

MIND IN BUDDHISM

by

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In 1914 I published a little book on *Buddhist Psychology* for the Quest Series of manuals.[1] (*B.L.B.* 236.) In 1924 I published a new impression of this, only adding a few newer impressions and corrected convictions in a supplement. After yet another ten years I have been asked whether, in case the book did not as a whole express my present opinions, I preferred it should be put aside, and a general restatement published, so far as, in a brief sketch, this could be done.

Of course I prefer that. The historic study of Buddhism, in no matter what branch, is a very new study. New materials have been coming every year to hand; nor are materials, now for some years made accessible, studied as they should be by those who write and speak on Buddhism. What such give us is mainly (*a*) discourses on formulas, (*b*) " individual reflections " which " try to convince us philosophically. . . ."[2] Now formulas are church-made fossils. And philosophical reflections too often ignore the changing values inseparable from the long historic growth of a world-religion like Buddhism. Moreover, they are usually based on inadequate knowledge of its records.

I do not pretend that my knowledge of Buddhist records is as a whole adequate. But since 1914 such knowledge as I then had of those records, which are earlier than any others

we yet have, is greatly increased. If I have altered much in what I now write about Buddhism, it is because I know it better, and not because I am drawing more on, I will not say my imagination, but on fancy. No man of science, no historian can get further in research without imagination. By it they must construct where yet they know only in part; by it they must recreate and make alive a dead past. No, it is better knowledge about early Buddhism that has altered what I have to say. It is this which makes it better on the whole, that the manual of 1914 should be replaced by a better manual.

Here meanwhile I set down in brief what "mind" was coming to mean for India when that which we of to-day call "Buddhism" was the new mission of the "men of the Sakyas."

Mental Analysis a New Interest.

I drop the word "psychology" because it is a term of this new world of ours, and only that. In my youth indeed we never heard it. We spoke of Mental Science, Philosophy of the Mind, and even Mental Physiology. It indicates a specialization in analytic, scientific procedure unknown before. Much more was this the case in ancient India. And if the word "psychology" is somewhat of a misfit for this modern procedure, it is a far worse misfit for what the teaching about "mind" came to effect in the Buddhist teaching about the "man." There is to-day too much reading the new into the old. By this I am not saying, that Buddhism did not bring a new view into an older view of things. Emphatically it did, both in what it tried to do, and in what it did.[3]

But preoccupation with mind was a new phenomenon for the thought of India generally, and this is not yet recognized as it deserves to

be. This new interest arose in or rather before the 7th century B.C. Buddhism came to be strongly affected by it, and through it came to use words for it in quite a new way. For example, the form of the stem *bhaj*: "distribute," used only for portions of food, or other matter, came, in Buddhist sayings, to be used for the breaking up of, for details in, things unseen, such as ideas, opinions. Such meanings had come to be needed, and so language was adapted to supply the need.

Just what do I mean by this new Indian phenomenon? We cannot hope to understand the line of evolution taken by early Buddhism unless we make due allowance for this new sort of attention to the mind.

I do not mean a new use of the word "mind" in speech-idioms. The Vedic hymns and applied utterances (*samhitas*) use *manas*, "mind," much as we do to-day. Thus we read "Which prayer, O Agni, is to be the choice of thy mind?" (acceptable to thee). "With what thoughts may we worship thee?" "This praise fashioned in the heart has been offered by the mind." "By what strong mind may we arrest the Maruts (wind gods)?" "What a man reaches with the mind, that he expresses by speech."[4] If the Buddhist Sayings merely carried on this way of speaking about mind, there would be no new things to record about "Buddhist psychology." Again, when we come to the Ritual Sayings (Brâhmanas), there is much mention of *manas;* but it is in the man as expressing, as manifesting "the self" (India did not say "himself") *as*, that is, by way of, mind, speech, eye, ear, breath, work (*karman*). Nowhere do we find any attempt made to resolve the *manas* into constituent parts.

In the early Upanishads we come upon the new note. Not only, as in the Vedas, is mind

spoken of as an instrument of the man, praying or what not; the mind is now spoken of as a wherewithal *to act upon the body*. In the next place, mind is coming to be viewed in the new light of a *manifold*, a varied "*more*" (*bhûyas*) in the man. Thus, while it is the self or man who "seizes hold of" and animates the body, it is "with the mind" (*manasâ*) that he does so; with the mind he sees, hears, feels, etc. And then, "in the self," we read, "there is surely more than 'name'"; (this word in ancient India—and where not else besides?—meant all of man that was not just visible shape, *rûpa*); "there is speech; nay more, there is mind . . . nay more, there is intention (*samkalpa*) . . . there is thought (*citta*) . . . there is musing (*dhyâna*) . . . there is intelligence (*vijñâna*) . . . there is memory (*smrita*) . . ."

Here are two very marked New Words in Indian thought: mind as instrumental medium between body and the man; mind as an ascertainable plurality. In the former, we do not find the word instrument or tool; it was practically non-existent; it was not then our world of instruments. Nor do we find the word "will"; man's will was there, but he had not differentiated it from mind. As to that, we, with our grand word "will," may yet be heard saying: "I have a mind to do it." There was the word *kâma*, not yet debased as it became under Buddhist monasticism to mean only sensuous desires, but it never meant more than the vague generic term "desire"; it never appears harnessed to bodily efficiency as it is when we say, e.g. with Jesus: "I Will! Be thou clean!" (Luke, v. 13.) For it Buddhism did not find a worthier word, not at least until centuries later. But Buddhism did link

man with body through mind in a volitional way, even without the fit word.

In the latter "New Word," we see a crude effort to unfold a Many in the mind. Recalling that the root idea in "mind" is measuring (*minâti*), we may call it seeing ways of measuring in detail. And the new interest in this was not looked at without apprehension, for we find the teacher Kaushîtaki, in the Upanishad so called, warning his pupils: "Seek not to know speaking, feeling, thinking, doing; it is the speaker, the feeler, the thinker, the doer who is to be known."

Proto-Sankhya.

It is reasonable to assume, in this new interest, the work of some one man with a new message for his land and age. Had India taken earlier to writing, as did China, Egypt, Assyria, we might know much about him. As it is, he is but a name: Kapila, the "tawny one." To him and his "school" is ascribed this analytic doctrine, which came to be known as *sânkhya* (Pali, *sankhâ*, *sankhâna*), meaning literally "seeing well," and secondarily, in computing, naming, numbering. It has come down in a number of aphorisms of quite uncertain date, but centuries older than the exegeses in which they are enfolded. In these aphorisms, whereas the man or self is kept aloof, apart from matter, a very prime reality, but not "computable" (since he is sole computer), he is also kept apart from mind, this being held to be as divisible as is body; divisible into parts and functions, such as the senses, and much more, and existing, even as body exists, *for* the man, and only explicable as bringing enjoyment (or experience) not for itself, not for the many parts, but for the user, the enjoyer, the man.

Here then was the new phenomenon: man was no more just *nâma-rûpa*: soul (or inner world) and body. He had not one, but two parallel servants or sets of servants, or instruments. I do not find it recognized by us as a *new* phenomenon. My own first recognition of it may be seen in my *Gotama the Man* (1928). (*B.L.B.* 240.) When it is recognized, we can then see that its great expansion in Buddhism, in a way calculated to bring great harm to Buddhism *as a religion*, was not a purely Buddhist product, but was the influence exercised on Buddhism by a vogue of the day. Brahman (or early Hindu) teaching heeded the warning of Kaushîtaki, and no doubt of other teachers; it harnessed proto-Sânkhya into its service; it held up the analytic cult in a man's training as complementary to the opposite stress in culture which it called Yoga; it held the balance. Buddhism also started to do the same. It called *sankhâna* and *bhâvanâ* (making become: the imaginative, constructive side) as "the two strengths" (*balâni*).[5] But the analytic "strength" won, and the whole trend of Buddhism was led by it, in a way Kapila will never have foreseen.

Let me not be misunderstood—that there must be some connexion between those Sânkhyan and Buddhist analyses of man's inner world was brought forward some thirty-eight years ago by Jacobi commenting on Garbe's *Sânkhya Philosophie*. But neither of them seemed to see the long growth there was in both Sânkhya and Buddhism. Hence the conclusion they came to was not happily worded. It was that "Buddhist philosophy" was "derived" from "Sânkhya." For them "Buddhist philosophy" involved the whole of what we may call the religious message of Buddhism. There is a world of difference

between the two. That which alone deserves the name of a Buddhist philosophy *dates from our era.* It may be said, in some measure, to be due to influences partly derived from the Sânkhyan preoccupation with mental analysis. I refer chiefly to the writings of the Buddhists Nagârjuna, Vasubandhu and Ashvaghosha. But between these and the Sakyan religious mission of the 6th century B.C. lay some nine centuries of evolution in Buddhist standpoints, ideals and ecclesiastical and scholastic development. It should be clear then, that if we take the word Buddhist philosophy in this stricter sense, it cannot well be derived from the proto-Sânkhya of the 7th century B.C. Or again, that if we use the word philosophy in a large general sense for "culture," we must carefully distinguish, as those thinkers did not, the different periods of Sânkhyan and Buddhist "culture" in deriving the one from the other.

Parallel between Body and Mind.

Confining ourselves just here to the first age of Buddhism (from Gotama to Asoka), let us ask ourselves to what extent those first Buddhist teachers were influenced by this growing interest in mind as distinguishable from the "man," and to what extent, if any, did it form an integral part of their gospel.

The answer, if we find one, will of course not cover the whole question of the "mind in Buddhism." But for me it is of vital importance to seek it. And it is so because of the strange credulity with which we writers on early Buddhism make such a mere pundit of the great founder, not to mention his chief co-workers. Great world-religions are not the inspirations of the makers of categories and formulas. Charles Eliot's "Buddha," for instance, is just a pundit. And Dr. Stcherbatzky,

in his voluminous *Buddhist Logic* [*B.L.B.* 955] (vol. I), is content to believe that the founder taught " a very minute analysis of the human Personality," namely, the doctrine of the so-called five *skandha's* (Pali, *khandha's*), one of bodily, four of mental phenomena. By " Personality " he means the *pudgala* (Pali, *puggala*). Now I am convinced—and I have studied early Buddhism in a way, at first hand, as Dr. Stcherbatzky has not—that both the term *puggala* and the *skandha* doctrine played no part in original Buddhism. We see the term *puggala*, quite foreign to the religious literature of the 6th century B.C., creeping into the Suttas (at times in the compromise *purisa-puggala*), betraying as it comes the degraded concept of the man which was spreading over Buddhism. And we can discern the *skandha*-gag inserted into teachings which knew only the man *with* the body and the mind, or the " be-minded body." The learnèd author's credulity appears yet more glaring when he goes on to say: " This is the first main feature of early Buddhism: its soul-denial."

If by " early Buddhism " were meant the new ecclesiasticism of the centuries succeeding that of the founder's lifetime, I have not much quarrel with the tragic statement, albeit even then it is crude and inaccurate. But let us keep " the Buddha " out of this Buddhism! Or, if the title " Buddha " (unknown to the Pali prose records of the first and second Councils) be claimed as just a symbol of the after-men's teaching, let us then hear only of Gotama as the real Sakyamuni. If we use the torch of history, let us at least be historical!

Far too much and too long have later dogmas been made to pose as the genuine message of the founder of primitive Buddhism. To assign these dogmas to their true place in history, to

discover what was that real message—these are crying needs which must be worthily satisfied before we can write easy guide-books on this subject. Let us then seek an answer to my question.

Let us take the second Suttanta of the First Collection: the "Sâmaññaphala."[6] Possibly this had attained something of its present connected continuity as an oral discourse (probably not its final and present form) when the first Council was held, for it is one of the only two discourses which are there *referred to by name*. In it I see emerging the view, that "mind," while it is not body, is as distinguishable from the man as is the body. It is considered as a sort of mental body.

The solitary muser, having emptied himself of all hindrances, wins to one or more of eight inner experiences. In the first he values the relation of the body to the self. This is pictured as a jewel strung on a cord, taking on the tints of the cord as would a colourless diamond. The self is here called not *attâ*, or *puriso* (man), much less *puggalo*, but *viññâna*, literally awareness, intelligence. This is very old teaching, usually met with in Pali when the body perishing at death is contrasted with the surviving "man," or again, when the body is referred to as a station or perch for the imperishable "man." In the second experience, he "imagines" (literally, fashions; there was no word for imagination) another body, having shape (*rûpî*) but mental, fully organized. Just as a man could draw out a reed from the sheath, a sword from the scabbard, a snake from its sloughed skin, distinguishing the one from the other.

This is all. Writers have hitherto thrown no light on this apparently useless reflection. But if we recollect the stirring of a new interest

in " mind " as an invisible organism, in a way parallel to the bodily organism, both in procedure and in limitations, surely the quaint passage becomes full of significance. In the possibly not much earlier Katha Upanishad, the injunction is to distinguish, as it were " draw out," the inner self (*antar-âtman*) from the body " like an arrowshaft cut from a reed." Here it is *manas* that is to be drawn out in idea.

It may be said: It doesn't take us very far. True, but it takes us back to the dawn of a new " more " in the man, to the discerning of a new inner order he had not before got at. Life was for him made wider, deeper. Nor for him alone. I cannot forget the exhilaration I felt in my youth, when the first reading of, was it Carpenter's *Physiology of Mind*? revealed to me the wonder of this inner orderly procedure. There is nothing of magic in the paragraph, as I (not to mention others) used to think. The word used for body: *kâyo*, means actually a group or aggregate of any kind, even as our word " body " may be used. We have here a definite advance on the older Indian teaching of man as somehow " in " body. We have a second body which " he," the muser, " applies and bends down thought " (*citta*) to discern.

The New Need of Control.

The realizing of mind as a sort of body, and so as a servant, complicated life for the religious teacher. It was no new thing to teach control of body, but control had now to be extended to governance of mind. And it is noteworthy, that the leading and trusted co-worker Sariputta the brahman is especially associated, in the Suttas, with this new stress. He and his colleagues are shown discussing what would most add lustre to the glory of the moonlit night in the woodland. He elicits opinions, but gives there-

upon as his own: "He who has the mind (*citta*) under control, and is not under the control of the mind. Just as a man takes from his clothes-chest and puts on just the suit he requires, even so is such an one."[7] In four contexts do we find him made to say this.

The Upanishad parable of the Katha is more like Plato's. The man drives the chariot of the body with its prancing horses of sense. He is the experiencer (*bhôktri*); the mind is the reins and the driving, and reins must be held firm.

In all three teachings one thing at least is clear: the man or self is held distinct and very real; he is not merged in mind. (Even where in another Pali book the driver is mind, the king-warrior stands beside the driver.) Mind-ways are instruments to be at man's disposal. The clothes are not the man. They wear out, are sloughed off; he persists.

And the injunctions to control of mind cease to be trite when we remember how new they then were; what a fresh emphasis, coming from a new outlook, lies in them.

Terms for Mind.

Our late James Ward rightly said, in his "Psychology" (*Encyc. Britannica*): "in psychology words are things." They are in it what things seen, heard, weighed are to material research. Let the reader therefore bear with a word of discussion hereon. So far reference in Pali has been to three terms for mind: *manas*, *citta*, *viññâna*. The last I rendered by "self." The discourse would lose its point, did we render it by mind (or consciousness), since this is the subject of the next experience. Moreover, though neuter in gender, it is defined in current idiom as he-who-speaks, he-who-experiences (*vado vedeyyo*) in the masculine gender. The

two phrases are about man and his body, man and his mind. And the second is a "More" in experience come to be put into words.

I may be reminded by the alas! too few who know their Suttas: Does it not say, that these three mean one and the same: "*iti pi mano . . .*" : "this is mind, this is thought, this is intelligence?"[8] Could anything be plainer?

No, nor could anything be more plainly stated than the equation between the three Persons in the Christian Trinity, as now established in formula. But there was a day, a long day, when this was not yet an established teaching. Beneath the established identity in the Suttas, too, we see an earlier diversity. And this diversity led to each of the three tending to be used in different contexts. Note, too, that the line quoted by my imagined critics occurs once only, and in such a way as to suggest a later inserted gloss. The Sutta deals with just the man weighing which, if either, it were for a moment plausible to identify with himself, with "the self"; the body or the mind (*kâyo*, *cittam*. Not *nâma-rûpa*, note! nor *rûpa* and four mind-*skandha*'s). Surely body, since that at least does perdure for some decades; thought is as shifty, as flighty as a monkey leaping from bough to bough; a new leap every moment. The conclusion of the matter, one would think, will have been that warning of the Second Utterance: neither of the two is the man or self; both are just tools, useful, but limiting man's divine development. Actually the moral drawn is purely monkish standpoint, and leaves us wondering how far the editorial hand has here been busy?

Here is no space to go into the older distinction in idiom of the three exhaustively. I can but give one or two instances where *manas*

and *citta* seem to have borne a distinct mutual difference.

Not only above is *citta* likened to an ape. Restless preoccupation with impressions from without in the uncontrolled mind inspired the vivid little poem by one Valliya (*Theragâthâ*) [*B.L.B.* 247]:—

Within the little five-doored hut an ape
Doth prowl, and round and round from door to door
He hies, rattling with blows again, again.
Halt, ape! run thou not forth! For thee
'Tis not herein as it was wont to be.
Wisdom doth hold thee captive. Never more
Shalt roam from hence (in freedom as of yore).

Dhammapâla's exegesis confirms us in holding the figure to be that of the *citta*, receptive of, susceptible to impressions. *Citta*, too, is the term ascribed to Sâriputta's teaching above.

Now *manas* is not used with such a deprecatory stress. We see it made the referee, the valuer of sensations. We see it as the type-word of psychical action (*mano-kamma*) as distinct from vocal and bodily action. We see it used for deliberate, as distinct from impulsive, reaction in the word *manasikâro*, a word which came to stand as equal with our "attention." Reaction in act, again, is given to *manas*, not in *citta*, as in the entirely Upanishadic sayings of the ancient Dhammapada:

If with corrupted mind (*manasâ*). . . .

or again:

If with a pious mind a man do speak or act. . . .

Very different in outlook is the line put in to overlie the two couplets, these being, as "twin verses," in keeping with the rest of the chapter —but to that I will return.

Of the special significance of the third term for mind: *viññâna*, I have spoken. Of it, when not ironed out to mean as much as, and no more than the other two I have spoken. As such, it came down to be defined as meaning, for instance, " one is aware of a taste as acid, sweet, alkaline, etc." Yet that India should have had a specific term for man as surviving—and that after all still holds the field, as life's great crisis, however much we bury our heads in the sand about it—would not make her unique. Persia, too, had her specific term, the word *urvan*, meaning as some hold, " the chooser." That India had a rival term should open our eyes to a date in her religious values, when the matter of man's birthright in the worlds, man's right-of-way in the worlds bulked as largely, as vividly, in her religious preoccupations as we know it did in those of ancient Persia. Very early Buddhism shows this living interest. The Sutta Collections are full of it, but they also show it as waning.

And with that waning the distinctive meaning of *viññâna* waned, so that we find this inconsistency in what is told of the founder—he is shown psychically seeing an evil man of another world (*Mâra*) seeking the *viññâna*—the just released " soul " or " man " of a monk-suicide, and there is no suggestion, that what is sought is in itself an illusion. He is also shown elsewhere sharply rebuking a disciple for believing that the *viññâna* is anything more than a mental result of preceding mental conditions (*Majjhima*, No. 38); that it is no persisting " speaker " and " experiencer." We cannot see the founder consistent in holding to both standpoints. But if we see, in the two suicide Suttas,[9] an older tradition, in the Sutta of the sharp rebuke a later composition betraying a striking growth in preoccupation with " mind," explanation

becomes possible. *Viññâna* in the latter has ceased to be the *urvan* of the Persian; it has become merely a mental phase. These Suttas leave us in no doubt about the matter. It is *too easy* a solution to reject the former pair as "mythological" and take only the last Sutta seriously. On the one hand, the latter is so obviously a later, more scholarly, more deliberately compiled scripture, the work of the revising editor. On the other hand, there are the scattered allusions to *viññâna* as gaining a "platform," a bodily "support" (*thiti, patitthâ*) in this (bodily) encasement or that.

One more *viññâna*-context should be noticed. It is once or twice listed as a sixth element, with earth, water, fire, air, space.[10] I do not think we should read any "cosmic consciousness" into this context. The Commentaries pass it over, or just say: "*viññâna* means *nâma*, the other five are *rûpâ*. (That space should be *rûpâ*, not the absence of it, is interesting.) For me the term *viññâna* here means "man," "mankind," as completing the constituents of the known universe.

Two more terms for mind deserve brief comment: *saññâ, paññâ*, both variants of the root ñâ, to know. The former we find illustrated (as is that worsened *viññâna*) by our "perception," whether by this we mean the modern specific recognition of a sense-group, e.g., an orange, or the looser term for any "coming-to-know." Both ranges of meaning appear in Pali. *Saññâ* is the act of recognizing by way of the name. And when, in the furthest reach of abstract musing a man was said to attain to "neither *saññâ* nor not-*saññâ*," the idea appears to have been, that he had awareness of a name with unawareness as to the thing named. This seeming paradox should be as familiar to us as to the early Buddhist. We

may have names for That Which or Whom we have as yet no adequate conception. We can only conceive a More; we give It the name of the Most: *summum bonum*, supreme heaven, Deity, Consummation.

Paññâ, like *viññâna*, has a history, and it is also a tale of depreciation. In early Buddhism, until at least the compilation of the first book of Abhidhamma, *paññâ* was as important as, shall I say, such a term as " growth in grace " will have been for the Christian. But in the classic manual, *Compendium of Philosophy* [*B.L.B.* 67] of probably the 11th century, it is cited only to be dismissed in a line. Just as, in *viññâna*, the *vi-* means our " dis- " in, e.g., discriminating, the *sañ-* in *saññâ*, means inclusiveness and continuity, as in our " syn- " and " con-," so in *paññâ* the *pa* (Sanskrit: *pra*) means a forward force, e.g., *pa-kkamati*, to pass on, advance: our *pro-*, e.g., progress.

This connexion with growth appears in an interesting observation, ascribed to Sâriputta (*Majjhima*, No. 43): " What is *viññâna* is to be understood (*pariññâtabbam*); what is *paññâ* is to be made-become (*bhâvitabbâ*)." When this Sutta was compiled, *viññâna* had evidently fallen to the status prescribed in Sutta No. 38, as cited above. But *paññâ* still retained its high Indian status. And that was no mere phase of mental proficiency or progress. It meant growth, becoming more, in the very man, self, spirit. It meant essentially spiritual growth. Our own psychology is so preoccupied with the man's tool, the mind, or rather with " minding," that it has neglected the one thing that supremely matters, the *procedure* in growth of the mind-er. The same thing had already happened ages ago in Buddhism. In the Abhidhamma list of terms defining *paññâ*, a list far exceeding all other such lists, that for

energy alone being commeasurable, and making a bad second at that, the terms are a mix-up of words for intellectual and spiritual proficiency. The man was becoming merged, by that time, in mind. To be *pandita* (adjective, which in the Suttas is equal to *paññâvant* (having wisdom) came eventually to mean just " clever " and " learned " (the old *sutavant*); and so we come down to " pundit." Preoccupation with mind had annexed the word, but had outlived the older tradition of sanctity attaching to it.

The tradition died hard. There had been formulated, we know not when, the triad: *sîla*, *samâdhi*, *paññâ*: morals, mind-training, wisdom. Morals the base, like the firm earth; *samâdhi*, the various ways of mental study, including *jhâna; paññâ*, or growth on a higher plane than either of these. And we find that, for the, as I hold, lonely last tour of the aged founder and Ananda, in the absence of a listening recorder, a little set piece on these three is put into his mouth as his last sermons—O the pathetic absurdity of it for the Man of the Way!—And so sturdy was the tradition that nine centuries later, Buddhaghosa made them the framework of his *magnum opus*. In this work,[11] *sîla* is exclusively monk-morality, for he was addressing only his little world-within-world. To *samâdhi* we shall return. The *paññâ*-section he begins with the mind exclusively, so had the subject encroached on what had been purely spiritual, and passes on to examine a scholastic world whence the " man " was judged to have been entirely excluded as reality *by* the mind.

The Five Aggregates.

That Buddhaghosha places his analysis of mind (and body), not in his second part—on *samâdhi*—but in the *paññâ*-section, had a significance which eludes the writer or reader

who sees in that analysis something imputed to original Buddhist teaching. The subject of that analysis is not *nâma-rûpâ*, not *kâya*, *citta;* it is the man regarded as resolvable into, not a two-fold instrument and its user, but a five-fold complex, *and nothing else.* To this extremity had Buddhist thought been drawn down the current of that interest in mind as such, which for Kapila had meant so different an emphasis. For his school mind-analysis had meant a clearing away from the self, the man, the spirit, the unique being, all that was material or quasi-material, in that all this was to be estimated by a valuer. At the opposite extremity the valuer had been judged as merely the things valued; only valuing survived, at least in this shrivelled word of the Less. The complex consisted in *rûpâ*, the " seen " or material phenomena (I do not say " qualities," since this term presupposes a " substance "); and four mental phases: *vedanâ* (actually, " experiencing," but always resolved into pleasurable-painful or neutral feeling), *saññâ*, *sankhârâ* (a plural word meaning literally preparings, a vague and loose term for volitional states), and *viññâna.*

The history of the coming into orthodox Buddhist teaching of this curious schema, as well as the superseding of it after many centuries by a three-fold division of *rûpâ*, *citta* and *cetasika*'s (or varying mental content of any mental act or state), has yet to be written. There can be no finding space for it here. It will have been in new vigour by the 3rd century B.C., when the Pitakas as canon appear to have been definitely compiled from varying local versions and standardized. The compound *citta-cetasika*'s peeps out already in the first Abhidhamma book, but Buddhaghosha seven

centuries later recognizes only the five, not the three.

That we find the five called *skandha's* is enough in itself to remove the notion from the day of the birth of Buddhism. Commentators explain this ambiguous term by *râsi*, heap. (It means also trunk (of body or tree), shoulders, etc.) " Heaps " is to direct our attention to any mass that has crumbled, is crumbling. In body and mind was no stability, no quality of permanence, persistence, immortality—here the original teaching agreed. But meanwhile the stable, permanent, immortal man owning body and mind was slowly fading out—a disaster impossible in serious Indian religious thought when Sakyamuni was on earth. Sceptics played about then with nihilistic notions, as may happen at any centre of talk, academic or other. But the prevailing religious ideal was the immensely uplifted ideal of the Man, inherently *akshara*, imperishable, *amrita*, undying as Deity Itself, Which he in very essence was. When, with the worsening in Eastern brahmanism, reforming groups had been breaking away from orthodoxy; when, with the growing vogues of monasticism and mind-analysis, the glory faded out from the ideal of man as advancing through the worlds from potential to actual Deity; it became desirable to fix in terms the new lowered notion of man, his nature, life and destiny, as " man." And so we come to the terms *puggala* and *khandha*'s.

That we find the *skandha*'s in the second Utterance of the founder is no good evidence that he really knew of any such schema. Inserted at a later date the five only weaken the impressive warning, namely, that the very man is neither just body or mind (which is very different from saying that there is no " man "),

and is actually hindered by the tools he has to use here.

The Victory of the Analyzers.

This mode of spreading of any allusions to mind over four classes of mental experience, weakening as it is and impeding, to directness and force, tells us how very urgently will at one time have been felt the need to present the man as a manifold, and not as a unity. It indicates a final breaking away from both the main, the older Indian conception of the man as a unity, at once divine and human, and in particular from the whole of the Buddhist "right wing," by whom that unity was still taught. Matters came to a head—so say the records—at the Patna Council, as may be seen in the debates said to have been held there and then (about 230 B.C.) between that conservative wing of Vesâlî and the Analysts, the Vibhajjavâdins, of the left wing. These held that the "man" (called in the records *puggala*) could not be "got at"—they did not yet say, he was a non-entity—in any real ultimate sense. As knowable, he was resolvable into some 57 *dhamma*'s, i.e., mental and bodily phenomena, or experiences of mind.

It was a position not unlike that of the Scot, David Hume: a qualified nihilism. In the interesting midway (and composite) work *The Questions of King Milinda* [*B.L.B.* 298], about 150 years later, the "not got at" position is still being maintained in form; in substance, a nihilism equal to that of Buddhaghosha, Buddhadatta, and of the Compendium is actually worded. Whatever language (as Milinda sagaciously pointed out) might say to the contrary, whatever logical need there was, in affirming, for the affirmer, in doubting, for

the doubter, the "man" as essential entity was crucified.

Mind and Samadhi.

There is a tendency to see in any form of Buddhism mainly a preoccupation with the form of mental activity which is vaguely called "meditation." By this we generally understand spells of reflection, not mere reverie, but of thought which has some object, some method. We "think things over"; we "thresh things out," keeping silence, and if possible cultivating solitude.

Now here is a mental activity not peculiar to any country or time. It is anywhere only a matter of more or less in the habit. In India, indefinitely before the birth of Buddhism, we may say it was a more. There were those—a small fraction of the population no doubt—who strove in secluded abstraction to win nearer to the great object: union with the Divine Self with whom they were essentially one, either called a "becoming," a "making-become" (*bhâvanâ*), or *yoga*, the effort to yoke or unite (*yoga* means both effort and union). The general name for all such activity was *samâdhi*, "settling-on-to-persistently," which is on the whole well rendered by "concentration."

Original Buddhism was occupied much less with *yoga*, than with a specific cultivation of what I would call a More on the Way to the Most. This was the mode called *dhyâna* (Pali, *jhâna*), that is, not active reflection, but a more passive "musing" or "brooding." It did not aim at union, it aimed at comm-union; and that not with the concept of the highest or ideal self, but with cultivating the "companionship" (*sahavyatâ*) of beings who were not consummated, but were in a More than earth-life afforded. The age called them "devas." If we

render this by " angels," we must be mindful, that " devas " had been men and women of earth and might likely be so again. I prefer " deva " (pronounce dayva) untranslated. (After all, " angel " is a Greek word, once a foreign visitor.) To be in *jhâna* was to empty the self of earthly distractions and become alertly attentive. Hereby opportunity was given for what we now call psychic gifts to develop. In the Suttas the formula for the attitude is often followed by a description of the " gifts." These were five: levitation or other supernormal movement, clairaudience, thought-reading, recollection of former lives, clairvoyance. And these are contexts showing clearly the connexion between *jhâna* and converse with devas. The founder is shown frequently engaged in it.

But when, in course of time, the lofty conception of man's nature was lowered, when *yoga* became a dishonoured name for " fetter " of error, when other better worlds were looked upon with fear and repulsion, just because prolongation of life in body and mind was therein involved, then new formulas had to be found for *jhâna*, presenting it solely as detachment, with no beneficial intercourse to be thereby won. And we have to learn by " left-in " contexts what that earlier *jhâna* meant to the founder and his age.

The Mind versus the Man.

I have tried to show that the new realization of man's mind-ways, as being no more the real man than was body the real man, powerfully affected early Buddhism, and, taken together with that other equally, if not more, potent factor, the rising vogue of monasticism, forced that religious movement into a channel of a peculiar kind. The former factor (with which

we are here concerned) developed in early Buddhist teachers an exaggerated interest in man's instruments of self-expression, withdrawing attention from the spiritual becoming or growth of the very man himself. This development was mainly of the attitude we have now learnt to call " introspection." And it is interesting to note the efforts to name this attitude, not noticeable in earlier Indian literature. For instance, there are the verbs *anupassati*, *samanupassati*, " to look-at-serially," Yet more interesting is the new meaning assigned to an old term, the Vedic *smriti*, memory, meaning in a derived sense tradition. The Pali equivalent *sati* does not mean simply memory, nor is it used for tradition. Early Buddhism was new and had to create, and grow up to, its own tradition. By the Abhidhamma definition we see that *sati* meant a general alertness of mind, not only as to the past, but chiefly as to the present. Mental lucidity, keen awareness are nearer to *sati* than memory. Rhys Davids saw this long ago and framed the word " mindfulness " for *sati*, and it is difficult to beat it.

The practice of introspection came to be summed up in the formula known as the Four Satippatthânas, or Bases (or Conditions) of Introspection. The original form was probably " *sati-y-upatthâna*," that is, presence of *sati*. For some now unknown reason the *u* was dropped and the artificial term *patthâna* came into technical use, especially in that late compilation (Patthâna), the last book of the third Pitaka (Abhidhamma). The " four " were this: that a man should contemplate (*a*) the body, as purely material and the work of parents, (*b*) *vedana*'s, or experiences gained through the body, especially affects, or emotions, (*c*) thought (more rarely " thoughts ": *citta*), i.e., reactions

to, reflections on, the preceding, (*d*) *dhammâ* (in the plural), i.e., " things," the outcome of the activity of the first three.

The Four came to be held in high worth as the constant preoccupation of the good monk, a sort of mental sheet-anchor, holding him firm in the ever-threatening currents of distraction, envy, and other passions, or in hours of sadness. The reader for an example of the latter can consult the verses ascribed to Ananda, where he is said to be mourning his great bereavement. (Theragatha, *B.L.B.* 247.)

My little sketch must now end. It may be said, it has not much to show of what psychological analysis amounts to *for us*.[12] And if we leave out of account how we have been looking, not at a modern world, but at a new phase in an ancient culture, this is true. If for instance we seek, in these primitive efforts at mind-analysis, for inquiry into memory and mental " reinstatement " generally, we must come down, centuries later, to the Milinda Questions, where we first find *sati*, in its older meaning of " memory," analyzed in the quest for " laws of association of ideas." (I borrow our own terms.) Chiefly because of that " monastic factor," the chief concern of the monk was with the messages of sense and how to combat them. Not by shutting the eyes, the ears, but by the steadying hand of analysis, to examine, and turn away when their inadequate rewards had been gauged.

It was a worthy effort, once we concede that the artificial life of the monk was in itself worthy. For it fought positive dangers with positive weapons.[13] But it was fought at a fearful cost. It was bringing with it the forgetting that it was only the tools of the man that were being investigated and not the man himself. The tool-complex was gradually

set up as the tool-user. The newly distinguished instrument became the master, ousting the user as unreal, and as only a name for the complex. We have but to revert to that inserted extra, the first line in the Dhammapada, to see the mind made to usurp the place of man, inverting the sense in the two following and older couplets: "Things are forerun by mind, are made of mind, have mind as chief," comparing this new view with the older: "If a man act with mind."

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

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[1] Not to be confused with *Buddhist Psychological Ethics*, pub. R.A.S., 1900 (*B.L.B.* 233), 2d. ed., 1923.

[2] I quote from pp. 54 and 68 of this year's "Buddhism in England."

[3] On this distinction see my *Outlines of Buddhism*, 1934.

[4] Rig-Veda: I, 76, 1; I, 171, 2; I, 165, 2; Taittirîya-samhita, V, 1, 33.

[5] *Gradual Sayings*, I, p. 47, f. (*B.L.B.* 1,204).

[6] See *Dialogues of the Buddha* (*B.L.B.* 286), vol. I, No. 2.

[7] *Further Dialogues*, I, No. 32.

[8] (*Samyutta-Nikâya*, ii, 95.)

[9] Both in *Samyutta-Nikâya*: Godhíka and Vakkáli.

[10] In *Majjhima*, latter Suttas.

[11] Translated as the *Path of Purity*, by Pe Maung Tin (*B.L.B.* 1,046-8).

[12] If I have said nothing about sub-consciousness or psycho-analytic therapy, it is because early Buddhism had nothing to say about them.

[13] Cp. the last Sutta in *Further Dialogues* (*B.L.B.* 180).

B.L.B. Nos. indicate No. of work in the Buddhist Lodge "Bibliography of Buddhism."