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## Intellect and the Khandha Doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

WE know that Buddhist doctrine, as revealed in the Pāli Canon, frequently analyses the human being, in set terms, into a number of bodily and mental constituents. The analysis recurring most frequently is that known as the five Khandhas (Sanskrit: Skandhas). And it is affirmed that this analysis is exhaustive.

Again, in that Canon we find these five constituents frequently decried and depreciated in very strong terms of what we should call Puritan or evangelical ethics.

Yet again, in the same Scriptures, we meet with the paradox, that not only does acceptance of and progress in true doctrine depend on an effort of the human being so constituted, but that intelligence, intellect, knowledge, whatever be its place among those constituents, is appreciated and extolled exceedingly. On these three points the following slightly sketched considerations may be of interest.

The essential pre-occupation of early Buddhism with the analysis of the human individual will be readily granted. How fundamental for ethical regeneration this was held to be I have tried to show elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

The whole content of individual experience, of experience as referred to a "Me" or as "Mine," was to be considered as disinterestedly as if it were a cabinet of geological specimens, disintegrated, classified, with the pragmatic intention of breaking up the "ego-making," "mine-making" superstition of egomania, and revealing

<sup>1</sup> The following remarks are slightly enlarged from a paper read before a section of the Oxford Congress of the History of Religions, 1908, entitled "Knowledge and Intuition in Buddhism." Re-cast and compared with European thought, they formed a paper read before the London and Liverpool Buddhist Societies.

<sup>2</sup> *Buddhism* (Rangoon), 1903, Vol. I., Pt. I, "The Threshold of Buddhist Ethics."

the transient congeries in which illusion had seen a principle of permanent being. It appears to have been in virtue of this preoccupation that Buddhists were called, and called themselves Vibhajjavādins—"of the Analytic School."

An interesting testimony to the deep-seated and long-lived bent imparted to the doctrine by the prominence given to analysis, may perhaps be inferable from a passage in the itinerary of Yuan Chwang, the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim. He therein alludes to finding public debates being held in Peshāwar, in Kashmir, on what the translator calls "the nature of the sense-perceptions."<sup>1</sup>

The product of this scientific habit of mind with which we are now most familiar is the doctrine of the five Khandhas. It should not, however, be concluded that this resolution of the personal complex into a logically distinguishable congeries of five aggregates—aggregates of happenings rather than static elements—held the field from first to last, or exclusively at any time. Ten or twelve such schemes of division may be collected from the Piṭakas; for instance, *nāma-rūpa* or *kāya* and *citta* (or *viññāṇa*)—divisions tantamount to our own body and mind—again, *rūpa* and *vedanā*; *kāya*, *vedanā*, *citta*, *dhammā*; *kāya*, *āyu*, *usmā* (life and heat) and *viññāṇa*. Again, there is the concept of body as *com-mental* or *sa-viññāṇako*, or as conscious and *com-mental* (*saññi samanako*), and so on. With the exception, however, of the first of these—*nāma-rūpa*—none of them attains to the importance, as formula and as doctrine, of the Khandhas. We do not know to what extent the fivefold division was pre-Buddhistic, but it is introduced, as a set of terms needing no introduction as such, into the Buddha's second sermon to the Five Bhikkhus.<sup>2</sup> And it is invested with extreme antiquity in the *Dīgha Nikāya* (II., 35), in being appended to the Bo-tree meditations of each of the seven Buddhas, although it finds no place in the corresponding Vinaya tradition (op. cit. 78).

<sup>1</sup> On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India, A.D. 629—645. By T. Watters. I., 212.

<sup>2</sup> The "Anatta-lakkhaṇa-sutta." *Vin. Texts*, I., 100.

This importance and pervasiveness of the Khandha division in early Buddhism is due to the association of the fivefold formula with the central tenet of *anattā* or non-soul. With the later advance in Buddhist psychology on Abhidhamma<sup>1</sup> lines, the more archaic Khandha division was practically superseded by the division of *rūpa*, *citta*, and *cetasika*, or elaboration of the traditional content of *nāma-rūpa*. But in the Sutta-Piṭaka the Khandhas are nearly always mentioned in this special connection, namely, the negation of *attā*, or (Sanskrit) *ātman*, as permanent, super-phenomenal entity, co-inhering, somehow, with the individual, and re-individualised after each individual decease. The individual's components could, all five of them, be shown to be essentially such that the *Ātman* could not be any one of them. They were by nature creatures of growth and decay; they involved suffering; they were subject to natural laws, and limited by them. The *Ātman* was, as absolute, unitary, noumenal, above change, decay and suffering. It was "super grammaticam." Else it was not *Ātman*.

The further question: why the Khandha-summary of the individual was chosen to serve in negating *Ātman*, in place of any of the other summaries given above, is not altogether easy of solution. If we are not satisfied with the reply that it was the classification most in vogue at the time, or that the founders of Buddhism deliberately chose it as, on the whole, presenting a more excellent conspectus than its rivals, we may find some ground for its serviceableness in the many-tentacled tenaciousness of the doctrine they so earnestly repudiated.

For the Khandha division does not, on the surface, commend itself to our logic. The first, *rūpa*, *lit.* visible form or object, but extended, as Khandha, to mean material qualities, answers well enough to our "body." But it is difficult to endorse the division of the rest of the intelligent individual into feeling (*vedanā*), perception

<sup>1</sup> This is evident in the classic manual, *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, a translation of which by Mr. Shwe Z. Aung will be shortly published by the Pāli Text Society.

(*saññā*), concomitant mental factors (*saṅkhārā*) and cognition or consciousness (*viññāna*). From the point of view of the mutually exclusive species of our Hellenic logic, there is here a chaotic overlapping, and no effectual resolution of the compound into the simple or elemental. Three of the four terms are expressions for *awareness*, or recipient and reacting intelligence; the other representing the co-ordinated factors in its expression. All except *vedanā* are used with varying scope and implication in the Piṭakas. But then we must not forget that to describe, define, and classify, in the ancient methods revealed in the Pāli Canon, is to cover the entire range of a field of thought (e.g., "intelligent individual") by means of mutually overlapping names.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps, however, as I have already hinted, the real object in opposing to *rūpa*, not one mind-Khandha, or at most two, viz., mind-receptive and mind-reactive, cognition and volition, but *four* mental Khandhas, was the result of a solicitude not to omit any current term for mind that might serve as a nest and refuge for the insidious heresy of soul. The favourite method of setting forth this heresy is to represent a fivefold delusion of supposing that one Khandha or the other is the soul, or its bearer. And the repudiation is effected by a thorough elimination of soul from one and all of them.

This was at any rate the reason for the adoption of the fivefold division that commended itself as both orthodox and sufficient to the worthy Buddhaghosa. Why, he asks in his *Visuddhi Magga*,<sup>2</sup> did the Blessed One say there were five Khandhas, no less and no more? Because these sum up all classes of compound things, because these chiefly afford a foothold for soul and the animistic (*attattaniya-gāha-vatthu*), and because they are a depository for others.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This has been discussed in my *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, XXIX., and my edition of the *Vibhaṅga*, xvii., and *n*.

<sup>2</sup> The passage is given in Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, 156.

<sup>3</sup> *Aññesañ ca avarodhato*, i.e., either other divisions or other footholds. I have tried to render this quotation more literally than Warren has done, although his freer rendering seems correct enough.

Now if the Khandhas were held to cover all the component energies or modes of energy of the normal individual, and if they included no  $\bar{A}tman$ , then it follows that any spiritual process or faculty mentioned by the founders of Buddhism must, for them, have been classified, or held classifiable, under the five Khandhas. The Buddhist could not say, in the words of the Aitareyya Upanishad, "mind, cogitation, understanding, insight, decision, intention, memory . . . are all names for intellect (*prajñā*)," and *prajñā*—the base, the guiding principle of all that is—is the self ( $\bar{A}tman$ ).<sup>1</sup> The Buddhist could not say, with Plotinus, that intuition, intellect (*noûs*), thought, memory, were all powers of the *psyche*, and quasi-divine. The Buddhist could not say, with the Christian Fathers—with, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa,<sup>2</sup> that cognition is *psyche* detaching itself from body, or with Augustine that the soul (*psyche*) is the cognising subject, and that "when we know, it is God knowing in us." For he rejected  $\bar{A}tman$  and *psyche* as in or of the Khandhas. And he affirmed that if  $\bar{A}tman$  was borne in or by any human constituent, the bearer must be one of the Khandhas.<sup>3</sup>

More than this : he not only denuded the Khandhas of the divine energising of an indwelling  $\bar{A}tman$ , but he substituted nothing to retrieve the face value, ethical or religious, of the five Khandhas, so called. The whole weight of the puritanical, austere, anti-world, anti-flesh, anti-devil, anti-"pride of life," monastic, ascetic side of Buddhist doctrine is brought to bear with deprecatory emphasis on these poor five factors, and on the mistaken sentiment of complacency in them, either for themselves, or as informed by anything so transcendently superhuman, superphenomenal as the currently conceived  $\bar{A}tman$ .

We can only follow the Buddhist *an-attā* argument if

<sup>1</sup> "And that self is Brahman, is Indra, is Prajāpati." Ait. Up. Araṇyaka, 2, 6.

<sup>2</sup> Quoted in Siebeck's *Geschichte der Psychologie*, II., 379 ff.

<sup>3</sup> "All recluses and Brahmins who consider the *attā* as borne in different ways (*anekavahitām*), consider that it is borne by the five Khandhas, or by one of them." Khandha-Samyutta in *Samyutta Nikāya*, III., 46.

we keep in view this "current conception," distinguishing between Eastern and Western pantheism. With the puny things the West has called souls—the poor fluttering sprites of Greek vases, the melancholy shades of Vergil's underworld, the errant, fallible, doubled self we meet with in mediæval books sacred and secular, the

*Animula vagula blandula*

*Pallidula rigida nudula*

of Hadrian, the Buddha might have quarrelled; but it would have been otherwise. Whether with one Vedantist school we say that the Over-soul was My soul, or with another that My soul was Over-soul, Atman was not differently conceived in India as were "souls" in the West.

And the Khandhas, thus denuded, stand exposed as the vehicles of pain and misery, and as "a burden" taken up ever again by craving ever-reborn—craving of sense-desires, craving for rebirth. Thus exposed, missiles from the rich stores of Indian similes are aimed at them in the pages of the Piṭakas, likening them to diseases, to knives and javelins, to murderers with uplifted swords, to serpents, to bubbles of foam, to a mirage, to the conjurer's trickwork. Things alien, evil, of the world: distaste for them is to be cultivated, not mere dispassionateness.

It might, and very likely would, be objected here by a Buddhist, that the obloquy heaped upon the Khandhas is intended not for them as such, but only when and in so far as they are, in Warren's rendering, "coupled with depravity and attachment,"<sup>1</sup> that is, when the individual, in mind and body, shows himself infected with the Āsavas and the four kinds of "grasping." The Buddha is represented as saying: "I will teach you, bhikkhus, the five Khandhas and the five 'grasping'-Khandhas,"<sup>2</sup> and then proceeding to enumerate the five in the usual

<sup>1</sup> *Sasavā upādāniyā*, Warren, op. cit. 155. The four "grasplings" are "after sense pleasures, speculative opinions, rites and conventions, and theories of soul." Sir Charles Eliot very kindly reminded me of the distinction indicated above.

<sup>2</sup> *I.e.*, of grasping, *upādānakkhandhā*. My rendering is not less uncouth than Warren's "attachment-groups."

phraseology of inclusive description. In the case of the second five, the two words quoted below are the only specific difference introduced.

Now it is true that, in the many passages wherein the ethical undesirableness of the Khandhas is expounded, they are called not simply Khandhas, but "grasping"-Khandhas, that is to say, in those cases where the term "five Khandhas" is introduced. But where it is not introduced—where the five are depreciated severally and simply, as *rūpa* and the rest, there is no saving clause whatever qualifying the condemnation. In judging of a creed or doctrine as a whole, those which really count in the long run as its main features, are those that are most emphasised. One can find everything in any scriptures. The test as to whether any feature found is to rank as a tenet is: What emphasis is laid upon its utterance, in repetition and impressive phrasing? Judged by this, judged by the fact that, in the discourse referred to, the distinction drawn is *not used* to show to what sublime development the Khandhas, purged of the *āsavas* and *upādānas*, might attain, the distinction loses significance when the trend of the doctrine is considered as a whole.

Bearing all this in mind, let us look at certain powers imputed in the same books to the human mind, and rated at the opposite extreme of the scale of religious values. The Buddhists were by no means second to the Greeks, or the heirs of the Greeks, in the exalted estimate they formed of the possibilities of "intellect." If the lofty function of Plato's "intellect" (*noûs*) was, by exercising itself as wisdom (*sophia*), to discern the supreme good, even as the eye discerns the sun through light, so for the Buddhist was it by *paññā* (*prājñā*) or *ñāṇa* that the highest fetches of intuition, the sublimest ethical insight was attained. Buddhism and Platonism have this in common, that our discernment of truth or good, of things as they are, of things in their right perspective, is described, not as *dianoia* or reasoned understanding, but as an inner vision.

Now *paññā* (or *vijjā* or *abhiññā* or *ñāṇadassana*) covers



a number of highly-ranked mental faculties or processes, allusions to which, under more specific names, run all through the Sutta Piṭaka. The English reader may refer to, *e.g.*, the Ambaṭṭha Suttanta, translated in Rhys Davids's *Dialogues of the Buddha* (I., pp. 123—5). The Buddha having said that righteousness (*sīla*) and *paññā* make the true brahmin, not birth, is asked: "What is that *paññā*?" The reply is that (involved inseparably with the habit and state of virtue) *paññā* consists in certain forms of intellectual exercise, to wit, the graduated stages of rapt absorption called Jhāna, insight into the nature of an individual as such (here be it noted divided into body and mind (*viññāna*) only), the power through creative will to project a temporary double of one's self, other supernormal powers classed as *iddhi-vidhā*,<sup>1</sup> such as what is termed among ourselves levitation, etc., celestial or super-normal hearing, intuitive knowledge of another's subjective experience, commonly known here as thought-reading, thought-transference or telepathy, reminiscence of one's own past lives, *i.e.*, of more or less of them, for they are infinite in number, celestial or super-normal vision, and finally and, for the enlightened Buddhist, infinitely greater than the rest, the discernment and total eradication of the four mighty tendencies involving rebirth which the Canon calls *Āsavas*, *i.e.*, drugs or poisons.<sup>2</sup>

In a little sketch there is no scope, even if there were in the sketcher the competency, to enter into each of these modes of exercising the faculties in what India has conceived to be the highest levels of potency. Judged by this bare catalogue, the faculties engaged seem to make very light of both the interests and the limitations of sense-experience. And some may be inclined to say, "This is not bad as a summary of the subjective experience

<sup>1</sup> On this see *Dialogues*, loc. cit. 88, n. 4, and Introduction. The ten (not nine) modes (*vidhā*) referred to by Buddhaghosa only, are now known to occur in the Canon itself:—*Paṭisambhidā-magga*, II., 205 (ed. in 1907 by Dr. A. C. Taylor). But there the preceding creative potency is ranked under the ten as *adhivijjhāna-iddhi*, *i.e.*, fixation (of will). This work is obviously much later than the *Dīgha Nikāya*.

<sup>2</sup> That is, sense-desire, becoming (or lust for living as such), opinion, ignorance.

of an angel, or of one of Mr. H. G. Wells's Martians. Anyway, it is very old, and therefore no doubt entirely mythological." Or again: "There's not overmuch of what we should call 'intellect' about it." Now, I trust that no reader of *The Buddhist Review* will consider this very ancient and venerable list in an uncritical spirit, nor, on the other hand, dismiss it with criticisms so hasty and superficial. Let me say here that Buddhism, at least in Further India, has never yet relegated this ancient conspectus to the cupboard for ideas outgrown and obsolete. It has been taught as a series of states and powers attainable, not by angel, fairy, wizard, or Martian, but by man; from the days of Asoka and centuries later, from Buddhaghosa down to the actual present. The phrase of Semitic belief: "And God said, Let us make man in Our image," has often been inverted by modern criticism and anthropology. But it would seem as if the Indian, who centuries ago made that inversion for himself, was convinced that, if man had made gods in his own image, it was a god-like mind and will that made them. *His* were, given the right conditions and development, the powers that had been projected into deities.

In reply to the second remark, I would point out that, in the Western traditions, we have so long divorced intellectual energy from action, that we lose sight of the relative identity, from the Indian standpoint, of thought with thought transference, of synthesis with synnergy. We recognise in speech, it is true, a fusion of thought and action, or a translation of the one into the other. But for us intellect is receptive and ratiocinative. It receives but it only reacts *as* thought, or in informing what we are pleased to call "will." But for the Indian mind, thought can translate itself into material energy not less than material energy can, by way of sense, translate itself into consciousness. For that mind the problem of *afferent* consciousness that puzzles us is matched by the corresponding mystery—and fact—of *efferent* translation. We, on the other hand, relegate action to hands, limbs and voice, and in all other effects produced where these

agencies are apparently inoperative, see only the *māyā* of the conjurer, and the illusions of the credulous.

The theory of mental reaction to sense-stimuli expounded in the Piṭakas is more soberly scientific than the analyses of the pre-Aristotelian Greeks. The theory of association and of memory in the later *Questions of King Milinda* are no less sober and scientific so far as they go. So is the still later and more subtle analysis of the process of cognition in Buddhaghosa's works,<sup>1</sup> an analysis that is still taught in Buddhist Further India. So far we may find, in early Buddhist psychology, an anticipation of our own current theories at least as interesting as the investigations of Aristotle, on which our own analyses are mainly based. But we cannot rightly conclude therefrom that Buddhists would be satisfied with being termed Sensationalists, or those who derive all knowledge from sense. It is true that there is no word in their literature accounting for transcendent powers of mind, save by the two great factors of the effect of past Karma on the one hand, and the effect of special and strenuous training on the other. Nevertheless, it was reckoned as erroneous theory to hold that the supernormal faculty of the so-called "celestial eye" was abnormal intensification of physical sight.<sup>2</sup> This view is refuted by a quotation from the Buddha's word,<sup>3</sup> that there were three distinct sorts of vision: the physical, the celestial, and the eye of insight (*paññā*), by which I think must be meant that which is elsewhere called "the

<sup>1</sup> *Atthasālinī*, *Visuddhi-magga*, and *Sammoha-vinodanī*.

<sup>2</sup> This is in the *Kathā-vatthu* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Had the heretical notion become orthodox, we should have *paññā*, in one of its modes at least, classed under the *rūpakhandha* or bodily, physical factor of the individual! The heresy is suggested by the description, contained in an orthodox work of the Canon, the Paṭisambhidāmagga, of how the Celestial Hearing and Eye might be evolved by practice:—the latter, by so fixing the consciousness on light, or some radiant surface, that, in time, discrimination between light and dark is suspended, and a vision arises transcending the environment of sense-impression and attaining a purview of the passing and pageant of human lives (I, p. 112, J.R.A.S., 1906, 242). Of course the "fleshy eye" is here really numbed by sustained stimulus, while the intent contemplative tension of the mind is maintained, and imagination, or, if you will, intuitive insight, is given the better play.

<sup>3</sup> *Itivuttaka*, translated by Dr. J. H. Moore, New York, 1908, p. 72. I do not hold with the translator's interpolated "(Is)."

Dhamma-eye," *i.e.*, understanding of the Dhamma. Buddhaghosa, however, in the *Atthasālinī* (306), follows the *Dīgha*, in adopting a twofold division only : natural sight and paññā-sight.

An eloquent illustration of the scope of this other or "second" sight occurs in another suttanta of the *Dīgha Nikāya*,<sup>1</sup> which incorporates an old Indian tale. Pāyāsi, a noble, sceptic and agnostic as to the existence of all other worlds, and of rebirth other than human, is debating with the venerable apostle Kumāra-Kassapa, and goes on to say : " But who lets Master Kassapa know all these things : that there are Three-and-Thirty Gods, or that the Three-and-Thirty Gods live so many years ? We do not believe him when he says these things."

" That, Prince, is just as if there were a man born blind who could not see objects as dark or bright, as blue, yellow, red or brown ; who could not see things as smooth or rough, nor the stars, nor moon, nor sun. And he were to say : ' There are none of these things, nor any one capable of seeing them. I don't know them, I don't see them ; therefore they don't exist.' Would one so speaking, speak rightly, Prince ? "

" Not so, Master Kassapa. The visual objects of which you speak do exist, and so does the faculty of seeing them. To say ' I don't know them, I don't see them ; therefore they don't exist ' : that would not be speaking rightly."

" But even so, methinks, do you, Prince, talk like the blind man in my parable when you say : ' But who lets Master Kassapa know that there are Three and-Thirty Gods, or that the Three-and-Thirty Gods live so many years ? We do not believe him when he says these things.' For, Prince, the other world is not, as you imagine, to be regarded with this fleshly eye. Those Samaṇas and Brahmans who haunt the lonely and remote recesses of the forest, where noise, where sound there hardly is, they there abiding strenuous, ardent, aloof,

<sup>1</sup> A translation of this is in *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Vol. II., "The Pāyāsi Suttanta."

purify the eye divine ; they by that purified eye divine, passing the vision of men, see both this world and that other world, and beings reborn not of parents. In this way, Prince, is the other world to be seen, and not, even as you imagine, by this fleshly eye. Let this be a proof to you that there is another world, that there are beings reborn not of parents, that there is fruit and result of deeds well done and ill done."

The two visions are also illustrated in another book of the Canon by the simile of a man standing where he can see into the doors of two houses.<sup>1</sup> "Even so doth a bhikkhu by the celestial eye, purified, transcending the human eye, see beings dying and being reborn, going to weal or woe even according to their deeds (*karma*)."

We may put aside these transcendent powers, and take a definition of intellect, understanding or insight more on all fours with our own more grey and sober outlook ; that, for instance, describing equally *paññindriyam* (faculty of *paññā*), *sampajaññam* (conscious understanding) *vipassanā* (insight) and *sammāditṭhi* (right or perfect view) :—"Understanding, search, research, searching the truth (*dhamma*), discernment, discrimination, differentiation, sagacity, proficiency, subtlety, criticism, reflection, analysis, breadth, grasp, intuition, self-introspection," and the metaphors applied to these : "a guide, a spur or goad, a sword, a lofty platform, light, radiance, splendour, a jewel."<sup>2</sup> Thus does the Abhidhamma group all the cognate terms used in the Sutta Piṭaka to describe human intelligence. And there is, in all its definitions, none indicative of any higher appreciation than that which is here ascribed to the intellect of the five Khandha'd individual.

Calling both the foregoing categories for convenience' sake *paññā* (I refer to the list quoted from the *Dīgha Nikāya* and that taken from the Abhidhamma book), we may ask whether *paññā* is anywhere classed under one

<sup>1</sup> *Majjhima Nikāya*, I., 279 ; II., 21 ; III., 178. The passages are simply assertions of the fact of the intuitive faculty, as in the *Dīgha N.* reference ; not arguments as to the difference between the two kinds of "eye."

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 17—25 of my *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*. I do not pretend to have given more than an approximate rendering of the abstract terms.

of the Khandhas? If it is, why are the Khandhas so hardly spoken of, seeing that in them lies the capacity of developing the saintly supernormal intellect?

For all their denunciatory zeal as religious reformers, the founders of Buddhism<sup>1</sup> were too sincere in their psychology and their logic, to exclude *paññā* from their classifications. They do find a place for it, if not always under the same Khandha.

In the Sutta Piṭaka, and in one of its leading "gospels," the *Majjhima Nikāya*, *paññā* is classed with the *viññānakhandha*. The bond and the difference between the two is discussed by two leading bhikkhus, Mahā Koṭṭhita and Sāriputta. "What is it to have *paññā*?" "To discern (*pañānāti*) the Four Truths." "What is *viññāna*?" "To be conscious of happiness, of sorrow, of neutral feeling." "Are the two connected or distinct?" "Connected: what we discern, of that we are conscious; what we are conscious of, that we discern." "Is there no difference?" "Yes, *paññā* is to be cultivated; *viññāna* is to be thoroughly understood. That is the difference."

Thus, every ordinary person has *viññāna*, intelligence or cognition, which reacts to sensory stimuli, and imagines and co-ordinates his sense-derived experience. This instrument, with all its exposure to evil, needs to be well studied and its function understood. But when applied to and trained in the objects and methods of higher life and thought, it may become, raised to a higher power, the instrument of intuitive insight, widened reminiscence, intensified perception, moral self-mastery, and so forth, called *paññā*. Such is the view we find centuries later developed in the *Visuddhi Magga*. To Buddhaghosa, somewhat in accordance with the psychical theory of Aristotle, *saññā*, *viññāna* and *paññā* all formed one evolutionary concept of mind at a lower, higher, and highest power of involution, so to speak.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> I have here no definitely-named individuals in mind, but those unknown recorders who, in compiling the Pāli Piṭakas, founded for us the Buddhism that, so far as we at present know, is the nearest to the original teaching.

<sup>2</sup> See my *Bud. Eth. Psychology*, pp. 7, 8, n. 2.

In the *Dhamma-Sangani*, however, of the Abhidhamma, where concrete states of mind are resolved into a number of factors, and the attempt is made, with no very helpful result, to bring in the Khandha classification, *paññā* is included, as both *indriyā* and *balā* (faculty and force or power), under the varying content of the *Saṅkhārakkhandha*. As such, it figures, not as the receptive, reacting consciousness itself, but as a factor in concrete mental syntheses or synergies. When Buddhaghosa, however, discusses the *saṅkhārakkhandha* in his *Visuddhi Magga*, he omits *paññā*, but reserves all the last third of the book for it in all its modes, defining it as "insight and knowledge (*vipassanā-ñāṇam*), associated with moral consciousness."

We have seen that the early Buddhists, in rejecting an indwelling *Ātman* identical in substance with the world-soul, and the organ or seat of all higher insight and inspiration, conceded to the five Khandhas<sup>1</sup> they decried, the power of developing, given the right disposition and proper training, into instruments of supreme knowledge and volition. Are they, then, wholly inconsistent in heaping contumely as preachers on the Khandhas, while magnifying the functions of *paññā*?

Judged by the consistency we should demand from a system of psychological religion,<sup>2</sup> elaborated by one academic mind for chosen followers, the teaching of early Buddhism may seem inconsistent. But in a pioneer movement for ethical and intellectual reform we do not expect to find thoroughgoing consistency, not at least when the movement has grown vast and unwieldy. Think what it means to be one's self the outcome of certain traditions and environment, and yet be trying to alter the traditions the better to suit one's enviring society, to alter society by altering its traditions. The clinging grip of usage, the mortmain—the dead hand—of tradition

<sup>1</sup> *Kūpa* need not be omitted as the one clog to the flights of the mental Khandhas. The phrase, "touching with the body" (*kāyena phassitvā*), is a Pāli idiom, however meant, used to describe an ecstatic attainment of mind. It should interest students of Neo-platonism.

<sup>2</sup> I borrow the late Max Müller' term.

is not so easily thrown off. The reformer is himself not out of their clutches.

It was no new thing for Buddhists, any more than it was, later, for Christians, to be denouncing both "this vile body" and the mind or heart "out of which proceed evil thoughts." It was part of the business—if one may say so—it was in part the *métier*, of those intensely earnest religious upheavals, those great protests against the twin tyranny of formalism, and the vice which that formalism suffered to prevail, to denounce wholeheartedly the whole organism of the sinner; and besides this, judging by the Buddhist and other religious literatures of India, Buddhism did not *originate* anti-ritualism, anti-sacerdotalism and evangelistic ethics in that country. It handed on the torch of a very ancient Protestant tradition, kindling therewith, as it did so, certain possibly quite original intellectual fires.

As revivalists they were bound to denounce. As reformers in mental science, ethics and education, they considered man under another aspect: not as a sinner to be plucked from the burning, but as plastic material, as force running to waste, which, under proper training, was fraught with the highest promise. So they flagellated the bundle of fivefold modes of sense-reaction in a world of sensuous experience, while they found no pedestal too high for the new mental organism, *evolvable* from those Khandhas as butterfly from caterpillar, as diamond from carbon. As the Christian became a "new man" when he had, as Paul said, "put on the Lord Jesus Christ,"—"the mind that was in Christ Jesus," so what we might call "the higher psychology of the Buddhist" discerns in the *sekha*, working to become *asekha* (the student who would become adept) a quasi new set of faculties and processes. These, summed up, came to be called the Bodhi-pakkhiyā Dhammā, or conditions appertaining to enlightenment. But they are no longer spoken of under the atomic or static simile of *khandha*, *i.e.*, heap, mass, aggregate. They are all dynamically conceived, as process, potency, ways of progress. For the five indriyas



of sense—the five senses—we have substituted the five indriyas of moral sense :—faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, insight (or *paññā*). Other processes or faculties were the four Inceptions [Institutes or Applications] of Mindfulness, the four Bases or Preliminaries to Potency (*iddhi*), the four right struggles, the seven Factors of Enlightenment, the Aryan Eightfold Way. The man or woman who had so glorified the body of Khandhas by evolving out of them, by developing them into, this wonderful new consciousness of other interests and contrasted ideals, was no longer a mere vehicle or compound of sense-determined Khandhas.

And it is because of this evolution of mind and character and ideals that the Buddhists no doubt were “not careful to answer” critics in this matter, not more careful to class the higher regenerate intelligence under one Khandha or another. We need not trouble ourselves either to apologise for their logic or their want of it. “Illogical” is often applied to what is only a greater logic, *i.e.*, a reasoning with other and expanded data.

Khandhas and the whole machinery of experience by way of sense might serve well enough in analysing the average sensual man or woman, with only such activities and interests as belonged to that world of sense-experience. But once you substitute the new interests and ideals, the rising above worldly aims, then the whole training and machinery of the individual is practically covered by what I have for want, for sad want, of a good word called Intellect—*paññā*, *vijjā*, *abhiññā*—synonyms almost all of them, of *vipassanā* which corresponds exactly to our *insight* and which, in later Buddhist works, came largely to be substituted for the two latter terms. Emotional enthusiasm came into the training and so did strenuous sustained energy, desire, purpose—the fullest expression of will. But the central *aim* was ever intellectual—intellectual grasp, and the wider and deeper view. And this each one had to attain for himself and herself.

It may seem wise not to hurl out of sight the ladder

whereby a higher standpoint has been reached. It was by the poor body and mind of this indisputable sense-experience that Indian seers and saints had climbed. Traditional standpoints of religious revivalism on the one hand, and the traditional view of the difference, not in degree but in kind, between mundane knowledge and supramundane intuition and will, affected their judgment and their methods. But at all events the Buddha did not compromise as Aristotle did, who cut the knot of the problem of intellect by declaring that "it alone enters from without and is alone divine."<sup>1</sup> As for ourselves, we can afford at this time of day to look without fear and with hope and admiration at the brave upward way of man, evolving his finer instrument of *paññā* out of the homely and everyday tools of the Khandhas.

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<sup>1</sup> *De Gen. Animalium*, II., 3.