



The future of regional cooperation in South Asia: Lessons from the EU and ASEAN



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ABSTRACT

Since the organisation's inauguration in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)¹ integration process has yet to exceed the bare minimum, regional observers find that the organization yields too few practical results. In stark contrast, the ASEAN² member states recently embarked on their most ambitious integration project yet: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)³. Moreover, they set their sights on a true "Asian Union" in the future. Despite the ambitious agenda of the AEC - which represents the most developed economic platform in Asia - they continuously look to expand⁴ and eventually hope to build a borderless community.⁵ While ASEAN's regional integration steadily progresses, it is increasingly worrisome to behold the lack of parallel evolutions in South Asia. This paper aims to identify areas that lend themselves to closer cooperation based on lessons and successes of the EU and ASEAN.

Keywords: SAARC, EU, ASEAN, Non-traditional Security Threats, Energy Cooperation

¹ SAARC Member states are member states are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

² ASEAN now consists of a group of 10 countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia. ASEAN is building two parallel communities: the ASEAN Political-Security Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.

³ AEC Blueprint 2015-2025 consists of (i) A Highly Integrated and Cohesive Economy; (ii) A Competitive, Innovative, and Dynamic ASEAN; (iii) Enhanced Connectivity and Sectoral Cooperation; (iv) A Resilient, Inclusive, People-Oriented, and People-Centred Asean; and (v) A Global ASEAN.

⁴ AEC Blueprint 2025 (2015), [[Link](#)].

⁵ ASEAN 2030, Towards a Borderless Economic Community (2014), [[Link](#)].

Introduction

South Asia represent a region with enormous economic potential and integration and cooperation could further change the face (and prominence) of Asia on the global stage; however, 95% of its trade is externally focused. As such, the South Asian integration process is failing to move beyond historical struggles and misses out on opportunities of regional trade. Considering the relative success of ASEAN in which nations are striving to come together despite (admittedly large) internal differences, it is worthwhile to analyze and compare ASEAN's accomplishments and challenges to SAARC. Some important things to note are the geographical peculiarities of SAARC, for example only Pakistan has borders with India and another SAARC country; Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal can only get access to other SAARC members through India.⁶ Likewise, Sri Lanka is close to the Indian mainland and would benefit from better access; one could argue that this puts the onus on India to initiate and safeguard regional cooperation.

The region faces many important opportunities and challenges in the decades to come, can SAARC take advantage of the lessons EU and ASEAN, can it feed into the momentum of ASEAN integration in the crucial decades to come? How will opportunities such as China's One Belt One Road (and related projects such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) and a possible opening up of Iran⁷ benefit individual members as well as the region? Lastly, can a common system or treaty facilitate a strategy to meet SAARC members' burgeoning energy- and infrastructure needs? While the global economy faces challenges such as China's economic transition, the ongoing European crisis and stagnating U.S. economy, economists look to developing regions such as South Asia to take over as a driver of growth and development. As South Asian governments struggle to meet their growing energy needs and find ways to support their young population in the coming decades, these problems could be ameliorated with more meaningful integration. As we analyze existing frameworks and trends we need to keep in mind that further cooperation will only take place at the crossroads of 'need' and 'probability'; with other words: are there common factors that drive cooperation.

⁶ SAARC, 25 years of regional integration in South Asia, 2011, p. 10, [\[Link\]](#)

⁷ According to Grenscape, Indian imports from Iran have nearly tripled since January, hitting 540,000 barrels per day in March 2016 15 April 2016, [\[Link\]](#); What Lifting Sanctions on Iran Means for India, 18 January 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

EU early regionalization drivers

With regard to any potential comparison of the EU and SAARC might start by analyzing the genesis of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the organization that has continued to grow into something far more extensive over the years.⁸ An important goal of the European institutions (and NATO) was to ensure long-lasting peace on the continent. In a region as vast and diverse as South Asia, and with so many security issues to consider, there are small manageable chunks where these security issues can improve. For better or for worse, South Asian countries (especially India and Pakistan) find it rather difficult and belittling to deal with the EU's carrot and stick human methods on human rights and democracy. When it comes to economic cooperation and investment, the EU continues to pursue values based (human rights, social and environmental protection) trade policy⁹; and while this remains a highly valuable tool, at this point in time, SAARC nations will find little common ground on this topic. When the European powers came together, they were initially unable to find common ground on these issues. This is why the EU started out as ECSC, working on consensual issues like energy and steel.

It is therefore much more likely the SAARC member states will come together on the matters of energy, transport and the environment; most of these have been initiated but require significant progress to truly make an impact.¹⁰ This is an area in which the EU can provide valuable guidance in the form of regulations templates, policy templates¹¹ and lessons from its own development.¹² It would be most feasible to focus on energy cooperation, as there already is a SAARC Energy Centre (SEC), a special purpose vehicle to realize the vision of SAARC leaders to establish an Energy Ring in South Asia.¹³ Moreover, researchers point out that, as 70% of the region's population live in rural areas, they are extremely vulnerable to any environmental stressors that could

⁸ "Drivers of Regionalism: European and Asian cases compared" in *Drivers of integration and regionalism in Europe and Asia: Comparative perspectives*, Louis Brennan & Philomena Murray (eds.), Routledge, 2015.

⁹ Trade for All - New EU Trade and Investment Strategy, [\[Link\]](#).

¹⁰ SAARC Energy Centre Programmes, [\[Link\]](#).

¹¹ "EU Regional Strategy in South Asia, Moving beyond the role of a Trade Partner" in *Changing Waters: Towards a new EU Asia strategy*, April 2016, LSE Ideas, p.13-14.

¹² After all, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was the basis of the current eco-political union, and climate change was also an important driver for EU integration, see in-depth analysis by Diarmuid Torney in *Drivers or Intergration and Regionalism in Europe and Asia*.

¹³ SAARC Energy Centre Programmes, [\[Link\]](#).

culminate in conflict and civil strife.¹⁴ Also, taking into consideration that the Himalayan area tremendously affects most SAARC countries¹⁵, while Bangladesh is a non-mountainous country and does not touch the Himalayas, all its rivers are coming from the Himalayas; only insular states Sri Lanka and the Maldives are unaffected. The fact that the Himalayan region affects most countries makes it an exemplary field for regional cooperation; the pressing nature of environmental concerns ensures they fall squarely into the realm of both ‘need’ and ‘probability’.

ASEAN Integration Project and Role in Regional Mediation

Most importantly and urgently, due to the high trust deficit, SAARC could benefit from a preventative diplomacy platform as modelled by ASEAN. Besides the obvious increase in intra-regional trade, individual ASEAN countries are also successfully establishing FTAs and join multilateral treaties. For example, many are part of the forthcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), whereas EU is pledging cooperation with AEC. In stark contrast is the participation of SAARC countries in interregional cooperation. The EU and India have been discussing trade for the past 30 years but failed to show substantive progress; the 2007 negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) stagnated in 2013. According to the EU, India still maintains substantial tariff and non-tariff barriers that hinder trade¹⁶; India on the other hand looks to achieve a data secure status and demands greater market access of skilled professionals.¹⁷ Meanwhile, EU already boasts FTAs with three of ASEAN’s members: Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore. Despite persisting issues with regards to dictatorial rule and popular malcontent significantly decreasing the attractiveness of the region for investors and businesses, negotiating better access to the ASEAN market is clearly a priority for the EU. To this point, in 2015 the EU and ASEAN issued a joint statement claiming ‘new momentum’ in the relationship and the desire for a formal ‘strategic partnership’. As January 1st 2016 marked the official launch of the AEC, EU immediately reaffirmed the

¹⁴ Saleem H. Ali and Asim Zia, “Trans-boundary Data Sharing and Resilience Scenarios: Harnessing the Role of Regional Organizations for Environmental Security” in *Imagining Industan*, by Zafar Adeel and Robert Wirsing (eds.) 2016, Springer, p. 2.

¹⁵ Directly affects Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and indirectly affects Bangladesh, for more in-depth analysis see Saleem H. Ali and Asim Zia, “Trans-boundary Data Sharing and Resilience Scenarios: Harnessing the Role of Regional Organizations for Environmental Security” in *Imagining Industan*, by Zafar Adeel and Robert Wirsing (eds.) 2016, Springer, p.7

¹⁶ India-EU trade, [[Link](#)]

¹⁷ India, EU aim to break Free Trade Agreement impasse, 2 June 2016, [[Link](#)]

relationship by the official inauguration of the EU mission to ASEAN on the 26th of January 2016. This mission establishes a permanent ambassador of the EU to ASEAN in Jakarta, again, indicating the clear resolve to further enhance cooperation between the two trade blocs. On an economic level the EU is not giving up on closer cooperation - continuing to pursue bilateral relations with ASEAN member states as well as a show of renewed interest in a regional FTA.¹⁸

Another big step up for ASEAN is its expanding role as intra-regional conflict mediator paired with an increasing willingness to step up and be outspoken on matters such as the security in the South China Sea.¹⁹ However, in the wake of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) verdict, the 2015 show of unity on South China Sea security collapsed under Chinese pressure.²⁰ Regional stability in Asia is crucial for global peace and security. ASEAN has been an important factor in keeping this peace and engage with most actors in the region - including China. Overall, ASEAN favours neutrality and the organization's philosophy puts emphasis on consultation and consensus. They carry both the knowledge and understanding of the region and they have a good relationship with most if not all global actors. It is pertinent for both the US and the EU to strengthen and support this political aspect of ASEAN, and help them to deal with any future geopolitical shifts. ASEAN had been slowly growing more comfortable taking a political stance, as its 2015 joint communique²¹ makes specific mention of the South China Sea conflict. The EU would be wise to support and strengthen and encourage in adjacent regions like SAARC.²²

While SAARC has been to some extent an informal platform to discuss regional security challenges²³, it would be helpful to focus and foster a more formal platform, in the spirit of open dialogue, minimising pressures and enhancing consensus building through consultation. This is why South Asian nations should look at ASEAN for lessons, namely ASEAN's energy cooperation platform. The case of the peaceful resolution of the

¹⁸ How to further a win-win relationship with Asean: EU-AEC strategic opportunities, 8 March 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

¹⁹ ASEAN Joint Communiqué 2015, [\[Link\]](#).

²⁰ Asean show of unity over South China Sea collapses, 15 June 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

²¹ For example Indonesia opened up its automotive industry - Indonesia Lunch Dialogue, Davos 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

²² Freedom of Navigation and the Liberal World Order, 25 July 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

²³ SAARC, 25 years of regional integration in South Asia, 2011, p. 13, [\[Link\]](#).

maritime dispute between India and Bangladesh is a promising sign as it resulted in new opportunities for cooperation (see section on bilateral cooperation).²⁴

South Asia's Key Interest: Non-traditional Security Threats

In order to move beyond the platitudes of trade, integration and regionalization it is pertinent that South Asian nations address the realities of SAARC and focus on export and regulation. Doing so would also make it easier for outside observers to recognize SAARC's identity and purpose, making it easier for outsiders to engage with the organization. Regrettably, in recent years a plethora of initiatives, bodies and committees flooded the organization with no clear value added.²⁵

On a positive note, the most recent spring forecast by the World Bank expects South Asia to maintain real GDP growth of over 7% in coming years.²⁶ This forecast puts the region ahead of all other developing regions, the smooth and stable outlook contrasts with challenges and underlying factors that differ on the national levels. For example, Afghanistan's growth is predicated on stabilization of security situation and strong economic management. Overall, prospects are favourable, as China is looking to introduce a security - boosting military aid and urging seeks regional anti-terror bloc of Afghanistan-Pakistan-Tajikistan-China.²⁷ Meanwhile, Pakistan's performance depends on fiscal consolidation and improvements in key sectors such as energy - which is why the country is stepping up its efforts - mostly focusing on energy projects and CPEC rather than a more comprehensive approach of urban hubs and transit networks. The report adds that India's economic growth is likely to accelerate, if it manages to fuel domestic consumption and generate private investment to complement and support public infrastructure investment.²⁸ While the region has most growth potential it also has the most intense needs: the World Bank says region needs to invest \$2.5 trillion in infrastructure by 2020 to have enough power water and roads.²⁹ Compared to ASEAN,

²⁴ Bangladesh: Energy cooperation with India, Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, [\[Link\]](#).

²⁵ SAARC, 25 years of regional integration in South Asia, 2011, p. 10, [\[Link\]](#).

²⁶ World Bank, South Asia Spring Forecast 2016, page 27.

²⁷ China moves closer to Afghan Security Role, 11 April 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

²⁸ World Bank, South Asia Spring Forecast 2016, p. 29, [\[Link\]](#).

²⁹ World Bank, 2 April 2014, [\[Link\]](#).

the Asian Development Bank said the region needs to invest \$300 billion on development and infrastructure till 2020, a significant difference.³⁰

While SAARC institutions are relatively underdeveloped compared to the EU and ASEAN, it remains unequivocally important to continue and strive for progress, as history shows that these regions have successfully addressed several crucial regional difficulties. Despite difficult political circumstances, SAARC has tackled some issues: it launched the 2004 SAARC Social Charter; also, the food and development banks, Agreement on Transportation, Energy are important steps.³¹ However it still stands that the intra-regional trade is stuck at 5%, to while most recent estimates by the world bank that India-Pakistan trade could be increased from less than \$3 billion per year to \$20bn per year.³²

Opportunities

While there are many challenges, SAARC has had some significant successes. Importantly, the summits and committees necessarily provide for closer cooperation and proven essential as a source of informal communication among its members. Another significant accomplishment are the 1996 SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangements (SAPTA established goal of providing support to least developed member states) and the 2004 SAFTA agreement (focusses on reducing custom duties).³³ While its implementation has proven to be challenging, it is a strong indicator of political will and maybe even a slowly unfolding vision on regional cooperation.

Moreover, the 2014 SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity) emphasizes “the need to promote regional power trade, energy efficiency, energy conservation and development of labelling and standardization of appliances, and sharing of knowledge”.³⁴ Cooperation on energy, water and electricity; and environment may serve as a stepping stone for deeper regional integration.³⁵ SAARC also recognizes that “the South Asian region is energy deficient as it does not produce

³⁰ ADB, 3 May 2012, [\[Link\]](#).

³¹ SAARC, 25 years of regional integration in South Asia, 2011, p. 10, [\[Link\]](#).

³² The Potential of Intra-regional Trade for South Asia, 24 May 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

³³ SAARC, 25 years of regional integration in South Asia, 2011, p. 10, [\[Link\]](#).

³⁴ SAARC Framework Agreement for energy cooperation, 27 November 2014, [\[Link\]](#).

³⁵ “EU Regional Strategy in South Asia, Moving beyond the role of a Trade Partner” in *Changing Waters: Towards a new EU Asia strategy*, April 2016, LSE Ideas, p.16.

enough oil and gas to meet its needs thus depends heavily on imports. Most of the Member States are also not able to generate sufficient electricity to meet their demands. It has been estimated that energy needs of South Asia will increase three times in next fifteen to twenty years.”³⁶ The following initiatives and projects illustrate important progress in addressing these challenges.

Bangladesh-India cooperation, bilateral rapprochement - The Indian-Bangladeshi energy partnership is a prime example of successful cooperation in the region; with the peaceful resolution of ongoing disputes (maritime and other) the two countries managed to expand collaboration in many different areas and are building a true win-win relationship. In 2016, the countries will have worked together for five years to improve energy cooperation; in these five years, India and Bangladesh established inter-grid connectivity and since 2013 power flows from India to Bangladesh.³⁷ Moreover, this successful project resulted in talks to establish a transmission line via Bangladesh to provide it with electricity from northeast India. As a whole, this newly established cooperation and network could well provide a basis of cooperation with other neighbours, for example, countries like Nepal and Bhutan. Researchers suggest that “Bangladeshi investment and enterprises could be encouraged to tap the hydro-electric potential in the North-eastern states”³⁸ Considering these positive developments and increasing cooperation, it shouldn’t come as a surprise that the World Bank finds that Bangladesh’s exports to India could rise by 300%.³⁹ However these projects face another obstacle, it should be pointed out that climate change and changes in Himalayan water flow could negatively affect most countries⁴⁰ in the region in years and decades to come; stressing once more the importance of a comprehensive regional approach.⁴¹ While bilateral cooperation among SAARC member states is a great start, it is probably not sufficient in the long run.

Other interregional initiatives - South Asian nations could consider opening up their markets of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as they have enormous untapped hydro-

³⁶SAARC, Energy cooperation, [[Link](#)].

³⁷ Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, Bangladesh: Energy cooperation with India, [[Link](#)].

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ The Potential of Intra-regional Trade for South Asia, 24 May 2016, [[Link](#)].

⁴⁰ See examples of Pakistan, [[Link](#)]; China, [[Link](#)]; and Nepal, [[Link](#)].

⁴¹Waterflows decreasing in Nepal Himalayas, 24 June 2016, [[Link](#)].

power capacity;⁴² the governments of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Tajikistan have been considering the establishment of a regional energy market since 2005. The establishment of the CASA-1000 (Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Program) is an excellent step in the right direction and could provide a basis for other South Asian nations to increase energy cooperation among themselves. CASA-1000 aims to establish a regional electricity market among its members.⁴³

Challenges persist

Despite the region's economic potential, India and Pakistan remain divided on border disputes and security concerns. Also, in the past other SAARC members perceived India's actions as hegemonic, which in turn fed into the trust deficit among members. In recent times India is making great progress with most members and has gone through great lengths to improve its relationship with Pakistan. However, while the civil government in Islamabad appears open to more constructive talks with India, the military establishment continues to boycott them by intentionally generating friction as it refuses to give up on its policy of cross-border terrorism.⁴⁴

In 2014, the signing of the SAARC Framework agreement for Energy Cooperation (electricity)⁴⁵ may indicate there is potential for regional cooperation is in the works.⁴⁶ However one must point out that the agreement, while a step in the right direction, it is largely symbolic and lacks real impact on trade relations. For example, more "detailed agreements will have to be signed to sort out issues of pricing mechanism, grid harmonisation and regulatory matters."⁴⁷

The trust deficit is substantial and is demonstrated in a recent example: the Pathankot terror attack. While India recently allowed Pakistani researchers/scientist⁴⁸ to enter area of terrorist attack is a welcome sign and may indicate India's willingness to

⁴² The prospects of energy cooperation between Central- and South Asia, 26 April 2015 [[Link](#)].

⁴³ More importantly, the project is valued at \$1.17 billion, and it has seven financiers: The World Bank (through the International Development Association, IDA), the European Investment Bank, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, the Islamic Development Bank; the United States Government, the UK Department for International Development, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Ibid*.

⁴⁴ US dossier bares Pakistan's role in Pathankot terror attack, 30 July 2016, [[Link](#)].

⁴⁵ SAARC Framework for Energy Cooperation, Full text: see [[Link](#)]; SAARC Energy Agreement: A step in the right direction, IDSA comment, 5 January 2015, [[Link](#)].

⁴⁶ Saleem H. Ali and Asim Zia, "Trans-boundary Data Sharing and Resilience Scenarios: Harnessing the Role of Regional Organizations for Environmental Security" in *Imagining Indus*, by Zafar Adeel and Robert Wirsing (eds.) 2016, Springer, p. 27.

⁴⁷ What SAARC Has Done – and Failed to Do – Since its Last Summit, 15 March 2016, [[Link](#)].

⁴⁸ Pakistan team in India to investigate Pathankot attack, 28 March 2016, [[Link](#)]

engage openly with Pakistan. However, from the Pakistani side, Islamabad says India uses Pathankot terror attack as an excuse to derail talks; while others believe that the attack is an attempt by the Pakistani military to derail the talks between the civilian government and India.⁴⁹ While the scope and length of this focus piece do not allow for an in depth analysis of this issue, it is important to note that the persisting cross-border terrorism problem in South Asia is probably one of the most complex and resistant obstacles for regional cooperation.⁵⁰ As long as Pakistan continues to use terrorism for power projection⁵¹, the trust deficit will persist and deeper institutional integration may be out of reach for SAARC.

Another factor that hinders closer regional cooperation, especially between India and Pakistan, correlates with Chinese presence in the region. This is mainly due to India's problem of trade restrictions to do with tariff and non-tariff barriers. Despite India granting Pakistan most favoured nation status (MNF) in 1995⁵², the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004, and the huge potential for bilateral trade (and subsequent improvements in political relations and regional trade), positive effects on India-Pakistan bilateral trade are negligible as there is a need for strong political will and institutional framework to overcome trade barriers.⁵³ A Bangladeshi diplomat notes that, in particular, the problem of NTBs persist: "It was really wonderful when India reduced the sensitive list to dust, just 25 items. But, the impact is now obscured by NTBs (non-tariff barriers), some valid and some invalid".⁵⁴ Meanwhile China outperforms India in "scale economies, price competitiveness and trade complementarity."⁵⁵ The disparities in India-Pakistan relations deteriorated over the years while China-Pakistan relations flourished, exemplified by a clear vision of their economic relations and projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. The lack of vision, infrastructure constraints and the trust deficit continue to hamper regional cooperation in South Asia. It is therefore

⁴⁹Pakistan: India using Pathankot attack to derail talks, 11 June 2016, [\[Link\]](#); Pakistan and Terrorism: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as Critical Juncture?, 11 May 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

⁵⁰ For in recent analysis of these issues and their impact on the region see Siegfried O. Wolf, Pakistan and Terrorism: CPEC as critical juncture, 11 May 2016, [\[Link\]](#)

⁵¹ US diplomat: Pakistan use of terror proxies aiding global Islamic extremism, 12 July 2016, [\[Link\]](#) ; Pakistan and Terrorism: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as Critical Juncture?, 11 May 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

⁵² Pakistan has not reciprocated yet and would do well to grant India MNF status as soon as possible.

⁵³Why has SAFTA failed to boost Pakistan-India trade, 19 March 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

⁵⁴ What SAARC Has Done – and Failed to Do – Since its Last Summit, 15 March 2016, [\[Link\]](#).

⁵⁵ Pravakar Sahoo, Economic Relations of China and India with Pakistan, a Comparative Analysis, Asia Development Journal, June 2012, Vol. 19 No.1, [\[Link\]](#).

imperative that South Asian nations focus on a shared vision as they work to improve physical and soft infrastructure.⁵⁶

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To conclude, while SAARC has evolved slower than other regional organizations, it identifies some of the overlapping and potentially significant areas of regional cooperation in EU, ASEAN and SAARC, expresses hope that SAARC can stand upon their shoulders and continue to grow. It also shows that, given the political will, there is ample opportunity to cooperate in the area of unconventional security challenges, as they affect all members. Lastly, I propose potential action on behalf of the EU or other regional interested partners, acting as mediators and taking steps to encourage more cooperation and help South Asia reach its potential.

In order to properly address non-conventional security challenges, there must be more information sharing. To do so, it would be important to improve interregional access of scientists to boost cooperation (they need better access to visas etc.)

The EU could consider providing grants that expressly demand cooperation between Pakistani and Indian companies or organizations. As seen above, there has been some cooperation with India and smaller countries, confirming trust deficit India-Pakistan is one of the biggest concerns.

As the former colonial power, the United Kingdom may choose to strengthen ties and get more involved in the region, in this capacity it can work together with the EU to increase its positive impact on the region.

⁵⁶ Why has SAFTA failed to boost Pakistan-India trade?, 19 March 2016, [\[Link\]](#).