

The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brahmins.—

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Subject of the investigation.—Some of the Sūtras of the six orthodox philosophical Systems of the Brahmins¹ refer to Buddhist doctrines and refute them. As we are now sufficiently acquainted with Buddhist philosophy and its history, we can attempt to make out the peculiar school of Buddhist philosophy which is referred to in a passage of a Sūtra, and thus to determine the date, or rather *terminus a quo*, of the Sūtra in question. Our inquiry will be chiefly concerned with the Śūnyavāda or philosophical nihilism, and with the Vijñānavāda or pure idealism. The former is the philosophy of the Madhyamikas; the latter is that of the Yogācāras. It may be premised that both these systems admit the Kṣaṇikavāda or the theory of the momentariness of everything, so far at least as is consistent with their peculiar principles; to these I will now briefly advert. The Śūnyavāda maintains that all our ideas, if analysed, contain logical impossibilities or self-contradictions, and that therefore nothing real can underlie them; and that that upon which they are based is a nonentity or the void (*śūnya*, *nirupākhya*). This system² was established by Nāgārjuna, who flourished

¹ Abbreviations: M.S. = Mīmāṃsā Sūtra; B.S. = Brahma Sūtra (Vedānta); V.D. = Vaiśeṣika Darśana; N.D. = Nyāya Darśana; Y.S. = Yoga Sūtra; S.S. = Sāṅkhya Sūtra.

² The Śūnyavāda may be compared with the philosophy of Zeno, who by a similar method tried to refute the common opinion that there exist many things of a changing nature. Aristotle called Zeno *εὑρημὸν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς*; the same may be said of Nāgārjuna whose Mādhyamikasūtras set the example for the dialectical literature of the Hindus which reached its height in Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya. It deserves to be remarked that in this regard also the Vedāntin of Śaṅkara's school follows in the track of the Śūnyavādin,

about the end of the second century A.D.¹ The Vijñānavāda contends that only consciousness or *vijñāna* is real. There are two kinds of *vijñāna*: 1. *ālaya-vijñāna* or consciousness proper, which lasts till the individual reaches Nirvāṇa (*ā-laya*); and 2. *pravṛtti-vijñāna* or the thoughts of the same individual concerning objects. The latter is produced from *ālaya-vijñāna*. The Vijñānavāda was established by Asaṅga and his younger brother Vasubandhu, who seem to have flourished during the latter part of the fifth century A.D.² To this school belong Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the greatest Buddhist philosophers and writers on Logic (*pramāṇa*). Dignāga attacked Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāṣya, and was answered by the Uddyotakara (6th century A.D.) in the Nyāyavārttika. Dharmakīrti, who further developed Dignāga's philosophy, appears to have flourished about the middle of the seventh century A.D.

It will be our task to examine closely the Buddhist doctrines controverted in the philosophical Sūtras in order to decide whether they belong to the Śūnyavāda or to the Vijñānavāda. On the result of our inquiry will depend the presumable date of the Sūtras in question. If they refer to the Vijñānavāda, they must be later than the fifth century A.D.; if however this is not the case, and we can assign to them an acquaintance with the Śūnyavāda only, they must date somewhere between 200 and 500 A.D.

Doubts about the conclusiveness of this argumentation.—Even if we should succeed in recognising the true origin of the controverted doctrines, still it might be doubted whether the few passages on which we must rely for proof, form a genuine part of the work in which they occur, or are a later addition. For the aphoristical style of the Sūtras, the somewhat desultory way of treating subjects, and the loose connexion of the several parts (*adhikaraṇas*) in most of these works make the insertion of a few Sūtras as easy as the detection of them is difficult. The text of the Sūtras as we have them is at best that which the oldest Scholiast chose to comment upon, and it cannot be

¹ A contemporary of Nāgārjuna was Āryadeva. A poem ascribed to him has been edited in JASB. 1898. As in that poem the zodiacal signs (*rāśi*) and the weekdays (*vāraka*) are mentioned, it can not be earlier than the third century A.D.

² See Takakusu in *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, 1904, vol. iv, p. 53f.

safely traced further back. The uncertainty occasioned by the nature of our texts is, however, in the present case partly remedied by the repeated allusions in one text to the same doctrines, or by the occurrence in two Sūtraworks of the same discussion with the same arguments. These facts make it probable that the topic in question was one which at that time a Sūtrakāra considered himself bound to discuss.

Another objection may be raised against our chronological argument. It may be said, and not without a considerable amount of plausibility, that even before Nāgārjuna had brought the Śūnyavāda into a system, similar opinions may already have been held by earlier Buddhist thinkers; and the same remark applies to the Vijñānavāda. Therefore, it may be argued, a reference to doctrines of the Śūnyavāda or Vijñānavāda, need not be posterior to the definite establishment of these systems. On the other hand, however, it is almost certain that a Sūtrakāra would not have thought it necessary to refute all opinions opposed to his own, but only such as had successfully passed the ordeal of public disputation. For only in that case would the doctrines themselves and the arguments *pro* and *contra* have been defined with that degree of precision which rendered their discussion in aphorisms possible to the author and intelligible to the student. Now when a philosopher succeeds in upholding his individual opinions against all opponents in public disputations, he is henceforth considered the founder of a new school or sect, and the author of its tenets.¹ Therefore we may be sure that a discussion of Śūnyavāda or Vijñānavāda opinions in a Sūtra must be referred to the period after the definite establishment of those schools.

Origin and development of the views here presented.—I conceived the general ideas set forth above and began to work them out in the summer of 1909. My first impression, supported by the comments of Śaṅkara and Vācaspatimiśra and others, was that the Sūtras, especially B.S. and N.D., refer to the Vijñānavāda. On a closer examination, however, of the evidence, I became convinced that they really refer to the Śūnyavāda, and that the later commentators had brought in the Vijñānavāda because that system had in their time risen to paramount importance. I had nearly finished my article

¹ Compare my remarks on the Dhvanikāra in ZDMG. 56. 409f.

when Professor von Stcherbatskoi told me that he had treated the question about the age of the philosophical Sūtras in his work *Теорія познанія и логика по ученію позднѣйшихъ Буддистовъ*, часть II, St. Petersburg, 1909, and had arrived at the conclusion that the Sūtras refer to the Vijñānavāda. He kindly sent me an abstract in English of his arguments, which I subjoin for the benefit of those readers who, like the author of this paper, cannot read the Russian original.

In his work "*Epistemology and Logic as taught by the later Buddhists*" Mr. Stcherbatskoi maintains (p. 29) that the Sūtras of the chief philosophical systems in their present form do not belong to that high antiquity to which they commonly are assigned, nor to those half-mythical authors to whom tradition ascribes them. The philosophical systems themselves have been evolved at a much earlier period than that in which the Sūtras were written. The Sūtras in their present form must have been elaborated during the period subsequent to the formation of the Yogācāra school (Vijñānavāda), and their authorship has been attributed to writers of a high antiquity in order to invest them with greater authority. In a previous paper (*Notes de littérature buddhique*, Muséon nouv. série, vol. vi, p. 144), Mr. Stcherbatskoi had already established, on the authority of the Tibetan historian Bouston, that the Vijñānavāda system (Buddhist idealism), professed by a part of the Yogācāra school, was clearly formulated for the first time by Vasubandhu in his celebrated Five Prakaraṇas. As Vasubandhu could not have lived much earlier than the fifth century A.D., it follows that those philosophical Sūtras which refer to his doctrine, in order to refute it, cannot have been written at an earlier time.

It is well known that Buddhist idealism is mentioned, and that its tenets are refuted, in the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa and of Gotama. Thus B.S. ii. 2. 28 refutes the doctrine of the non-existence of external things. Again, ii. 2. 30 refutes the erroneous opinion of those who admit solely the existence of a series of mental impressions unsupported by external objects, and, arguing from the Buddhist's point of view, demonstrates that a series of mental impressions (internal cognitions) could not exist, unless there were external objects to produce the impression. Once more, B.S. ii. 2. 31 maintains, according to Śāṅkara's interpretation, that, inasmuch as, according to Buddhist doctrine, the stream of internal cognition consists of a series of separate moments, it cannot have actual existence on account of its momentariness.

It appears upon consideration of these Sūtras that their author is bent upon refuting the doctrine which proclaims 1. the unreality of the external world, and 2. the actuality of an internal consciousness which consists of a series of cognitional acts. Both these tenets are characteristic of Buddhist idealism which developed subsequently to the nihilistic doctrine of the Madhyamikas. The latter denied the reality of the internal consciousness as well as that of the external world.

In his commentary, Śāṅkara corroborates our opinion, inasmuch as

he avers that the above mentioned Sūtras refute the doctrine of those who maintain that the stream of our consciousness is an altogether internal process, existing only so far as it is connected with the mind. Now it is well known that the Vijñānavādins alone professed the doctrine that *prameya* and *pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala* have existence only in so far as they are connected with the mind (cf. p. 418 of vol. i of Thibaut's translation of B.S.; Śloka. iv. 74 ff.; Nyāyabindu, i. 18, ii, 4). Śāṅkara mentions likewise the scholastic argument against realism of which Dignāga made use at the opening of his work *Ālambanaparīkṣā* (cf. Tanjour, mdc v. 95). This work, in which the main tenet of idealism (Vijñānavāda, otherwise termed Nirālambanavāda) is proved, is one of the fundamental works of the school. The argument starts from the antinomic character of the ideas of the whole and of the parts, and states that the external object can be neither the whole, nor can it consist of atoms (indivisible partless things: cf. p. 419 in Thibaut's transl. of B.S.).

Further we find in the Nyāyasūtras a refutation of Buddhist idealism, namely in iv. 2. 26—35. It is worthy of note that the Buddhist doctrine is referred to in the course of an argument upon the nature of atoms—thus as it were answering the considerations which we likewise find in the work of Dignāga in favor of the Nirālambanavāda. The Nyāyasūtras maintain the indivisibility of atoms, and, while refuting the opposed opinions touching this point, they refer to the Buddhists, to the Madhyamikas (who denied the existence of atoms), and to the idealists (who admitted atoms to be a percept of the mind or an idea). In the Tātparyatīkā, p. 458, Vācaspatimiśra avers that the Sūtra, N.D. iv. 2. 24 implies a refutation of the Mādhyamika doctrine, while the Sūtras iv. 2. 26—35 are directed against those who proclaim that all ideas of external things are false (*ibid.* p. 461). It is thus established by the testimony of Vācaspatimiśra and of Vātsyāyana (Nyāya-bhāṣya, p. 233. 6) that Sūtra iv. 2. 26 is directed chiefly against the school of the Vijñānavādins.

Though the philosophical Sūtras of the remaining systems do not contain any clear reference to the Vijñānavādins, yet it has been noted that some of the Sūtras display a remarkable knowledge of each other. To judge by the whole tone and drift of the philosophical Sūtras, they must be the production of one and the same literary epoch.

On the basis of what has been here said, it can be averred with a considerable degree of probability that the philosophical Sūtras of the chief systems belong approximatively to one and to same period, a comparatively late one, and can in no wise be attributed to those venerable authors to whom tradition ascribes them.

Improbability of this view.—As stated before, I too entertained at first the opinion expressed by Professor von Stcherbatskoi, but I was induced to give it up by reason of the following chronological considerations. As the Nyāyabhāṣya was criticised by Dignāga, its [author Vātsyāyana (Pakṣila-svāmin)] must be earlier than the latter, by at least ten or

twenty years, since it is not Vātsyāyana, but the Uddyotakara (Bhāradvāja) who answered Dignāga. He may therefore have flourished in the early part of the sixth century or still earlier. Now Vātsyāyana is not the immediate successor of Akṣapāda Gautama, the author of the Sūtra; for, as Professor Windisch pointed out long ago, Vātsyāyana incorporated in his work, and commented upon them, sentences of the character of Vārttikas which apparently give in a condensed form the result of discussions carried on in the school of Gautama. Hence Gautama must have been separated by at least one generation from the Bhāṣyakāra, and can therefore not be placed after the last quarter of the fifth century.¹ Thus if we accept the latest possible date for the composition of the N.D., it would fall in a period when the Vijñānavāda could scarcely have been firmly established. The V.D. is probably as old as the N.D.; for V.D. iv. 1. 6 is twice quoted by Vātsyāyana, namely in his comment on N.D. iii. 1. 33 and 67, and V.D. iii. 1. 16 is quoted by him² in his comment on N.D. ii. 2. 34, and the Uddyotakara quotes the V.D. several times simply as the Sūtra or Śāstra, and once calls its author Paramarṣi, a title accorded only to ancient writers of the highest authority.³ We are therefore almost certain that two Sūtras at least, N.D. and V.D., preceded the origin of the Vijñānavāda, or rather its definite establishment; and the same assumption becomes probable with regard to some of the remaining Sūtras, because the composition of the Sūtras seems to be the work of one period

¹ This result is supported by collateral proofs. 1. When commenting on N.D. i. 1, 5, Vātsyāyana gives two different explanations of the terms *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, *sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*, the names of the three subdivisions of inference, showing thereby that the meaning of these important terms had become doubtful at his time. 2. In his concluding verse, which however, is wanting in some MSS., Vātsyāyana calls Akṣapāda a R̥ṣi, which he would not have done, if he had not considered the Sūtrakāra as an author of the remote past.

² See Bodas's *Introduction* (p. 23) in Tarkasaṃgraha BSS., 1897.

³ At this point I may mention that Professor von Stcherbatskoi, when passing through Bonn on his way to India in December 1909, told me that he had meanwhile studied the first *pariccheda* of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in the Tanjour. Dignāga giving there his definition of *pratyakṣa* (perception) and refuting the opinions of the Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṅkhya, quotes N.D. i. 1. 4 and several Sūtras of V.D. which treat of *pratyakṣa*.

rather than of many. In order to prove this assumption to be true, we must show, as stated above, that the Buddhist doctrines refuted in several Sūtras need not be interpreted as belonging to the Vijñānavāda, but that the discussion in the Sūtra becomes fully intelligible if understood as directed against the Śūnyavāda.

Difficulty of distinguishing both systems in our case.—The point at issue is whether perception (*pratyakṣa*) is a means of true knowledge (*pramāṇa*) or not. The realistic view, strictly maintained by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophies, is that by perception we become truly cognizant of real objects. The Śūnyavāda, Nihilism or Illusionism, contends that no real objects underlie our perceptions, but that those imagined objects as well as our ideas themselves are intrinsically illusory, in other words, they are nonentities or a mere void. On the other hand, the Vijñānavāda declares that our ideas or mental acts (perception included) are the only reality, and that external objects (since they have no existence) are not really perceived and do not cause our ideas about them, but are produced, so far as our consciousness is concerned, by ideas existing independently of objects. It will thus be seen that both Vijñānavāda and Śūnyavāda are at one as far as regards the unreality of external objects; and therefore a refutation of this theory may be directed against the one of these doctrines as well as the other. Commentators chose between them as suited their purpose. Thus Kumārila, commenting on a passage which will be dealt with later, makes the following remarks:¹ “(Among the Bauddhas) the Yogācāras hold that ‘Ideas’ are without corresponding realities (in the external world), and those that hold the Madhyamika doctrine deny the reality of the Idea also. To both of these theories, however, the denial of the external object is common.² Because it is only after setting aside the reality of the object that they lay down the Samvṛti (falsity) of the ‘Idea.’ Therefore on account of this (denial of the reality of external objects) being common (to both), and on account of (the denial of the reality of the ‘Idea’) being based upon the aforesaid denial of the external

¹ Ślokavārttika, translated by Gangānātha Jhā, p. 120, 14—16 (Bibliotheca Indica).

² Similarly Śrīdhara ad Praśastapādabhāṣya p. 229 speaks of *nirālam-banam vijñanam icchatām Mahāyānikānām*.

object,—the author of the Bhāṣya has undertaken to examine the reality and unreality of the external object.” And accordingly Kumārila interprets his text in such a way as to make it serve as a basis for the refutation first of the Vijñānavāda and then of the Śūnyavāda. He, as well as Śāṅkara and Vācaspatimiśra and later authors who wrote when the Vijñānavāda had become the most famous Buddhist philosophy, felt of course bound to refute it; and if the text they commented upon still ignored the Vijñānavāda and combated the Śūnyavāda only, they could introduce their refutation of the Vijñānavāda by doing just a little violence to their text. That such was actually the case, is the thesis I want to prove.¹

Mentioning of the Vijñānavāda in the Sāṅkhya Sūtra.—Before examining those texts which give rise to doubts regarding the particular school combated, I briefly advert to one which beyond doubt discusses the Vijñānavāda doctrine. I refer to the Sāṅkhya Sūtra. In that work the principal doctrines of the four philosophical schools of the Buddhists are discussed: those of the Vaibhāṣikas i, 27—33, of the Sautrāntikas i, 34—41, of the Vijñānavādins i, 42, and of the Śūnyavādins

¹ *Remarks on the development of the Śūnyavāda.*—Like Kumārila, other brahmanical philosophers treat the Śūnyavāda as the logical sequence of the Vijñānavāda or as a generalization thereof; but the true or historical relation is just the reverse: the belief in the unreality of external things is a *restriction* of the previously obtaining and more general belief in the unreality or illusory nature of everything whatever, consciousness included. Buddhist Nihilism or Illusionism, introduced and supported by a splendid display of the novel dialectic art, seems to have deeply impressed and invaded the Hindu mind of that period. But realistic convictions or habits of thought could not be wholly eradicated; they entered into various kinds of compromise with Illusionism. The belief in the transcendent reality and oneness of Brahma as taught in the Upaniṣads admitted a combination with Illusionism in the Māyāvāda of the Vedāntins of Śāṅkara's school, nicknamed Pracchannabauddhas, who maintained that Brahma alone is real and that the phenomenal world is an illusion (see Sukhtankar, *The teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja* in WZKM. vol. xii). On the other hand the ‘*cogito ergo sum*’ proved irresistibly self-evident to many Mahāyānists also, and led them to acknowledge the reality of consciousness. These were the Vijñānavādins or pure Idealists. But the great Logicians of this school seem to have further encroached on its principles; for Dharmakīrti, in this particular point also probably following Dignāga, declared the object of perception to be *svalakṣaṇa*, i. e. the catena or series (*santāna*) of *kṣaṇas* to be *paramārthasat*, i. e. really existing.

i, 43—47. The Sūtra referring to the Vijñānavādins reads thus: *na vijñānamātram bāhyapratīteḥ*; 'Not Thought alone because of the conception of the external.'¹ The next Sūtra (43): *tadabhāve tadabhāvāc chūnyam tarhi*, 'Since as the one does not exist, the other too does not, there is the void then' is according to Vijñānabhikṣu a refutation of the Vijñānavāda, but according to Aniruddha the statement of the Śūnyavāda which is discussed in the following Sūtras. However this may be, there can be no doubt that here both the Vijñānavāda and the Śūnyavāda are discussed, in that sequence which (as stated in the last note) has become customary for later theoretical writers. Now it is admitted on all sides that the Sāṅkhya Sūtra is a very late, or rather a modern, production, and that it does not rank with the genuine philosophical Sūtras. Therefore the fact that the Sāṅkhya Sūtra mentions the Vijñānavāda does in no way prejudice any one in deciding the question whether the Sūtras of the other systems also were acquainted with it. Perhaps it might be said that the directness of reference to the Vijñānavāda in the Sāṅkhya Sūtra shows what we should expect to find in the other Sūtras if they did really know and refute that doctrine.

1. Nyāya.

I begin our inquiry with the examination of the passage N.D. iv. 2, 25 ff., which, according to Vācaspatimīśra, is directed against the Vijñānavādins; for, as explained above, chronological considerations make it almost certain that our Sūtra was composed before the establishment of the Vijñānavāda, and therefore entitle us to doubt, in this matter, the authority of the author of the Tātparya Tīkā. The subject treated in those Sūtras, namely, whether perception is a means of true knowledge, is connected with and comes at the end of a discussion of, other subjects which for the information of the reader must briefly be sketched. First comes the problem of the 'whole and its parts,' iv, 2, 4 ff. The adherents of Nyāya (and Vaiśeṣika) maintain that the whole is something different (*arthāntara*) from the parts in which it 'inheres,' an opinion which is strongly combated by other philosophers. Connected

¹ Aniruddha's Commentary, Garbe's translation, in BI., page 23.

with this problem is the atomic theory, which is discussed in 14ff. After Sūtra 17, Vātsyāyana introduces an opponent, 'a denier of perception, who thinks that everything is non-existent' (*ānupalambhikaḥ sarvaṃ nāstīti manyamānaḥ*). There can be no doubt that an adherent of the Sūnyavāda is meant. He attacks the atomic theory, 18—24, and is refuted in 25 thus: "as your arguments would lead us to admit a *regressus in infinitum* (by acknowledging unlimited divisibility) and as a *regressus in infinitum* is inconsistent with sound reason, your objection is not valid (*anavasthākāritvād anavasthānupapattēś cā 'pratiṣedhaḥ*). Vātsyāyana, after explaining this Sūtra, continues: '(An opponent objects:) what you say with regard to notions (*buddhi*), that their objects are really existing things, (that cannot be proved). These notions are intrinsically erroneous (*mithyābuddhayas*); for if they were true notions, (*tattvabuddhayas*) they would, on being analysed by the understanding, teach us the true nature of their objects." The argument of this opponent is stated in Sūtra 26 which the above passage serves to introduce, and runs thus: "If we analyse things, we do not (arrive at) perceiving their true nature (or essentia); this not-perceiving is just as, when we take away the single threads (of a cloth), we do not perceive an existing thing (that is called) the cloth." Vātsyāyana explains: "(This is) just as on distinguishing the single threads (of a cloth): this is a thread, this is a thread, &c. &c., no different thing is perceived that should be the object of the notion cloth. Since we do not perceive the essentia, in the absence of its object, the notion of a cloth, that it exists, is an erroneous notion. And so everywhere." Sūtras 27 and 28 contain the counter-arguments, and Sūtra 29 adds to them the following: "And because by right perception (*pramānatas*, viz. *upalabdhīyā*) we come to know things (whether and how they are)." Sūtra 30 gives a proof for this view: *pramāṇānupapattiyupapattibhyām*. Vātsyāyana explains: 'Now then the proposition that nothing exists is against reason; why? (answer): *pramāṇānupapattiyupapattibhyām*. If there is proof *pramāṇa* (in favour of the proposition) that nothing exists, (this proposition that) nothing exists, sublates the (existence of) proof as well. And if there is no proof for it, how can it be established that nothing exists? If it is regarded to be established without proof, why should (the contrary) that all things do exist, not be regarded as

established?" Here it is quite clear that the opponent whom Vātsyāyana refutes, is a Śūnyavādin just as in Sūtra 17. For there is no indication that Vātsyāyana in the mean time has changed front, and that the opponent in Sūtra 26 is not a Śūnyavādin, but a Vijñānavādin. The latter contends that external things do not exist (*bāhyārthā na santi*), while Vātsyāyana (on 27) makes his opponent uphold *sarvabhāvānām yāthātmyānupalabdhiḥ*. Moreover, this opponent maintains that "notions about things are erroneous notions (*mithyābuddhayaḥ*)," and this is primarily the view of the Śūnyavāda. The fundamental principle of the Vijñānavāda is that ideas only (*vijñāna*) are really existent, and not that they are erroneous ideas. That Vātsyāyana really has in view the opinions of the Śūnyavādins, may be seen from his concluding words in 36, "therefore erroneous notions too are really existing," and in 37, where he speaks of his opponent as one for whom "everything is without essence and unreal" (*nirātmaṇḥ nirupākhyam sarvam*). Nevertheless Vācaspatimiśra,¹ commenting on Vātsyāyana's words in Sūtra 25 translated above ("An opponent objects: what you say," &c.), remarks that the opponent is a Vijñānavādin. That he is mistaken, we have seen, and a general cause of such a mistake on the part of later commentators has been given above, p. 7. In the present case we can watch the gradual development of this misrepresentation. For in his comment on 26 the Uddyotakara again introduces the opponent's argument that every part of a thing may be regarded as a (minor) whole consisting of minor parts, and that this analysis may be continued not only down to atoms but *in infinitum* till everything is dissolved into nothing. Now as Professor von Stcherbatskoi informs us (see above p. 5), Dignāga in his work *Ālambanaparīkṣā* makes the discussion of the problem of 'the whole and its parts' the basis of his exposition of the Vijñānavāda. Therefore the Uddyotakara, who answers Dignāga's attacks on Vātsyāyana, avails himself of an opportunity to undermine the antagonist's basis of argumentation. And Vācaspatimiśra, knowing what was the starting-point of Dignāga's speculations, and seeing that it was exhaustively treated by the authors of the Sūtra and the Bhāṣya, was easily misled to believe that they were defend-

¹ Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīkā (viz. S. S.), p. 460, 3d line from below.

ing it against the Vijñānavāda. Being separated from them by 400 years or more, he was ignorant of their historical interrelation, and consequently interpreted the philosophical discussion in the text before him from a merely theoretical point of view. For, as indicated above, a rational refutation of the Śūnyavāda was naturally divided into two parts, the first proving the reality of objects and the second the reality of ideas; and a theoretical construction could well treat the Śūnyavāda as the logical outcome of the Vijñānavāda, and take the first part of the refutation of the Śūnyavāda as directed against the Vijñānavāda.

We proceed in our analysis of the Sūtra. After the last passage translated above, we have another objection of the Illusionist in Sūtras 31 and 32. "Like the erroneous belief in the objects seen in a dream is this belief in the means of true knowledge and the things known through them erroneous." Vātsyāyana explains: "Just as in a dream the objects seen in it are not real, while there is belief in them, so the means of knowledge and the things known through them are also not real (*na santi*), though there is belief in either." Sūtra 32 completes this argument: "Or like magic, *fata morgana*, and mirage." As this argument serves to demonstrate that *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are an illusion, it is evident that the opponent is a Śūnyavādin. The next Sūtra 33 answers his objection, in pointing out that 'he has established nothing, as he has given no reason' for declaring (1) that the belief in *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is like that in objects seen in a dream and not like the perception of objects in the waking state, (2) that in a dream non-existing things are perceived. This argument of the Sūtra is supplemented in the Bhāṣya by another formulated in what looks like a Vārttika; it comes to this. If you say that things seen in a dream do not exist because they are no more seen in the waking state, you must admit that those seen in the waking state do exist; for the force of an argument is seen in the contrary case, viz. that things exist because they are seen. The Uddyotakara enlarging upon this argument unmistakably introduces Vijñānavāda views; for he speaks of things independent of the mind (*citta-vyatirekin*) and uses the term *vijñāna*; but there is no trace of all this in the Bhāṣya. The Sūtra then goes on to explain the belief in things seen in a dream and other topics con-

nected with the subject in hand which, however, do not concern us here.

To sum up: our investigation has proved that neither the Sūtra nor the Bhāṣya refer to the Vijñānavāda, and that the whole discussion is perfectly intelligible if we consider it as meant to refute the Śūnyavāda.¹

2. Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā.

Brahma Sūtra, 2nd Adhyāya; 2nd Pāda, contains a discussion and refutation of other philosophical systems. The Sūtras 18—32 deal with Buddhist philosophy. Sūtras 18—27 deal with the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādins; and 28—32, according to Śāṅkara; with those of the Vijñānavāda. Rāmānuja agrees with Śāṅkara in so far as he also refers Sūtras 28—30 to the Vijñānavāda, but he differs from him in that he interprets the last Sūtra² as containing a refutation of the Śūnyavāda. For convenience of reference I subjoin the text of the Sūtras 28—32 and the translation of them by Thibaut according to Śāṅkara's and Rāmānuja's interpretation:

nābhāva upalabdheḥ 28

vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat 29

na bhāvo 'nupalabdheḥ 30

kṣaṇikatvāc ca 31

sarvathānupapattē ca 32.

I. Śāṅkara's interpretation, SBE. vol. xxxiv, p. 418ff.:

The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them), 28.

And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream, 29.

The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Buddhist view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things), 30.

And on account of the momentariness (of the *ālayavijñāna* it cannot be the abode of mental impressions), 31.

And on account of its general deficiency in probability, 32.

¹ If the Sūtrakāra knew the Vijñānavāda, we should expect him to combat it in ii, 1, 8 ff., where *pratyakṣādīnām aprāmāṇyam* is discussed. But in that place even Vācaspatimiśra (p. 249) assigns this opinion to the Madhyamikas.

² He omits Sūtra 31 of Śāṅkara's text.

II. Rāmānuja's interpretation, SBE. xlviii, p. 511ff.:

Not non-existence on account of consciousness, 27.¹

And on account of difference of nature (they are) not like dreams, 28.

The existence [of mere cognitions] is not on account of the absence of perception, 29.

[Here ends the *adhikaraṇa* of perception.]

And on account of its being unproved in every way (viz. that the Nothing is the only Reality), 30.

Now it would be rather surprising if the Śūnyavāda had been ignored by the Brahma Sūtra as Śāṅkara in his treatment of the above Sūtras would make us believe; he says that Śūnyavāda is thoroughly irrational and may therefore be left out of account. But the Śūnyavādins were once formidable opponents, and it would have delighted an orthodox dialectician to expound their unreasonableness. Rāmānuja apparently was conscious of this deficiency and therefore introduced the refutation of the Śūnyavāda in the very last Sūtra. But this Sūtra contains only an argument, and if Rāmānuja be right, we search in vain in the preceding Sūtras for the statement, or even a hint, of the doctrine he wishes to refute. However this Sūtra reads like a finishing blow dealt to a vanquished opponent whose arguments the author had just been refuting. That this opponent was a Śūnyavādin becomes probable if we compare the Sūtras in question with those in N.D. which we have examined above and, which, as we have seen, refer to the Śūnyavāda only. For Sūtra 29: *vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat*, deals with the same argument which is stated in N.D. 31f.: *svapnābhimānavad ayam pramāṇaprameyābhimānaḥ; māyāgandharvanagaramrgatṛṣṇikāvad vā*. The *ādi* in *svapnādivat* means according to Śāṅkara *māyādi*, in other words the things fully enumerated in the second of the quoted Sūtras of N.D. As the argument in N.D. and B.S. is the same, it is almost certain that the same doctrine is discussed in both works, and as the doctrine refuted in N.D. is the Śūnyavāda, it is highly probable that it is meant in B.S. also. Though we have thus very weighty reasons for not trusting Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, and all the later commentators in their inter-

¹ Rāmānuja's numbering here differs from that of Śāṅkara. In order to avoid confusion I shall refer to the latter only.

pretation of the passage under consideration, still the almost deliberately enigmatical character of the Sūtras would make it a hazardous task to explain them without the aid of tradition. Fortunately, however, the same philosophical problem aphoristically discussed in those Sūtras has been dealt with at considerable length by an other ancient author.

For Śābarasvāmin, the Bhāṣyakāra of the Mimāṃsā Sūtra, after having commented on M.S. i, 1, 5 transcribes a long passage from the unknown Vṛtti, which begins in the edition of the Bibliotheca Indica on p. 7, line 7 from below, and ends on p. 18, line 6, as the editor remarks in a footnote p. 18.¹ The whole passage is without doubt by the Vṛttikāra; it gives an explanation of Sūtras 3—5, and is introduced by Śābarasvāmin at the end of his own comment on Sūtra 5. It is therefore a matter of no little surprise to find that Kumārila-bhaṭṭa in the Śloka-vārttika (on Sūtra 5) assigns only the first part of this passage, viz. from p. 7, l. 7 from below, down to p. 8, l. 8 from below, to the Vṛttikāra; and accordingly his comment on this part only bears the title Vṛttikāragrantha in the edition of the Śloka-vārttika in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 212, 216. Kumārila himself refers to the author of this part of the passage as the Vṛttikāra, ib., p. 136; but he refers to the author of the following part (which is actually the work of the same author) as Bhāṣyakṛt, p. 221 (v. 16) and Bhāṣyakāra, p. 224 (v. 29), i. e., Śābarasvāmin. That part which Kumārila ascribes to the Vṛttikāra, contains the explanation of Sūtra 3 and part of Sūtra 4 only. If Kumārila were right, this passage should have been quoted by Śābarasvāmin at the end of his comment on Sūtra 4, and not, where he actually introduces it, at the end of his comment on Sūtra 5. Kumārila does not notice nor attempt to account for the fact that Śābarasvāmin, on his assumption, twice interprets part of Sūtra 4 and the Sūtra 5, once at the proper place, and then

¹ Śābarasvāmin introduces this passage by the following words: *Vṛttikāras tv anyathe 'maṃ granthaṃ varṇayāmcakāra: tasya nimittaparīṣṭir ity evamādiṃ*. We first have a comment on Sūtra 3; the comment on Sūtra 4 commences p. 8, l. 2, that on the second part of Sūtra 4 (*animittam*, &c.) on p. 12, l. 2 from below; on p. 11, l. 2 from below, begins the comment on Sūtra 5, and that on the last part of the same Sūtra on p. 17, l. 10 (*avyatirekaś ca*); *arthe 'nupalabdhe*, p. 17, last line; *tat pramāṇam* (*Bādarāyaṇasya*) *anapekṣatvāt*, p. 18, l. 3.

again after what he contends to be the end of the quotation from the *Vṛttikāra*. And any lingering doubt that also the second part of the passage ending on p. 18, l. 6, is not by Śabarasvāmin, is removed by the passage that comes after it. For there (p. 18, l. 7, 14, 16; p. 24, l. 9) he controverts and sets right some assertions in the preceding part which according to Kumārila is not by the *Vṛttikāra*. Whether Kumārila himself or some predecessor of his was the author of this error, we do not know; but we can well understand how it crept in. For Śabarasvāmin, whose habit is not to make long quotations, apparently inserted this passage from the *Vṛttikāra* because it contains a discussion of peculiar Mīmāṃsaka doctrines, e. g., on the six *pramāṇas*, for which his succinct commentary on the Sūtras of Jaimini would not otherwise have offered an opportunity. In quoting, and not criticising, those doctrines, he intimated his acceptance of them; and Kumārila therefore, misled by Śabarasvāmin's words *Vṛttikāras tv anyathe 'mam granthaṃ varṇayāṃcakāra*, ascribed to the *Vṛttikāra* only that part of his exposition where it obviously differs from Śabarasvāmin's comment, not the remaining part which chiefly contains the additional matter. This second part was so important for the Mīmāṃsaka philosophy, that Kumārila devoted to the discussion of its contents little less than half the volume of his *Ślokavārttika*. He had therefore a strong motive to ascribe this part of the quotation to Śabarasvāmin on whose *Bhāṣya* he wrote his *Vārttika*. But from the fact that he did so, we may perhaps conclude that at his time, or earlier, the original work of the *Vṛttikāra* had been lost or at least had ceased to be studied at all; for otherwise he could not have committed or repeated this gross error.

Now the question arises as to who is the author of the *Vṛtti* from which the passage under consideration has been taken. Gangānātha Jhā in his admirable translation of the *Ślokavārttika*, p. 116, note (17) says with regard to this passage: "Kārikās 17—26 expound the view of the author of the *Vṛtti* (*Bhavadāsa*)." However, the name of *Bhavadāsa* is not given by Pārthasārathi commenting on the passage in question (printed text, p. 212—216); but on p. 11, commenting on v. 33, in which Kumārila adverts to a controverted opinion brought forward 'in other commentaries' *vṛttyantareṣu*, he mentions as the authors 'Bhavadāsa and others,' in accordance with

Kumārila's statement in v. 63, p. 21. On these passages, it would seem, Gangānātha based his conjecture, which in my opinion is unacceptable. For if an author is referred to simply by the title *Vṛttikāra*, an authority of high rank must be intended, as is seen in many other cases; and it is not at all likely that Kumārila would have ranked such an authority together with other commentators, as he did with regard to Bhavadāsa in the phrase *vṛtṭiyantareṣu*. If there had been more than one *Vṛtti*, then it would have been inaccurate to speak of the *Vṛttikāra*. And besides, the *Bhāṣya* contains no reference to Bhavadāsa; Kumārila must therefore have learned Bhavadāsa's opinion from his work. But as shown above, he most probably did not know the original work of the *Vṛttikāra*. Hence it would follow that the *Vṛttikāra* is not to be identified with Bhavadāsa.

The same scholar ascribes, on p. III of the introduction of his work named above, the *Vṛtti* to the revered Upavarṣa. But as the *bhagavān* Upavarṣa is mentioned in the very passage from the *Vṛttikāra*, he must be not only different from, but also considerably older than, the latter; for the title *bhagavān* is given only to authors of high authority and some antiquity.¹

As thus both conjectures of Gangānātha Jhā about the author of the *Vṛtti* can be shown to be wrong, I venture to advance one of my own. Rāmānuja quotes a *Vṛtti* on the *Brahma Sūtra* by Bodhāyana and refers to him as the *Vṛttikāra*.² Now I think it probable that Bodhāyana wrote the *Vṛtti* not only on the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā* (i. e. B.S.), but also on the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*, just as Upavarṣa, the predecessor of the *Vṛttikāra*, commented on both *Mīmāṃsās*. For, according to Śāṅkara ad B.S. iii, 3, 53, Upavarṣa in his commentary on M.S. referred to his remarks in the *Śārīraka*, i. e. his commentary on B.S. And Śābarasvāmin also was equally versed in the *Uttara* and the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsās*; for a lengthy dissertation on the existence of the soul, called *Ātmavāda*, (p. 19, l. 3—p. 24, l. 9 of the printed text) in his *Bhāṣya* reads like part

¹ Hall, Index, p. 167, says with reference to the Śābara *Bhāṣya* "Kṛṣṇa Deva states, in the *Tantra Cūḍāmaṇi*, that a *Vṛtti* was composed on this work, by Upavarṣa." If Kṛṣṇa Deva is right, his Upavarṣa must be a different person from our Upavarṣa.

² Thibaut in SBE. vol. xxxiv, p. xxi. Sukhtankar, *The teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, p. 7, 9 (WZKM. vol. xii, p. 127, 129).

of a Vedānta treatise. Śāṅkara ad B.S. iii, 3, 53 says¹ with regard to that passage that the Ācārya Śābarasvāmin took (his subject) from B.S. iii, 3, 53, and treated it in the *pramāṇalakṣaṇa* (i.e. ad M.S. 1, 5). The meaning of this statement is that Śābarasvāmin by anticipation discussed the existence of the soul in the Bhāṣya on M.S. i, 1, 5, while the proper place for this subject is in a commentary on B.S. iii, 3, 53; we can not safely conclude from Śāṅkara's words, that Śābarasvāmin actually wrote a commentary on B.S., and even less, that he transcribed the passage in question from it (for it is clearly worded with reference to the context in which it now stands). But at any rate it is evident that at Śābarasvāmin's time the Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsās still formed *one* philosophical system, while after Kumārila and Śāṅkara they were practically two mutually exclusive philosophies.

After this necessarily long digression we return to the examination of that part of the passage from the Vṛttikāra which relates to the Bauddha doctrines. It consists of two sections called Nirālambanavāda and Śūnyavāda in the Śloka-vārttika where the discussion of it is introduced by the remarks translated above, p. 7. The author, i.e., the Vṛttikāra, has explained in the preceding part that perception is a means of right knowledge provided that no defect (*doṣa*) vitiates any of the parts or elements which combined constitute perception; he then goes on as follows:

"(An opponent objects:) 'All cognitions (*pratyaya*) are without foundation (in reality) just like a dream; for we recognise in a dream that it is the nature of cognition to be without foundation. A waking person also has cognitions, e.g. of a post or a wall; and therefore this cognition also is without foundation.' We answer: a waking man's notion (e.g.) 'this is a post' is a positively ascertained one; how is it possible that it should turn out wrong? 'The notion in a dream also was, just in the same way, a well ascertained one; previous to the awakening there was no difference between the two.' You are wrong; for we find that (what we saw) in a dream, turns out wrong; but we find that (what we see) in the other case (i.e. in the waking state), does not turn out wrong. If you say that on account of the class-characteristic (cognition as a

¹ ita evā "kṛsyā" cāryeṇa Śābarasvāminā pramāṇalakṣaṇe varṇitam.

genus) (the same predication) will hold good in the other case, (we reply as follows). If you mean that the cognition in a dream is wrong because it is a cognition, then of course the cognition of a waking man must be wrong too. But if cognition is (taken to be) the reason that something is so as it is cognised (and not different), then it is impossible to say that this cognition (viz. one in a dream) is different (i. e. wrong) because it is a cognition. (Not from the nature of cognition by itself), but from something else we come to know that cognition in a dream is wrong on account of its being opposed to truth. 'How do you ascertain this?' In the following way because a sleepy mind is weak, sleep is the reason for the wrongness (of cognition) in a dream; in dreamless sleep it (the mind) is absent altogether; for one without any consciousness whatever, is said to be in dreamless sleep. Therefore the cognition of a waking man is not wrong. 'But the sensorium of a waking man also may be vitiated by some defect.' If so, the defect may be found out! 'While one dreams, a defect is not found out.' It is; for on awaking we find out that the mind had been vitiated by sleep."

The problem discussed in the preceding passage is the same as that in N.D. iv, 2, 31—33, see above, p. 12. The point at issue is this. Perception in a dream cannot be said to be wrong, unless some other perception is admitted to be true, in contradistinction to which that in a dream could be recognised to be wrong. As the opponent maintains that all cognitions are wrong, his argumentation from dreams is without meaning. I now continue the translation of the passage from the Vṛttikāra:

"(The opponent says: 'The cognition itself) is a *void*. For we do not perceive a difference of form in the object and the idea of it; our idea is *directly* perceived, and therefore the so-called object which should be different from the idea, is a non-entity.' (Answer:) Well, this would be the case, if the idea had the form (or shape) of its object. But our idea is without form, and it is the external object which has the form; for the object is directly perceived as being in connexion with a locality outside of ourselves. An idea caused by perception is concerned with an object, and not with another idea; for every idea lasts but one moment, and does not continue to exist while another idea comes up. (The opponent says:)

‘While this second idea is originating, it becomes known (to the first idea) and, at the same time, it makes known to it the object, just as a lamp (illuminates and makes thus known things).’ We reply: This is not so. For before the object has become known, nobody is conscious of having the idea, but after the object has become known (to us), we become aware by *inference* that we have an idea concerning it; it is impossible that both these processes should be simultaneous. (The opponent says:) ‘We do not contend that we know the object before the idea has originated, but after it has originated; therefore the idea originates first, and afterwards the object becomes known.’ (We reply:) Quite right! The idea originates first, but it is not the idea that first becomes known. For as will occur occasionally, we say of an object which we do know, that we do not know it.¹—Moreover it is the very nature of every idea to be always and necessarily bound up with the name of (or a word denoting) its object. Therefore an idea is ‘intimately connected with a name,’ but that which is ‘not intimately connected with a name’ is termed ‘directly perceived.’²—And furthermore, if (the object and the idea) had the same form, this would sublate the idea and not the object which is directly perceived. But there is no such uniformity (between the object and its idea, as you assume); for by *inference* we become cognizant of the intrinsically formless idea, but we *directly perceive* the object together with its form. Therefore cognition is based on the object.—And furthermore, the notion of (e.g.) a piece of cloth has an individual cause (in this sense, that we have the idea of the cloth) only when threads form the material cause (of the object, viz. the cloth). For if this were not the case, a man of sound senses might

¹ We are not conscious of having an idea concerning it.

² The printed text is wrong. Instead of ‘*tasmān na vyapadeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyam ca nāpratyakṣam*’ we must read ‘*tasmān nāvya-padeśyā buddhiḥ, avyapadeśyam ca nāma pratyakṣam*.’

What is meant is this. An abstract idea is always coupled with a word expressing its object; but this is not the case when we directly perceive a thing. Therefore perception is thus defined in N.D. i, 1, 4: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyatmakam pratyakṣam*. Instead of *avyapadeśyam* the Buddhists say more accurately *kalpanāpodham*. The definition of *pratyakṣa*, Nyāyabindu I, is *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhṛāntam*; and *kalpanāpodha* is defined (ibidem) *abhilāpasamsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā, tayā rahitam*.

have the notion of a jar though threads had been used (in the production of the object in question); but that is not the case.¹ Therefore cognition is not without foundation (in external objects), and consequently direct perception does not convey erroneous knowledge."

In this part of the passage from the Vṛttikāra, the opponent whose arguments are refuted is without doubt a Śūnyavādin. This is not only the opinion of Kumārila (see original, p. 268 to 354, translation, p. 148—182), but it is unmistakably indicated by the word, with which this part opens, viz. *śūnyas tu*. But if we consider the arguments brought forward, by themselves, we might be led to believe that their object is to prove that only the idea has real existence. And on the other hand in the first part the illusory character of all ideas or cognitions is discussed; and this is properly the view of the Śūnyavādins. Nevertheless Kumārila would make us think that the Vijñānavādins are combated in this first part to which he gives the title Nirālambanavāda (see original, p. 217 to 268; translation, p. 119—148). At first sight the text itself seems to speak in favour of his view; for it opens with the opponent's statement that the *pratyayas* are *nirālambana*. But very weighty reasons prove, in my opinion, that Kumārila's view is wrong. (1) As said above, the problem discussed in the first part of our text is the same as in N.D. iv, 2, 31—33, and we have demonstrated above that not only these Sūtras, but also Vātsyāyana's comment on them have in view the Śūnyavāda only. (2) The technical terms peculiar to the Vijñānavāda, e. g. *viññāna*, *ālayaviññāna*, *pravṛttiviññāna*, *vāsanā*, are absent from our passage, and instead of them only such words as *pratyaya*, and *buddhi*, and *jñāna* (which are common to all Indian philosophers) are used. (3) The only argument discussed is that waking-cognitions being like dream-cognitions are likewise illusory, and as has already been said, this is not an opinion which is peculiar to the Vijñānavādins. (4) The division of the whole passage into two parts, of which the first combats the Nirālambanavāda, and the second the Śūnyavāda, is quite arbitrary. There is in truth but one subject of dis-

¹ The meaning of this argument is that the object is not caused by the idea, but it has a cause which is independent of the idea, viz. the material from which the object or the thing is produced.

cussion in the whole passage, viz. that which is stated at the beginning of the first part, and which is repeated at the end of the second: *nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*. And therefore the whole text must be directed against the Śūnyavāda because this is avowedly the case in the second.¹

In the introductory remarks it has already been explained how later commentators came to interpret a refutation of the Śūnyavāda as one of the Vijñānavāda. If radical Scepticism, represented by the former, attacked the validity of perception as a means of true knowledge, it is natural that it brought forward arguments which might be used also by pure Idealism, represented afterwards by the Vijñānavāda. But it is worthy of note that all those arguments on which the Vijñānavādins based their idealistic system, had already been advanced by the Śūnyavādins. Thus it is evident that the Vijñānavāda was potentially contained in the Śūnyavāda, and that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, who founded the idealistic school of Buddhist philosophy, were largely indebted to their predecessors.

The result of the preceding inquiry, viz. that the controversy in the passage from the old Vṛttikāra is about Śūnyavāda opinions only, *a fortiori* holds good with the Vedānta Sūtras also. But that passage may also serve us as a commentary on B.S. ii, 2, 28—32. I have above identified conjecturally our Vṛttikāra with Bodhāyana who wrote a Vṛtti on B.S.; if this be true, it is most likely that in our passage he should have given the essence of his comment on the quoted Sūtras in B.S., which are concerned with the same problem. But if my conjecture is not accepted, then the case is similar to that of Śabarasvāmin, who, when expounding the Ātmavāda in his Bhāṣya on M.S., anticipates the Sūtras of B.S. in which this topic is discussed. In the same way our author who wrote

¹ I draw attention to another passage, p. 14f., though it is not conclusive for the question in hand. There the Vṛttikāra discusses the problem about the meaning of words, and touches the problem of the whole and its parts. The opponent denies that there is such a thing as a wood, a herd, &c., and goes on to object to perception as a means of true knowledge 'the trees also are non-existent.' The answer is: "If you say this (we need not enter into a renewed discussion), for this view of the Mahāyānikas has already been refuted" (*pratyuktaḥ sa mādhyānikāḥ pakṣaḥ*). This is apparently a reference to the passage translated in the text, and the followers of the Mahāyāna are spoken of without the distinction of Madhyamikas and Yogācāras.

the Vṛtti on M.S. must have regarded Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā as the two interconnected parts of one uniform system; and when he treated a subject which properly belongs to the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, he must have treated it in conformity with the latter. We actually find in the passage from the Vṛttikāra the substance of a commentary on B.S. ii, 2, 28—32, disposed in nearly the same order as that of those Sūtras, as will now be proved. The substance of the first part of the passage is epitomised in Sūtras 28 and 29: *nā 'bhāva upalabdheḥ; vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat*. We may paraphrase these two Sūtras in accordance with the explanation of the Vṛttikāra as follows: "The objects of cognition are not non-entities (i. e. cognition is not without foundation in the external world: *na nirālambanaḥ pratyayaḥ*), because we actually perceive external objects. 28. Nor is our cognition similar to dreams, &c., because there is a real difference of cognition in the state of waking and that of dreaming 29" The next two Sūtras contain in a condensed form the substance of the second part of our passage, *na bhāvo 'nupalabdheḥ* 30. "(An idea) cannot be the real object (underlying cognition, as proved in Sūtras 28 and 29), because (the idea) is not the object of direct perception." In the passage from the Vṛttikāra the opponent maintains: 'our idea is directly perceived (*pratyakṣā ca no buddhiḥ*), and the author refutes him by showing that an idea is not perceived, but that we become aware of having an idea by inference. This is the substance of Sūtra 30. The next Sūtra: *kṣaṇikatvāc ca* (31): "And because cognition has but momentary existence" is explained by the Vṛttikāra in the passage beginning: 'for every idea lasts but one moment' (*kṣaṇikā hi sā*). The meaning is of course that one idea cannot perceive another; for while the first exists, the second has not yet come into existence; and when the second has come into existence, the first has ceased to exist. The last Sūtra: *sarvathā 'nupapattē ca* (32) "And because it is unreasonable in every way" gives occasion to the Vṛttikāra's remarks beginning with 'But there is no such uniformity' (*api ca kāmam, &c.*).

Thus it will be seen that with the help of the passage from the Vṛttikāra we can fully and consistently explain the original Sūtras. And I venture to presume that this interpretation comes nearer the meaning of the original, than that given either by Śāṅkara or Rāmānuja; for these commentators living

several centuries after the Vṛttikāra did violence to the text because they felt obliged to introduce into their comments the substance of controversies which happened long after the time of the Sūtrakāra.

The preceding inquiry has proved that the Śūnyavāda only has been confuted in the Brahma Sūtras and in the Vṛtti quoted by Śābarasvāmin. These two works must therefore have been composed in the period between 200 and 500 A.D. according to what has been said in the beginning of this paper. I am inclined to think that Śābarasvāmin also must be assigned to the same period, since he also appears to ignore the Vijñānavāda and to refer to the Śūnyavāda when controverting the Buddhist denial of the soul (p. 20f.). There a Buddhist combats the argument that knowledge (*vijñāna*) presupposes a knower (*vijñātr*), and explains that knowledge and memory can be accounted for by the assumption of *skandhas* or rather a *santāna* of momentary *skandhas*. He concludes: *tasmāc chūnyāḥ skandhaghanāḥ*, "therefore nothing real is behind the *skandhas*." This doctrine is of course common to all Buddhists, but the expression used here, *śūnya*, seems to betray the Śūnyavādin. And besides, in this controversy, especially where the real meaning of *aham*, is discussed, a Vijñānavādin would have introduced his term *ālayavijñāna*; but no special terms of the Vijñānavāda are used by Śābarasvāmin. It is therefore probable that he wrote before the establishment of the Vijñānavāda. His archaic style also speaks in favour of an early date.¹

3. Yoga.

In Yoya Sūtra, iv, 15f., the Buddhist denial of the external world is briefly discussed. Sūtra 15: *vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayoṛ viviktaḥ panthāḥ*. "Since the same object (is perceived by many persons and) causes various impressions on their mind, they (i. e., the objects and the ideas caused by them) must be two different things." This is apparently a refutation of the Nirālambanavāda, but it does not appear whether it is intended against the Śūnyavāda or the Vijñāna-

¹ Cf. Bühler in SBE., vol. xxv, p. CXII. After the preceding discussion it is perhaps superfluous to state that I cannot subscribe to the exaggerated chronological estimate of that scholar.

vāda.¹ Sūtra 16: *na cai 'kacittatantram vastu; tad apramāṇakam, tadā kim syāt?* "Nor can the existence of an object be dependent on the mind of one observer; for when (his mind being absent) it is not observed at all, (pray) what would become of the object?" (cf. S.S. i, 43) Here, I think, the meaning of the Sūtra will be best understood, if we assume the opponent to be an adherent of the Vijñānavāda. For in that philosophy the *ālayavijñāna* which represents the self-consciousness of the individual person, contains the *vāsanās* (= *saṃskāras*) which becoming mature (*paripāka*) produce the *pravṛttivijñāna* or the thoughts concerned with objects.² According to this theory the object is dependent on *pravṛttivijñāna* or, in common language, on the mind of the observer.³ If this interpretation is right, Patañjali must be later than the middle of the 5th century A.D. At any rate he cannot be earlier than the 3rd century A.D.

Even the earlier of these two dates is at variance with the prevailing opinion that Patañjali the author of the Yogasūtra is the same Patañjali who composed the Mahābhāṣya. For Patañjali is said to have written the Yogasūtra, the Mahābhāṣya, and a work on medicine. This tradition, however, cannot be traced to an ancient source.⁴ Nevertheless European

¹ In the Bhāṣya on the preceding Sūtra we find the same argument about things seen in a dream with which we are already familiar. Vācaspatimiśra in the Tīkā ascribes this argument to the Vijñānavādin (cf. above, p. 11), but he says expressly that it has been introduced by the Bhāṣyakāra without its being warranted by the Sūtra (*utsūtra*).

² Sarvadarśanasamgraha, Anandasram edition, p. 15f.

³ Y.S. iv, 21 might be taken for a reference to the Vijñānavāda; but the commentators are apparently right in referring to the *mānasa-pratyakṣa* or *manovijñāna*, which seems to have been acknowledged by the older schools also. The definition in the Tīkā, however, agrees nearly verbatim with that in the Nyāyabinduṭīkā (*Bibl. Ind.*, p. 13, l. 11).

⁴ It occurs in a traditional verse which is quoted, as Professor J. H. Woods informs me, in the commentary on the Vāsavadattā by Śivarāma (p. 239 of the edition in the Bibl. Indica; Śivarāma wrote in the beginning of the 18th century, Aufrecht Cat. Cat., p. 652). According to Bodās (Tarkasamgraha, B.S.S., p. 24) this (?) verse is said to be from Yogabīja. It must be stated that the passage in the Vāsavadattā which refers to Patañjali alludes to his oratorical gifts only. Similarly, a verse in the Patañjalicarita, V, 25 (Kāvya-mālā, Nro. 51), by Rāmahṭṭa Dikṣita of the 18th century (cf. Aufrecht, l. c., p. 517), ascribes to him *sūtrāṇi Yogasāstre Vaidyakaśāstre ca vārttikāni*. Here he is identified apparently

scholars are inclined to give it credit, e. g. Lassen, *Ind. Alt.*, I², p. 999, Garbe, *Sāṅkhyaphilosophie*, p. 26, note, and *Sāṅkhya und Yoga*, p. 36, and others; and accordingly they place Patañjali in the 2nd century B.C. But it can be shown on internal evidence that the author of the Mahābhāṣya cannot be identical with the author of the Yogasūtra. It is worth while definitely to establish this point.

Professor Garbe admits that there are no special coincidences between the language of the Yogasūtra and the Mahābhāṣya, and accounts for this want of agreement by the difference of the subject of both works. But on the other hand we certainly might expect that the greatest grammarian of his age should have observed the rules of his grammatical work when he wrote another on Yoga. Yet in Y.S. i, 34 he writes *pracchardanavidhāraṇābhyām* instead of *vidhāraṇapracchardanābhyām* as it ought to be according to the rule *laghvaḥsaram* (i. e., *pūrvam*) in *vārttika* 5 of ii, 2, 34; and here the meaning of the two parts of the compound furnishes no reason for altering their grammatical order, as might perhaps be pleaded for the order in *sarvārthataikāgratayoḥ* iii. 11 instead of *ekāgratāsarvāthatayoḥ* as postulated by Pāṇini's rule *ajādyadantum* ii, 2, 33. A similar case is *grahītṛgrahaṇagrāhyeṣu* in i, 41. Vācaspatimiśra says when commenting on that Sūtra:¹ "the order of the members of the compound as given in the Sūtra is irrelevant, because it is opposed to the order required by the subject (viz. *grāhyagrahaṇagrahītṛ*)." Now grammar is in favour of that very order which is also required by the subject; for this order is in accordance with Pāṇini's rule: *alpāctaram* ii, 2, 34: "In a Dvandva the member of fewer syllables should come first." And though a deviation from this rule might be defended, still the grammarians seems to have regarded it as an irregularity better to be avoided.² At any rate our

with Caraka. This is expressly done according to Bodās (l. c.) by the grammarian Nāgeśa, who lived in the 18th century, in his *Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhāntamañjūṣā* (cf. Aufrecht, *Cat. Cat.*, s. v.).

¹ *tatra grahītṛgrahaṇagrāhyeṣu iti sautraḥ pāṭhakramo 'rthakramavirodhān nā 'daraṇīyaḥ.*

² Patañjali discusses the question whether the rule *alpāctaram* applies to compounds of more than two members, to which alone the comparative *alpāctaram* would seem to apply. He adduces two verses which contain three-membered dvandvas: *mṛdaṅgaśaṅkhatūnavāḥ* and *dhana-patirāmakeśavānām*. Kātyāyana in *vārttika* 1 accounts for these ex-

case would have given cause to a grammarian to consider the order in which he should place the members of the compound, and he certainly would not have chosen that order which could be impugned for reasons derived from grammar *and* from the nature of the subject. The reason why the author of the Sūtra placed *grahītr* first in the dvandva, was perhaps a linguistic instinct that words not ending in *a* or *ā* should come first, a rule which grammarians restrict to words ending in *i* and *u* (*dvandve ghi* ii. 2. 33).

On the other hand it can be shown that the author of the Mahābhāṣya held philosophical ideas which differed considerably from those of Yoga and Sāṅkhya. Commenting upon *Vārttika* 53 ad i, 2, 64 he discusses a *kārikā* on the meaning of gender: the feminine denotes the congelation (*saṁstyāḥā*), the masculine the productivity (*prasava*) of the qualities (*guṇas*): sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. "All individual things (*mūrtayas*) are thus constituted, they are qualified by congelation and productivity, possessing sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell. Where there are but few qualities, there are at least (*avaratas*) three: sound, touch, and colour; taste and smell are not everywhere." This is a very crude theory about the qualities and one that is very far removed from the refined speculations of the Sāṅkhyas and Yogas about the *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas*.—Therefore, since the author of the Yogasūtra does not conform to the grammatical rules taught by the author of the Mahābhāṣya, and because the latter is ignorant of the philosophical views of the former, they cannot be identical, but must be two different persons.

Having shown that the only argument for the great antiquity of the Yogasūtra is fallacious, I shall now bring forward internal evidence for a rather late date of that work. The Yogaśāstra of Patañjali is described as being part of the Sāṅkhyasystem (*yogaśāstre sāṅkhyapravacane*); and it is well known that it generally conforms to the Sāṅkhya. But there are some Yoga doctrines which differ from the Sāṅkhya. Yoga admits the *Īśvara*, while Sāṅkhya is essentially atheistic; and

ceptions by assuming that the two last members are a dvandva (*śaṅkhatūnava*) and form the second member of the whole dvandva (*atantre taranirdēṣe śaṅkhatūnavayor mṛdaṅgena samāsaḥ*).

this peculiarity of the Yoga seems to be very old, since it is mentioned in so ancient a work as the *Mahābhārata* (xii. 300. 3 ff.). But there are other Yoga doctrines not countenanced by *Sāṅkhya*¹ which are clearly adoptions from other systems. They are the following:

(1) The doctrine of *Sphoṭa* has been adopted from the *Vaiyākaraṇas*; it is expounded in the *Bhāṣya* ad iii. 17. This theory is however not directly mentioned in the *Sūtra*, and its introduction rests entirely on the authority of the *Bhāṣya*. (2) The doctrine of the infinite size of the *antaḥ-karāṇa* seems to have been adopted from the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy (*ātman*). It is given in the *Bhāṣya* on iv. 10 and there ascribed to the 'Ācārya.' (3) The atomic theory which originally belonged to the *Vaiśeṣika*,² is clearly referred to by *Patañjali* in i. 40 (cf. *Bhāṣya* on iii, 44). (4) The doctrine that time consists of *kṣaṇas*, which was first put forth by the *Sautrāntikas*, is clearly assumed in iii. 52, though the details are explained in the *Bhāṣya* only.—The *Sphoṭavāda* and the *Manovaiśvavāda* (1. and 2.) may be later additions to the system, but the *Paramānuvāda* and the *Kṣaṇikavāda* must be ascribed to *Patañjali* and cannot be later than him. That he did adopt them, directly or indirectly, from the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Buddhists*, though of course not in their original form, presupposes that these doctrines had somehow ceased to be shibboleths of hostile schools, and that the general idea underlying them had been acknowledged by other philosophers too. We know that this has been the case with regard to the atomic theory which has also been admitted by *Buddhists*, *Jainas*, *Ajīvakas*, and some *Mīmāṃsakas*.³ The *Kṣaṇikavāda*, in an altered and restricted form, has been adopted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. For according to them some qualities (*guṇas*) exist for three *kṣaṇas* only, e. g., sound originates in one *kṣaṇa*, persists in the second, and vanishes in the third. This is a kind of *Kṣaṇikavāda* so changed as to avoid the objections to which the original doctrine was exposed. Still it must be remarked that even this altered form of the *Kṣaṇikavāda* is not yet found in the

¹ See Garbe, *Sāṅkhya und Yoga*, p. 49 ff.

² Cf. *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. i, p. 199 ff.

³ See my article quoted in the last footnote.

Sūtra,¹ but is first taught in the *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, p. 287.—This adoption of originally heterodox doctrines by Patañjali therefore unmistakably points to a relatively modern time, and thus it serves to confirm the result at which we arrived by examining the allusions to Buddhist doctrines contained in Y.S.; namely, that the *Yogasūtra* must be later than the 5th century A.D. It is probably not far removed in time from Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, the remodeler of Sāṅkhya.

Nor can an objection be raised against this date from the remaining literature of the Yoga. For the *Bhāṣya* by Vyāsa, which is next in time to the Sūtra, contains nothing that would make the assumption of an earlier date necessary. Garbe places Vyāsa in the seventh century (l. c., p. 41); and though his estimate is supported only by a legendary account of Vyāsa's pupils, still it is not improbable in itself.

The results of our researches into the age of the philosophical Sūtras may be summarized as follows. N.D. and B.S. were composed between 200 and 450 A.D. During that period lived the old commentators: Vātsyāyana, Upavarṣa, the Vṛttikāra (Bodhāyana?), and probably Śabarasvāmin. V.D. and M.S. are about as old as, or rather somewhat older than, N.D. and B.S. Y.S. is later than 450 A.D., and S.S. is a modern composition.

¹ V.D. ii. 2. 31 teaches that sound is produced by conjunction and disjunction and sound. This is the germ of an undulatory theory of the transmission of sound in India; but the details of this theory, containing the above mentioned doctrine of the three *kṣaṇas*, are not yet worked out in the Sūtra.