

THE PLACE OF JAINISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN THOUGHT.

In the present paper I propose to investigate the development of philosophical ideas in ancient India at the time when Jainism entered on the scene. This enquiry is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the original concepts of Soul (*jīva*) and matter (*pudgala*) in the revealed literature of the Brahmans (*Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*) in contradiction to the ideas on the same subjects in Jainism and the classical philosophies (*darsana*), with which the second part will be concerned.

PART THE FIRST.

1. CHAPTER:-THE ANCIENT CONCEPT OF SOUL.

1. All Indian philosophers with the exception of the Vedāntists of Śaṅkar's School (*māyā-vādinah*) and the Buddhists, however much they may differ in details, agree in the main about the nature of Soul, viz. that is a permanent or eternal immaterial substance; they consequently maintain the personal immortality of the souls. To all who are accustomed to this belief it is difficult to realize that it is of a comparatively late origin. The primitive Aryans held a distinctly different opinion about the nature of the soul. Their belief may be described as follows. The life of man is continued after death in a form similar to what he

had been during his life on earth; it is but a shadowy existence, yet one in a bodily form, however subtle that body may have been imagined. This post-mortal body is the soul itself, there is no separate soul different from it. It will be convenient to call this principle of conscious life which is conceived under some bodily or material form, *psyche* instead of soul, and to use the term *soul* only to denote the immaterial and permanent substance which is possessed of intelligence and consciousness.

2. The primitive ideas of the Aryans about the psyche have been retained, to some extent, by the ancient Indians, and still linger on in the popular belief of the Hindus about the manes (*pitarah*) which forms the basis of the *śrāddha* practice. For the *pitṛ-tarpana* or oblation to the manes presupposes the belief that the manes stand in need of food and drink just like men; they must, therefore, have been imagined to be of an organisation not quite unlike that of men while living on earth. The psyche is frequently spoken of as a man (*puruṣa*) or rather manikin of thumb's size (*aṅguṣṭha-mātra*); at the time of death it departs from the body which is then left behind as a corpse.

3. In the Brāhmaṇas and in the oldest Upaniṣads¹ we meet with very remarkable spe-

1 The oldest Upaniṣads are the following *Bṛahadāraṇyaka*, *Chhāndogya*, *Taittirīya*, *Aitareya*, and *Kauṣītakī*. After those Upaniṣads there is a decided break, and those which come nearest them, the *Kāthaka*, *Śvetāśvartara*, *Muṇḍaka*, etc. belong to a new period as will be explained in the second part.

ulations on the nature of the psyche which show a great advance over the primitive beliefs described above. In those works the psyche is spoken of as consisting in, or being made of several constituent parts which are frequently called *prāṇas*. They are regarded as the factors of physico-psychical life. Most usually five such factors are enumerated, viz. *prāṇa* breath, *vāc* speech, *chakṣuḥ* seeing or eye, *śrotra* hearing or ear, *manas* mind. Occasionally more than five factors are mentioned, as in the passage to be quoted in the sequel; but the above set of five factors has, beyond doubt, been the almost generally accepted one. These psychical factors are not as many functions of, or qualities inherent in a common substratum, but they are distinct entities which combining form one individual psyche. They are, however, not quite independent or self-existent, for they stand in an intimate relation to the following physical or cosmical essences, taken in the same order: *vāyu* wind, *agni* fire, *āditya* sun, *disaḥ* the heavenly quarters, *chandramas* moon; and on the death of the individual man, they will eventually be reunited with the latter.

The Upaniṣads contain some discussions which throw full light on the theory of the psychical factors and make it quite clear that none of those factors was regarded as the permanent principle of personality, or, in other words, none of them could be claimed as the soul in the true meaning of word. In the 3rd Adhyāya of the *Brhad Aranyaka* a great disputation under Janaka, King of Videha, is described, in which Yājñavalkya,

answers the questions put to him by the Brahmans of the Kurus and Pāñcālas. In the 2nd Brāhmaṇa the opponent of Yājñavalkya is Jāratkārva Ārtabhāga. The problem under consideration is discussed in §§ 11–13, of which I quote the text and translation, the latter based on that of Max Müller in *Sacred Books of the East*. Vol. xv, p. 126 f. 11 ‘Yājñavalkya, he said, when such a person (a sage) dies, do the vital breaths (prāṇas) move out of him or no?’ ‘No’, replied Yājñavalkya; ‘they are gathered up in him, he is swelled, he is inflated, and thus inflated the dead lies at rest.’ 12 ‘Yājñavalkya’, he said, ‘when such a man dies, what does not leave him?’ ‘The name’, he replied, ‘for the name is endless, the Viśvedevas are endless, and by it he gains the endless world.’ 13 ‘Yājñavalkya’, he said, when the speech of this dead person enters into the fire, breath into the wind, the eye into the sun, the mind into the moon, hearing into the quarters, into the earth the body, into the air (or space) the self, into the shrubs the hairs of the body, into the trees the hairs of the head, when the blood and the seed are deposited in the water, where is then that person?’ Yājñavalkya said: ‘Take my hand, my hand, my friend. We two alone shall know of this; let this question of ours not be (discussed) in public’. Then these two went out and argued, and what they said was Karman (work), and what they praised was Karman, viz., that a man becomes good by good work, and bad by bad work. After that Jāratkārva Ārtabhāga held his peace.”

याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियत उदस्मात्प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो३
 नेति । नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्योऽत्रैव समवनीयन्ते स उच्छ्रत्याध्माय ह्याध्मातो
 मृतः शेते ॥ ११ ॥ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते किमेनं न जहा-
 तीति । नामेति । अनन्तं वै नाम । अनन्ता विश्वे देवाः । अनन्तमेव स
 तेन लोकं जयति ॥ १२ ॥ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच यत्रास्य पुरुषास्यग्निं वाग-
 प्येति वातं प्राणश्चक्षुरादित्यं मनश्चन्द्रं दिशः श्रोत्रं पृथिवीं शरीरमाकाशमात्मा-
 ओषधीर्लोमानि वनस्पतीन्केशाः अप्सु लोहितं च रेतश्च निधीयते । क्वायं तदा
 पुरुषो भवतीति । आहर सोम्य हस्तमार्तभागावामेतस्यैव वेदिष्यावो न नावेत-
 त्सजन इति । तौ, होत्क्रम्य मन्त्रयांचक्रते । तौ ह यदूचतुः । कर्म हैव तदूचतुरथ
 यत्प्रशशंसतुः कर्म हैव तत्प्रशशंसतुः । पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः
 पापेनेति । ततो ह जारत्कारव आर्तभाग उपरराम ॥ १३ ॥

The purpose of the questioner in the foregoing passage of the *Brh. Ar.* is, as the reader will have remarked, to elicit from Yājñavalkya a declaration about the nature of Soul, for thereby he would be led on to explain its identity with Brahma. But this Yājñavalkya will not do, because his intention in the whole disputation is to prove that all the speculations of his opponents do not lead up to the true knowledge of Brahma. The first two paragraphs deal with the man who on dying reaches *moksha*. In § 11 Yājñavalkya declared that the *prāṇas* do not move out of him, but remain in the corpse; accordingly the *prāṇas* cannot be the Soul. The next question in § 12, what remains of such a man is answered evasively by Yājñavalkya. But his opponent is not to be put off easily; so he makes straight for the point: where is the *person* of a man, after his body has been dissolved into its elements and the constituent parts of his psyche have been reunited with their cosmical prototypes fire, wind, etc.? Yājñavalkya again avoids the declaration

which his opponent seems to have expected, by referring to *karma*. They discuss the subject, in private, and therefore their view is not fully stated; but from the hints given in the text it must have come to this: the *karma* of a man who dies brings about a new set of *prāṇas* to start a new life, a good or a bad one according to the nature of the *karma* he had accumulated in his previous life. At any rate it is quite clear that both disputants assumed psychical life to be brought about by the combination and co-operation of the five *prāṇas*, and had no idea of any permanent substratum of man's personality. If such a belief, in immortal souls had been current at the time of the composition of *Brh. Ār.*, it would have come out in the course of the discussion, or rather it would have been absurd for the author to put into the mouth of Ārtabhāga the questions which he makes him ask. After all, the discussions as we read them in the *Brh. Ār.*, are not to be taken as historical records, but the whole disputation is an invention of the author after the model of a similar disputation on ritualistic items in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa. Therefore the general ideas embodied in this part of the *Brh. Ār.* also must be considered to belong to the common stock of ideas current during the Upanishad Period. I do not contend that the sages of that time did deny the existence of permanent souls, but that the very idea that there might be *immortal* souls had not yet entered their mind.

The same idea relative to soul comes out in teaching of the Upanishads that consciousness

ceases with death: *na pretya saṃjñāstīti* Brh. Ār. 2, 4, 13. 4, 5, 13. *saṃjñā* here means according to Śaṅkara *viśeṣa-saṃjñā* i. e. consciousness of ones' personality. This is no doubt the true meaning of *saṃjñā* in this passage; for *saṃjñā* has both meanings: 'consciousness' and 'individual name', which are here combined in Śaṅkara's rendering. The loss of self-consciousness is interpreted in another passage (Chhāndogya Upanishad, 6, 9, 1. 10, 1) by the merging of the individual being in Brahma. 'As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant trees, and reduce the juice into one form, and as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that tree, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True (either in sleep or in death), know not that they are merged in the true. In the next Khanda the same idea is illustrated by the simile of rivers and the ocean. (यथा सोम्य मधु मधुकृतो निस्तिष्ठन्ति नानात्वयानां वृक्षाणां रसान् समवहारमेकतां रसं गमयन्ति । ते यथा तत्र न विवेकं लभन्तेऽमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्म्यमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्मीत्येवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदुः सति संपद्यामह इति). These similes illustrate unmistakably the loss of conscious personality in death, which indeed could be the consequence from the absence of any permanent substratum of it. Now all words and expressions in the Upanishads which might be used to denote the concept of Soul, can be proved not to denote the immortal Soul in our sense of the word. But it is not necessary here to enter in these details; we are here concerned with the main issue only viz. that the

concept of immortal souls is entirely absent in the Brāhmaṇas and the oldest Upanishads.

2. CHAPTER:-ORIGINAL NON-DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPIRIT AND MATTER.

From what has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter we are led to conclude that the distinction between Spirit and Matter was not yet grasped by the thinkers of the oldest Upanishads. For how could they have got at the concept of Spirit, when they did not possess the idea of permanent Souls? We need, however, not rely on this inference only; we can prove directly from the Upanishads themselves that they do not yet distinguish principally between Spirit and Matter. For this purpose we will examine some passages in the sixth Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad where the evolution of the world from original Being (*sat*) is taught. In the second Khaṇḍa Uddālaka declares to Śveta-ketu, his son. 'In the beginning, my dear, there was that only which is, one only, without a Second' सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्. Here the question has been raised already in old times whether this *Sat* is Spirit or Matter. For we learn from the first Sūtras of the *Brahma Sūtra* as explained by the commentators, that the Sāṅkhyas declared the *Sat* to be primeval matter, called *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* in their system. But the Vedāntins identified the *Sat* with Brahma which is essentially spiritual. Their argument against the Sāṅkhya view is contained in the 5th. Sūtra (*ikṣhaternāś-abdam*). For the text quoted above continues: 'It (*Sat*) thought, may I be many, may I grow forth It sent forth fire.' तदैक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तत्तेजोऽसृजत.

The Vedāntin's argument is that 'thinking' cannot be predicated of matter which is *acetana* not intelligent accordingly the *Sat* being intelligent because it 'thought' is what we call Spirit. The argument of the Vedāntin would be unimpeachable, if the author of the Upanishad had distinguished Spirit and Matter in the same way as the Vedāntin did, which however he did not. For he continues: 'That fire thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent for the water'. तत्तेज ऐक्षत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽसृजत. And again: 'Water thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth earth (food): ता आप ऐक्षत बह्व्यः स्याम प्रजायेमहीति ता अन्नमसृजन्त. Now there can be no doubt that Fire, Water, and Earth, however subtile they may have been imagined by the author or the Upanishad, must be classed with Matter, and not with Spirit. Yet they too 'thought' *aikshata*; and if 'thinking' did prove that the *Sat* is Spirit then those elements too had likewise to be considered to be Spirit. It is true that in the next *Khaṇḍa* the *Sat* is called *devatā* but the same designation is also given to Fire, Water and Earth. They would, therefore, at the same time be Spirit as well as Matter. This is an actual dilemma, and there is no other way out of it than to assume that in the period of the oldest Upanishads the distinction between Matter and Spirit had not yet clearly been grasped however difficult it may be for modern thinkers to realize such an attitude of the primitive mind.

The language of the oldest Upanishads gives evidence to the correctness of the view I have sought to establish. For those words which in

later times are used to express the idea of Spirit or of attributes of Spirit, viz. *Cetanā*, *caitanya*, *cetana*, *cetaḥ*, *cit*, *buddhi*¹ are entirely absent from the oldest Upanishads. Of course there are words for 'thought', and 'thinking' as *dhi*, *prajñā*, *prajñāna*, *viññāna*, but these were originally looked upon as functions of the mind; *manah* however is, according to our text, only a refined product of Earth, as will be evident from the discussion of some important parts of the same Prapāṭhaka, which we must now enter upon.

Fire, Water and Earth, the first products of the primeaval *Sat* are not to be identified with the same elements as they are generally understood. I should rather call them proto-elements; for they never occur single, but always are combined in such a way that all three are present in every thing whatsoever. In this regard they bear the closest resemblance to the three *guṇas* in Sāṅkhya philosophy *Sattvaṁ*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*; this resemblance, nay almost identity, is so striking that scholars now agree in assuming that the Sāṅkhyas have derived their idea of the three *guṇas* from that of the three proto-elements *tejaḥ* *āpāḥ*, *annam* in the 6th Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya Upanishad. These proto-elements, then, enter into combination for the formation of everything. How they build up the body and psyche of man is taught in the 5th Khanda of our text. The earth (food) when eaten becomes three-fold;

1 *Citta* occurs only once in the Kaushitaki Upanishad and several times in the 8th Prapāṭhaka of the Chhāndogya, which seems to be a later addition.

its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtilest portion mind. (1). Water when drunk becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes urine, its middle portion blood, its subtilest portion breath. (2). Fire when eaten becomes threefold; its grossest portion becomes bone, its middle portion marrow, its subtilest portion speech. (3). For truly, my child, mind comes of earth, breath of water, speech of fire (4).

अन्नमशितं त्रेधा विधीयते । तस्य यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तत्पुरीषं भवति यो मध्यमस्तन्मांसं योऽणिष्ठस्तन्मनः । १ । आपः पीतास्त्रेधा भवन्ति यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तन्मूत्रं भवति यो मध्यमस्तल्लोहितं योऽणिष्ठः स प्राणः । २ । तेजोऽशितं त्रेधा भवति यः स्थविष्ठो धातुस्तदस्थि भवति यो मध्यमः स मज्जा योऽणिष्ठः सा वाक् । ३ । अन्नमयं हि सोम्य मनः आपोमयः प्राणस्तेजोमयी वागिति । ४ । Mind, breath, and speech combined form the psyche of man; they consist of the subtilest essence; *animā*, as it is called in the next Khaṇḍa, of earth, water, and fire. But a still more subtile *animā* than those spoken of before, is the *Sat* which upholding the psyche makes it a soul *jīva*, as may be gathered from the following two passages. 'When a man departs from hence, his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath, in fire, fire in the Highest Being (i. e. *Sat*). Now that which is that subtile essence (the root of all) in it all that exists has its self. It is the true. It is the Self and thou, Śvetaketu art it.' (8th, Khaṇḍa 6. 7.)

अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम् स य एषोऽणिमा । ६ । ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति । ७ ।

The next passage is in the IIth Khaṇḍa. This (body) indeed withers and dies when the loving Self has left it; the living Self dies not. That which is that subtile essence etc. वाव किलेदं म्रियते न जीवो म्रियते इति स य एषोऽणिमा इत्यादि. The last sentence (*Sa ya eṣo anima* etc.) occurs nine times in our text. It inculcates the great teaching of the Upanishads that Brahma is the root of all. The word *brahma*, however, does not occur in the whole of the 6th Prapāṭhaka; but in the eighth (8, 4) it is said: 'the name of this Brahma is the True' एतस्य ब्रह्मणो नाम सत्यमिति.

It will be seen that *jīva* in the second passage comes much nearer of our concept of Soul, but it differs from it in one essential point; it does not possess permanent personality. For on *mukti* this *jīva* merges in Brahma and loses its individuality (see above, *na pretya Sanijñāstīti*). According to the teaching of the Upanishad there can be no personal immortality of the Souls.

In the *Bṛhad Āraṇyaka*, in the part which is ascribed to Yājñavalkya, the teaching of the Upanishads relative to Brahma and the souls has reached its highest development. The *Chhāndogya Up.* does not attempt to define the nature of Brahma, but according to Yājñavalkya its nature is pure intelligence.¹ Thus we read II 4 12: Thus verily, O Maitreyī does this great Being, endless, unlimited, *consisting of nothing but knowledge* rise from out these elements, and vanish again in them. There is no consciousness in

1 At the end of III 9 we read the following definition of Brahma: *Vijñānam ānandaṁ Brahma*.

death'. एवं वा अरे महद्भूतमनन्तमपारं विज्ञानघन¹ एवैतेभ्यो भूतेभ्यः समुत्थाय तान्यैवानु विनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति.

Yājñavalkya had no doubt recognized the paramount importance of intelligence (*viññāna*) not only for the conception of the highest Being (*Brahma*) but also, and perhaps primarily, for that of the human soul. For *Bṛh. Ar.* III 7, 16-23 contains a discussion of the several constituent parts of the psyche; there we meet with a set of eight instead of the usual five *prāṇas* spoken of above in the first chapter, the additional ones being *tvac*, *viññānam* and *retah*. The importance of *viññāna* is apparent in the explanation of sleep in II 1, 17 put in the mouth of Ajātaśatru, king of Kāśī. 'When this man is thus asleep, then the intelligent person (*puruṣa*) having through the intelligence of the *prāṇas* absorbed within himself all intelligence, lies in the space, which is in the heart. When he takes in these different kinds of intelligence, then it is said that the man sleeps. Then the breath is kept in, speech is kept in, hearing is kept in, seeing is kept in, the mind is kept in.' यत्रैष एतत्सुतोऽभूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुष एषां प्राणानां विज्ञानेन विज्ञानमादाय य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते । तानि यदा गृह्णाति अथ हैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम । तद्गृहीत एव प्राणो भवति गृहीता वाग् गृहीतं चक्षुर्गृहीतं श्रोत्रं गृहीतं मनः ॥ This *viññānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ* comes still nearer to our conception of soul than the *jīva* of the *Chhāndogya Up.*; but like the latter it has no permanent existence, and in *mukti* it merges in *Brahma*. It is worth remarking that the *Kaushītaki Up.* which appare-

1 The parallel passage IV 5, 13 has *Prajñānaghana* instead of *Vijñānaghana*.

ntly is the youngest of the group the old Upanishads, uses *prajñā* as almost synonym with *viññāna* of our text, and *prajñātmā* with *viññānamayaḥ puruṣaḥ*. But there is no appreciable advance over the standpoint reached already by Yājñavalkya (or the school of thinkers represented by that celebrated name).

To sum up the results of the first part of our investigation: In the first chapter we have traced the development of the idea of Soul from the crude notions of the primitive Aryans through a long course of progress to the final form given it by the most advanced authors of the oldest Upanishads. They stopped short of recognizing the personal immortality of the souls, for otherwise they would have placed themselves in opposition to the unanimous teaching of the Upanishads, viz. the identity of the souls with Brahma. To take this last step had therefore to be left to the thinkers of the next period.—In the second chapter I have explained that the heterogeneity of Matter and Spirit was as yet unknown in the period of the oldest Upanishads, but that in this respect an advance had been made in so far as Brahma considered as an intelligent principle comes near the true idea of spirit. It was reserved for the next period to principally distinguish between Matter and Spirit. The inquiry into the further development of the ideas treated above will form the subject of the Second Part. Before, however, entering upon it, it is necessary to state that in the Upanishads the beginnings of two very important theories are the first time clearly

discerned, the theories of retribution (*Karma*) and of metempsychosis (*punar janma*). From the passage about Karma quoted in the first chapter we learn that this subject was not to be discussed in public; we thence conclude that at that time the theory of Karma was not yet generally known and accepted, as it certainly was ever since, but was still regarded as an arcanum, a secret teaching, not to be divulged to the masses. The migration of souls, first appearing in the Upanishads, is several times hinted at in them; at some length it is explained in *Brh. Ār.* VI 2, and *Chānd. Up.* V. 10. Waving minor differences the opinion is that the souls first go to the moon, and those which are to be reembodied descend thence. They finally reach earth as rain and become food; he who eats it, will become the father of the individual in his new birth. It goes without saying that this belief is widely different from the theory of rebirth as it has been understood during the middle age of Indian history down to the present day.

PART THE SECOND.

The Vedic period closes with the group of the oldest Upanishads from which we have largely drawn materials for the investigation conducted in the preceding part. There are, however, three more groups of younger, and even quite late Upanishads to be enumerated presently. They too are severally ascribed by tradition to one or other of the four Vedas; but they differ in many respects, to such a degree from the oldest group that they must be placed in an altogether

different period. After the oldest group there is an unmistakable break in this branch of Sanskrit Literature occasioned most probably by a longer interval of time during which new currents of thought had set in and had been gradually modifying the mental physiognomy of the Vedic period. From this transition-period may be dated the middle ages of India.

The Upanishads have chronologically been divided by the late Professor Deussen into four groups. To the first group belong the oldest Upanishads. The three remaining groups are the following. 2. the meterial Upanishads: *Kāthaka*, *Īśa*, *Svetāśvatara* *Muṇḍaka*, and *Mahānārāyaṇa*; 3. the younger Upanishads in prose: *Praśna*, *Maitrāyaṇīya*, and *Māṇḍūkya*; 4. the host of late Upanishads ascribed to the *Atharva Veda*. The fourth group may be neglected for the purpose of our inquiry; but I shall have to add some remarks about the second and third groups in order to make good my assertion that between them and the oldest group there is a well defined break.

I have already mentioned above a few of terms (*cetanā* etc.) which are absent in the first group and become current in the younger ones. The number of such new words which have been collected from Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the principal Upanishads, Bombay. S. S. 1891, amounts to more than a hundred. I transcribe here some in way of illustration; nouns; *avyakta*, *ahamkāra*, *kāraṇa*, *tanu* (body), *deha*, *dehin*, *dravya*, *niṛtti*, *pariṇāma*, *prakṛti*, *phala* (result), *moksha*,

vahni, *śakti*, *sarvaga*, *sarvajña*, *sūkshma*; verbs: *udbhū*, *upalabh*, *tyaj*, *niyam*, *pariṇam*, *prārth*, *bandh*, *vyāñj*, *vyāpa* with many of their derivatives.

The absence of these words in the oldest Upanishads may, in a few cases, be accidental, but on the whole it must be real; for the first group is of considerable extent and of nearly double the bulk of the second and third groups taken together. In some cases a word is quite common in groups 2 and 3, but occurs only once in the first group, e. g. *indriya* organ of sense (*Kaushitakī*), *jñāna* (*Taittirīya*), *yoga* (ib.), *nitya* (*Bṛhad Ār.*) &c. The change in the vocabulary of the language proves that the texts which exhibit it are of a later date, and indicates, at the same time, that new ideas had risen to express which the new words were employed. Most important in the latter regard are the following facts. In the *Śvetāśvatara* we meet with the Sāṅkhya terms *guṇa* (1, 3) and *pradhāna* (1, 10), and in 1. 4. 5 the principal ideas of Sāṅkhya are enumerated under the simile of a wheel; in other Upanishads of the 2nd and 3rd groups several of the leading ideas of Sāṅkhya are referred to and made the basis of further speculations. There can be no doubt that in the interval between the first and the second group of Upanishads the rise of the Sāṅkhya philosophy had taken place. The same is probable also with regard to Yoga-philosophy, because of its intimate connection with Sāṅkhya. Yoga is mentioned by name in several of the younger Upanishads in which Sāṅkhya terms occur; but it cannot be

made out whether they refer to the Yoga-philosophy or to Yoga-practice in general.

The rise of Sāṅkhya-Yoga is, however, merely a symptom not the true cause of the radical change occurring at that epoch. Without underrating the importance and influence of the new philosophy, we may feel confident that a more powerful agent was needed to completely modify the mental attitude of whole nation, or at least that of its leading classes. I can imagine no weightier cause to bring about this result than the widespread belief in the personal immortality of the souls which was at that time, as will be proved in the sequel, first introduced. For this doctrine, when once proclaimed was sure to gain the willing assent of the majority of the people who are naturally averse to believe in their annihilation or, what practically comes to the same, in the loss of consciousness after death. The doctrine of the permanent existence of souls leads logically to the distinction of Matter and Spirit which also was not yet recognized in the oldest Upanishads. Now both these doctrines make part already of the oldest philosophies, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, and of Jainism. Of much later origin are the Vaiśeshika and Nyāya philosophies; they also have admitted both tenets into their system. Even the Vedānta philosophy expounded by Bādarāyaṇa in the *Brahma Sūtra*, though it pretends to systematize only the teachings of the Upanishads, declares that *jīva* is eternal and indestructible, whatever Śaṅkarāchārya by a forced interpretation of the *Sūtras* may

allege to the contrary (as has been convincingly shown by Abhayakumar Gupa in 'Jīvātman in the Brahma Sūtras', Calcutta 1921). Sutra in this regard goes a step beyond the younger Upanishads *Kāthaka* and *S'vetāśvatar* which dwell on the diversity of the individual souls from Brahma, though on the other hand they maintain also their identity with it.—The belief in the personal immortality of the souls was, however, only the principal factor in bringing about the new modes of thoughts that obtained in post-vedic and classical times; it co-operated with the theories of Karman and of the migration of souls which were of somewhat older origin, for, as stated above, they were already known, though in an undeveloped and as it were nascent form, just before the close of the Vedic period. They reached their final form which is met with in all Indian religions and philosophies except Materialism, at later time probably together with the new soul-theory.

Now to return to the question at issue it may be stated that Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Jainism are the oldest systems which came to the front after the close of the Vedic period. They teach all those novel doctrines just now, especially the plurality of immortal souls and the heterogeneity of Matter and Spirit. Although they have developed these general ideas which they have in common, on divergent lines, still some details which will be discussed later seem to point to a kind of remoter affinity. The agreement in the metaphysical basis of Sāṅkhya and Jaina philosophy can be accounted for by the assumption that

these systems rose into existence in about the same age, and naturally worked out the ideas current in it, but in different ways peculiar to each of them. The supposition of contemporaneous origin of Sāṅkhya and Jainism furnishes us with the clue for fixing approximately the corresponding date. All we know about the age of Sāṅkhya and Yoga is that according to Kauṭilya they and the Lokāyatam were the only brahmanical philosophical systems existent at his time, i. e. about 300 B. C.; they were of course much older. We are better informed about the antiquity of Jainism. Scholars now agree that Jainism was not *founded* by Mahāvīra, but that one at least of his predecessors, Pārśvanātha was an historical person. Now the Nirvāṇa of Pārśva is separated from that of Mahāvīra by an interval of 250 years, and since the latter was an older contemporary of Buddha whose Nirvāṇa occurred about 484 B. C., Mahāvīra's Nirvāṇa may be placed about 490 B. C., and consequently that of Pārśva about 740 B. C. Therefore the first part of the eighth century B. C. was the time during which Pārśva propagated his creed, and for practical purposes the same period may be assigned to the rise of historical Jainism and the origin of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. Assuming the space of two centuries for the development and general acceptance of the novel doctrines in question we may place the close of the Vedic period in the beginning of the first millennium B. C.

Before discussing those doctrines of the Sāṅkhyas and Jainas which bear some resemblance to each other as regards the underlying general

idea, but differ in other regards, I must remark that our knowledge of Sāṅkhya and Yoga is unfortunately derived from late sources. The oldest work extant on Sāṅkhya is Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhya Kārikās* which belong to the fifth century A. D. The Yoga Sūtra of Patañjali seems to be a comparatively late work; the Yoga it teaches has largely been borrowed from Sāṅkhya, and this is still more the case with the Yogabhāṣya by Vyāsa who frequently cites passages from older writers on Sāṅkhya. It is, therefore, in many cases not possible to decide whether a particular doctrine explained by him is to be ascribed to Sāṅkhya or Yoga. For our purposes we may regard both systems as fundamentally one, wherefore they will be spoken of as Sāṅkhya-Yoga.

We shall first examine the idea of Matter as conceived by Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jainism. They agree in this that matter is permanent as regards its existence, but indefinite as regards quality; indeed, according to their opinion, matter is something which may become anything. This opinion appears to have been generally current at the time when matter was first recognized as something radically different from Spirit, i. e. the souls, and to have been immediately derived from the older idea of the Chaos or *sat*, the one substance which gave origin to all things, both material and spiritual. At a later time, however, the original view of matter just explained was superseded by the opposite one, that matter is also definite and unchangeable as regards quality, i. e. that it comprises the four or five elements (*bhūtas*)

which are entirely distinct from one another. This opinion was held by the Lokāyatas who are younger in origin than Sāṅkhya-Yoga, and it was adopted by the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya philosophies which seem to have somehow been developed from the Lokāyatam. The unanimous opposition of the later philosophies in this regard to Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jainism is a collateral proof of the latter having been coeval in origin. But they have developed the common general idea of matter on entirely different lines. The Jains declare matter (*Pud-gala*) to be atomical, the Sāṅkhyas teach that primeval matter (*prakṛti* or *pradhāna*) is an all-pervading substance (*vibhu*). The atoms according to the Jainas are indefinite as regards quality; they may be in a gross (*bādhara*) or subtile (*sūkṣma*) state; in the former they occupy one point of space (*pradeśa*) each in the latter an infinite number of them may be simultaneously present in the same point; by the combination of gross atoms all things in the world are produced except of course the souls (*jīva*) and the substances *ākāśa*, *dharma* and *adharma* about which I shall have to say a word below. According to the Sāṅkhyas primeval matter consists of the three Guṇas *sattvaṁ*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ* of which I had already occasion to speak above in the 2nd. chapter; all three are present everywhere in the *pradhāna* and by acting on one another and mixing in various proportions they produce a series of substances *mahān*, *aḥnikāra*, etc. down to the five elements which build up all material things in the world. It would seem that the original Sāṅkhya dispensed with atoms. But as stated in the *Nyāya Vārttika*

p. [?] some Sāṅkhya or Yoga author did assume atoms; Gaudapāda in his commentary on the *Sāṅkhya Kārikās* several times mentions them without disapproval; in the *Yoga Sūtra* I 40 they are also admitted, likewise in the *Bhāṣya* on I 40. 43. 44. III 52. IV. 14, cf. Vācaspatimiśra's comment on I 44. These facts seem to prove that the atomistic theory enjoyed such general favour that even the Sāṅkhyas and Yogas connived at it, if not from the very beginning, but certainly in the course of time.

I now turn to the Soul-theory of Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jainism. There is agreement with regard to some fundamental aspects of it. Souls are immaterial and eternal; essentially they are intelligent, but their intelligence is obscured by their connexion with matter which is without beginning and ends with Mukti. The Jainas have a tenet about the size of the Soul (*jīva*) not shared by any other philosopher. For they teach that the soul is of finite and variable size, being always coextensive with the body which it occupies for the time being. It is probable that the original Sāṅkhya was not explicit on this point. For according to the ancient teacher Pañchaśikha, as quoted in the *Yogabhāṣya* on I 36, the souls (*puruṣas*) are infinitesimally small (*aṇumātra*), while according to Īśvara Kṛṣṇa and all later writers it is all-pervading (*vibhu*).—Greater still is the difference of opinion between Sāṅkhya-Yoga and Jainism on the nature of the bondage of the soul and its delivery from it; but it would be to no purpose to explain and compare both

theories since they have nothing whatever in common. Two more doctrines, however peculiar to Jainism, are worth noticing: that about the elementary souls (*ekendriyas*) which are embodied in particles of earth, water, wind and fire, and that about the *nigodas*. These doctrines, especially the former, bear some affinity to animistic views which probably obtained in popular religion. At any rate difference in most details regarding matter as well as souls is so pronounced as to preclude the assumption that Sāṅkhya should have borrowed from Jainism, or Jainism from Sāṅkhya.

Before closing our inquiry I mention two more points about which the Sāṅkhyas and Jains do not exactly agree, but entertain ideas which appear to have a curious affinity with each other. The Jainas assume two transcendental substances Dharma and Adharma as the substrata of motion and rest; without them motion and rest would be impossible, they are in *alokākāśa* where they are absent. Their function is to render motion and rest of things possible. *Ākāśa* is not sufficient for that purpose, as its function is restricted to the making room for them (गतिस्थित्युपग्रहो धर्माधर्मयोरुपग्रहः । आकाशस्यावगाहः *Tattvārthādhigama Sūtra* V 17-18.). The Jainas, evidently, thought it necessary to account for motion and rest by assuming two special substances as their conditioning cause. Now Sāṅkhya-Yoga alone of all Indian philosophies has likewise tried to explain motion and rest as being caused by two substantial principles *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*. For *rajaḥ* is necessary for motion, and immobility is caused by *tamaḥ*. Immobility

or rest is, however, but one aspect of *tamaḥ*, another is 'iniquity' *adharmā*. This character of *tamaḥ* consisting in *Adharma* proves the near relation between Sāṅkhya *tamaḥ* and Jaina *Adharma* and explains at the same time why the substratum of immobility has been named by the Jainas by the strange name *Adharma*.

A favourite dogma of the Jainas is the *Anekāntavāda*, which is elaborately explained and defended by Haribhadra in his famous work *Anekāntajayapatākā*. According to this theory the Real has infinite attributes (*ananta-dharmāt-makatvena tattvam* Hemachandra), wherefore all predicaments about things are one sided, the contrary being also true from another point of view (*Syādvāda*). Now Sāṅkhya-Yoga lays claim to a similar view with regard, however, to Matter only, and this doctrine designated by phrases expressing the denial of *aikāntikatva*, e.g. Vācaspatimiśra commenting on *Yoga Sūtra* II 23 speaks of the Yogas as *aikāntikatvaṁ vyāśedhantah*, and Vyāsa on III 13 uses the phrase *ekāntānabhyupagamāt*. Of course, the opinions of the Jainas and Sāṅkhya in this regard are far from being identical, but they agree in the peculiar mode of thinking concerning *Anekānta*.

Here I may conclude the present enquiry. It was my aim to show that Jainism together with Sāṅkhya-Yoga is the earliest representative of that mental revolution which brought about the close of the Vedic and inaugurated the new period of Indian culture which has lasted through the middle ages almost down to the present time.

Bonn, 19th, March 1922

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