure 77, most of the respondents were young or middle-aged and not elderly persons.

### Education

The following figure 78 shows statistics from the three surveys for the educational level of the respondents. The 2008 survey shows the surprising result that only 23.4% did not have schooling. This would indicate that the people of FATA have a much higher level of educational achievement than the rest of Pakistan. Even the less impressive statistics from 2009 and 2010 show that our respondents are more educated than the general population. The proportions of middle school to college educated people in the sample are impressive. When one examines the way that households were chosen in villages, it is understandable that more educated people were sampled. See the reference to the 'Starting point bias' in the Methodology section of the report.

It is not established properly in the 1998 Census Report whether

Fig 78. Educational level of the respondents



those who have religious education come under the 'educated' category, but a substantial portion of the respondents specified religious education only. In 2008, 10.4% respondents were found to be 'religious educated only', which remained similar in 2009 (11.8%), but went down to 7.8% in 2010 survey.

## Education of the head of the family

If the respondent was not the head of the family, then they were asked the education level of the head of the family. We hardly see a women as the head of the family in *Pakhtun* culture. Fewer respondents in the older generation are schooled. In 2009, 55.4% of the respondents were found 'not schooled' while in 2010 it went down considerably to 46.5, however, for both years this group remains still higher than in 2008 and in Pakistan in general.


In general, the FATA survey has sampled a much more educated person than the general population for the given age group. This may be attributable to the 'Starting point bias' described in the methodology section.

## Income level of the respondents

The income levels in FATA are low when compared to the income level of urban centres of Pakistan. There is a general misperception about the people of FATA, that is, that majority of them are rich due to enormous illegal opportunities such as smuggling of goods, heroine and opium trade, opium cultivation,


Table 29. Education of the head of the family (respondent)

Responses	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Not schooled	55.4	46.5
Religious education only	4.7	9.9
Schooled upto Primary level	10.0	11.0
Schooled upto Middle level	11.4	7.7
Schooled upto Secondary school certificate	10.2	11.8
Schooled upto Intermediate	3.2	5.8
Schooled upto Bachelors degree	2.9	4.0
Master degree	1.7	2.4
Specialisation: MBBS/doctor	0.2	0.6
Specialisation: Engineering	0.1	0.2
Other upto professional education	0.2	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>



arms manufacturing and smuggling, etc. However, the wealthy are few in numbers although more visible.

The figure reveals that the respondents' level of income, and the average, has shifted from 2008 to 2010. It has shifted from low income toward middle income and slightly toward a larger proportion of wealthier people during the last three years. These figures are misleading because inflation has been a major contributor to this shift.



## Household size

Because of the extended family nature and the custom of living in compounds, the concept of household in FATA includes the head of the family, his sons (married and unmarried) and daughters (un-married), daughters-in-law, and grand children. This custom makes for a very large-sized household.

We have to assume that when asked the size of the family that the respondents are referring to the number of people in the compound.

The figure 80 reflects that we have sampled very few small families. The families of 6-10 and 11-15 are the 'Norm.'

## Occupation

The occupation of the male and female respondents was noted. We see that more respondents identified 'housewife' option, and that goes with the increased percent of female respondents. The fact that Agriculture labour is the 2nd highest category of occupation chosen by the respondents is an indication of the more urban-type of respondent. 'Urban' in the small town and village context. This is also seen in the diversity of employees

Table 30. Occupation of the respondents

Responses	Percent 2008	Percent 2009	Percent 2010
Agricultural Labour	11.3	10.0	9.0
Farm owner	12.6	7.1	1.4
Unskilled labour	4.4	5.2	3.6
Skilled labour	5.1	7.3	6.9
Technician	1.5	1.9	1.8
Clerical employee	1.8	1.8	1.0
White collar employee	12.0	4.1	2.0
Management/supervisor	1.0	0.9	1.2
Small business owner	8.3	12.1	5.1
Large business owner	3.5	1.2	1.5
Government employee	9.3	9.8	0.0
Home based worker	0.0	5.7	2.7
House wife	14.0	18.7	37.6
Lady health worker			2.6
Student	2.9	2.3	3.0
Chowkida/watchman			3.5
Civil servant of FATA			1.8
Military, police, security personal			0.6
Provincial civil servant			0.9
Teacher			6.8
Unemployed	8.1	5.3	6.6
Others	4.6	6.7	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

and business owners in the table 30 below.


## Occupation by gender

The occupation results for 2008 - 2010 surveys show that agriculture is purely male dominated skill, while we see home-based workers, Lady Health Workers, teachers in the female category of the FATA respondents. We also see some skilled worker in the female category such as those women working on embroidery, tailoring, etc. Men are more unemployed than women. Surprisingly, in the rural tribal set-up we see some women as owners of small businesses.

In the tribal society, inheritance for women is discouraged; however, the data also reveal some female farm owners.

## Marital status


In the rural *Pakhtun* areas, early marriage is still the norm. This is shown in figure 81 that nearly three quarters of the respondents,



for all three years, are found to be married as opposed to just average 20% un-married. A fifth of the population, probably among the very young in the same, is not married. Widowed or divorced are found to be a very small part of the sample

## Religion


FATA is a predominantly Muslim society with few non Muslim



populations. There are some Christians, Hindus, and Sikh but are very few and in recent times, due to the insurgency, most of them have left their homes in FATA.

## Shiite Sunni proportions in FATA

Respondents who identified themselves as Muslim, were subsequently asked which sect they belong to. For both years, the average ratio is *Shiite* 13.2% and *Sunni* 86.8%. In FATA we have both Shiite and Sunni population in Kurram and Orakzai Agencies, while the rest of FATA is Sunni dominated.





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