

India's perception of the EU-India Free trade agreement and military cooperation within the EU-India strategic partnership

Author: Arno Dohmen

Publication date: 2020

Contact address: arno.dohmen@uni-bonn.de / arno_dohmen@web.de

India's perception of the EU-India Free trade agreement and military cooperation within the EU-India strategic partnership

Introduction

Relations between India and the European Union (EU hereafter) are generally considered as not being meaningful and of little importance. The low level of bilateral trade, the barely noticeable cooperation within the “strategic partnership”¹ between the EU and India, and the long lasting negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between the EU and India are some of the contributing factors to this situation (Wouters et al. 2013: 2; Singh 2016: 539ff.; Wülbers & Betz 2014: 1ff.; Felbermayr et al. 2016: 10ff.; Khorana 2019).

This situation of underexplored bilateral relations between the EU and India is also accompanied by a negative perception that one side has of the other (Jain & Pandey 2019: 98f.; Sachdeva 2015: 40; Pandey 2019: 90). Moreover, this situation reveals that the EU and India have not yet found a common language on many points. Obviously, there is no lack of topics of conversation between the two sides, but a lack of understanding.

It is generally known that understanding and thoughts are expressed through language(s), and that language(s) and thought(s) depend on what is perceived. What is perceived, in turn, depends on what kind of language(s) is/are spoken.

Statements and analyses in the context of EU-India relations are primarily based on English language. However, as will be shown below, the focus on English language is accompanied by misunderstandings and problems. In this context, it should also be borne in mind that many languages are spoken in India and the EU. Hindi is one of the Indian languages that has long been more important in India than English in many ways. Also, for this reason, this essay will include aspects of the perception of India's Hindi-speaking civil society regarding the EU-India “strategic partnership”.

The first part of this essay discusses the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. Focus will be on the role of military cooperation within this partnership, on an imprecise definition of this partnership and on trade-related aspects. These explanations are followed by explanations of the importance of language and perception in the context of the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. A closer look at the role of the Hindi language will also be part of these. Subsequently a number of specific presentations on India's perception of the EU, the EU-India FTA and military cooperation within the EU-India “strategic partnership” will be presented. Finally, a conclusion will be drawn.

The “strategic partnership” between the EU and India

For the EU, the “strategic partnership” with India is one of ten that EU concluded worldwide. In contrast, India has already entered into 31 “strategic partnerships” between 1997 and 2017 (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 310f.; Jain 2014: 7f.; Singh 2016: 542f.; Sachdeva 2016: 11; Park 2019: 258; Cihelková et al. 2020: 1723).

The European Commission (EC) already signalled its interest in a stronger partnership with India in 1996 by publishing a document entitled *EU-India Enhanced Partnership*. At the

¹ Please refer to the following section “Imprecise definition of ‘strategic partnership’”.

first EU-India Summit in 2000 both sides agreed on a “new strategic partnership” based on shared values and objectives (Jain 2014: 6; Singh 2016: 541). This summit is considered as the beginning of a process of the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. A joint declaration has been issued to set out the framework of this partnership (Jain 2014: 6; Singh 2016: 541; Jaffrelot 2006: 2f). In 2004, the EC issued a further communication in which it proposed an ambitious “strategic partnership” with India, given India’s major international position, economic prosperity, vast territory and large population (Stamelos & Tsimaras 2019: 137; Wouters et al. 2013: 2; Singh 2016: 542; Jaffrelot 2006: 2f.). The agenda for the “strategic partnership” was set at the EU-India summit in 2005 and supplemented in 2006 by a joint action plan, which in turn developed into further joint action plans (Wülbers 2011: 19; Wülbers & Betz 2014: 2; Jain 2014: 7).

In November 2018, the EC published the Communiqué *Elements for an EU Strategy on India*. According to this communiqué, cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, climate change, defence and security is to be expanded (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 321). The EC expressed its willingness to intensify military cooperation with India in a question and answer document (EC 2018). This readiness is also reflected in the document *EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025*, which was published after the EU-India Summit on 15 July 2020 (EU 2020).

As indicated above, this essay will primarily address the question of the role and meaning of military cooperation within the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India.

Imprecise definition of “strategic partnership”

To better understand the role and meaning of military cooperation within this partnership, it would be useful to take a look at the definition of such a partnership.

However, although “strategic partnerships” are important foreign policy instruments and serve as a process and format for conducting external relations with key actors, there are different definitions of such a partnership, and this vagueness also exists with regard to the “strategic partnership”² between the EU and India (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 309; Jain 2014: 5; Singh 2016: 541).

In EU documents, the term “strategic partnership” first appears in the *European Security Strategy 2003* where it is used as a kind of unspecific foreign policy instrument (Singh 2016: 541). In other official EU documents, there is no further clear definition of this term; however, it is sometimes associated with the implementation of FTA (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 311; Singh 2016: 543).

There is also no official definition of this term in documents of the Indian government. In general, in India “strategic partnerships” are apparently regarded as purely declaratory and politically appropriate foreign policy instruments for long-term cooperation with countries that pursue divergent political and economic views and orientations, but with which convergence in terms of common foreign policy interests is to be promoted (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 310). According to India, however, there are four significant elements of its “strategic partnership” with the EU: first, the primary objective is economic; second, the partnership

² Sean Kay defines a “strategic partnership” as a tool which „enhances or justifies a close relationship between two states that seek mutual gains but whose interests may be competitive rather than shared“ (Kay 2000: 15).

strengthens 'strategic' autonomy; third, it is based on mutual equality, common interest and benefit; and fourth, it is not asymmetric, with one side being prescriptive or intrusive and the other passive (Jain 2014: 7ff.; Singh 2016: 544).

From all this, it is obvious that in the absence of a precise definition, the "strategic partnership" between the EU and India can be interpreted in different ways. Below it will be shown that pertinent Indian English, Hindi, German and French news media have completely different understandings of this "strategic partnership".

Trade relations

In the previous section it was mentioned that from India's perspective the primary objective of the EU-India "strategic partnership" is economic. The EU could certainly benefit from this, as India's gross domestic product has grown by an average of 7% over the last few years and the country has a highly dynamic market. India's economy, which has been growing rapidly for years, can be attributed primarily to strong domestic demand, which goes hand in hand with rising consumer spending (EC 2020).

It is remarkable, however, that the EU was India's most important trading partner in 2019. Total bilateral trade amounted to EUR 100 billion at that time (Jain & Sachdeva 2019: 309ff.; Stamelos & Tsimaras 2019: 137ff.). In 2018 this figure was still EUR 92 billion. This corresponded to 12.9 % of India's total trade. Bilateral trade between India and China in the same period was slightly lower at 10.9 %. India's trade with the USA also amounted to 10.1% during the same period and was thus also weaker than EU-India trade. The EU was also India's main export destination, accounting for around 18 % of India's total exports (EC 2020).

However, from EU's perspective, the situation is completely different, as India was only EU's 10th trading partner in 2019. Trade in goods between the EU and India in 2019 accounted for only 1.9 % of EU's total trade. This puts India far behind the USA, with which the volume of trade amounted to 15.2 %. The volume of trade with China was 13.8 %. Although trade between the EU and India has increased by 72 % over the last decade (EC 2020), India's marginal role in EU's trade relations is clearly visible.

With the aim of increasing bilateral trade and intensifying economic relations between the two sides, a treaty for the implementation of an FTA was negotiated between 2007 and 2013. However, these negotiations proved to be extremely tough, which is why negotiations were declared frozen in 2013. Admittedly, as the EC and India signalled interest in continuing the negotiations (EC 2020; Felbermayr et al. 2016: 10), negotiations were resumed in 2018 (Khorana 2019).

These tough negotiations on the implementation of the EU-India FTA, which have been going on for years, can be seen as evidence of the failure of a common understanding between the EU and India. The above-mentioned vague definition of the "strategic partnership" between the EU and India can certainly also be seen as further evidence of a lack of common understanding. It seems reasonable to include the importance of language and perception in this context.

Language and perception

Above it has been expressed that there is a clear lack of common understanding between the EU and India in many respects. It is worth repeating that a common understanding and “one common language” between the EU and India is based on a wide range of both EU and Indian languages. English and Hindi are two important languages in this respect, firstly because they are both official languages of the Indian Union according to § 343 of the Indian Constitution, and secondly because these languages cover a large part of the population of India. Furthermore, English is the language of economic policy actors.

However, the diplomatic and English communication seems to be conflict-ridden, which is apparently also reflected in the so far failed negotiations on the implementation of the EU-India FTA. In fact, however, there are also concrete indications that there are clear grievances at the level of English communication between politicians and decision-makers of EU and India, as condescending and patronising attitudes emerge in communication (Grant 2008: 1; Wülbers 2011: 21). Of course, such communication can neither promote an FTA nor any other joint project between the EU and India.

However, not only communication between politicians and economic policy makers should be taken into account, but also communication within the civil society, as this communication significantly shapes public opinion. At the latest since the publication of Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion*³, comprehensive literature that deals with the interrelationships between public opinion, which is largely shaped by the media, and economic policy, is available.⁴

Despite the large number of theories and findings, it is undisputed that media – among other factors – have a decisive influence on perception and economic policy decisions. Furthermore, above mentioned literature proves that interdependencies between political reality and “media reality” can never be considered separately, as they are in a permanent and mutual process. These findings are thus also directly related to the “strategic partnership” and the so far not implemented FTA between the EU and India.

Hindi discourses

However, while it is widely taken for granted within the research community that English based discourses are considered in such contexts, it is surprising that other Indian languages are not given the same attention. This may be due to the assumption that these languages pay little or no attention to such discourses and/or that their focus on specific indigenous target groups only have minimal influence on politics and economy. It seems appropriate to explain the role and meaning of the Hindi language in this context.

First of all, it should be noted that Hindi media almost reach 40% of the population of India. With this percentage rate the Hindi media clearly have the highest reach among media in native languages (Neyazi 2018: 1). The reach of Hindi media is mainly increased by the leading daily newspapers *Dainik Bhāskar* and *Dainik Jāg'raṇ*, which today publish their

³ Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1922.

⁴ Luhmann 1996; Chomsky & Edward S. Herman 2002 and Erbring 1989 are just a few of the many pertinent publications.

papers in twelve (*Dainik Bhāskar*) and eleven (*Dainik Jāg'raṇ*) Union states of India. The number of Union states where Hindi is the predominant language is eight (ibid. 8). This shows the important role that leading Hindi newspapers play in conveying information. It should also be mentioned that *Dainik Bhāskar* and *Dainik Jāg'raṇ* seem to partially support the political agenda of the current BJP government. The political relevance of Hindi media can also be seen in the fact that politicians today give exclusive interviews to the Hindi press (ibid. 108f.).

Under the current BJP government, which received its votes primarily from the economically significant Indian middle class, Hindi even has gained greater importance. Despite criticism, the BJP has tried to establish Hindi as the only national language (Neyazi 2018: 8; Fernandes 2015: 239). Moreover, the BJP's election victories go hand in hand with a political upheaval in which the leading anglicised Indian strata clearly have lost political control. Population groups that are more inclined to native languages and thus to thoughts and ideas conveyed in these languages are increasingly exerting political influence.

It therefore seems reasonable to also consider the attitude of India's Hindi-speaking population about the EU, the EU-India "strategic partnership" and the so far failed negotiations on the EU-India FTA. Before providing a glimpse into this attitude, it is worth taking a closer look at the Indian media landscape.

In comparison to English newspapers, which mainly focus on urban areas and big cities, Hindi newspapers have a stronger presence in small towns and rural areas (Neyazi 2018: 15; Schneider 2014). Already in 1981, the proportion of English newspapers in small towns and rural areas only was 5.3%, while the proportion of Hindi newspapers was 32.7%. However, Hindi dailies managed to expand their presence in the capitals of India's individual Union states, which are crucial for political activities. In 1981, the proportion of Hindi newspapers in these capitals was 13.4%, the proportion of English newspapers 14.1%. By 2016, however, the proportion of Hindi newspapers in this important segment had exceeded that of English newspapers. By 2016, the share of Hindi newspapers in the capitals of the Union states had risen to 24.5%. At the same time, the share of English newspapers only reached 19% in this segment. In fact, already in 2015, Hindi dailies accounted for the lion's share, with a circulation of almost 141 million copies and 47.7% of the total circulation of Indian daily newspapers. At that time English dailies ranked second with 33 million copies and 11.4% of total circulation (Neyazi 2018: 64f.).

Paradoxically, it is unmistakable that use of the internet is growing faster in rural India than in cities. Above all, this is facilitated by the fact that content is transmitted in regional languages, not in English. In fact, as early as 2014, Google called for the establishment of the Indian Language Internet Alliance, which promotes Indian languages on the Internet. Between 2014 and 2015 Hindi websites grew by 97%, while English websites only grew by 19% at the same time. Although the number of Internet users in all Indian languages is growing rapidly, the increase on Hindi speaking Internet users is more pronounced. By 2016, the growth of Internet users in local languages had already reached 127 million, exceeding the number of Internet users in English. Almost half of these 127 million users used the Internet in Hindi (Neyazi 2018: 192). Given the significant growth of Hindi media over the last two decades, their influence on politics, especially in the Union states, cannot be denied (Neyazi 2018: 192).

India's perception of the EU-India Free trade agreement

In view of the unexhausted EU-India relations, the so far failed negotiations on the EU-India FTA and the hardly noticeable cooperation within the EU-India “strategic partnership”, it seems reasonable to take a look at what is perceived in India in this respect. Hindi media should not be ignored in this context.

First of all, the long-lasting negotiations of the EU-India FTA suggest that media reporting about the status of negotiations is not only positive. In 2011, the opinion-leading Hindi daily *Amar Ujālā* published the article *Vikasit deśom ke cor dar'vāje*, which can be translated into “(t)he postern gates of the developed countries”. The article criticises the industrialised countries and the negotiations on world trade (Doha Round). The Doha Round is not only incapable, but also not interested in solving problems in developing and emerging countries. The industrialised countries would only continue the negotiations on the EU-India FTA in order to increase their own prosperity and their share in world trade. To this end, they would enter into secret negotiations and would try to implement FTAs that go beyond the standards of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Amar Ujālā 2011).

The article *Ull'ṭe rāste par cal'ne kī jid*, which can be translated as “(t)he obstinacy of walking along contrary paths”, was published in 2012 in the opinion-leading daily *Hindustān Dainik* and is a commentary by Sitaram Yechury, the leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist). In the very second sentence, Yechury states that the EU is in a serious economic crisis and that the existence of the Euro is threatened. Especially because of the stagnating economic situation in the EU, the EU has demanded access to the Indian market (*Hindustān Dainik* 2012).

Both articles expressed an extremely negative perception of the EU and the EU-India FTA, which as mentioned above is linked to the EU-India “strategic partnership”. The fact that media coverage always has influence on economic policy decisions, and in particular that Hindi media has a major influence on Indian politics, underlines the importance of these two articles. These two articles have certainly provided a leading impetus and contributed to the fact that the EU-India FTA negotiations are still not concluded. It stands to reason that Indian negotiators involved in the negotiations must take account of these criticisms of the EU and the EU-India FTA, which are widespread among the Indian population.

India's perception of military cooperation

With regard to military cooperation within the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India, it is also worth taking a look at the perception of this partnership. Although this essay is essentially limited to India's perspective, European media naturally also report on the EU-India FTA and the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. With regard to military cooperation within the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India, however, there are indications that this cooperation has a much higher relevance for India than for the EU.

At least the German business and financial newspaper *Handelsblatt* and the French financial newspaper *Les Échos* considered the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India and ‘strategic’ influence in association with the EU-India FTA and access to the Indian market for European companies (*Handelsblatt* 2007; *Les Échos* 2013). Within these articles the focus was on economic aspects, not on military ones.

Pertinent Indian media also give the impression that the economic policy understanding of this partnership is important. However, there are also clear indications that the association of this partnership is much more strongly associated with military aspects and, in fact, even forcefully needs to be associated by military aspects.

The opinion-leading Hindi daily *Nav'bhārat Tāims* (NT) already addressed this “strategic partnership” in the context of the EU-India FTA in 2007. In three different articles, the paper suggested that the conclusion of this FTA would help to strengthen this “strategic partnership”. It is noteworthy that the term ‘strategic’ was basically used as *sām'rik*, because this word actually means “military”⁵. Paradoxically, however, the three articles primarily referred to cooperation in the fields of business, science and energy (NT 2007a.; b; c.).

The Hindi news portal *IBN7*⁶ also addressed this “strategic partnership” and reported in 2010 that former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh travelled to Brussels for the EU-India summit (IBN7: 2010). In addition to talks on economic cooperation, talks on the fight against terrorism and a reform of the UN Security Council had been scheduled. Singh described a change in the partnership between India and the EU, in particular highlighting the mutual understanding between the two sides:

pradhān'mantrī ne kahā, “yūropīya samgh ke sāth hamārī bhāgīdārī ārthik aur vikās meṃ saḥ'yog se śurū hokar vyāpak raṅ'nītik sampark meṃ badlī hai. unhoṃne kahā ki bhārat yūropīya samgh kī bṛhat⁷ bhūmikā kā svāgat kar'tā hai.” unhoṃne kahā ki bhārat aur yūropīya samgh ke bīc lok'tamtra, bahul'vād, sahiṣṇutā, kānūn kā śāsan, mūl'bhūt⁸ mānavādhikāroṃ, pres kī svataṃtratā aur nyāyālay kī svataṃtratā ke lie sammān jaise mūlya ek'samān haiṃ. unhoṃne kahā ki vaiśvik mas'loṃ par hamāre vicāroṃ meṃ kāphī samān'tā hai. unhoṃne kahā ki vah ātam'k'vād aur surakṣā kī gair-paramparāgat cunautiyōṃ se nipaṭ'ne sahit rāj'nītik⁹ evaṃ raṅ'nītik saḥ'yog bārhāne ke lie prayās kareṃge. (IBN7: 2010)

The Prime Minister said: “Our partnership with the European Union has evolved from economic [cooperation] and development cooperation to a comprehensive strategic (literally: military) relationship. He said that India welcomes the European Union’s demonstrative role.” He said that within India and the European Union, values such as respect for democracy, pluralism, tolerance, the rule of law, fundamental human rights, freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary are identical. He said that there is considerable agreement in our (i.e. India and the EU) views on global issues. He said that he will make efforts to develop political and strategic (literally: military) cooperation along with addressing the unconventional challenges of terrorism and security.

It is remarkable that this “strategic partnership” was discussed here in the close context of security and terrorism by using the term *raṅ'nītik*, actually “military skillful” or “military strategic”¹⁰ (IBN7: 2010). Although this term is different from the above-mentioned *sām'rik* “military”, which was used in 2007 by *Nav'bhārat Tāims*, it also leads to an exclusively military interpretation of this “strategic partnership”.

⁵ More literal “related to war/conflict”.

⁶ Since 2016 this TV-canal is called *News18 India*.

⁷ Published *vṛhat*.

⁸ Published *mūl'bhāt*.

⁹ Published *rāj'nīti*.

¹⁰ More literal “related to the science of war”.

This Hindi-language or lexical occurrence is not without its problems. Even if this is an attempt to adapt to the non-military semantics of the English ‘strategic’, the newly created, transferred meaning of the Hindi word is most likely still foreign to most Hindi speakers. This means that the military character is always in the foreground of understanding this “strategic partnership”. In a nutshell and translated, this even means that the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India is a „military partnership“ for Hindi speakers. This is certainly something different from what the EU intended.

This fact should also be seen in the context of Indian English news media. In 2010, *Hindustan Times* (HTi) reported on this “strategic partnership” and published the article “*Poland keen to supply tank recovery vehicles to India*” (HTi 2010a.). Although there is no official “strategic partnership” between Poland and India till date (Kugiel 2019: 143ff.), the article focused on the EU-India FTA and military and economic cooperation between India and Poland. Here, the term ‘strategic’ was also given a geographical meaning, which in the broadest sense referred to the geographical area of Europe. However, it would have been more precise and direct to simply speak of the economic area of Europe, because strictly speaking, in this overall military context, the economic aspects were in the foreground at this point. It is obvious that themes related to the term ‘strategic’ smoothly merge with each other and that there is no clear understanding of the term.

Even though the term ‘strategic’ or “strategic partnership” was not used in another article from HTi, the desire for a more intensive economic relationship with the EU, the conclusion of the EU-India FTA, a joint fight against terrorism, and a reform of the UN Security Council were reflected in this article. Here it was emphasised that above all Germany is a relevant supplier of military goods for India (HTi 2010b.). This is in so far interesting because a “strategic partnership” between Germany and India already exists since 2000 (Jain 2014: 8; Singh 2016: 544).¹¹ In an article of *CNN-IBN* published in 2013, Germany was also described as India’s ‘strategic’ partner (CNN-IBN 2013). It can be seen that India has an expectation regarding the supply of military equipment to Germany, which is also contextually related to the “strategic partnership” between the EU/Germany and India and the implementation of the EU-India FTA.

However, the range of meanings of the term ‘strategic’ or “strategic partnership” is not yet exhausted with these examples. In another article from HTi, the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India was enthusiastically and hopefully described by Manmohan Singh. Singh also linked this partnership to issues of the economy, counter-terrorism and energy. The ambiguity about exactly which areas this partnership covers is reinforced here, by the fact that the sectors “development”, “education” and “science” are also included. However, the military component was at least hinted by terms such as “peace”, “stability” and “security”. Here, too, it is clearly visible how topics related to the term ‘strategic’ merge with each other.

He said [Manmohan Singh] India’s partnership with the EU was poised for further expansion, and ‘we will work with the EU towards world peace, stability and prosperity’. ‘We see EU as a key strategic partner in meeting India’s development needs.’ Over the years, the partnership between India and the European Union has matured tremendously, covering areas like politics, security, education and science. (HTi 2010c.)

¹¹ Already in 1998 France and India concluded a „strategic partnership“ (Jain 2014:8; Singh 2016: 544).

Conclusion

Language, perception and media coverage have a strong influence on the conclusion of the EU-India FTA and the EU-India “strategic partnership”. In India the Hindi-speaking civil society and Hindi media play an important role in this context, as they have a major influence on Indian politics.

It has been expressed that the EU and the conclusion of the EU-India FTA are also negatively perceived by Hindi media. It was also pointed out that the EU and India have not yet succeeded in defining their “strategic partnership” in terms of concepts and contents. At the same time, European and Indian news media have different expectations of this partnership. India’s high claims and hopes regarding this “strategic partnership” are clearly reflected in above quotes by Manmohan Singh. In concrete terms, it has become visible that the meaning of the term ‘strategic’ and the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India varies greatly depending on the country, situation and context. The economic component of this partnership is of high importance to EU and India.

However, the Indian perception of this partnership in relation to military cooperation must be addressed. This aspect seems to be of great importance to India. Of course, there are historical and political reasons for putting military cooperation high on the agenda. But it needs to be highlighted that there might be a different view in the EU.

First of all Hindi-speakers speak of a “military partnership” when referring to the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India. This close military association, which goes hand in hand with more intensive military cooperation, a lack of the definition of this partnership, and a negative image of the EU in India, at least leaves room for interpretation; perhaps even explosive political power. The question must be asked whether and how this state of affairs can have an impact in the context of current conflicts between India and Pakistan and India and China, for example. Is it not inevitably very obvious that a large part of Indian civil society, due to the “military partnership” between the EU and India, is also fundamentally asking itself the question of stronger military support by the EU? And to what extent can the EU actually meet such high expectations of the “strategic partnership”?

Strong military expectations of the EU, such as those expressed above in the quotes by Manmohan Singh, but which are not reciprocated by the EU, could further worsen EU’s image in India and thus the EU-India relationship. This threat also exists for German-Indian relations. The “strategic partnership” between Germany (and the EU) and India, Germany’s role in the EU, and India’s direct military expectations of Germany, as discussed above, are good reasons to question Indo-German relations as well.

Ultimately, the lack of a definition of the “strategic partnership” between the EU and India causes irritation for the EU, Germany and India. Indeed, a definition is overdue. A definition of this partnership may involve high diplomatic efforts, but it can provide a ‘strategic’ momentum for intensifying relations. On the other hand, the continued neglect of a definition could have an unpredictable explosive political power.

This, and the new Sino-Indian relationship, would be an opportunity for the EU to rethink its relations with India and Europe’s knowledge of India. For if India were to favour China over the so-called “West”, the authoritarian Chinese model could further encourage similar tendencies in India – certainly not in the interest of this “West”. A stronger “strategic partnership” and the implementation of the EU-India FTA could certainly serve as signs of

confidence and preludes to meaningful and understanding-based relations.

Bibliography

- Amar Ujālā 28.06.2011. *Vikasit deśom ke cor dar'vāje*.
<http://www.amarujala.com/vichaar/VichaarDetail.aspx?nid=1404&tp=b&Secid=4&SubSecid=10>), accessed 17. 11. 2011.
- Chomsky, Noam; Herman, Edward S. 2002. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Cihelková, Eva; Nguyen, Hung Phuoc; Fabuš, Michal; Cimova, Kristina. 2020. “The EU concept of the ‘Strategic Partnership’: Identifying the ‘unifying’ criteria for the differentiation of Strategic Partners”, in: *Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues* 7,3: 1723 – 1739. (<[https://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2020.7.3\(19\)](https://doi.org/10.9770/jesi.2020.7.3(19))>, accessed 02.07. 2020).
- CNN-IBN. 2013. *India seeks strong German political thrust to ink FTA with EU*. Network 18. 11.05. 2013. (<<http://ibnlive.in.com/news/india-seeks-strong-german-political-thrust-to-ink-fta-with-eu/384521-7.html>>, accessed 25. 05. 2015).
- EC. 2018. *Explaining the European Union’s partnership with India*. Europäische Kommission. Brüssel: 20.11. 2018. (<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_6483>, accessed 03. 10. 2020).
- EC. 2020. *Countries and regions: India*. Europäische Kommission. Brüssel: 07.05.2020. (<<http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/india>>, accessed 03.10. 2020).
- Erbring, Lutz. 1989. „Nachrichten zwischen Professionalität und Manipulation: Journalistische Berufsnormen und politische Kultur“, in: Kaase Max; Schulz Winfried (Hrsg.). *Massenkommunikation: Theorien, Methoden, Befunde*. Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie Sonderhefte: Bd. 30. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 301 – 313.
- EU. 2020. *EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025*. 15.07.2020. (<<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45026/eu-india-roadmap-2025.pdf>>, accessed 03. 10. 2020).
- Felbermayr, Gabriel; Mitra, Devashish; Aichele, Rahel; Gröschl, Jasmin. 2016. *Europe and India: Relaunching a Troubled Trade Relationship*. ifo Forschungsberichte 80. Final Report on September 13, 2016. München: ifo Institut.
- Fernandes, Leela. 2015. “India’s middle classes in contemporary India”, in: Jacobsen, Knut Axel (Hrsg.). *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary India*. London: Routledge: 232 – 243.
- Grant, Charles. 2008. *Four pillars for an EU-India partnership*. Centre for European Reform. 02.06. 2008. (<<https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2008/four-pillars-eu-india-partnership>>, accessed 23. 12. 2019).
- Handelsblatt. 2007. *EU-Freihandelspläne in Asien stocken*. 30.11. 2007. Müller, Oliver. (<<https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/mittelstand/aussenwirtschaft/boomlaender-eu-freihandelsplaene-in-asien-stocken/2899980.html>>, accessed 03.10. 2020).

- Hindustān Dainik. 03.02.2012, „Ull̥te rāste par cal'ne kī jid“
<https://www.livehindustan.com/news/article/article1-story-215836.html>, accessed 28.05.2020.
- HTi 2010a. *Poland keen to supply tank recovery vehicles to India*. 06.09.2010. Hindustan Times. HT Media.
- HTi 2010b. *PM leaves for Brussels tomorrow for India-EU summit*. 08.12.2010. Hindustan Times. (<
<http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/PM-leaves-for-Brussels-tomorrow-for-India-EU-summit/Article1-635979.aspx>>, accessed 03.10.2011).
- HTi 2010c. *EU should open markets, avoid protectionism: PM*. 10.12.2010. Hindustan Times. (<
<http://www.hindustantimes.com/News-Feed/Business/India-EU-should-open-markets-avoid-protectionism-PM/Article1-636841.aspx>>, accessed 03.10.2011).
- IBN-7. 2010. *bhārat-yūropīya śikhar sammelan āj se śurū, pīem pahūmce*. Network 18. 10.12.2010. (<
<http://khabar.ibnlive.in.com/news/44667/12/4>>, accessed 03.10.2011).
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2006. Indien und die EU: “Die Scharade einer strategischen Partnerschaft”, in: *GIGA Focus Asien* 5. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, Institut für Asienkunde.
- Jain, Rajendra Kumar. 2014. *India-EU Strategic Partnership: Perceptions and Perspectives*. NFG Working Paper Series Nr. 10. Stumbaum, May-Britt U.; Mohan, Garima; Zhao, Jizhou (Hrsg.). Berlin: NFG Research Group ‘Asian Perceptions of the EU’, Freie Universität Berlin.
- Jain, Rajendra Kumar; Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2019. “India-EU strategic partnership: a new roadmap”, in: *Asia Europe Journal* 17,3: 309 – 325.
- Jain, Rajendra Kumar; Pandey, Shreya. 2019. “Public Attitudes and Images of the EU in India”, in: Jain, Rajendra (Hrsg.): *Changing Indian Images of the European Union. Perception and Misperception*. Singapur: Palgrave MacMillan:139-151.
- Kay, Sean. 2000. “What is a strategic partnership?”, in: *Problems of Post-Communism* 47,3: 15-24.
- Khorana, Sangeeta. 2019. “Is Brexit an opportunity to revive the EU-India trade deal?” 26.03.2019. The Conversation Trust (UK) Limited. (<
<https://theconversation.com/is-brexit-an-opportunity-to-revive-the-eu-india-trade-deal-113780>>, accessed 03.10.2020).
- Kugiel, Patryk. 2019. “Indian Perceptions of Poland”, in: Jain, Rajendra (Hrsg.): *Changing Indian Images of the European Union. Perception and Misperception*. Singapur: Palgrave MacMillan: 139 – 151.
- Les Échos. 2013. *Les contrats, fil rouge de la visite de Hollande en Inde*. 15.02.2013. De Jacquelot, Partrick (<
<https://www.lesechos.fr/2013/02/les-contrats-fil-rouge-de-la-visite-de-hollande-en-inde-317448>>, accessed 03.10.2020).
- Lippmann, Walter. 1922. *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Luhmann, Niklas. 1996. *Die Realität der Massenmedien*. 2. erw. Aufl. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Neyazi, Taberez Ahmed. 2018. *Political Communication and Mobilisation. The Hindi Media in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- NT 2007a. *riṣṭom kī aur maj'bhūtī cāhtā hai yūropīya saṃgh*. Nav'bhārat Ṭāims. 15. 02. 2007. (<<http://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1619285.cms>>, accessed 24.06.2013).
- NT 2007b. *śikhar sammelan meṃ hogī iyū se mukt vyāpār par carcā*. Nav'bhārat Ṭāims. 06. 07. 2007. (<<http://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2179619.cms>>, accessed 24. 06.2013).
- NT 2007c. *aīṭamī karār ko yūropīya saṃgh kā samarthan*. Nav'bhārat Ṭāims. 01.12. 2007. (<<http://navbharattimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2586285.cms>>, accessed 24.06. 2013).
- Pandey, Shreya. 2019. “The Visibility and Perceptions of the EU in the Indian Print Media, 2009–2010”, in: Jain, Rajendra (Hrsg.): *Changing Indian Images of the European Union. Perception and Misperception*. Singapore: Palgrave MacMillan: 79 – 92.
- Park, Sunghoon. 2019. “EU’s strategic partnership with Asian countries: an introductory article for the special issue”, in: *Asia Europe Journal* 17: 257 – 263.
- Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2015. *Evaluation of the EU-India Strategic Partnership and the Potential for its Revitalisation*. Vandewalle, Laurence (Official responsible); Unal, Aysegul (Editorial Assistant). Brüssel: Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union (European Parliament). European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs. (<<https://doi.org/10.2861/615735>>, accessed 27.07.2020).
- Sachdeva, Gulshan. 2016. “India in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Foreign Economic and Security Interests”, in: *Eurasia from the Outside In*. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
- Schneider, Nadja-Christina. 2014. *Medien in Indien: Zwischen Globalisierung, Ausdifferenzierung und bedrohter Glaubwürdigkeit*. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 07.04.2014. (<http://www.bpb.de/themen/IBDE4P,0,0,Medienpluralismus_in_Indien.html>, accessed 06.01. 2020).
- Singh, Uday Pratap. 2016. “The Indo-EU Strategic Partnership: Future Perspectives”, in: *International Journal of English Language, Literature and Humanities* 4,5: 539 – 553.
- Stamelos, Harry; Tsimaras, Konstantinos. 2019. “India and the European Union: A Quick Look at their Legal Relations and their Strategic Partnership”, in: *Athens Journal of Law* 5, 2: 137 – 148.
- Wouters, Jan; Goddeeris, Idesbald; Natens, Bregt; Ciortuz, Filip. 2013. *Some Critical Issues in the EU-India Free Trade Agreement Negotiations*. KU Leuven Working Paper 102. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies.
- Wülbers, Shazia Aziz. 2011. *The Paradox of EU-India Relations: Missed Opportunities in Politics, Economics, Development Cooperation and Culture*. Lanham: Lexington Books.
- Wülbers, Shazia Aziz. 2015. “EU and India – Goals, Challenges, Prospects”, in: Liebert, Ulrike; Wolff, Janna (Hrsg.). *Interdisziplinäre Europastudien: Eine Einführung*. Wiesbaden: Springer VS: 417 – 431.
- Wülbers, Shazia Aziz; Betz Joachim. 2014. “Die europäisch-indischen Beziehungen: Chancen, Herausforderungen und Perspektiven. ”, in: *GIGA Focus Asien* 9. Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies.