

# A Situation Analysis of SALW in Pakistan and its Impact on Security

By  
Naveed Ahmed Shinwari  
and Salma Malik





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# **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

Small arms are the enemy of humanity and its unnoticed presence has already killed hundreds of thousands of people each year and if left unchecked they will continue to add to the miseries of mankind. Pakistan is awash with small arms due its proximity with Afghanistan. Concrete efforts have not been effectively directed towards the prevention of small arms proliferation. In this regard United Nations adopted a Program of Action in July 2001 to address the issue of proliferation of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

Only three years back I would have viewed any attempt aimed at controlling the availability of small arms in Pakistan with skepticism. Then, as a member of a society that takes pride in possession and display of weapons, I was hardly aware of the magnitude of misery that small arms bring to humanity. This shows in a clear manner how our lack of information on current issues affects our overall vision. During the previous three years I have studied a reasonable amount of material on small arms and its impacts on humanity. This has altered my views to a degree where I feel it my moral duty to make whatever efforts I can, to minimize the pain and agony caused by small arms in NWFP in particular and Pakistan in general. This research work is a manifestation of my goals and objective in the coming days.

I am thankful to our regional South Asia Small Arms Network (SASA-NET), Sri Lanka, for their financial assistance for the publication of this research paper and Saferworld (UK) for their continued technical and moral support. I am also thankful to Ms. Salma Malik of Department of Defense & Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad for her informative and enlightening research work, and our honorable Board member Mr. Musharaf Hussain for editing and translation (into Urdu) of this paper. I am grateful to Mr. Shahid Abdullah who designed the cover page of this research. Thanks are due to my staff members for their hard work in collecting data, data analysis and compilation of material.

Naveed Ahmad Shinwari  
Chief Executive  
CAMP, Pakistan





# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The presence of small arms and light weapons is threatening the existence of human kind. Though lately but consistent efforts are underway to eradicate the small arms problem from the face of earth. UN Program of Action of 2001 aims to address the issue at national, regional and international level. The non-governmental organizations around the world, working on the small arms problem, are looking for concrete steps to be taken by states parties to control and reduce the availability of SALW and should develop a strong mechanism for thorough follow-up.

Why this research? Prior to the publication of this research work eminent scholars and researchers produced a handful of articles and research work on the subject. However, CAMP intended to continue the task to update the information so that policy makers on small arms control and others linked with this issue might have a vivid picture of the situation.

This paper is the outcome of the research jointly conducted by Salma Malik of Department of Defense & Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad and me. This research has two main parts. The first part is the result of the review of the available literature on small arms researches, articles, and manuals etc. While the second part is based on the outcome of the survey sample conducted in Peshawar - the capital city of NWFP province of Pakistan. The sample survey was conducted to document the perception of local communities towards security, police performance and the presence of small arms in the society.

This research work is further divided into five chapters.

**Chapter 1** aims to highlight the small arms problem at global, regional and national level and its impact on the humanity, economy and human development. It also covers the definitions of small arms and light weapons and the types of small arms and light weapons. This chapter also highlights the history and factors contributing to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in South Asia and Pakistan. It gives an account of the illicit and licit production of SALW in Pakistan.

**Chapter 2** provides information on the governments of Pakistan's efforts on de-weaponization of Pakistan society, its progress, success and failures. It also provides a detailed data on the weapons confiscated and recovered during the amnesty, pre-amnesty and post amnesty periods. This chapter looks at the constraints and the political choices made at that time which had a devastating impact on the security situation in Pakistan.

**Chapter 3** provides a brief account on the history, culture and tradition of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. It provides some information on the tribal social structure, Jirga system, and the use of small arms in FATA. This chapter also provides information on the administrative set-up of FATA and its traditional conflict resolution system through Jirga.



## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**Chapter 4** consists of conclusions and recommendations for the government of Pakistan in particular and South Asian governments in general to prevent the proliferation of small arms through bi-lateral and multilateral measures.

**Chapter 5** consists of results of the sample survey conducted in Peshawar. This chapter provides information about the people's perception on crime, security, police performance and their attitudes towards weapons. Some useful recommendations for further research and programmes on small arms are also provided for the policy makers and activists in addressing the issue of small arms.

We hope that this research paper would make an important and practical contribution to the national, regional and global efforts in eradicating the menace of deadly weapons.

The background is a solid pink color. It features several faint, light-colored geometric shapes: a large triangle in the upper left, a curved line resembling a comet tail or a stylized 'C' in the center, and a five-pointed star in the upper right. A horizontal white band is positioned across the middle of the image.

# [ PART 1 ]



# INTRODUCTION

(Salma Malik)

*Small arms proliferation [is] not merely a security issue; it is an issue of human rights and development. The proliferation of small arms sustains and exacerbates armed conflicts. It endangers peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. It undermines respect for international humanitarian law. It threatens legitimate but weak governments and benefits terrorists, as well as the perpetrators of organized crime* <sup>[1]</sup>.

Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SA & LW) casts negative effects on the state as well as the society. Viewed either through prisms of state or human security, SA constitute a grave threat. Banning their use, like that of landmines, is only a utopian concept best left to some sections of the civil society engaged in advocacy. However, with appropriate measures the flow and use of these weapons can be restricted to a large extent. And even if some portions of it can be accomplished, a great service to humanity would have been achieved.

The uncontrolled proliferation of illicit (and to an extent licit) Small Arms and Light Weapons in the regions of the world facing some form of political instability & violent conflict has proven a major obstacle to peace, economic development and efforts to rebuild war-torn societies. Taking the center stage as the primary instruments of violence in internal conflicts; Small Arms and Light Weapons are responsible for a large number of deaths and displacement of citizens around the world. The argument that what comes first – Conflicts or Arms? Leads us to the conclusion that if conflicts occur first then, the intensity of these conflicts spurs the (indiscriminate) usage and accumulation of arms. Whereas, if a society is already armed, as is the case in many modern conflicts, then the very presence of these weapons strengthen and enhance power and viciously escalate the ongoing conflict.

Empirical evidence shows that presence of vast quantities of SA actually help in not only prolonging the conflicts, but also increase their lethality and create massive population displacement and disturbance, resulting in refugee flows etc. Moreover, small arms are known to increase the incidence of child soldiers, cause immense civilian casualties and help create an atmosphere for vested interests on all sides to seek continuation of the conflict. Since conflicts tend to undermine the writ of the state they tempt smugglers, international criminal groups and terrorist outfits to keep the pot boiling and use the conflict zone as a safe haven for their operations. This kind of situation, by no means peculiar to any specific region or zone of conflict, makes it extremely difficult for mediators to resolve the conflict peacefully, or establish any kind of post-conflict rehabilitation and re-development programs <sup>[2]</sup>.

In the *Contemporary Conflicts* of the post-Cold War time period, the question of what comes first, Conflict or arms, becomes irrelevant in the face of the quantity and sophistication in the nature of arms available to actors involved. Not only this but weapons also provide people a feeling of security and empowerment which they need in the face of loss of faith and trust in the states' diminishing ability to better protect its citizens. Although it is true that weapons do not kill people, people do & that conflict occurs due to cause that are deep-rooted & multi-faceted. Hence the root cause of such multi-faceted conflict often is never easy to resolve and get progressively worse with the passage of time.



It is only through eradicating the root cause of the violence that we can hope to reduce its occurrence. But, the scale of violence and the resultant deaths from it are helped enormously by the widespread availability of the means of killing. Both the intensity and the duration of violence are determined by the availability of small arms and their proliferation in the regions of conflict. This violence takes shape of an extremely vicious and vehement cycle, which not only breeds from the frustrations arising out of socio-economic and political inadequacies and injustice, but also in its wake leads to further social anomalies.

The cold-war-era preoccupation with nuclear arms and major weapons systems has left the arms-control community with very little knowledge about the global trade in small arms (technically, pistols, revolvers, rifles and carbines) and light weapons (machine guns, small mortars, and other weapons that can be carried by one or two people). However over the past few years, there is witnessed an interest in examining why these weapons are so easily accessible and how they affect the societies now flooded with them. These disturbing findings are driving a new arms-control movement, led by a loose coalition of the United Nations, concerned national governments and non-governmental organizations.

Small arms and light weapons are weapons of choice in most internal conflicts for a number of reasons: they are widely obtainable, relatively cheap, deadly, easy to use and easy to transport. Unlike major conventional weapons, such as fighter jets and tanks, which are procured almost exclusively by national military forces, small arms span the dividing line between government forces—police and soldiers—and civilian populations. Depending on the gun laws of a particular country (if such regulations even exist or are enforced), citizens may be permitted to own anything from pistols and hunting guns to military-type assault weapons.

At this juncture it is useful to give a definition as to what comprises Small Arms & Light weapons. In 1997, the United Nations General Assembly approved and refined definitions for the following categories of small arms and light weapons (SALW):

**Small Arms:** Revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns.

**Light Weapons:** Heavy machine guns, hand – held under - and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft gun and recoilless rifles, Portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, Portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems and mortars of caliber less than 100 mm.

**Ammunition and Explosives:** Cartridges (rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, anti-personnel and anti-tank grenades, land-mines, mobile containers with missiles or shells for single action and anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems and finally explosives <sup>[3]</sup>.

A similar definitive explanation is given by the year 2001 *Small Arms Survey*, covering both military-style and commercial firearms (handguns and long-guns) however, the *Survey* uses the terms, Small Arms, Light Weapons & Fire arms interchangeably. For unless otherwise noted, there is no distinction to be made between commercial firearms (e.g. hunting rifles), and small arms and light weapons that are designed for military purposes (e.g. assault rifles) <sup>[4]</sup>. Chris Smith of the North-South Defence & Security Program at the Centre of Defence Studies, King's College defines *Firearm* as - "any weapon



(including a starter gun), which will or is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; the frame or receiver of any such weapon; any firearm muffler or silencer; or any destructive device" [5].

In contrast to the declining trade in major weaponry since the end of the cold war, global sales of small arms and light weapons remains strong. No organization, private or public, provides detailed data on the global trade in these weapons, in part because of the difficulty of tracking so many transactions (and because of the low level of attention that has been paid to the problem). Reliable estimates of the legal trade in small arms and light weapons put the annual figure between \$7 billion and \$10 billion. A large but unknown quantity of small arms—worth perhaps \$2 billion to \$3 billion a year—is traded through black-market channels. Because data are so scarce, comparing these numbers to those for small-arms exports during the cold war is difficult. But studies in southern Africa and the Indian subcontinent do indicate that during the 1990s the availability of modern assault rifles increased considerably [6].

The use of small arms in contemporary conflicts does not in any way mean that the costs, scope or destruction are at all small. The destruction in Bosnia caused by the mortar war and snipers was seen on television by all. While the existing condition of Afghanistan is the direct result of more than US \$ 6 billion worth of weapons aid (mostly in the form of small weapons) that was sent into the country by a superpower and sympathetic allies through a conduit third country. Such as the CIA sponsored arms pipeline to Afghan Mujahideen, fighting off the Soviet interventionism and Pakistan playing a proactive role of a conduit state.

The effect of proliferation of small arms in the conduit country is also a case study in itself, which is the main focus of our current study. And as mentioned above that most of the casualties in these contemporary conflicts are civilians – i.e. ordinary bystanders in someone else's strategic plan, for every person directly hit, over 20 persons are displaced. The war in Afghanistan alone is responsible for a refugee population of around 4.5 million, which was the fourth of the 18.9 million people under UN care in 1992. At the end of the year 1997 there were more than 22 million refugees and displaced people, and these figures do not include movement of emigrants seeking to escape poor and deteriorating socio-economic conditions [7].

In 1998, in a comprehensive survey of the problem of small-arms proliferation, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted its deepening concerns about this issue, particularly regarding the safety of civilians. As a leading guardian of international humanitarian law [8], the ICRC stated that it was especially troubled by three dangerous trends. First, the group expressed its alarm at the growing number of civilian deaths and injuries—which often reaches 60 to 80 percent of total casualties that occur in modern conflicts. Equipped with rapid-fire automatic weapons, untrained and undisciplined fighters, few of whom know anything about the Geneva Conventions on human rights, either specifically target civilians or fire indiscriminately into crowds, killing and wounding scores of noncombatants, including women and children.

Second, civilians suffer increased pain and deprivation when international relief operations get suspended more frequently because the aid workers themselves have become targets of attack. In the 1990s more than 40 ICRC personnel were killed in Chechnya and Rwanda alone, compared with the 15 who lost their lives in all conflicts between 1945 and 1990 [9].



Third, societies awash in weapons often find themselves caught in a culture of violence even after the formal conflict ends. For young ex-combatants who have known little else besides war, their weapons become a status symbol and a means of making a living, either through individual acts of street crime or as part of an organized criminal operation [10].

By conducting interviews with its field personnel and by analyzing medical data collected during its operations in Cambodia and Afghanistan, The ICRC has been able to document the high rates of civilian death and injury caused by small arms and light weapons; both during armed combat and after the fighting had stopped. In looking at the data from Afghanistan, for example, researchers found that weapons-related injuries decreased by only one third after the civil war ended and that gunshot fatalities actually increased. In many post-conflict societies, up to 70 percent of all civilians still possess military-type firearms; mainly assault rifles such as the M16 and AK-47. ICRC personnel indicate that these weapons are responsible for more than 60 percent of all weapons-related deaths and injuries in internal conflicts—far more than land mines, mortars, grenades, artillery and major weapons systems combined. From El Salvador to South Africa, the story is depressingly similar: years of internal conflict are followed by high rates of social and criminal violence made possible by the easy access to small arms and light weapons.

Proponents of small-arms control have largely abandoned the goal of enacting a single, all-encompassing instrument like the land-mine treaty [11]. When signed in 1997, that treaty seemed a natural model for an agreement that would prohibit most exports of small arms and light weapons. But eliminating all transfers of small arms between states would never receive the support of those countries that depend on imported weapons for their basic military and police requirements. Many states, including China and Russia, also view guns as legitimate items of commerce and are thus reluctant to embrace any measures that would restrict their trade. Accordingly, the favored approach emphasizes a multidimensional effort aimed at eliminating illicit arms transfers and imposing tighter controls on legal sales, along with promoting democratic reform and economic development in poor, deeply divided societies.

The aim of this paper is to examine at length this issue, which is exclusive to no singular country based case study but with a focus on Pakistan. Since Pakistan is a country that shows many of the symptoms which are a characteristic of small arms diffusion into the larger social fabric. Neighboring the forever-turbulent conflict zones of Afghanistan and Kashmir, the conditions within the country have also given rise to a gradual but dangerously spiraling of small arms. The CIA - ISI nexus during the Soviet invasion and the resulting arms pipeline passing through Pakistan. The centuries old flourishing arms bazaar in the north of the country, a perpetual environment of conflict with the neighboring India, Jihad in Kashmir and the culture of romancing with gun by large contributes to the dilapidating human security parameters within the country.

The paper will explore and analyze at length, the nature of threat posed by the proliferation and diffusion of small arms and light weapons and its impact on the overall security of the state. What different policy frameworks for the problem of small arms and light weapons have been identified? Defining what constitutes as Small Arms, Light weapons or Firearms, & examining the concept of small arms and light weapons proliferation. With the focus of our study being on the South Asian case study at large and Pakistan specifically, the paper would review the major sources of S/A & L/W proliferation in the country and its broader socio-political implications. Finally, there will be explored various options and remedial measures to redress this issue. With a growing recognition of the urgent need to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects; Holistic and comprehensive approach at global, regional



and national levels; Humanitarian and socio-economic consequences as a result of illicit trade of these arms in all its various aspects.

## **Small Arms Proliferation in South Asia**

In the case of South Asia and more specifically Pakistan, some very interesting aspects come forth. The source of weapons supply and acquisition has been myriad: ranging from illicit influx, transfer or trade to the local production facilities. Several countries in the region produce SA/LW in the government owned or public enterprise, which are licitly regulated, with India and Pakistan support the most developed weapon manufacturing capacities. But as such the predominant form of acquisition of L/W by the state security forces continues to be the import or foreign technology transfer.

In Pakistan the issue of S/A is that of proliferation, as well as its production (i.e. by indigenous elements) added to this is the problem of culture, let alone a legacy of conflicts. But before taking up Pakistan's case study, let us focus on the two main reasons for the increase in the supply of these weapons. According to Chris Smith,

*(a) The availability of modern light weapons may raise the level of violence.* Implying that if those under attack feel insecure, possession of light weapons – such as assault rifles – could allow an individual or a small group to inflict considerable damage upon a numerically larger group, the majority of which either maybe poorly armed or totally unarmed. However, even if the short-term effect could be self-defence, the long-term consequence might be to limit if not negate other ways of addressing conflict resolution by peaceful means and to start an arms race.

It is possible to imagine a sub-national arms race with both sides seeking types of weapons, which they believe the other side, has already acquired. & This has occurred to a greater extent in Pakistan as well.

*(b) These weapons can change the balance of power between the state and sub-state groups, such as insurgents and drug traffickers and other criminal* [12].

Because of the factor that such weapons can move from one sub-state group to another with considerable speed because of their small size and relatively low cost. If they are available within the region or if a supply line can be established, particularly if funded by outside interests, sub-state groups can rapidly change the balance of power between themselves and the security forces. In some instances, security forces might even find themselves facing weapons that are more sophisticated than those to which they have access.

Examples from within the South Asian Region are that of Afghan *Mujahideen*, Sikh separatists, Kashmiri freedom fighters etc. Even where these groups are unsuccessful in achieving their political or ideological goals they extract a heavy price in terms of measures that the state is forced to adopt to counter their activities.

The region of South Asia has been unfortunate enough to inherit similar patterns of violent conflict. With at least three continuing violent conflicts, Kashmir, Indian Northeast & Sri Lanka. Three cases of societal



violence due to huge diffusion of weapons, Karachi, Pakistan as well as Indian Punjab and the Frontier regions including Afghanistan, and rising political violence in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and now Nepal as well, together with a rise in organized crime overall. Conflict is directly related to the fact that there are some 3 million weapons out of the control of state machinery with more coming in, primarily from Afghanistan, with the South East Asian and international markets beginning to make their presence felt [13]. Where as such, the scourge of S/A proliferation to varying degrees affects all countries of South Asia, Pakistan has been the hardest hit, with the largest concentration of weapons. The source of this being the CIA sponsored arms pipeline to Afghan fighting militia through Pakistan in the 1980s. Secondly, where the Frontier region of Pakistan or the Darra Bala as commonly known is the *Main Open Arms Bazaar*. A number of underground arms bazaar are apparent – Cox Bazaar (Bangladesh), in areas outside major urban centers such as Mumbai, and Delhi and a growing pipeline coming in via Nepal and Myanmar. In short, the issue of light weapons is one that is common to all states in the region and not limited to India and Pakistan alone.

The South Asian region seems to be progressing along two contradictory paths. On the one hand, it is perceived as a vibrant, multi-religious and multi-ethnic society that has by its very diversity and size, the potential to grow into a formidable economic and cultural pole of power and influence. On the other hand, this potential is being eroded from within and without by an unprecedented spread of light weapons that has transformed religious diversity into a maelstrom of violence, communal fraction and pushed ethnic differences into a bloody and unrelenting conflict [14]. Simply put, the availability of small arms and light weapons has weaponized societal discontent and empowered a variety of non-state actors of all kinds. Facing them, the police and Para-military forces, often let loose a reign of terror under pressure to retrieve the situation. Caught in between these two factions, i.e. one state and the other non-state are men, women and children who want no part of either but suffer the most of the casualties.

In a study conducted on the pilferage and trafficking of Small Arms, Brig. Shahidul Anam Khan regards the end of the cold war and transformation of the world order as the main cause behind the easy flow, availability and trade of these weapons at illicit level [15]. The reason being that in this transitional phase, Europe, North America and Asia unveiled their huge arms stockpiles, creating a glut in the world arms market of used but quite modern weapons. This gradually put pressure on cash-poor countries – such as the former Soviet Union & Eastern European countries – to sell their surplus. Not all of these transactions however were done officially. Arms were also sold illegally, ensuring light weapons delivery around the world through the black market, secret government- to- government deals and the sponsorship of sub-state groups.

### **Sources & Incentives for Light Weapons in Pakistan:**

The motives for which suppliers and recipients engage in transfers may be mixed. Suppliers may have political agenda or commercial motives or a mix of the two. In particular reference to Pakistan, the predominant form of acquisition of weapons by security forces as well as non-state actors continues to be through;

- Imports or foreign technology transfers [16].
- The availability of light weapons in other parts of South Asia partly reflects the onward shipment of weapons originally intended for use in Afghanistan.



- A major source of weapons purchase, proliferation and production is the centuries old Darra Bara, which was once regarded as a cottage industry but has now become a huge industrial enterprise, free of governments control and taxation policies. The private gun-manufacturing units of Darra have a production capacity of not less than a hundred AK 47s per day. Proud of their skill, the gunsmith of Darra Adam Khel and Landi Kotal, as well as those scattered around Peshawar, certain parts of Balochistan and Afghanistan are proficient enough to manufacture any kind of sophisticated firearms, which are much cheaper in rate <sup>[17]</sup>.
- The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ushered in a new era in the light weapons trade in South Asia. Other interested parties also contributed directly and indirectly to *Mujahideen*, such as China (weaponry) and Saudi Arabia (financing). Pakistan became the conduit for this massive military assistance program, with the CIA coordinating the supply of weapons and the Pakistani ISI responsible for receipt and distribution <sup>[18]</sup>.
- Since the end of the Afghan War, the availability of arms on the commercial market has increased considerably and in some cases prices have fallen. For one thing, many Afghans returning to their country after months or years in the refugee camps in the NWFP left their weapons behind in Pakistan.

Based on these sources, the various weapons on sale fall into four categories:

- First, there are weapons that leaked from the US-supported arms pipeline. Following the Geneva Accords, which effectively marked the withdrawal of Soviet occupational forces, US arms supplies actually increased to ensure a Soviet withdrawal. All of these systems, notably the stringers remained in the region after the Soviet withdrawal.
- Second, the stocks of Soviet weapons captured by the *Mujahideen* during the conflict.
- Third, these manufactured by the small-scale producers within the region. This would include both the Darra private gun manufacturers and the state licensed and regulated public arms producers.
- And finally, arms bazaars of NWFP are full of miscellaneous weapons that arrive in the region through extremely circuitous routes – from Vietnam or the Middle East <sup>[19]</sup>.

Chris Smith in his study also taps the Pakistan Ordnance Factory (POF) as a possible source, but the likelihood of any pilferage is very less, given the stringent control measures enforced. In any case, the array of weaponry on sale in the arms bazaars makes the NWFP a unique region in South & Southwestern Asia, with virtually any type of weapons available for purchase without any state regulation.

Although L/W have somewhat always been available in the arms bazaars within the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, such as Darra Adamkhel and Landi Kotal; the major impetus and free flow of modern light weapons increased manifold after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The December 1979 Soviet invasion resulted in Pakistan's proactive support to the various *Mujahideen* outfits engaged in fighting the occupationist forces. This effort was partially driven by its own security concerns but mainly on behalf of the US, which provided material and financial assistance to these Afghan guerillas through Pakistan. The failure or ignorance of the incumbent government of the time to pay adequate attention to this dangerously spiraling trend of weapons accumulation and free flow in the hands of non-state actors aggravated this problem. In spite of the cessation of Soviet occupation, Afghanistan has till recently been bitterly engaged in a Civil War, which has cast very severe shadows on the Pakistani civil society.



Before moving further, the point to be stressed is that when studying weapons proliferation, an important aspect is to keep in perspective the *demand & supply factor*. The motives for which suppliers and recipients engage in weapons transaction may be mixed. Suppliers may have political or commercial incentives or a combination of both. For this reason, excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms is closely related to the increased incidence of conflicts and high level of crime and violence. It is observed that sub-state or non-state forces make extensive use of such arsenal due to its merits of easy accessibility, storage and handling. Insurgent forces, irregular troops and freedom fighters, criminal groups and groups harboring ethnic, religious and sectarian agenda use SA/LW for their particular motives with impunity. Generally speaking the most perturbing aspect of these conflicts is that more than 80% of the casualties are civilian non-combatants - mostly women and children. Irregular forces do not distinguish and, being equipped with whatever type of weapon they can acquire, use them with impunity. A point to be noted is that small arms when used by disciplined, regular armed forces, there is a clear distinction made between combatants and non-combatants [20].

With regard to the manufacture, production and sale of light weapons, we can divide the domestic producers SA/LW in Pakistan into three broad categories:

- The State owned or Public Sector Enterprise.
- Private Manufacturers (operating under state license and regulations).
- The Darra Bara /Gun Making Cottage Industry (which is not under any State supervision).

Fourth, not so domestic a source, but a major perpetuator of weapons proliferation and diffusion has been the neighboring Afghanistan and the corresponding Kashmir freedom struggle. Which has enhanced not only the Demand and supply factor, but has also kept active free flow of weapons between the northwest and northeast of Pakistan and has greatly contributed to weapons problem within the country.

### State Owned /Public Enterprise:

*Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) Wah*, is a state owned weapons manufacturer, which was established in 1950 after partition from India. The main idea behind the establishment of POF was to make the country self sufficient in small arms and ammunition production. It now comprises of 14 plants and 8 subsidiary companies, and employs more than 30,000 people [21]. The company manufactures a wide range of weapons, most, of which are produced under license, including small arms and ammunition, as well as medium and heavy artillery and anti- tank weapons. In 1986, the company was reported to employ some 40, 000 people and to have military exports of \$30-35 million annually, with a stated goal of \$150 million per year in the near future [22]. Small arms manufactured under licensed production agreements include Heckler & Koch's G3A3 and G3A4 assault rifles, MP5A2 and A3 sub-machine guns and P7M13 pistol. In addition, the POF reportedly manufactures Rheinmetall MG3 machine guns and Royal Ordnance Factories' 105 mm anti-tank ammunition as well as anti-personnel land mines [23]. POF has exported arms to a number of countries, such as France, Morocco, Sri Lanka, the Gulf States, Philippines National Police, Kenya, and South Africa [24].



All of these items are produced under license with a very stringent control mechanism and maintenance of complete record. The items thus produced are not only ISO 9001 certified, but also come under strict export regulations under the government's *Statutory Regulatory Orders* (SRO- 123/ 124 of February 1998). Carrying out correct marketing procedure and purchase enumeration both at the receiving and purchasing end is also properly overseen. Besides the POF, items such as anti tank systems and ammunition, anti-personal & anti-tank landmines, explosive devices, multi barrel rocket launchers etc. are also manufactured at the *Kahuta Research Laboratory (KRL)*, an independent entity under state control.

As such, not being a profit based entity; the principle reason behind establishing POF was to provide the Pakistani military a weapons production facility, so that its dependence on foreign sources is minimized. Thus as mentioned above, the revenue generation criterion does not find much relevance in this case. The point to be noted here is that due to a limited demand, POF's full production capacity is not being properly utilized. The factories end up producing only what is required by the principle client, the Pakistani military, and this of course is quite restricted in scope given the ammunitions production capacity which is not more than US \$ 70 million [25]. These ordnance factories hold reserve stocks and repair facilities for the normal wear and tear.

This insufficient demand –supply relationship has an adverse effect on the financial viability of the POF. Not only are its production potentials left unutilized; the enterprise fails to compete effectively both at the international and domestic procurement level due to a host of reasons. To overcome this aspect, from the entire gun manufacturing facilities, POF remains the only outfit, which is allowed to export its products. These exports include anti tank ammunition as well as infantry equipment and the sales also cater to the domestic market but in a very limited manner.

### **Licensed Production Agreements, (LPAs) [26]**

Besides producing armaments for the Pakistan military, in the last decade or so, the POF has also entered into *licensed production agreements* with few countries, of which the agreements with German arms manufacturing firms are most important [27]. Through the LPAs, the POF either "buys" the contract, or provides end user certification to such arms shipments. According to Lora Lumpe, in her book, 'The Running Guns' [28].

In a 1992 interview, a Pakistani arms manufacturer was surprisingly frank in revealing one reason for establishing licensed production agreements with POF. According to him, POF, which had long maintained ties with German arms manufacturers, had recently begun providing a new service, end use certificates to cover German shipments to Kuwait. Arms exports to middle east are illegal under German law, and have frequently aroused controversy. By going through Pakistan -- a legal destination, many German companies had found a convenient route to enter the Middle East market. Some of Germany's largest weapons manufacturers had granted production licenses to the POF, so sales to Pakistan did not raise problems in Bonn. The article also described another variation of the end-user scheme in which German companies would negotiate a contract with a Middle Eastern client, then hand it to POF for the actual deliveries, in essence 'selling' their contract to the Pakistanis.

From 1960 to 1999, 14 countries established small arms and ammunition licensed production agreements with some 46 countries [29]. A 1995 report estimated that licensed production was taking place in at least 21 developing countries, 16 of that were also exporting the small arms they manufactured. These



countries included Brazil, Chile, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, North and South Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and Turkey [30].

#### **Private Manufacturers:**

Second in line are the private manufacturers who operate and produce certain non-prohibited bore weapons under license. The organized legal arms manufacturers are limited in number, and are concentrated mainly in the province of Punjab and Karachi. Although the licensing requirements restrict the manufacturers from producing anything other than the exact configurations of the armaments; the main incentive or motivation for the private enterprises is to generate profit. A task that becomes increasingly difficult in the above mentioned restricted business environment where on the one hand these guns manufacturers are constrained by license regulations and on the other they are provided with no incentives and are also heavily taxed by the government.

Because of the licensing requirements, these private entrepreneurs are forced to continue with the production of the same items whether or not they have any market demand. This proves to be an extremely cost-intensive effort and, in a bid to cover production cost as well as to maintain a proportionate profit level; these manufacturers not only use sub-standard material but are also involved in unauthorized manufacturing. Accordingly, in many cities there are few or no licensed manufacturers, but there are found many dealerships and repair license holders. The end-users in this regard are usually sub-state actors or outfits that purchase these items for coercive activities [31].

#### **The Darra Bara or Gun Making Industry:**

The illicit gunsmiths of India are poor cousins when compared to those of DAK. Darra is the heart of Pakistan's notorious arms bazaar, and it is here that one can acquire practically any small arm desired, and at a low cost: Kalashnikovs, M-16s, Uzis and even guns hidden in walking sticks and ballpoint pens. Some are originals left over from the war in Afghanistan, others are copies made in back-alley workshops, repaired originals, or copies made from cannibalized parts. Often the only difference between the original and the local designs is that locally manufactured barrels are made from inferior quality of metal. Original AK-47s sell for about US\$320, but an identical copy starts at US\$50 [32]. The Darra gunsmiths are famous for their skills and expertise, which they have passed down from father to son for generations and are known for their ability to produce any kind of weapon under implausible conditions. Although these artisans do not have any formal technical training but have inherited the skills and have the ability to copy and make almost any kind of light weapon. Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, they produced mainly rifles and shotguns, in addition to a wide range of pistols. Now they are adept at producing authentic copies of any light weapon desired in a matter of days. They have been known to make imitation Chinese laser-sight pistols and Japanese pen pistols down to the finest detail [33]. Some of Darra's older craftsmen have also invented their own designs, for example a shotgun that works like a revolver, with a chamber holding six shells [34]. Unlike the previous two categories of gun manufacturers, the Darra gunsmiths base their business on the demand and supply notion and are extremely vigilant of the prevalent market trends and demand factors.

Not only this, the Darra gunsmiths are keenly aware of the market trends. At one time, they supplied the Afghan *Mujahideen* in their struggle against Soviet occupation. Now they are the main suppliers of guns to Kashmir and to Pakistan's troubled provinces of Punjab and Sind. Darra's shops and factories offer home delivery anywhere in the country, and are known to have also sold arms to guerrillas from Northern Ireland and the Middle East [35].



As mentioned above, the arms bazaars of DAK and Landi Kotal in NWFP are famous for the production of LW for centuries. Both a colonial as well as a Cold War legacy, these traditional grey areas gained increased salience after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This brought forth a new dimension to LW manufacture and production in this area—the unabated and immeasurable proliferation and inflow of illicit and illegal arms. Before the Soviet incursion, Darra used to produce mainly 9 mm rifles, shotguns and pistols ranging from 0.22 to 0.32 caliber, etc. The Darra manufacturers are now adept at producing very authentic copies of Kalashnikovs, bazookas, and even rocket launchers, etc. With regard to the illegal and illicit trade and manufacture and leakage points, this industry and the surrounding tribal belt is of most relevance.

One important characteristic of Darra and its various manufacturing units is that it is an unorganized, unlicensed enterprise, free from any state licensing, regulation and tax requirements. It is a part of NWFP's tribal belt where no formal state law has been accepted or applied, and the tribal authority, or what is better known as the *Jirga*, mediates and enforces justice, law and order. The government also cannot do much about the production/sale of weapons here, because the state laws do not have jurisdiction over the tribal areas—even the British couldn't establish their writ there. The government can only check the in-country movement of arms from that area, which is indeed a very challenging task.

Arms purchasers are attracted to the Darra Bara because the manufacturing cost of weapons made here is relatively low compared to the state-regulated gun making sectors and ready availability of a wide variety of weapons with so much pilferage taking place across the border. As mentioned earlier, Darra is free from state regulations, and restrictions plus the major source of raw material is made locally available. The main features of the weapons made at Darra whether *locally* or through *conversion* (i.e. putting together foreign-made components taken from different weapons) are they are low in cost, and thus do not have a high mark-up; there is still margin left wanting for better quality control.

These arms bazaars of Pakistan are perhaps the best-known example of small-scale production of SA. Hundreds of one-room operations manufacture copies of AK-47s and other rifles and pistols. Individual craftsmen manufacture small numbers of weapons, with a pistol taking three days and an AK-47 between seven and ten days. But because there are many hundreds of such arms sellers, the overall production figures run into thousands of weapons [36].

Most homemade production of SA is unauthorized, if not illegal, from the point of view of the state in which it occurs. In some cases, however, the state itself engages in unauthorized SA production by reverse engineering another country's or a company's product, or by exceeding its permissible licensed production quota. Such production is illicit in that the owner of the original product has not given permission for production, but the manufacture of such weapons is often undertaken by state-owned companies or by private companies that are authorized by state agencies.

### **The Afghan Factor:**

Today it is widely recognized that Afghanistan is the world's leading center for unaccounted weapons, with at least 10 million in circulation within the country. The Afghan war against the Soviet Union was long and brutal, as was the civil war that followed. Even so, it is not easy to reconcile such an estimate



with a total population of only about seven million Afghani men aged 18 to 52, especially considering that this figure also includes millions of Afghani men still living in Iran and Pakistan.

The super powers, China, and their allies delivered large quantities of light weapons ranging from land mines, to surface-to-air missiles. These deliveries were mainly to non-state combatants in civil and regional conflicts throughout the cold war. Throughout much of the cold war, the US government engaged in covert political and military operations, including secret arms supply to state and guerilla forces, authorized under the National Security Act of 1947 [37]. The use of small arms and light weapons supply increased during the late 1970s, when black lash against the Vietnam War made direct US military engagement an unacceptable policy option for reversing several revolutionary governments that emerged at the close of the decade. Although the policy of military aid to anti-Soviet insurgents is known as *Reagan Doctrine*, in fact Ronald Reagan was building on initiatives of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, in arming guerilla movements against the governments of Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua.

The Reagan Government's Afghan policy emphasized arming multiple resistance groups known collectively as *Mujahideen* in order to draw Soviet Union into a costly and damaging war for control of Afghanistan. This case is unique among the Reagan Doctrine cases in that the administration and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had an unambiguous green light from Congress to arm the insurgents. As a result, the full extent of the program did not require concealment, as was the case with arms supply to groups in Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua. Unlike the latter cases, which used covert delivery systems to hide war making from Congress and the public, the arms pipeline to Afghanistan relied on channels with little accountability because of preconditions set by the intelligence and military services within Pakistan. Which served as the primary staging ground for the fighting groups and which did not want to be seen as engaging in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Soviet tactics required Afghanistan's Mujahideen to wage a ground war while defending against helicopter, airborne and bombing attacks. The guerrillas received aid to wage these wars in two stages: 1979-1984 and 1985-1989. During the first stage, the Mujahideen operated with weapons that were on hand before the invasion - arms pilfered from Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and Soviet stocks and small amounts supplied through China or the Pakistani pipeline. Significant external supply began in 1985-6 and permitted the guerrillas to upgrade and expand their arsenal.

Few guerrillas had sophisticated weapons of any kind at the time of Soviet invasion in December 1979. One analysis suggests that many fighters had little more than bolt-action Lee Enfield .303 rifles, while a much smaller number had AK-47s or Pakistani supplied FN-FAL assault rifles. The insurgents came into large supplies of light weapons as a result of the upheaval in the DRA military during 1980 and began receiving arms through the Pakistan pipeline the same year. By 1988, the Mujahideen arsenal reportedly included AK-47s, AK-74s, SKS 7.62mm rifles, Iranian 7.62mm G3 rifles, 9mm Sten guns, Shotguns, Chinese made Type - 56-1 assault rifles and light machine guns (7.62 mm RPD and RPK, the 7.262 mm PKM, and older Czech weapons). Initially the US supplies were restricted to replicas of Soviet weaponry, such as SA- & and SA -9 SAMs, until 1985. And these shipments were arranged through various routes such as Turkey or Egypt, in order to further mask US involvement [38]. Also that China acting on its own interest in countering Soviet influence eventually emerged as the main supplier of missiles to guerrillas over the course of war [39].



The plan went into high gear in 1986, when CIA chief William Casey took three significant measures. The first was to convince Congress to step up the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan by providing the *Mujahideen* with U.S. advisors and U.S.-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles to shoot down Soviet planes. The second was to expand the Islamic guerrilla war from Afghanistan into the Soviet Republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, a decision reversed when the Soviet Union threatened to attack Pakistan in retaliation. The third was to recruit radical Muslims from around the world to come and train in Pakistan and fight with the Afghan *Mujahideen*. The Islamic world had not seen an armed jihad for centuries. & The CIA was determined to create one, to put a version of tradition at the service of politics. Thus was the tradition of jihad-of a just war with a religious sanction, nonexistent in the last 400 years revived with U.S. help in the 1980s. In a 1990 radio interview, eminent scholar Eqbal Ahmad explained how "CIA agents started going all over the Muslim world recruiting people to fight" [40].

With Pakistan's Zia-ul-Haq as America's foremost ally, the CIA advertised for, and openly recruited, Islamic holy warriors from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Algeria. Radical Islam went into overdrive as its superpower ally and mentor funneled support to the *Mujahideen*, and Ronald Reagan feted them on the lawn of the White House, lavishing praise on "brave freedom fighters challenging the Evil Empire".

This is the context in which a U.S./Saudi/Pakistani alliance was forged, and religious Madrassahs were turned into political schools for training cadres. The CIA did not just fund the jihad; it also played "a key role in training the *Mujahideen*." The point was to integrate guerilla training with the teachings of Islam and, thus, create "Islamic guerrillas." The Indian journalist Dilip Hiro (1995) explained:

Predominant themes were that Islam was a complete sociopolitical ideology, that holy Islam was being violated by (the) atheistic Soviet troops, and that the Islamic people of Afghanistan should reassert their independence by overthrowing the leftist Afghan regime propped up by Moscow [41].

The CIA looked for, but was unable to find, a Saudi Prince to lead this crusade. It settled for the next best thing, *Osama bin Laden* the son of an illustrious family closely connected to the Saudi royal house. Bin Laden was recruited with U.S. approval, and at the highest level, by Prince Turki al-Faisal, then head of Saudi intelligence. This is the context in which Osama bin Laden helped build, in 1986, the Khost tunnel complex deep under the mountains close to the Pakistani border, a complex the CIA funded as a major arms depot, as a training facility, and as a medical center for the *mujahideen*. It is also the context in which bin Laden set up, in 1989, al-Qaeda, or military base, as a service center for Arab Afghans and their families. The idea of an Islamic global war was not a brainchild of bin Laden; the CIA and Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) hoped to transform the Afghan jihad into a global war waged by Muslim states against the Soviet Union. Al-Qaeda networks spread out beyond Afghanistan: to Chechnya and Kosovo, to Algeria and Egypt, even as far as Indonesia.

The United States and Saudi Arabia funneled some \$3.5 billion into Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghan war, according to Milt Bearden, CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989. "Jihad," along with guns and drugs, became the most important business in the region. The business of "jihad" -- what the late scholar Eqbal Ahmad dubbed "Jihad International, Inc." -- continues to attract foreign investors, mostly wealthy Arabs in the Persian Gulf region and members of the Pakistani Diaspora. (As World Bank economist Paul Collier observes, Diaspora populations often prolong ethnic and religious conflicts by contributing not only capital but also extremist rhetoric, since the fervor of the locals is undoubtedly held in check by the prospect of losing their own sons).



The Afghan jihad was the largest covert operation in the history of the CIA. In fiscal year 1987 alone, according to one estimate, clandestine U.S. military aid to the Mujahideen amounted to 660 million dollars—"more than the total of American aid to the contras in Nicaragua". Apart from direct U.S. funding, the CIA financed the war through the drug trade, just as in Nicaragua. The impact on Afghanistan and Pakistan was devastating. Prior to the Afghan jihad, there was no local production of heroin in Pakistan and Afghanistan; the production of opium was directed to small regional markets. Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics at University of Ottawa, estimates that within only two years of the CIA's entry into the Afghan jihad, "the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands became the world's top heroin producer, supplying 60 percent of U.S. demand." The lever for expanding the drug trade was simple: As the jihad spread inside Afghanistan, the Mujahideen required peasants to pay an opium tax. Instead of waging a war on drugs, the CIA turned the drug trade into a way of financing the Cold War. By the end of the anti-Soviet jihad, the Central Asian region produced 75 percent of the world's opium, worth billions of dollars in revenue.

Afghan Mujahideen are best known for their use of shoulder-launched missiles, becoming practically synonymous with *stinger* missile systems. But the Afghans had been using a range of surface-to-air missiles long before the first 150 stingers arrived in summer 1986, which represented only a small portion of the missiles they employed to counter Soviet airpower [42]. This Congressional approval to transfer of stingers to the Mujahideens was not, without its share of controversy. CIA expressed serious reservations about the security of weapons, the ability of the recipients to use the weapons successfully and the precedent of providing state of the art weapons to such groups. That is one reason that the quantity of missiles and chain of transfer was relatively restricted. After the Soviet withdrawal the Stingers were allegedly used in other conflicts and ultimately became the focus of a highly publicized but futile US effort to collect the missiles and bring them back home.

The arms pipeline to the Mujahideen leaked significantly. By the time the weapons reached Mujahideen field commanders, they had been loaded and off-loaded at least fifteen times while transported over the distance of several thousand kilometers by trucks, ship, trains, and pack animals. How many weapons leaked out of the pipeline is unknown, but the estimates run into millions of unaccounted for weapons [43]. One glaring proof of this is the April 1988 *Ojhri* camp blast in the Rawalpindi metropolis, which claimed not less than 100 civilian lives. Although no official version of the inquiry conducted came out, it is generally speculated that the blast was engineered to cover-up for the undelivered and hoarded weapons, and there is also a major link between this incident and the Iran – Contra scandal.

Another contributing factor, however diminutive, is that Afghans returning to their country after months or years in the refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province have left their weapons behind in Pakistan. This again forms a cause for weapon proliferation. The interesting paradox is that under the Geneva Accord, it was agreed that any surplus weapons that were left off the pipeline would be handed over to the Afghans, and interestingly there was a frantic arms transfer to Afghanistan, before the agreement came into effect. All know what became of those weapons. Most of these were smuggled back into Pakistan and sold in arms bazaars of the tribal area.

Besides, Afghanistan has a significant number of small arms manufacturing units. The trade of these arms is a ready source of income for the war ravaged Afghan population. With a long porous border that stretches the entire Pakistan-Afghanistan belt, coupled with corrupt and inefficient border control forces, the mechanism fails miserably in effectively checking and curbing the inflow of not only weapons, but other forms of smuggling as well. This has made the availability of arms in the commercial market



considerably high and in some cases prices have fallen, attracting buyers from all over the country and region to purchase unlicensed weapons.

### **Negative Fall-Out of Small Arms Proliferation for Pakistan:**

As regards the *Leakage* of these illicit arms, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan ushered in a new era in the light weapons trade in South Asia, because of which millions of tons of military material including SA/LW were imported into the region. Other countries also contributed in one way or another by providing the warring Mujahideen, with direct or indirect assistance both in material and finances, for example China wary of Soviet designs contributed weaponry, where as Saudi Arabia came forth with financial assistance. As a front line ally, Pakistan became the conduit for this massive military assistance program, its top Intelligence outfit, ISI, managing the receipt and distribution & the American CIA coordinating the supply of weapons. With a bitter Vietnam experience still fresh in memory, the United States, at least initially, did not want to be seen as providing direct military assistance for the Mujahideen, and for this reason massive amounts of arms were purchased from the Chinese government. Interesting trends could be witnessed in this undercover arms pipeline; the CIA would procure through Egypt large amounts of antipersonnel mines originally produced in Italy. During this time period weapons even of Israeli and Indian makes could also be found in circulation. The CIA would then arrange for the arms to be either flown to Islamabad or shipped, via Oman, to Karachi [44].

Consequently, once arms reached either Rawalpindi or Karachi, they were handed over to the ISI and ceased to be the charge of CIA. Given the overriding preoccupation with secrecy and non-accountability, extremely poor records were kept of how many weapons were transferred, where, and to whom. At Karachi, for example, port authority accounts were settled in cash, manifests were merely labeled "defence stores" and customs officials were not involved. For this reason, nobody really knows how much weaponry was imported into Pakistan [45].

Pakistan emerged as the fourth largest recipient of US aid in exchange for its role as arms conduit to the Mujahideen. During 1980, Congress appropriated \$ 30 million in covert programs intended directly to aid the Mujahideen and \$ 1.5 billion in overt military and other aid for the government of Pakistan, in exchange for playing this role. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made the US abruptly restructure its previous punitive relation with Pakistan. Precisely for the reason that other than China, Iran and the Soviet Union, Pakistan was the only country bordering Afghanistan through which the US could arrange arms shipments to the Afghan resistance. At the same time, Pakistan could point to legitimate new security concerns of its own, as a result of the invasion. In late September 1980, there were reported not less than 200 airspace violations of Pakistan by the Soviets [46]. In addition to bilateral American aid, the Pakistani government received significant financial input from international agencies, the Saudi government, and other sources.

The arrangement carried substantial financial dividends as well. The ISI demanded and received control over the arms pipeline and the choice of recipients as a precondition for the country's help in channeling weapons to the Mujahideen. Control over the supply lines gave the ISIS enviable access to vast stores of weapons. Between 1979 and 1989, the CIA channeled \$ 2 billion in weapons aid, or an estimated 80% of the agency's covert aid budget to the Mujahideen. The ISI used its role in the pipeline and appropriated for its own purposes between 50-70% of the military resources intended for the Mujahideen. The agency and its partners used the diverted weapons for self-aggrandizement through black market sales. They also retained a portion of the weapons to consolidate their own power within Pakistan's military and civil



society. The diversions were known at that time within the region and within the US but were accepted as an unpleasant but necessary element of the aid program [47].

As a result, the sub-state recipients were able to accumulate stocks of weapons and ammunition sufficient to sustain combat for extended periods after external support ended. Moreover many groups used their protected status as US clients to enter lines of licit and illicit trade through which they are now able to finance wars without external aid. Most lasting is the impact these significant weapons inflows have on entire surrounding regions and the people living there. The Weaponization of the Northwest frontier Province NWFP is legendary, as is the gun violence rate in Lahore. Finally, the Afghan pipeline contributed not only to an ongoing humanitarian crisis and to state and regional instability, but it also strengthened a global network of fundamentalist, virulently anti-western - and in particular anti-American sentiment.

With regards, drugs and opium trade, the effect on Pakistan was devastating. To begin with, the increase in opium production corresponded to an increase in local consumption, hardly an incidental relation. The UN Drug Control Program estimated that the heroin-addicted population in Pakistan went up from nearly zero in 1979 to 1.2 million by 1985, "a much steeper rise than in any nation". There were two other ways in which the Afghan jihad affected Pakistan. The first was its impact on Pakistan's military and intelligence services, which were key to giving the CIA an effective reach in Afghanistan and, more generally, in Soviet Central Asia. The more the anti-Soviet jihad grew, the more the intelligence services, particularly the ISI, moved to the center of governmental power in Pakistan. The Islamization of the anti-Soviet struggle both drew inspiration from and reinforced the Islamization of the Pakistani State under Zia. Second, the more the Afghan jihad gathered momentum, the more it fed a regional offshoot, the Kashmiri jihad. The jihadi organizations were so pivotal in the functioning of the Pakistani State by the time Zia left office that the trend to Islamization of the state continued with post-Zia governments as well.

One region that was most directly affected by the growing availability of S/A & L/W has been the province of Sind, and its state capital Karachi. Though the problems in Sind have been more political than ideological, much division occurs along ethnic lines. Throughout the 1980s, levels of violence in Karachi reached unprecedented and shocking levels prior to Pakistan army intervention in 1992. Although, Sind traces a streak of violence, several analysts from Karachi agree that the dramatic increase in the violence and polarization dates from 1985 to 1986, when weapons from the Afghan pipeline began to find their way into commercial channels.

Dr. Ayesha Agha in one of her studies [48], pinpoints several factors that have affected and in turn been adversely hit by the S/A proliferation and these namely being;

- ◆ Ethnic divisions and bad governance,
- ◆ Rise in sectarianism, coupled with mushrooming of religious schools that took sectarian ideology to the grass roots level, enhancing dogmatic orthodoxy.
- ◆ Lack of social and human development, accompanying fragmentation of Pakistan's Muslim society.
- ◆ Systematic judicial corruption.
- ◆ Very adversely affected economic indicators.



- ❖ Added to these is an additional factor of fragmentation of Afghanistan, rise of Taliban movement, which was followed by an Islamization of arms transfer [49].

Appeasement policies adopted by the political leadership. Awarding various alliance group members with prohibited bore licenses.

The impact of these factors on the overall societal growth and Human security aspect of the Pakistani society was extremely negative. The rising sectarian, dogmatic orthodoxy coupled with easy access and unabated usage of firearms besides instilling deep-rooted fears in the masses brought Pakistan close to being labeled as a terrorist state.

# Pakistan & Deweaponization Efforts

(Salma Malik)

Just as in most other regions of the world, in South Asia only the military firearm inventories were reasonably well understood in the past. The weapons trade seems to be accelerating in the region due to a combination of inter-state conflict - the American led campaign against Afghanistan and the border strife between India and Pakistan - and internal tension - worst in Sri Lanka, but serious enough in Kashmir, Nepal and elsewhere. With sectarian battles and feuding increasingly common in the streets of the major metropolis and much of the countryside as well, small arms proliferation has become one of the country's leading social problems.

In response to the rising social violence and the easy availability of automatic weapons, in the autumn of 2000, the Pakistani government initiated a national Arms control campaign. The main goal of the campaign was to facilitate 'de-Weaponization' through confiscation and prosecution of illegally held arms. Initially owners were encouraged to register licensed weapons. During the second stage owners could surrender illegal firearms over a two-week amnesty in June 2001. Although the number of weapons received was not expected to be great, the hope was that these measures would break the culture of freely carrying Kalashnikov rifles in public and facilitate future police intervention [50]. According to the 1998 census, Pakistanis owned around 2 million licensed firearms. In addition, officials of the Ministry of Interior believe that there are roughly 18 million more illegally held. While there is no reason to doubt the scale of these numbers, they may give a misleading impression of the distribution of small arms in Pakistani society. Much like their counterparts in the US and other countries, Pakistani firearm owners typically have more than one gun. Till recently, firearm ownership was concentrated in a section of the population, such as the NWFP, Balochistan than in Sindh and Punjab. Out of a total population of some 140 million firearms ownership appears to extend to some 4-6 million individual. Compared with the 20 million firearms to be in public hands, the inventories of the armed forces appear to be much smaller. The Pakistan Armed Forces, with a total active and reserve strength of 1.3 million, probably have at least three million small arms of all types.

This arms recovery and deweaponization campaign was unique in the sense that compared to earlier arms recovery efforts worldwide; it was not only very well organized, but also launched by the government. Where as campaigns carried out elsewhere, such as Australia, Balkans, Brazil, Northern Ireland, Latin America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama), Scotland, Africa (Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone & South Africa) have usually been carried out either by the non-governmental sector, the community development organizations, by UN peacekeepers or were merely regional initiatives.

In May 2001, the cabinet approved a *New Arms Control Policy and Action Plan for the Recovery of Illicit Weapons*. Earlier, a ban was imposed on the display of weapons throughout the country in February 2000, while issuance of fresh arms licenses were stopped totally from March 2000.

The main contours of this *Phased Action Plan* for the recovery of illicit weapons were as follows:

- ❖ Pre-Amnesty Phase.
- ❖ Amnesty Period/ Voluntary Surrender of Illicit Arms.



- ❖ Post- Amnesty Phase/ recovery of Illegal Weapons.

### **Pre-Amnesty Phase:**

This phase was initiated through launching of a comprehensive electronic/ media campaign launched on June 01, 2001. This was done in order to create public awareness and motivate masses to surrender their illegal weapons. Before granting amnesty, a massive crackdown was launched, country wide, in which 2576 weapons were recovered while 2272 persons arrested in connection with possession and trafficking of small arms <sup>[51]</sup>.

Along with the media campaign, not only were the issuance of new licenses completely banned, but in this first phase, display of weapons in public was also strictly forbidden.

### **RECOVERY OF ILLICIT ARMS**

#### **PRE-AMNESTY PHASE 30.05.2001 TO 05.06 2001**

<b>Province</b>	<b>No. of Cases Registered</b>	<b>Weapons Recovered</b>	<b>Ammo Recovered</b>	<b>Persons Arrested</b>
Punjab	2180	2162	4836	2179
Sindh	-	118	244	80
NWFP	-	278	28817	-
Balochistan	-	18	137	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>2180</b>	<b>2576</b>	<b>34034</b>	<b>2272</b>

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

### **Amnesty Period/ Voluntary Surrender of Illicit Arms.**

On June 5 2001, an amnesty period of 15 days (i.e. from June 5 to June 20) was announced in which people were asked to deposit their unlicensed/ illegal weapons. The response of the masses according to the Interior Ministry's reports was quite encouraging and during these 15 days more than 87000 weapons were recovered throughout the country. People from the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu & Kashmir AJ&K and Afghan refugees also backed the government initiative and deposited their illegal weapons.



The voluntary surrender of illegal and unlicensed weapons and recovery of illicit weapons by the police marked this phase. A province- wise detail of arms and ammunition deposited voluntarily during this period is provided as under.

## Amnesty Phase from June 06 to June 20, 2001:

Province/ Place	Weapons Deposited Voluntarily										
	Rifles	Shot Gun	Sten Gun	Pist/ Rev	K.K	H- Ger.	Dyn	Carbine	** Misc.	Total Weapons	Ammo
Punjab	7628	12604	131	17839	565	102	-	1627	-	40496	18810
Sindh	266	901	-	1202	77	-	-	-	41	2487	630
NWFP	16085	9000	660	10893	2542	658	12	-	1014	40864	*13207
Balochistan	1281	130	14	563	194	28	1	-	35	2246	36454
ICT	237	156	-	813	28	15	-	22	04	1275	791
<b>Total</b>	<b>25497</b>	<b>22791</b>	<b>805</b>	<b>31310</b>	<b>3406</b>	<b>803</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1649</b>	<b>1094</b>	<b>87368</b>	<b>188762</b>

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

\*7 incl. 577 Heavy Ammo

\*\*Including 26 Rocket Launchers, 83 Repeaters, 497 Pashpasha, 09 Mines, 10 G-3, 17 Danger Machine, 84 Bren Gun, 179 LMG, 03 Missiles, 38 Anti Aircraft Guns, 103 Dagger/ Knives.

## **Post- Amnesty Phase/ Recovery of Illegal Weapons.**

After the expiry of the general amnesty period, on June 20, 2001 Surrender of Illicit Arms act 1991 was enforced in the country. The Crackdown Phase, that commenced w.e.f. June 21, 2001 was successful in recovering close to 25000 weapons, and resulting in the arrests of 9663 people in a two months time. This approximates to about 400 weapons recovered per day, an encouraging figure, which later showed a marked decline.

Besides the ban and cancellation of all prohibited bore weapons, the government also launched a buy Back scheme of weapons and revalidated all weapons issued so far.



## Post- Amnesty Phase

A Consolidated Report from 21. 06.2001 to 24.08.2001.

Province	Raids	Cases	Arms Recovered						Persons Arrested	Challenged	Pending	*** Ammo
			KK/ SM G	Rifle / Sten Gun	Pistol/ Revolver	Gun/ Carb	** Others	Total				
Punjab	4464	5996	71	879	3623	1322	739	6634	5779	1007	5937	23809
Sindh	-	2662	206	428	2916	1769	60	5379	1958	53	-	18433
NWFP	4567	1383	797	4289	3669	2783	594	12132	1659	121	-	192923
Balochistan	79	136	86	123	291	103	158	761	167	1	-	18935
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>9110</b>	<b>10187</b>	<b>1160</b>	<b>5719</b>	<b>10499</b>	<b>5977</b>	<b>1551</b>	<b>24906</b>	<b>9663</b>	<b>1182</b>	<b>5937</b>	<b>254100</b>

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

**\*\* This includes 02 Missiles, 02 AA Gun, 327 Hand Grenades, 120 Dynamites, 25 Rocket Launchers, 70 Repeaters, 97 Pashpasha, 84 Mines, 7 Bren Guns, 35 LMG, 1A A Gun, 1 Danger Machine, 84 Daggers/ Knives, 03 G-3, 05 Mines.**

**\*\*\*Including 226 RPG Shells, 78 Mortar Shells, 565 A. A. Ammo, 11 Shot Gun Shells, 05 Anti-Personal Mines, 02 Anti-Tank Mine, 95 Explosive Fuses, 21 Rocket Fuses, 107 MM, 05 Rockets, 230 Anti Aircraft Gun Rounds, 20 Rocket Launcher Shells.**

## Arms Control Campaign

Statement showing collection/ recoveries of weapons during the entire campaign. (Latest)

Province	Pre-Amnesty Phase	Amnesty Phase	Post-Amnesty Phase (till Oct. '02)	Total
Punjab	2162	40496	12251	54909
Sindh	118	2487	5867	8472



NWFP	278	40864	14073	<b>55215</b>
Balochistan	18	2246	503	<b>2767</b>
ICT	0	1275	79	<b>1354</b>
**FATA	0	279	0	<b>279</b>
*Afghan Refugees	0	1078	0	<b>1078</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>2576</b>	<b>88725</b>	<b>32773</b>	<b>124074</b>

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

A consolidated report of the weapons and ammunition collected from the **\*Afghan Refugees** during the amnesty phase. (June 05 to June 20, 2001)

S. No.	Weapons	Quantity
1.	Rifles	350
2.	Shot Guns	120
3.	Sten Guns	10
4.	Pistol/ Revolvers	368
5.	K. K.	146
6.	H-Grenades	37
7.	Rocket Launchers	3
8.	LMG	5
9.	Bren Gun	4
10.	A. A. Gun	4
11.	Pashpasha	26
12.	Mines	5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>1078</b>
13.	Heavy Ammo	1222
14.	S A Ammunition	8395

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.



Arms and ammunition surrendered in **\*\*Tribal Areas** during the Amnesty Period (June 5- June 20, 2001).

S. No.	Type of Weapon	Quantity of Weapons	Ammunition
1.	Cannons (25 Pounder Russian made)	2	0
2.	12.7 Guns	14	96
3.	75 MM RR	3	138
4.	Anti Aircraft Guns	10	251
5.	14.5 MM AA Guns	4	40
6.	Mortar Guns 81 MM/82 MM/3	62	398
7.	20 MM Mortar Gun	1	0
8.	Rocket Launchers	28	184
9.	MBRL	35	182
10.	SPG-9	11	0
11.	Missiles	23	0
12.	Gun 50 Brouning	3	765
13.	Missiles Long Range	23	0
14.	40 MM	1	0
15.	Bomb Fuses	48	0
16.	Mines	8	0
17.	Zaraki	3	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>279</b>	<b>2055</b>

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

### **Weaknesses:**

Following weaknesses have been noticed during the campaign:

- ❖ Slow and unsatisfactory trend in recovery during the Post-Amnesty phase, casting shadows on the resolve of the government and the fate of the campaign.
- ❖ A total of 10187 cases had been registered during the post-amnesty phase (till August 2001) but regrettably to date there had been no convictions.
- ❖ So far 9663 persons have been arrested of which 1182 culprits have been challaned. In other words, this means that 8481 persons are either pending investigation or trial.



- ❖ All weapons surrendered during the Amnesty period were supposed to be transported to District Headquarters for proper stock taking by Joint Teams comprising DMTs, Police and District administrations. Completion reports are still awaited.
- ❖ No high priority target raids have been conducted so far.
- ❖ There is a marginal difference in routine recovery of weapons and recovery during the post amnesty phase. (165 weapons/day in routine while 400 weapons/day in Post amnesty).
- ❖ The confiscated weapons and ammunitions were to be handed over to the police, and then systematically destroyed. So far there has been reported only one such destruction, which brings up the question that such confiscated weapons, if not properly stockpiled, are being mishandled and misused by law enforcing agents themselves.
- ❖ There appears to be no efforts made to curb the production/ manufacture and pilferage of weapons from its principle source, i.e. the tribal belts and the Darra arms bazaar.
- ❖ Finally, there has not only been a lift in the ban on the import of firearms from different manufacturing countries, but it has also been made a part of the trade policy for the year 2004-2005 <sup>[52]</sup>.

## Recovery of Illicit Arms - Post Amnesty Phase.

### A Consolidated Report from 21.06.2001 to 06.11.2002

Province	Arms Recovered						** Ammo	Police Action/ Conviction State							
	K Kov/ SMG	Rifle/ Sten gun	Pistol/ Revolver	Gun/ carbine	* Others	Total		Raids	Cases/ FIRs	Arrested	Challaned	Cases Disposed			Pending
												Convicted	Acquitted	Total	
ICT	10	60	327	14	52	463	3203	0	443	0	0	0	0	0	443
Punjab	845	11168	43078	15798	1354	72243	238519	42515	47827	46597	7414	3637	390	4027	40413
Sindh	537	700	7752	2613	393	11995	44244	8	8402	9387	430	0	0	0	7972
NWFP	3099	6598	14865	5924	1788	32274	814156	10360	7542	50481	435	0	0	0	7107
Balochistan	288	353	335	70	1434	2480	152744	86	139	119	78	2	2	4	61
Grand Total	4779	18879	66357	24419	5021	119455	1252866	52969	64353	106584	8357	3639	392	4031	55996



Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

*\*This includes 04 Missiles, 03 AA Guns, 624 Hand Grenades, 966 Dynamites, 60 Rocket launchers, 200 Repeaters, 100 Pashpasha, 92 Mines, 33 Bren Guns, 123 LMG, 1 Danger Machine, 120 Dagger/ Knives, 03 G-3, 05 Mines.*

*\*\*Including 231 RPG Shells, 562 Mortar Shells, 565 AA Ammo, 11 ShotGun Shells, 05 Anti-Personal Mines, 30 Anti-Tank Mines, 99 Explosive Fuses, 22 Rocket Fuses 107MM, 440 Anti Aircraft Gun Rounds, 565 Rocket Launcher Shells, 18 Mine Shells.*

## Arms Recovery Campaign- An Analysis.

Province	Routine Average Recoveries			Deposit in Amnesty Phase			Recoveries in Post Amnesty Phase		
	Total in One Year	Per Day Recovery	% Age	Total in 15 Days	Per Day Deposit	% Age	21 July to Aug. 31.		
							Total in 72 Days	Per Day Recovery	% Age
Punjab	29168	80	57.7%	40496	2699.7	46.35%	7285	101.18	27.8%
Sindh	6286	17	11.8%	2487	165.8	2.84%	5505	76.45	21.01%
NWFP	17183	47	32.2%	40864	2724.2	46.77%	12633	175.45	48.21%
Balochistan	4777	2	0.89%	2246	149.73	2.5%	776	10.77	2.96%
ICT	250	0.68	0.46%	1275	83	1.45%	0	0	0
<b>Pakistan Total</b>	<b>53366</b>	<b>164.2</b>		<b>87368</b>	<b>5824.53</b>		<b>26199</b>	<b>363.87</b>	

Source: National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior & Narcotics Control, Islamabad.

Ever since the promulgation of the Arms Act 1878, there have been both licit and illicit weapons in the country. This law was able to control the numbers of weapons of both categories; it was never able to totally eradicate illicit weapons. As with all other laws, whether they relate to murder or fraud or other offences, whether promulgated in our country or in any other country, there is never total eradication of the offences but the numbers of offences committed are held in control.

For a little over a hundred years i.e. from 1878 when the Arms Act was introduced up to 1984, the government was able to exercise effective control over the number of weapons in civilian hands in the country. 1984 onwards a process of proliferation is noticeable and this condition aggravated with the passage of each year. Proliferation was initiated with the commencement of a policy under which firearms licenses could be issued generously, prior to that the issue of firearms licenses was tightly controlled. As



this policy of liberalization of the issue of arms licenses continued, an unprecedented large number of licensed weapons were placed in hands of the members of the civil society.

The number of illicit weapons grew in tandem with the number of licensed arms. It is important to understand that there is a close relationship between the number of licensed weapons in the society and the number of illicit weapons held by the same society. As between nations, an arms race commences when one of two or more competing nations adds armament to its arsenal. The new weapons are either purchased legitimately in government-to-government transactions or when such transactions are not possible, armaments are purchased from international gun-runners by the competing nations to maintain the balance of power. The same psychology motivates individuals and groups of individuals; they compete for arms. Liberal licensing policies cause an arms race between individuals and groups of individuals who arm themselves generously with both licit and illicit weapons. Therefore to control illicit weapons, it would be essential to bring an end to the arms race by discontinuing the liberal licensing policy initiated in 1984 and by reverting to the stringently controlled licensing policy, which was in vogue during the preceding 100 years. The enforcement of such a policy would also lend credibility to government operations against illicit weapons.

To appreciate the causes of the proliferation of illicit weapons, it is important to study the liberalized arms licensing policy of the post 1984 period. During this period, the numbers of both licensed and unlicensed weapons increased manifold. The R& D Cell of the Central Police Office in Punjab conducted a study on the subject in 1996. The findings of this study offer an insight into how the policy evolved and its impact on the number of weapons in the society.

The purpose of the R&D exercise was to establish the number of licensed weapons in the province and also to identify the policies, which led to a lax licensing system. The study revealed that in mid 1980s a liberal licensing policy was initiated. Initially members of the Majlis-I-Shura were allowed a quota of the firearms licenses, which were issued on their recommendations by the District Magistrate. This breach once created in the tightly controlled licensing policy continued to be enlarged by various succeeding governments by allocating quotas for firearms licenses to various groups of influential persons such as Senators, Members of national Assembly, Members of Provincial Assembly, Presidents of Chambers of Commerce etc.

In subsequent phases, these quotas were enhanced to meet the escalating demand. Waiving the mandatory requirements for police verification prior to issue of licenses followed this. Waiving police verification had very serious implications, which were probably not appreciated by the government of the time. Police verification besides reporting on the applicants' character, criminal record, financial status, requirements for a fire arm etc. also reported whether the applicant's name, address and parentage were correct or not, besides whether such a person existed or not. With the removal of police verification, it became possible to issue licenses in the name of non-existent persons, i.e. "Benamis." It also became possible to issue dozens of licenses in one person's name, even more seriously the issuing authority could issue licenses to members of terrorist organizations, because they did not have the benefits of police report on the applicants' association/ background.

The R&D Study revealed that a minimum of 1.4 million firearms licenses had been issued between 1981 and 1995 [53]. The actual number is probably much more since the records in the District Magistrate's offices are now poorly maintained. With these developments, the stringent arms control regime prevalent



was more or less destroyed. With this avalanche of licenses, the checks and balances built into the system went into default. The office of the District Magistrate ceased to keep faithful records, this was followed by discontinuation of mandatory returns the DMs were required to send to the Inspector General of Police. Similarly periodic information to the concerned police stations was also discontinued. The discontinuation of these reports on the one hand caused the government to be ignorant of the level of arms in the society, while on the other hand the police ceased to receive information regarding the number and details of licenses issued by the District Magistrate. The police stations were therefore, unable to update their record, which resulted in another breach in the check, provided under the law. Police inspection of dealers and individuals fell into disuse as they had little information on which to base these checks/inspections.

This policy has led to a complete breakdown of the arms control regime introduced by the Arms Act 1878 read with the Arms rules. The laws pertaining to firearm licenses had lost their sanctity. A race had been created between individuals to equip themselves with firearms. If for some reason, an individual could not get a license, either he helped himself to an unlicensed weapon or would approach a big to moderate level arms-dealer/ seller, who would provide them with the necessary documentation in a week or ten days. Another noticeable development was that those who had a licensed weapon would also keep unlicensed weapons simultaneously. Another practice is that of tempering with the markings, engraving the serial number of the licensed weapon on a number of weapons so that they can carry more than one weapon against a single license. This is resorted to especially in the case of automatic and prohibited bores.

Another aspect relates to fire arms dealers and their records. To keep up with the massive demand created by the liberal issue of firearm licenses, the number of dealerships was increased very generously by the provincial governments. Here the record keeping, which is very intricate and provides for cross checks, was largely incomplete and inaccurate enabling the dealers to conduct illicit arms trade on a massive scale. The police conducted raids and checks at Faisalabad, Lahore and Multan where most dealership had to be closed down since they had violated all rules pertaining to purchase, sales and movements of weapons. The Magistrate and Police had over a period of time discontinued inspection of premises. With checks in abeyance licensed arms dealerships had become outlets for gunrunners and a major source of illicit weapons.

The theory that Pakistan was flooded with weapons because of the Afghan War and that we in this country were helpless victims, is not wholly true. The respective governments of the time played a very active role in the spread of firearms in the society. It created a massive demand by initiating a very generous and liberal licensing policy and further compounded matters by relaxing the built-in checks. Various notifications issued by the government confirm this assertion. The net result is that we are flooded with both licensed and unlicensed weapons. What basically is required a reversal of this entire process and rehabilitation of the firearms control regime, and restore the sanctity to arms control laws. That illicit weapons increase in tandem with the licit weapons in the society is clearly established by scrutinizing the number of arms ordinance cases registered by police in which police seize illicit weapons. Figures for the province of Punjab only confirm this assertion. In 1986, the police registered 17000 cases, in 1987, the figure rose to 24000, in 1988 to 33000, in 1989 to 35000. This finally peaked to 46000 in 1990. These cases indicate the rapid increase in the number of illicit weapons. The seizures for 1990 are 300% above the 1986 figures.



In conclusion we can draw several lessons:

- ❖ The government must never create a privileged class; all citizens must be equal before the law.
- ❖ To reduce the number of illicit weapons, it is essential to reduce and rationalize the number of licensed weapons and stringently control future issues.
- ❖ For a successful implementation of the doweaponization drive, there should have been achieved a close coordination between the LEAs and the Intelligence Agencies at all possible levels.
- ❖ An effort to ascertain the volume of weapons being targeted and if possible approximate quantities with various groups.
- ❖ Having assessed the quantities a deliberate intelligence effort be carried out to pin point weapons deposit/dumping area of various militant groups.
- ❖ Based on definite information from credible sources, raids be conducted without creating panic in the entire area.
- ❖ Any campaign that is initiated by the government can never be conclusive nor can the desired results be achieved unless it has complete support and a continued follow up by the provincial governments as well as successive regimes. The doweaponization campaign also unfortunately became a victim of the successive governments' disinterest and gross neglect and utter disregard, thus becoming entirely redundant.
- ❖ With regards to incorporating the arms industries in DAK into legal market, in October 2000, a team of five POF mechanical engineers carried out a study to survey the market. The Chairman POF also visited DAK and discussed the demands of the manufacturers and dealers in greater detail, where- after two sets of recommendations, one at POF level and the other at the Government level were made, which are as follows:

### ***POF Level:***

- ❖ Enroll batches of youth from the Darra in POF on the basis of their educational qualifications and technical skill. This will provide livelihood to few families and indirectly encourage many others to join national mainstream. POF management has already started action in this regard.
- ❖ Reserve seats for technical training of eligible individuals from DAK in POF Institute of Technology on concessional rates, who can then be given employment in different private and public sector engineering industries in Pakistan. POF will take action.
- ❖ Assess possibility of establishing a shotgun rifle factory either at Peshawar or Kohat (in settled areas) as a commercial pursuit under Wah Industries Limited as per laid down rules with the approval of Board of Directors. Locals can be offered to become shareholders. This factory will have most of the technicians from DAK under strict administrative, security and quality controls of MD Wah Industries Limited (POF's commercial window).
- ❖ Prominent Darra manufacturers could register as vendors with POF and be given specific production orders to produce some spares subject to quality checks by POF department.

### ***Government Level:***

- ❖ Ban on the issuance of licenses for shotguns and hunting rifles may be lifted forth with.



- ❖ Special arrangements may be made to introduce Darra arms manufacturers with executives of other engineering industries of Pakistan specially those making medical instruments and vehicle spares. The POF Board can coordinate this as we interact frequently with different chambers of commerce.
- ❖ Ministry of Overseas Employment should be requested to give special preference for seeking employment opportunities for the eligible male members of Darra arms manufacturers. Economic prosperity may discourage them from undertaking arms manufacturing of prohibited weapons.
- ❖ As a goodwill gesture, government should allot agriculture land to the deserving families of DAK to enable them to earn their livelihood from agriculture profession. It may be noted that these tribes are very tough and most suitable for establishing and maintaining farmlands.
- ❖ Some food processing or vehicle spare part manufacturing industrial units may be established in DAK for providing employment to the people.
- ❖ Last, but not least all out efforts may be made to stretch the writ of the government into these areas while granting them desired liberty of action in their own belt according to their customs. For example, they regard civil police as inefficient and most corrupt and they therefore hate to permit their entry into tribal areas. NWFP government may like to make some local arrangements and introduce some innovative system to ensure law and order in these areas without police or with security forces in the garb of Khasadars [54].

Though no official policy has been evolved on above recommendations as far, yet some of these could be considered for implementation after suitable change. A government controlled and regulated factory can be established within DAK where modern machinery could be used for manufacturing quality sports guns and other small arms with better steel and the facility of heat treatment shop and adopting quality control methods. The sophistication thus brought in the manufacture of arms would gradually detract peoples' interest in much inferior arms presently being produced and the owners of the existing units would be compelled to move for modernization under the regulatory control of the government and follow the laid down standards.



# FATA and Small Arms Proliferation A Historical and Cultural Context

(Naveed Ahmad Shinwari)

When Pakistan came into being as a sovereign state in 1947, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was placed directly under the rule of the Governor General through a chief commissioner, who acted as his agent. The province was divided into two areas of separate administrative status i.e. the “settled areas” and tribal areas. Tribal Areas of Pakistan, popularly known as Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), fall under the Executive Authority of the President of Pakistan [55]. FATA includes Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Aurakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan Agencies and six Frontier regions (tribal areas attached to the districts but exclusive of FATA). According to 1998 Census report the estimated population of FATA is about 31,38,000, which is 2.4% of the total population of Pakistan.

FATA lies between the northwestern Himalayan zone and the southwestern chain of the Sulaiman Mountains. As a narrow tract it runs along the river Indus with the parallel lines almost north to south, making a long and porous border with Afghanistan. This tangled hill mass constitutes 27,224 Sq. Km land of the Frontier province, which makes up 3.6 per cent share of the total area of Pakistan [56].

## FATA Administration

Pakistan's Constitution of 1973 gives the President of Pakistan the Executive powers to exercise through the Governor of the NWFP for administrative purposes. Articles 246 and 247 of the constitution deal with the status of FATA. Neither Supreme Court of Pakistan nor High Court of NWFP exercises any jurisdiction authority over FATA. The whole authoritative system of administration that was introduced by the British government is still operative in the area. The entire system of an agency revolves around an individual, the Political Agent. He acts as the executive officer, a judicial magistrate and a collector of revenue at the same time.

The government of Pakistan recently introduced adult franchise in FATA in October 2002 elections. Before the introduction of adult franchise, only the members of the national assembly from FATA were elected through a limited number of Maliks. All matters are adjudicated through *Jirga* (tribal council) and the substantive law is the Pakistan Panel Code whereas the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) is the procedural law.

During the British Raj, FATA served as a buffer zone, however, after the independence of Pakistan in 1947 as a sovereign state, FATA ceased as a buffer zone and were granted a special status to protect their socio-economic conditions. Under the British Raj these tribal areas came under their direct control in 1848. During the 2<sup>nd</sup> Afghan War of 1978 the British government appointed a special Political Officer for Khyber agency and gave it a status of agency. Kurram agency was the second area that was given the status of agency in 1892. A year later, in 1893, a famous Durand Line was drawn between Afghanistan and the British India. At that time the British government had been facing grave threats from the tribal communities. It has made them to introduce more strict and inhuman laws including Frontier Crime Regulation, which is still in practice in FATA. *Jirga* under FRC tries offences of all types in FATA. To determine the guilt or innocence of an accused arrested for any charge, a *Jirga* with the consent of accused is constituted to enquire into the allegation and give their verdict based on *Riwaaj* (local customs and traditions). This council has the power to award penalties but they do not have powers to recommend death penalty even if the accused deserves it [57]. On receipt of the finding of the Council of Elders, Political Agent/Assistant Political Agent may [58]:



- a. remand the case to the Council for a further finding; or
- b. refer the case to a second Council; or
- c. refer the parties to the Civil Court; or
- d. pass a decree in accordance with the finding of the Council or of not less than three-fourth of the members thereof, on any matter stated in the reference; or
- e. declare that further proceedings under this section are not required.

Under the FCR provisions the Political Agent has the powers to demolish any house or building/Hujra used by or owned by the accused for the purpose of crime. It has been seen that the local people cannot construct a building without prior approval of Political Agent. If declared guilty of such an offence, the offender is liable to strict punishment of six months imprisonment, or fine or both. No appeal lies against any decision, decree, order taken by the Political Agent. Review powers rest with the Commissioner who has the powers to scrutinize the case and can revise such orders. The Political Agent has a pool of informers who are paid from his secret fund. These informers provide information to the Political Administration about the good or bad conduct of tribal families, individuals, clans or tribes.

The Malik system was first introduced in FATA by the British government solely for administrative purpose. *Malik* is the most privileged, preferred and influential person of an area or a village. The aim behind this move was to encourage pro-government and pro-administration tribal elders to exercise a strong hold and influence over these tribes. These Maliks work as a medium or agent between the administration and their tribes. This practice is still prevailing. *Maliks* are hereditary and pass to their elder sons. There are also anti-administration *Maliks* who are resolved to work for the betterment of their respective communities, but they are in minority.

In the 1920s, the British government opened strategic roads in different agencies. To guarantee the protection of these roads, the British agreed to give allowances to the tribes in the form of *Khassadaris*. The *Khassadars* are deployed for protection of strategic roads and other government utilities. They also perform guard duty, export duty and protection of various installations. Besides *Khassadars*, Levy Forces also assist the Political administration in all Police functions under the prevailing law in the agency, maintenance of Law and Order situation, check smuggling of narcotics, weapons and essential commodities, watch and ward functions etc. The revenue record of lands is not available or not maintained in the FATA except North Waziristan and Kurram agencies. Only the record of lands under Military compensation is maintained by the agency Patwari (lowest revenue official or village registrar).

### **Tribal Culture and Tradition**

Tribal people have preserved their old culture and traditions coming from generation to generation with slight changes. Tribal society is a set of many characteristics with a relative sense of unity and cohesion. It is based on its inter-clan linkages, which unites families, clans and tribes in the web of their kinship. The family structure is the most complex feature of tribal society that shares family honor, property and intra-familial hate and love relationships. Household structure is alike and is in the shape of fortresses. These forts like houses comprise of 10 to 15 houses within one enclosure and may represent one entire family. Each such family represents a head, who may be the grandfather of several sons and grandsons. In such a manner they make a single large family and represent the same family at every level. Every cluster of houses has *Hujra* (men's sitting and meeting place) where the male members discuss on a daily basis their personal and tribal



issues and spend most of their time over there. *Hujra* plays a vital role in the lives of tribesmen. It is the center of their social life where all types of ceremonies like wedding and funerals are observed and disputes are also discussed and settled here through *Jirga*.

Generally, the parents of the boys and girls arrange the marriages when they are in the age of 15-25. In most cases children are engaged from their childhood by their parents. The society is mainly male dominated and women are not given their due status in decision-making. They are generally strict in their observance of the Islamic custom of *Pardah* – seclusion and veiling of women. The deplorable conditions of women can be judged from the fact that they, confined to their houses, play a very limited and almost invisible role in the entire family structure. Their male family members who make each and every important decision for them decide their fates. Religion plays a vital role in tribal society and in most areas people belong to Sunnites school of thought. They are staunch Muslims and patriotic Pakistani. Hospitality and bravery are the main characteristics of the tribal society.

### **Jirga – A Traditional Conflict Prevention/Resolution Method**

The concept and practice of *Jirga* in Pushtun culture is practiced in Western Pakistan and Afghanistan that has passed from generation to generation in a very traditional manner and it is very difficult for outsiders to understand its entire dynamics unless they understand the mindset of Pushtun community in its entirety.

*Jirga* is a council of elders who are respected community members and are known for their wisdom. In a situation of conflict or dispute the community constitutes a *Jirga* of elders with general consent of the communities or both the parties involved in such a dispute or conflict to deliberate the issue and reach to a consensus according to the local *Riwaaj* (tradition), and Islamic injunctions.

The modern legal system approaches to justice has some strengths yet it has some weaknesses that have been acknowledged by and large. Victims often feel frustrated that justice does not properly meet their needs at the expense of time and resources. Many feel that the process of justice deepens societal wounds and conflicts rather than contributing to healing or peace [59]. On the other hand *Jirga* system is a process to address some of these issues. *Jirga* deals in minor as well as major cases of robbery, burglary, murder, rape, and families and clans and tribal conflicts. In Pushtun societies crime is seen as the violation of Islamic law and then traditional law. Violation of these laws creates obligations and then *Jirga* takes actions. *Jirga* involves victims; accused and community in the process to put things right and prevent further damage. The central approach of the *Jirga* system is to take into consideration the victim's needs and accused party's obligations. In tribal societies victims may feel ashamed and may select retaliation method to revenge and to restore their honor and prestige. This shame may pass from generation to generation and may never end. Both male and female rape victims suffer humiliation for the rest of their lives and the shame may affect their children as well [60]. To prevent such humiliations and making things right *Jirga* system gives offenders a chance for internal healing through forgiveness and security, easing the threat of revenge. Once the accused accepts the obligation and gives his consent to accept the decision of the *Jirga*, a collaborative environment is created for all the stakeholders. The victim, the community and even the offender feel honor in this process. The respect of every stakeholder has to be taken into account so that people then feel that 'justice has been done'. The victim's respect and dignity is also restored as the accused has to fulfill all the obligations put forth on him by the *Jirga*. In such a manner all the stakeholders feel secure and healed in a dignified manner.



### **Character of Tribesmen and the Role of Weapons in Their life**

The inhabitants of North-West Frontier Province including FATA are Pushtuns, who speak Pushtu language. Many writers and historians have different point of views about the origin of Pushtuns or Afghans. Two main theories have come forward regarding the origin, and the history of Pushtuns. One group of writers or historians are of the view that Pushtuns are one of the lost ten tribes of Israel while the other group views that they are the descendants of Aryans. Still researches are underway by different historian and writers to find out the exact origin of *Pushtuns*.

Pushtuns are men of guns through which they protect their honor. Tribal Pushtuns have a code of honor, which they strictly observe and quote with pride under the name of *Pushtunwali*. *Pushtunwali* is their dearest value, which conducts and controls their routine lives, behaviour and attitudes. There are three main obligations of *Pushtunwali*. The first obligation is *Nanawati*, the right of asylum, which compels him to give shelter and protection even to an enemy who comes as an aspirant. The second obligation imposes the right to and necessity for revenge by retaliation, which is called *Badal*. And the last one is *Milmastya*, or openhanded hospitality to all who may or may not demand it.

Sir Wylly writes in his book "The Borderland – The country of the Pathans" about the character of a Pushtun in the following manner;

"Pushtuns are perpetually at war with each other. Every tribe and section of a tribe has its internecine wars, every family it's hereditary blood feuds and every individual his personal foes. There is hardly a man whose hands are unstained. Every person counts up his murders. Each tribe has a debtor and a creditor account with its neighbours, life for life, they consider retaliation and revenge to be the strongest of all obligations. They possess gallantry and courage themselves and admire such qualities in others. To their minds hospitality is the first of virtues. Any person who can make his way into their dwellings will not only be safe but will be kindly received".

The possession of small arms is a common feature of tribal life. The ordinary tribal man views his weapon as an ornament of man and item of personal apparel. This is the reason that a household stove may be kept cold, but the barrel of gun is kept warm. Weapon is also considered as a status symbol and high quality and expensive weapon gives prestige to the owner in his surroundings. It also conveys a message of power and shows their capacity to protect their families, clans and tribes. To know the role of small arms in tribal society it is important to study the state of mind of the tribal society. The use and possession of small arms in tribal society is governed by complex rules of social behavior that reinforce the institutions that maintain the society identity and cohesion. In tribal society strong family bonds and tribal code of conduct formulated through Islamic and traditional *Jirga* system give tribal life structure, meaning, identity and stability. State's modern law and regulations has not been introduced to the tribal areas however, if practiced it would have not guaranteed maintaining stability in family, tribal and inter-tribal relations.

Local people protect their honor from their own tribesmen, other tribes and even from the state. The absence of any judicial system, weak government writ, proximity with the free border, and the culture of small arms possession are the most striking factors in contributing to the proliferation of small arms in these areas. A considerable number of tribal families are involved with family or tribal enmities within their tribes or with the other tribes. This is also a very old practice and it is difficult to state an exact period of its evolution. The word "*Pushtunwali*" (honor) and *Tarboorwali* (enmities) are the main motivating forces which compelled the *Pushtun* tribes in general and tribal areas in particular to carry on the old customs. These enmities are long lasting and may prolong up to decades. In some cases it took almost 80 years in resolving the conflict



between two families or tribes. Owing to the fact that due to the absence of any law enforcing agencies, judiciary system and writ of the government the local people level their scores themselves in these feuds. It has not only forced families to migrate from place to place but also forced them to own more weapons that impede the economic growth of a family, and development of a tribe or an area. Before the Afghan-Soviet War of 1979-89 the local people of FATA were used to keep conventional weapons like shotguns, 0.30 and 0.32 bore pistols, revolvers, 12 Bore, 7 and 8 MM rifles, etc. It was only the Afghan-Soviet War that had paved ways for the proliferation of small arms in these areas. Modern weapon is now an ordinary feature of tribal life and it would be quite difficult to give an exact data however, there is a general observation that each adult tribal man possesses more than one firearm. It can be supported by a fact that each family possesses its own stockpile of small arms for their security and to keep themselves honorable in their surroundings. An average family's combine stockpile may consist of automatic rifles, LMGs, SMGs, AK-47, M 16, automatic pistols, and ammunition. While a well off family may possess more lethal and expensive weapons like rockets, skid missiles, rocket launchers, etc adding to their stockpile. Each family may have more than 30 adult men, keeping in view the family structure of these tribal people. Manpower is considered as a Blessing of God and a wealth as well. A poor family having many male children is considered wealthier than a rich family having less number of male children. Their elders have taught these tribes how to operate the small arms since their childhood. A boy of 10 or 12 years of age can easily operate AK-47.

The distribution pattern of small arms in any society is the result of two opposing forces: people's desire to own guns and the obstacles that prevent weapons from reaching them [61]. Obstacles might include: mountains ranges, rivers and customs posts at some points at the border areas. These obstacles have never stopped the proliferation of small arms in FATA. Demand for weapons may vary from event to event, economic situation, political and strategic consideration and traditional practices in local tribal communities. Strategy of deterrence has been used as mean to communicate a message or threat to a family, clan or tribal adversary in response to actions that the adversary might take. The more weapons the family, clan or tribe has in its stock the more powerful message it conveys to its adversary. In return if the other party refrains from taking actions then they have been deterred. However, it must be noted that, where deterrence works, weapons become a stabilizing factor in inter-communal relations, even though the capacity to do extraordinary harm remains a reality [62]. This could not be the primary reason for stabilizing the situation in the tribal society however; the consequences of people's desire to level their scores can be checked by the local Jirga system that can prohibit the un-regulated bloodshed. Such mass warfare might contribute to the mass bloodshed while people are scared of inflicting mass casualties that could lead to high blood money counting on each head. Tribal people are very well aware that such mass killings would undermine their tribal unity, honor and power. In absence of any agency, which could provide and guarantee human security the local people take the task to protecting themselves on their own and thus obviously there is a demand for weapons. The gun is regarded as the 'fifth religion' of man in these areas.

The exact data about the crime ratio in FATA is difficult to acquire from the local administration however, there is a general observation that the crime ratio of the entire FATA might be less than a single police station of Peshawar district of NWFP. It can be supported by the fact that the Jirga system of tribal society significantly contributes to the prohibition of families, clans and tribes rivalries through a well-formulated code of conduct. As discussed above that these social institutions have strong roots in the tribal society and are well respected by the people. If not respected the consequences would have been very severe and could lead to the demolition of families' properties and their exile. Killing is considered as a very expensive activity which may cost them money as well as material.



### **History of Small Arms & Light Weapons in FATA:**

The specific evidence supporting the large-scale presence of small arms has actually long been available. The presence of small arms in *Pushtun* tribal society is a very old legacy, which owes its existence from several events that took place since ancient times. Khyber Pass, at a 15 km distance from Peshawar, served as the most important place in the history of medieval sub-continent. It has long served as the gateway between North-West Frontier Province and India for trade and for invasion. Since then all the invaders from Alexander to the Mughal King Babar used the famous route of Khyber Pass to Sub-continent and annexed the region to their empires. Because of these frequent invasions and warfare the areas has had a turbulent history. In the wake of the Ghaznavid invasion on India in 11<sup>th</sup> century, the *Pushtun* tribes entered the territory of India. The area was primarily held by *Pushtun* rulers until the invasion and conquest of Babar, the founder of Mughal dynasty who incorporated it into his kingdom in the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In 18<sup>th</sup> century the North-West region became part of the Afghanistan and then in the same century it became part of the Sikh kingdom.

The people of the area were given a very little choice to lead a civilized life but to opt for their self-defense. Most of the time they had to face invaders one after another, which compelled them to possess arms to protect their honor. It is because of this cultural legacy that in *Pushtun* society the people feel proud in possessing and carrying weapons. Tribal people fought little intensity of wars against the British Raaj in different parts of FATA and the area remained one of the most disturbing areas for the British government to be controlled through force.

Keeping in view its proximity with the Afghan border, its history, socio-political context and mindset of the tribal people, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah (father of the Nation) identified a policy for Pakistan after its independence on 14<sup>th</sup> August 1947. He formulated the policy "which was rested on three interconnected assumptions: the fundamental link with Kashmir (which he called "the jugular vein of Pakistan"); a close relationship and interest in Afghanistan which would allow the Pakistan Army to concentrate on the eastern borders; and the dramatic decision to withdraw troops from the forts and garrisons of the tribal areas of North West Frontier Province" [63]. These tribes were given assurances that their customs and laws would be preserved. Thus, these areas have been less controlled or the government has little writ over the entire tribal areas, which ultimately made the situation quite conducive for the wrong doors to carry out unlawful activities like, smuggling, drug trafficking, arms manufacture and transfer, kidnapping, providing shelter to the criminals from the settled areas etc.

However, Afghan – Soviet War of 1979-1989 and the subsequent civil war gave impetus to the proliferation of small arms in FATA region as well as in Pakistan. During this period tribal people were prominent among the members of the Mujahideen, the Islamic Guerrilla Group, that formed to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and opposed the Soviet backed Afghan regime. During this period the long and porous border have seen the massive influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan. Some more than 3 million registered refugees were placed in 386 camps in NWFP and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. The same period of war has not only brought crippling destruction to Afghanistan but it also impacted seriously Pakistan community at large. FATA remained all along a base for mounting war efforts in Afghanistan against the Soviet regime. FATA remained a focus of these war related activities throughout the period and remained a base for ammunition depots; war material supply routes; training camps for Mujahideens and an ongoing influx of Afghan refugees.

The area was strategically important for these reasons. Such a high influx of refugees into Pakistan, a drug and gun culture has contributed badly to the miseries of the local communities. It has not only put pressure on the economy of the country, especially on the local communities, but also disrupted the law and order situation of the province. Besides, FATA was infested with landmines and littered with large quantities of



unexploded ordnance (UXO). The local people of FATA also witnessed USSR forces bombing the area on and off with gunship helicopters and MIG planes.

American CIA shared responsibility for running the Afghan war along with ISI, and each year (1981-88) the former provided \$640 million for Afghan covert operations [64]. The West supplied the weapons in abundance but forgot to demilitarize the Afghan society after the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to some source an estimated 50 - 70% of these weapons remained in Pakistan, finding their way to the hands of some terrorist and sectarian groups and making it a significant source for black market weapons in South Asia. The long and porous border has made the situation very precarious. Small arms have become household items of our society that are easily accessible and at cheap rates. A Russian made hand grenade is available in the black market at US \$ 1.5 to US \$ 3 and one can easily buy a gun of satisfactory quality at the rate of US \$ 50. Local illegal production of small arms in tribal areas has also contributed to the illicit proliferation of small arms in the region (More detailed account of the Afghan factor is already highlighted in chapter – 1 of this research paper).



# Conclusion & Recommendations

(Salma Malik)

This problem can thus be addressed at two levels: *intra-state* and *inter-state*. Individual states must focus on institution building and strengthening systems to eradicate the problem. This in conjunction with inter-state cooperation can deal with the problem. The sinews of conflict - the men, the money and the weapons - all transit neighboring states, mostly without their being able to do very much about it. Clearly, strong action by one state cannot address the problem since the sustenance of the conflict lies elsewhere. For instance, Pakistan has instituted stringent anti-terrorist laws, but the continuing movement of weapons from the conflict in Afghanistan makes such measures impractical to impose. India may police the Northeast with determination, but the movement of men and money through Bangladesh makes this more of a continuous fire fighting exercise, rather than a solution.

A workable and more cogent Dewateronization policy has to be planned at both domestic and regional levels. Regional arrangements could be bilateral or multilateral, and successful measures could be adopted at domestic level as well. These could include:

**Raising Awareness:** about the lethality of these deadly "weapons of civilian destruction," both in the public as well as law enforcement agencies. Bringing up the light weapons problem for discussion at the national level by involving the media, NGOs, religious institutions and politicians. Educational institutions need to be encouraged to form gun free campuses, towns and cities. Strong governmental support for such efforts and high profile media campaigns would assist in spreading the message.

SALW proliferation is a menace that cannot be eradicated without sufficient public support. Thus far, Civil Society actors have not been made a part of the on-going Dewateronization debate in the country. It is recommended that efforts should be made to organize conferences and workshops to bring together civil society actors, stakeholders and officials to share their views and to jointly devise strategies to root out the problem.

Development of NGO activity primarily focused on the issue. The subject has received cursory attention in most countries of South Asia. Establishing an NGO for the purpose that would collect and disseminate information on SALW manufacture, transfers, seized weapons etc. would be a worthwhile exercise [65].

**Exploding the Myth of 'The Cheaper Option.'** States have variously armed each other's militants and dissident elements in an exercise that is clearly seen as an extension of policy by other means (the cheaper option). It is very important to explode these theories and expose them as dangerously short-term measures that are part of the problem rather than the solution.

There is need for a firm commitment by the parliament or the head of state never to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbors and to condemn all such activity would be in itself a confidence building measure. Such a call should not be linked to any other issue to avoid dilution of central message - to stop proliferation of weapons and the wanton killing of innocents.



**Gun Control:** It has been usually observed that under pressure of violence and internal instability nearly all governments have been guilty of loosening gun control laws, as a result of which more weapons enter society aggravating the existing problem. For instance, it was reported that the provincial government of Punjab, tried to end sectarian violence by appeasing both parties involved by granting arms license worth six crore rupees provided each would abstain from violence [66].

An existing agency like the Criminal Records Bureau or the Human Rights Commission needs to be tasked as a watchdog to monitor the licensing policy. This assumes a central data-collating agency that would regularly provide updated information to the public. Standardized data collection is an exception rather than the rule in developing states and this need to be given high priority especially for police functions.

### ***Weapons Destruction/ Control.***

Given that conflict areas yield huge number of weapons, it is vital that these do not re- enter society. Since the type of weapons confiscated are often superior to that within state inventories, these weapons have been used to equip police forces or para -military forces. While this may be acceptable as long as these weapons remain under tight supervision, the other alternative often employed by states is dangerous and gets out of control. i.e. outfitting Irregulars or so called anti-terrorist militias. There is a need for open sources of information on weapons seized and destroyed, besides carrying out of surprise parliamentary checks on such storage sites should be instituted.

With regards legal production, several safeguard measures can be introduced, and some of these that are already in place, be observed more stringently, such as: a proper end user certification, monitoring as well as accountability measures, should not be permitted to states that have a record of violating UN and other international arms embargoes, checking and preventing, unauthorized licensed production by companies and governments. Increased transparency in sales, manufacture and production, raising standards of firearm regulations. An effective and safe stockpile management, along with stringent Marking procedures, besides a rigorous control on state-owned weapons, complemented by a control of international movement of weapons. Enforcement and implementation of regulations by state agencies and authorities, and lastly, but most importantly, to undertake measures to counter demands [67].

### ***Collation and Dissemination of Information:***

Every country needs to "boot- up" its information gathering by Standardizing and disseminating information on When, Where and Why of light weapons diffusion to and from all bodies directly concerned with the menace. This is also a valuable tool for early warning of an impending conflict, since the knowledge of a sudden movement of weapons into a particular area, will send alarm bells ringing in concerned ministries.

### ***Ban Small Arms?***

States need to undertake a serious and objective review of their current laws with the ultimate goal being to ban the manufacture, possession, trade and use of SA/LW except by the military and specified armed police forces of recognized governments. Yet populations have traditionally used small arms by for sports and personal security. Besides advances in technology has made available, weapons of very high rates of



fire and lethality, which are also smaller and lighter and hence easier to conceal. Threat to personal security also rises with the increased availability of same sophisticated and lethal weapons. But if the state is able to regain control loose weapons among civilians, the threat itself reduces and so does the need for citizens to possess such arms for self-defence. Thus a tautology exists which must be broken.

The first step could be made by ensuring that no semi-automatic and automatic weapons are allowed to be held by individuals and groups outside the armed forces of the state, while arms of lesser capability such as bolt-action rifles, could be allowed under a strict licensing system.

### ***National Coordination:***

At present most countries of the world have multiple agencies, which deal with small arms manufacture, trade, supply, licensing, enforcement and accounting. If effective control over all activities relating to arms proliferation is to be maintained, states should bring all such activities under the control of a single agency. While this may not be feasible in most states, at the very least a central national coordination body should function as a sort of clearinghouse for information and action. For example, all decisions and information on imports and exports and the subsequent disposal of small arms should be cleared by this coordinating agency. The establishment of such national small arms agencies - working under strict standards of transparency and accountability - will promote better coordination and cooperation among states at the international level.

### ***Border Management:***

Tighter national control on small arms is a prerequisite to the effective management of small arms proliferation. At the same time, improved customs laws and procedures, as well as improved surveillance of borders, will be required to check illicit cross-border trade and other transnational weapons flow. The rising globalization of trade is increasing the volume and frequency of trade among countries, and the growth of trade within the Southern Asia is likely to accelerate in the coming years. Yet surveillance and monitoring systems and procedures have not kept pace with the requirements of effective trade management. Criminals involved in transnational activities seek loopholes to exploit in order to transfer illicit arms to another country.

Larger container consignments as well as fast marine craft, which facilitate smuggling - are increasingly becoming the routine method of transporting goods. For example, in December 1995, a single civil-chartered transport aircraft delivered a large consignment of modern small arms (including nearly 300 automatic AK-47 assault rifles) into Indian Territory <sup>[68]</sup>. During the 1980s Afghan jihad, large containers carrying weapons of all sorts, from the AK-47s, stinger missiles and weapons of non-western origin would be forwarded by the CIA to the Afghan fighting forces. Improved technology therefore needs to be developed to meet present and future surveillance challenges.

Unilateral measures to improve border management should include a revision of customs procedures and regulations and the establishment of a more capable and extensive coastguard and border security force. Yet, while border management can be improved unilaterally by each state, a cooperative bilateral framework would provide far greater effectiveness. This will require, as proposed earlier, bilateral and multilateral agreements for cooperation under an umbrella agreement, which demonstrates serious political commitment. A cooperative monitoring center also needs to be established to develop appropriate technologies and training for improved border management in the region.



India tried placing security fencing along its western border. For border management by security forces alone runs the risk of their subversion and corruption since the stakes in illicit arms and narcotics traffic across borders are very high. A similar fencing along the Pakistan-Iran border has also been contemplated. However, there are serious difficulties in fencing the borders between Afghanistan and its neighbors or in other mountainous areas of the region. However, post September 11 and the in its efforts to contain and capture Al-Qaida and Taliban warriors and sympathizers, the US did provide the Pakistani rangers with border surveillance equipment as well as helicopters to monitor and curtail border violations [69]. But in any case the costs of fencing and its maintenance are also a relevant factor. UN agencies, international financial institutions and multinational corporations should seriously consider the idea of financing such measures so that economic and industrial activities could operate in an environment of peace and stability.

### ***Developing a Definition and Categorization for Equipment:***

Thus far, the manufacturers and buyers have got away with legal lacunas. Semi-automatic weapons not categorized as prohibited bore are adapted to fit a prohibited bore category weapon. To make things easier, especially from a law enforcement perspective, the government could ban the purchase of all semi-automatic and automatic weapons. These are the weapons that could only be allowed to the specified official agencies or private security firms under intimation to the government.

### ***Development of Domestic Restraint Regime for Private Manufacturers:***

As a starting point, areas could be designated where weapons manufacture is carried out as a cottage industry. Of course, the small-scale and insignificant production cannot be monitored or stopped. Individuals with criminal intent may continue to produce equipment but this problem can be addressed through better policing. However, for manufacturing units in the tribal areas or the NWFP, an area could be specifically designated for such activities. This would make the monitoring of illicit manufacturing easy.

Efforts should be made to bring illicit manufacturers gradually under the official net. Keeping in view the sensitivity of curbing or abolishing illicit manufacture in Pakistan's tribal areas, it would be far more beneficial to develop a clientele relationship with such centers. The idea is for the government to, impose a production quota on these centers, and to purchase these weapons.

In this manner, the production could be controlled without creating a political crisis that could not be handled by the authorities. Once a public sector- private sector dependency is established, Islamabad could slowly reduce the production quota. This will also give the government a chance to observe conditions in the manufacturing centers and devise alternative strategies for economic uplift of the area and its people.

Furthermore, monitoring could be expanded to gathering information and collecting data on the inflow of raw materials. The weapons industry depends on some basic materials such as steel etc. that are procured from various points, mostly in the southern part of the country. While it may be difficult to check or evaluate what is being traded around the country, agencies could develop checkpoints to see what is coming into the areas of production. Along with this, verifiable quota restrictions may be introduced on the production of small arms.



### ***Cooperation & Liaison between Police and Citizens:***

Devolution of security planning to the grassroots level. It must be kept in mind that security is a service provided to the people; however, the state authorities have traditionally monopolized security planning at the exclusion of the subjects to whom the service is provided. From the standpoint of checking small arms proliferation, citizens and the local police could share the responsibility of ensuring security. What is being suggested here is the establishment of small - sized security communes. People elected or nominated from an area could then share the responsibility with the local police keeping their neighborhood clean of illegal weapons. Considering that there may be some practical problems in carrying out this task, ideas such as the Albanian "arms for development," program, and mixing it with this approach. The basic idea is to provide sufficient motivation for people in the area through offering communal rewards in terms of more resources for development of infrastructure, road or school construction if they were to help clean their community of weapons.

One facet of the post-cold war order that is apparent in the most cursory overview is the trend towards greater regionalism. Additionally, and perhaps, not so noticeable, is the slow changing trend of the existing regional arrangements that were once largely economic groupings, that are now being pulled slowly towards handling conflict situations and discussing 'soft security' issues. The objective of a **Regional Approach** is two folds. At the conceptual level, it serves as a valuable confidence building measure. At the operational level, the objective is to pool resources to be able to move faster and to deny "uncivil society" - the gunrunners, drug traffickers and others.

### ***Strengthening Existing Institutions:***

At the same time, existing institutions and mechanisms of regional and international cooperation need to be strengthened and expanded to provide better control over weapons flow outside of governmental jurisdiction. Existing mechanisms in South Asia focus essentially on narcotics production and traffic, money laundering and criminal activities. Very little cooperation has been instituted in the area of illicit weapons manufacture, trafficking and diffusion, although the existing mechanisms and procedures do have an indirect bearing on the problem and could provide a framework for future measures in the area.

A recognition that the illicit manufacture, possession and traffic of light weapons not only undermines the stability of individual states, but also by virtue of its nature, threatens the very fiber of civil society in the international system should go a long way to bringing states to an understanding based on shared interests. For instance, almost all cases of failed states - such as Somalia and Afghanistan - have witnessed an extensive diffusion of modern light weapons into society and hands of warring groups.

### ***SAARC Agenda.***

Therefore, it is vital to bring light weapons up on the forefront on the SAARC agenda. A regional call to eliminate the trafficking of light weapons would do much to assist in pushing the realization that all states, large or small, are equally affected by the threat, in different degrees and in different manifestations. For this purpose a SAARC heads of the state level summit should identify the light weapons threat as a common one, and condemn all such transfers of weapons to non-state actors.



### ***Information Sharing.***

Though SAARC was one of the pioneer regional organizations to put drug trafficking and terrorism squarely on the agenda of co-operation, with SAARC Regional Convention on Terrorism (November 1987) acting as an umbrella instrument, which could have been utilized as much (or as little) as each constituent party wished. The vital core of the Convention, emphasis on Information sharing, is still to be operationalized after more than a decade. Political bottlenecks aside, the main hurdle has been the bureaucratic dislike for information sharing, especially from organizations linked to intelligence.

To bridge these bureaucratic gaps, there can be instituted common training programs for customs, intelligence and police officers. Focused entirely on weapons interdiction and control. Standardize data collection procedures and format. Setting up of a core organization in any SAARC country based on information technologies and their use to counter the fluidity and speed of organized crime. A third regional level measure could be to harmonize gun licensing laws across the region and make them stricter. A SAARC watchdog body would publish information on an annual basis.

The South Asian countries collectively share a large coastline, and with a large percentage of weapons transiting via the sea, there can be explored the possibility for joint monitoring of the coastlines, with mixed crews/ boats, an operation which is routinely followed among European countries. Though this could be restricted to patrol and coastguard boats only, to avoid erosion of security, but given the level of distrust prevalent between the major South Asian countries, it might be difficult to implement.

### ***Demobilization & Reintegration of Former Combatants:***

Nearly all of the major South Asian countries face the problem of demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating former insurgents or combatants. For the lack of such a scheme would inevitably push these ex-fighters into a life of crime and organized violence.

That is why there is a need to start building technical expertise at a regional level in disarmament techniques and demobilization schemes. A regional fund for quick disbursement for demobilization schemes would be a valuable input. Non-governmental organizations need to be identified to take on the task of reintegrating ex-militants.

### ***Cooperative Border Management:***

An independent action as well as part of the CBMs campaign, adoption of cooperative methods for border management (including sea borders) to control the trade of small arms and other contraband items. This forms the second level of cooperation that goes beyond simple confidence building. Here the intent would be to adopt methods for active cooperation. These cannot be adopted without sufficient confidence building or in the absence of trust among states.

### ***Formulation of Cooperative Security Zones:***

A starting point, at bilateral level, would be to outline or designate territory as Cooperative Security Zones. The idea is to define an area where all official military activity would be limited. Likewise, these areas would be jointly monitored to stop all illegal arms traffic. These areas would ideally be adjacent to the internationally recognized borders. Such a plan would largely depend upon the resolution of outstanding issues among the states.



Understandably, this plan may not work without a certain level of confidence building. An option that one could think of is to agree upon,

- A cooperative security zone in the border area between the two countries.
- Agree to stop all military activities in such areas,
- Restrict weapons movement in the area along with banning heavy caliber equipment from this zone, and
- Agree to share information about the number of people living there and the licensed weapons possessed by the inhabitants.

Initially, such agreement would not be subject to verification. The idea is to institute confidence-building methods that would then help the two states or more to reach to a point where they could introduce cooperative verifiable monitoring of border areas. This may actually prove to be a good CBM that is a must for any future cooperation to stop small arms proliferation. This could gradually pave the way for better understanding and lead to a situation where the states may agree to exchange verifiable information and have cooperative monitoring of territories.

In the longer run, there is a need to move towards a regional Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in the Weapons of Civilian destruction. In order to provide the much-needed impetus to curb weapons trafficking, it would be ideal to put in place a Regional Convention, separate from SAARC. For where it is possible to cap and even roll back a nuclear weapons' program, it is almost impossible to roll-back light weapons proliferation, once they have moved into society. There is also a clear indication that weapons continue to pour into the region in increasing numbers therefore urgent action is required. Such a Convention would incorporate most of the above, as well as; standardize import, export and transit procedures, declare illicit trafficking, a punishable crime in the entire region, with standardized legal procedures for dealing with it. Enable technical assistance and capacity building in weaker states, standardize gun control laws, allow controlled delivery measures, introduce standardize record keeping, allow free and easy access to database to all countries in the region. And also form a common core on intelligence and policing.

The ultimate objective is to deny "uncivil society" the ease of free and quick movement that it enjoys today thanks to global transport and information links. It has to be admitted that a slow bureaucratic approach, which aims at can-do measures, or even knee jerk reactions, usually has the effect of annoying the states involved in interdiction, rather than smoothing the path towards cooperation. The regional efforts have to be undertaken for the benefit of all, and should not harm anyone except those whose business it is to spread terror and violence.

### ***Bilateral Agreements:***

These have been negotiated between many states in the region, although they focus mainly on narcotics traffic and other crime. But with deep nexus between narcotics and small arms, these arrangements may expand to illicit transfers of small arms. Within the region, India has bilateral agreements with Myanmar, Afghanistan, the UAE and Pakistan (signed in July 1994). The agreement between India and Pakistan has led to several high level meetings on narcotics, joint investigations and Indian liaison with the Federal



Investigation Authority in Pakistan. There is however, much greater potential for cooperation under these instruments and processes.

### ***Sub-Regional Arrangements:***

Within the sub-region, there are a number of cooperative mechanisms, like the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which adopted a plan for Drug Control in 1995 and League of Arab States, which has appointed an Expert Group on Drug Control. The Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism of the SAARC remains an umbrella framework for the development of regional cooperation on issues like hijacking, extradition, hostage taking kidnapping and firearms and explosive trafficking. Any conspiracy, actual or attempted, under the first two offences is also regarded as an offence.

These conventions provide the groundwork for future cooperation, but some problems remain unattended. First, there is no clear indication as to how the Desks use the information that is made available. Second, as yet there is no computerization of the information gathered, (even if there is, information sharing becomes a major impediment). Third, there is no established information dissemination procedure. Fourth, the arrangement suffers where political tensions surround an issue. In addition, some countries still have to enact the "enabling legislation," to translate the Convention on Terrorism into their national legislation. Intelligence sharing, the most crucial aspect of the agreement on terrorism also suffers from some limitations, not the least of which is the basic tendency of most law enforcement agencies the world over to resist giving any information.

The following figure provides a list of options ranging from the immediate state to International level that can be adapted to solve the problem of small arms proliferation and pilferage.

### **Conclusion:**

The problems engendered by these arms and the solution of these problems is multifaceted. Coordinated action by national governments, regional organizations, NGOs and global bodies including the United Nations are needed for addressing this issue. To this end an effort has been made to forward specific suggestions are given at the national, regional and international levels to curb and curtail the deleterious consequences of the SA/LW. It hardly needs any emphasis that micro-disarmament should be a part of a comprehensive approach and should be considered in the overall context of disarmament priorities.

SA/LW have already spread extensively into the states and societies of southern Asia and are being used in a number of societal and other armed conflicts. There is an overwhelming need for peace in the region so that the maximum amount of energy and investment can be devoted to human development. The information and communication revolution has generated a strong desire in the region for a better quality of life. To which armed conflict at national and international levels - fought mostly with small arms - is the biggest hurdle. The need for cooperation among the states of southern Asia to control the spread of light weapons is deniable. Yet deep and historical mistrust and tensions, continuing civil war and socio-economic vulnerabilities present major obstacles to increasing regional cooperation. It is precisely for these reason that greater awareness of the nature and consequences of the spread of light weapons needs to be given the highest priority.



Core cooperative measures should be built on states' political commitment to reverse the existing proliferation and to control the future spread of light weapons among civilians. A first step could be a joint statement of intent to ban the possession and traffic of illicit arms within the territories of the states concerned. Such an approach will require defining the type of arms to be banned. Broadly speaking, all weapons normally used by military forces and armed police should be prohibited to civilians. As almost all countries of the region already have arms control laws or regulations that prohibit civilian ownership of this class of weapons, the states would only need to harmonize their national legislation and implementation methods.

For regional cooperation in Southern Asia to be effective, it would require the participation of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, The United Arab Emirates, Iran, the Central Asian Republics, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Yet forging an agreement among all these countries would be difficult for obvious reasons. Regional cooperation might therefore best begin with a smaller core group of countries, perhaps using SAARC as a base to build upon, especially as it has already instituted some agreements to counter terrorism and drug trafficking.

The next stage of cooperation would aim to institute a convention prohibiting the illicit manufacture and transfer of SA/LW (including ammunition). The convention negotiated and signed by members of the Organization of American States in 1997 [70] would be a useful model for this purpose. While more extensive measures would be necessary to effectively control the transnational movement of light weapons, this type of convention would reinforce states' initial commitment to bringing all small arms within government control. Given the geopolitical realities of the region, however, any regional coordination group would have to serve in an advisory, rather than executive role.

Regional coordination on arms control policy could be based upon information exchanges on weapons manufacture, flows and recoveries. Each state should gather data on small arms, possibly in the shape of registers of manufacture, production, sales, trade agents, imports and exports of firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related material. Ultimately, the collection and dissemination of this information should provide the requisite support for better control measures in the region, especially when combating transnational arms smuggling.



The background is a solid pink color. It features several faint, light-pink geometric shapes: a large rectangle in the upper left, a curved line resembling a comet or a swoosh in the center, and a five-pointed star in the upper right. These shapes are rendered with a slight transparency, allowing the pink background to show through.

# [ PART 2 ]



# **The Impact of Small Arms on Pakistani Society**

(Naveed Ahmad Shinwari)

## **INTRODUCTION:**

This chapter is based on data collection and analysis of a survey carried out in Peshawar, the capital of North-West Frontier Province (N-WFP), in September – October 2004. The main theme of the survey was to document the perception of local communities towards security, police performance and the presence of small arms in the civil society of the NWFP province of Pakistan. The city of Peshawar was chosen for the survey sample, however, this survey sample can be replicated in other districts and provinces of Pakistan with slight changes keeping in view the local requirements.

## **BACKGROUND OF THE SURVEY UNIVERSE**

North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), province of Pakistan, occupying the entire northwestern part of the country east and south of Afghanistan, was merged with the other provinces and states of West Pakistan in 1955 to form the single province of West Pakistan. But in 1970 the West Pakistan unit was once more divided, this time into four provinces i.e. Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and N-WFP. Total area covers by NWFP is 74,521 sq km (28,773 sq mi) with an estimated population of 14 millions. The province is mostly mountainous and rocky, and is crossed by several mountain ranges, including the Hindu Kush in the northwest, the Himalayas in the northeast, and the Sulaimān and Safed Koh ranges in the west. Much of Pakistan's trade with Afghanistan passes through NWFP, and Peshāwar, the province's capital city, serves as a market center. Majority of the inhabitants are from Pushtun origin that speak Pashto language, which is also spoken in Afghanistan.

The province's culturally varied past is evident throughout the region. Roman and Hellenistic influence flourishes in the popular style of Buddhist art called Gandhara, and Hindu influence is reflected by Mahayana Buddhism, which had its origin in the NWFP and from there spread to Central Asia and East Asia. Many important Buddhist relics have been found in the region. Its snow-capped peaks and lush green beautiful valleys attract tourists and mountaineers from across the country and abroad. Its art and architecture is well known.

Pakistan has for many years suffered from an extremely high level of small arms proliferation. There is no reliable figure relating to the numbers of either illicit or legally held weapons in the country. However, rough estimates are in the millions with two million licensed firearms recorded by the 1998 census and estimates of at least 18 million more being held illegally <sup>[71]</sup>.

The Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a major cause of regional and international security concerns. During this period the proliferation of SALW remained unchecked. It has not only created a regional anxiety but also as a turning point in international politics. Having concerns for its own security at the western border, Pakistan emerged as a frontline ally of US against the Soviet expansionist designs. The NWFP and the FATA, having a long and porous border with Afghanistan, remained a focus of these war-related activities throughout this period of war. The area bore special strategic importance due to its geographic location and remained a base for ammunition depots; war material supply routes; Mujahideen training camps and an ongoing mass influx of Afghan refugees from Afghanistan into Pakistan. The US provided assistance to Afghan Mujahideens through Pakistan against the Soviet regime. On one hand Pakistan benefited significantly in terms of its economy and made itself well equipped in Defence sector but on the other hand the Afghan War had severe implications on its internal and external security. The high



influx of Afghan refugees has destroyed the ecological balance, promoted drug trafficking, gun culture (popularly known as 'Kalashnikov culture'), sectarianism, and endless law and order situation for the Pakistani civilians.

Another factor contributing to the proliferation of SALW in Pakistan is illegal manufacture of replica weapons industry in FATA areas where the government exercises little control. In these areas there are more than 4000 gunsmith's shops that are very adept to produce replica weapons. Despite the low literacy and lack of technical knowledge these gunsmiths are excellent in producing excellent replicas of weapon made in the best ordnance factories in the World. It is a general observation that FATA is one of the major sources of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Pakistan. Small arms and light weapons supplied by US and other nations flooding the region during the Soviet-Afghan War, were revamped and sold in FATA. The Afghan crises had provided an opportunity for the tribal people to get big profits from the small arms business. There were other actors like enforcement agents, public sector employees, transporters and others who saw monetary benefits and got involved in this business.

These factors have badly contributed to the poor human security environment, protracted personal enmities, poor human development, rise in poverty, decline in overall national growth, reluctance of foreign investors in investing in Pakistan and lack of confidence of the common man in the country's administrative and judicial system.

### **Crime Trends in NWFP:**

The supply of weapons by the CIA to Afghan Mujahideens for covert operations paved way for illegal arms trade in the region. The CIA shared responsibility for running the Afghan war with the ISI, and each year (1981-88) the former provided \$640 million for Afghan covert operations [72]. This huge supply of weapons diffused across the border into the hands of militants, criminal gangs, ethnic and sectarian groups, who are now challenging law enforcing agencies across the country in general and NWFP in particular. Murder, honor killing, robbery, burglary, car lifting, drug trafficking, sectarian violence and arms smuggling are the most common crime reported in NWFP. In 2003 various types of crime cases reported in NWFP rose to 86,073 from 83,485 reported in 2002 [73].

According to a local newspaper Daily Mashriq, dated 1<sup>st</sup> January 2004, following table 1 shows the types of crimes reported in the province of NWFP during the year 2002 and 2003;

**Table 1:**

<b>S. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>
01	Kidnapping	168	145
02	Kidnapping of women (for forced marriages)	290	312
03	Police Encounter	157	162
04	Decoity	8	2
05	Robberies	41	37
06	Home Burglary	500	563







injured in family disputes. During the same period 86 cases of robbery, 27 cases of home burglary and 108 car theft cases were reported.

**Table: 3**

<b>S. No.</b>	<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>2002</b>
01	Murder	511
02	Injuries	1013
04	Robbery	86
05	Home Burglary	27
06	Car Theft	108



## **SURVEY METHODOLOGY:**

The data has been collected through structured questionnaire given to people representing every walk of life. Gender distribution was also kept in consideration to document the perception of both the sexes.

**Random Sampling:** Due to time and logistic considerations the research team decided to carry out a random survey in the city of Peshawar. The respondents were randomly selected in markets, university, offices, households etc.

**Limitations of the Sample:** The research team collected data from 100 respondents in Peshawar. However, the respondents belong to diverse geographical areas of the NWFP province. Although this sample is enough for a pilot study in NWFP, any qualitative analysis of such a small sample has to be regarded with caution and should not be considered as representative of the entire population.

**Survey Procedures:** Before conducting the interviews, the respondents were told about the purpose of the study, the confidentiality and also that they could stop the interview at any time they liked. Despite the fact that the respondents were very cooperative, still they were cautious about while replying to certain questions.

The survey questions were read to the respondents and the interviewer wrote down the replies. In some cases the questionnaires were handed over to the respondents and they returned the complete questionnaires.

Before deployment the research team members were properly trained and they complemented the qualitative data as well as took notes of remarks made by the respondents.

The survey included the following three sections:


- ◆ Section 1: Individual Data on the respondent
- ◆ Section 2: Crime and Security Perception
- ◆ Section 3: Trends and Attitudes Towards Firearms




## SECTION 1: INDIVIDUAL DATA

The total sample conducted in District Peshawar consisted of 100 surveys from 35 female and 65 male respondents. The age group ranged from 18 to 65. The respondents represented different geographical localities of the NWFP province however; the survey was conducted in Peshawar city. Sixty Eight per cent respondents belonged to Peshawar district and the remaining respondents were from different localities of the province. Peshawar is the commercial center of NWFP therefore; people usually visit Peshawar on and off.

According to the following **figure 1**, 37% respondents belong to the age group of 18-25, 33%, 18% of 26-35, 9% of 36-45, 9% of 46-55 and 3% of 56-65.




According to **figure 2**, majority of the respondents i.e. 34% were post-graduates (Master level including 2% doctors and 1 M. Phil), 14% graduate, 11 intermediate, 13% matriculate, 9% middle pass, and 5% primary graduate from schools, while 14% were illiterate.





According to **figure 3**, occupation of the respondents ranges from government employees to self-employed, private sector employee, un-employed, labor, farmer to housewife and student.



### Credibility of the Respondents:

Such types of survey mostly depend on the willingness of the respondents in giving their time and views. It also depends on the level of knowledge of the respondents and how they perceive and interpret questions asked during the survey. During analysis of the data collected from 100 respondents, responses were different in some cases. For instance in one reply 52% respondents were determined to own a gun however; in another question 80% respondents supported the need for firearms control. Therefore, there is always a risk that some of the respondents may not be telling the truth. However, this survey sample is basically aimed at recording the perception of the common citizen who may interpret each question according to his own perception.



## **SECTION 2: CRIME AND SECURITY PERCEPTION**

This section includes 14 open ended and closed ended questions, which provide information on the perception of common citizen on types of crimes and security situation during the past years. The purpose of this section of the survey was to assess how people perceive themselves and their communities to be safe and how people rate police performance.

### **Importance of Definitions of Crimes Types**

The legal definition might not necessarily be consistent with the common man's views and could be loosely used and deprived of its legal meaning. It becomes important to educate the respondents with regards to the legal terms and meanings of types of crimes before documenting his/her response. Therefore, the following few definitions were used to describe types of crimes recorded in the survey findings.

- ♦ **Murder** was defined as 'when someone was killed by another person on purpose and not by accident'.
- ♦ **Attempt of Murder:** According to section 300 of the Pakistan Penal Code "whoever with intention of causing death or with the intention of causing bodily injury to a person, by doing an act which in the ordinary course of nature is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that his act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, causes the death of such person.
- ♦ **Home Burglary** was defined as 'when thieves come, or try to come, into the house independently whether you and/or your family are inside or not'.
- ♦ **Robbery** was defined when as 'when you are walking and someone approaches you and threatens you unless you give something'.
- ♦ **Car Theft** was defined as 'when your car disappears while you are not present.
- ♦ **Kidnapping** was defined as 'when someone is kidnapped by someone for ransom or for family rivalry'. According to section 359 and 361 of the Pakistan Penal Code "whoever takes or entices any minor under fourteen years of age if a male or under sixteen years of age if a female, or any person of unsound mind, out of the keeping of the lawful guardian of such minor or person of unsound mind. Without the consent of such guardian, is said to kidnap such minor person from lawful guardianship".
- ♦ **Robbery:** In all robbery there is either Theft or Extortion. When theft is robbery..... theft is "robbery" if in order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft, or attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.

**When Extortion is robbery?...** Extortion is robbery if the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that person, or to some other person, and, by so putting in fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to deliver up the things extorted. (Section 390 Pakistan Penal Code Page 480)

- ♦ **Decoy:** According to section 391 of the Pakistan Penal Code "when five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery or where the whole number of persons come jointly committing or attempting to commit a robbery and persons present and aiding such commission or



attempt amount of five or more, every person so committing, attempting, or adding, is said to commit decoity”.

- ❖ **Car Theft:** According to section 378 of the Pakistan Penal Code “whoever, intending to take dishonestly any vehicle out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, move that vehicle in order to such taking is said to commit car theft.
- ❖ **Car Snatch/Lifting:** Snatching the car on gun point or by force




## SURVEY RESULTS:


### Perception on types of Crimes in Peshawar

The first set of questions was based on the types of crimes most common in Peshawar, crimes people are most scared of and whether respondents feel secure in their surroundings.

In the first question of Section 2, the respondents were asked whether they had experienced any crime or offence during the past ten years. In response, **38%** replied 'Yes' and **62%** replied 'No'. Further inquiry was made from the 38% respondents about the type of crime they had experienced. According to **figure 4** majority of the respondents (20 respondents) experienced 'Robbery', 13 respondents experience 'Murder', 4 respondents experienced 'Decoity' and 1 respondent experience 'Child Abuse' crime in their personal lives.



Peshawar is an urban center having villages in its surrounding. Major portion of its population lives in these surrounding villages. However, they visit Peshawar on a regular basis because of their jobs and businesses in Peshawar and for other social obligations. When respondents were asked whether they were worried about crimes in their localities.






According to **figure 5** the response was mixed and only 66% of the respondents were 'always' or 'often' or 'time to time' worried about crimes. However, 22% were 'never' worried and 12% 'seldom' worried about crimes in their localities.



**Figures 6 and 7** show the respondents' perception on safety during the daylight and night at home or outside their homes. However, majority of the respondents felt safe during the daylight while they generally felt very unsafe at night whether at home or outside their homes.




The reason for the mix response in relation to the two questions mentioned above was that that there are some areas where people are concerned about their security only during night while there are other areas where people are scared even during daylight. Therefore, the responses were the reflection of their concerns about their respective residential or work areas.


The perception of respondents on changes in crimes is shown in the **figure 8**. The responses were not based on their exact knowledge of reported crimes but based on their general feelings. Majority of the respondents (43%) felt that the crime ratio has increased with the passage of every day.



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
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
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As far as police performance is concerned the respondents documented their responses, which can be seen in **figure 11**. The majority of the respondents i.e. 55% were of the view that the police performance remained the 'same' over the past years while 26% were of the view that police department had improved its performance during this period. However, 19% of the respondents thought that police's performance was getting worse.




Keeping in view that the factor of anti-police sentiments among the communities is usually at work, their exact perception of the performance of Police department might become difficult and vague to document.


In an open ended question the respondents were asked whether who was responsible for providing security to them other than police, the response is as follows in the **figure 12**;

Most of the respondents i.e. 34% felt that no one is there to guarantee their security, whereas 19% replied that they themselves were responsible for their personal and home security. While 25% replied that their villagers and/or community members had formed committees that provided security to the neighborhood. Some respondents (8%) replied that they rely on God and 7% replied that army provides security to their homes and neighborhoods. It should be noted that there are some army cantonment areas where civilians as well as army officials reside. Moreover, some 7% respondents replied that they had acquired the services of security guards.





In another open-ended question the respondents were asked, what measure they and their families had taken to prevent crimes in their respective areas. **Figure 13** shows that majority of the respondents (59%) did nothing to prevent crimes in their respective communities. They opined that providing security was solely the responsibility of the Police department. There are some 32% respondents who replied that they prevented crimes in their areas through village/street committees. Most of the respondents in this category belonged to villages and suburban areas of Peshawar and other districts. There is also a strong institution of Jirga, which not only provides speedy justice but also prevent crimes in these areas, therefore, the respondents' response in relation to the street/village committees might have referred to Jirga institution.



In another open-ended question regarding the forms of security measures the respondents rely on, the researchers received multiple responses shown in **table 4**. The respondents could identify more than one option.

**Table 4: Forms of Protection in Place to Protect House**

Keeping Weapons at Home	55
Security Guard/Watchman	20
Locked Doors	44
Security Alarm System	2
Through keeping Dogs	2
Rely on God	12



**Table 4** shows clearly that the respondents usually rely on weapons to protect themselves as well their houses from intruders (n=55) when they cannot afford to keep security guards or expensive security alarms.

Regarding improvement in the law and order situation the respondents were then asked to give their recommendations to the government or law enforcing agencies. The respondents could identify more than one recommendation, for the question was an open ended one. According to the **table 5** given below, most of the respondents were of the view that police department should be improved (42 recommendations), they should increase their patrolling in the neighborhoods (29 recommendations), police stations should be increased (28 recommendations), police force should be better trained (16 recommendations), the police force should be increased (13 recommendations) and police should be sincere to their job (10 recommendations). Improvement in laws related to crimes was also recommended.

<b>Table 5: Recommendation/Suggestion for Improvement in Crime Situation</b>	
<b>Recommendation/Suggestion</b>	<b>Respondents</b>
Improve Police Department	42
Increase Police Patrolling	29
Increase Police Stations	28
Training of Police Force	16
Proper Implementation of Law	15
Increase Police Force	13
Sincerity of Police Force	10
Reduce/ban weapons	6
Government Should Provide Security	5
People Should be Educated	4
Provide Speedy Justice to People	3
Form Local Committees of People	3
Decrease Police Power	1

**Table 5** also shows people's lack of trust in police department, as most of the recommendations are directed towards police reforms. The respondents also targeted the state authorities, especially justice department, and felt that this should also be reformed.




## **SECTION 3: TRENDS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS FIREARMS:**

The purpose of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Section of the sample survey was to document the perception of common citizen towards firearms. Whether firearms are necessary for them in a local cultural context and how firearms are being used. Once the perception of the common people is known, it would be quite easy for policy makers at government level to put in place adequate laws and regulations for controlling the use of firearms. Besides, its findings will also help civil society organizations to develop appropriate target awareness campaign strategies. The questions related to 3<sup>rd</sup> section were also intended to know the willingness and openness of the people to answer these questions. To most of the questions of this section the respondents were reluctant and felt uneasy to provide exact information. Some of the open-ended questions received several responses. To a question, for instance “what would you recommend to control the use of guns or reduce the need for guns in your area”, the respondents were given open space for their responses and 11 types of recommendations were recorded.


### **SURVEY RESULTS**

According to **figure 13**, most of the respondents (35%) were of the view that firearms were ‘always’ used in crime, 24% felt that firearms were used ‘sometime’ while 22% felt that firearms were ‘often’ used in crimes. The second category of the respondents i.e. 15% and 4% felt that firearms were ‘never’ and ‘seldom’ used in crimes, respectively.




The frequency of gunshots in Peshawar city and its surrounding villages has remained a very old and common tradition since long. In Pushtun culture of Frontier province of Pakistan, aerial shooting is a common practice when people fire in the air to celebrate their joys during festivities like at the night before EID, in marriages ceremonies and at the birth of a male child. It always results in deaths and injuries of innocent people who fall prey to the menace of stray bullets.





Despite the fact that the government has put in place strict regulations against aerial firing, still people are involved in this evil practice, even in posh areas of Peshawar. According to **figure 15**, majority of the respondents i.e. 35% felt that gunshots were heard 'always', 22% 'often', 24% 'sometime' and 4% 'seldom'. There were only 15% respondents who felt that they 'never' heard gunshots in their surroundings.

As far as the availability of firearms is concerned, according to **figure 16**, 36% of the respondents felt that firearms had 'decreased', while 32% still opined that firearms had 'increased'. Besides, 32% of the respondents still felt that the availability was still the 'same'. During the interview the respondents who selected option 'same' meant that the flow of firearms was still the same as it was during the Afghan-Soviet War and then Afghan civil war, which means that the availability of firearms is still unchecked by the state authorities.



In a subsequent open-ended question the respondents were asked about the probable reasons for the possession of firearms by civil society. The responses are shown in the following **table 6** and **table 7**. The reasons for the increase in the availability of firearms is shown in **table 6** and decrease in **table 7**.



**Table 6: Increase in the Firearms Availability**

Causes	No. of Respondents
Easy availability	13
Family and Personal Vendetta	12
Low Price	8
Worst Security Situation and lack of government interest	13
Lack of education	5
Tribal areas gray market	4
As a hobby	4
Afghan War	6
Sectarian Violence	1
Political Disputes	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>67%</b>

According to table 6, majority of the respondents i.e. 67% provided several reasons contributing to the availability of firearms, while 33% of the respondents (table 7) were of the view that the government has put ban on arms trade and licenses and that the people are now more educated the ill effects of small arms.


**Table 7: Increase in the Firearms Availability**

Causes	No. of Respondents
Government put ban on arms	18
People are more educated now	15
<b>Total</b>	<b>33%</b>


When the researchers asked the respondents about the possession of firearms by their friends or relatives, majority of the respondents i.e. 76% replied in 'yes'. It means that majority of the families in Peshawar possesses firearms at their houses. Only 12% each of the respondents replied 'no' and 'don't know'. The reason might be their lack of information and/or reluctance to give information.




**Fig. 17: Possession of firearm by a friend or relative**




When the respondents were asked about the legal status of these firearms 44% replied that the firearms possessed by their relatives or friends were having licenses however, 20% were unsure about the legality of those firearms. Exact information about the legal status of weapons in the possession of respondents' friends or family members were difficult to obtain. However, the main purpose of these two specific questions was to know the level of presence of firearms either legal or illegal in the civil society.



Access to small arms has always been very easy for the residents of Peshawar due to its proximity with the tribal areas. The following figure 19 shows the access of a common man to firearms. Majority of the respondents i.e. 50% replied that they have easy access to firearms, while 42% replied in the negative. However, there is a general observation that locally manufactured firearms in black market can be purchased at very cheap rates. According to the comments of the respondents a weapon could be bought from a person without meeting any legal formalities and it has further made availability of firearms very easy.



The availability of firearms is also related to the demand by the communities and individuals. According to **figure 20**, 52% of the respondents showed their willingness to own a gun, while 45% replied in 'no'.



It is also observed that those who replied in 'no' were not categorical in their response and there is a possibility that they might have firearms in their possession.

In a subsequent question the respondents were asked what were the reasons they 'would' or 'would' not own a gun. The responses are shown in the following **table 8** and **table 9** respectively;

Table 8	
Reason	Respondents
For self defense	46
Government's lack of protection	3
Family tradition	2
For hunting purpose	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>56%</b>

According to the above table 46% of the respondents felt that they would own a gun for their self-defense, whereas, 5% said that they would own a gun for hunting. Some 3% were of the view that due to government's lack of providing protection they would prefer to own a gun. Only 2% felt that gun possession was their family tradition.




According to the following table, 44% of the respondents ruled out the possession of firearms and felt that firearms are not needed and its possession is dangerous.


Table 9	
Reason	Respondents
There is no need	31
Dangerous	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>44%</b>

The subsequent set of questions is focused on gun control and the respondents were asked about gun control measures in their society. The questions were based on unearthing the level of motivation of the respondents and their willingness to cooperate in the gun control measures.

The first question was asked about the respondents' opinion with regards to the need for gun control. According to **figure 21**, 80% of the respondents felt the need for gun control while only 6% were against the gun controlling measures.



The respondents' level of motivation was also documented and they were asked about whether they would encourage people to disown guns once the security situation improved.



According to **figure 22**, 87% of the respondents were agreed that they would encourage such initiatives once the security situation is improved by the state authorities. Only 4% were against any such move.

In a subsequent question, which was open-ended the respondents were asked to provide their recommendations for controlling the use of weapons or reduce the need for weapons the responses were multiple from each respondent, for each respondent could identify more than one recommendation.

Table 10	
Recommendations	Respondents
Increase Police Powers	51
Holding voluntary weapon collection programmes	28
Government should ensure security	25
Strict Police accountability	4
Increase police stations	9
People should be motivated to disown arms	9
Arms smuggling should be stopped	4
Sincerity of police	5
Grey market should be closed	7
Control ourselves	4

The above table reflects the majority of the respondents' mistrust in the police department as well the government. The respondents recommended to bring some reforms in police department i.e. police powers should be increased (n=51), police stations should be increased (n=9), police should be sincere in the performance of their duties (n=5) and strict police accountability (n=4). Total of 69 recommendations came out for bringing reforms in police department, however 28 respondents recommended voluntary weapons collection programmes, and 25 respondents recommended that the government should provide security to its civilians.




## **The Impact of Small Arms on Pakistani Society**

The respondents were inquired about the sources of firearms flow into the area. The respondents could identify more than one source, which is shown in the following table.


Table 11	
Source	Respondents
Tribal areas (FATA)/Grey markets	98
No illegal arms	3
Afghanistan	25
Don't know	19

According to 98 respondents' perception tribal areas (FATA)/grey markets are the major source of firearms flow into the society. While 25 respondents were of the view that Afghanistan is the major source of small arms proliferation. While 19 respondents did not know the sources of the firearms proliferation, however they might have been reluctant to give precise information or they might not be having any knowledge about the sources of firearms.

The respondents were then asked about their "Perception of Self-Defense", which means that every individual has the right to defend him/herself through possession of a firearm. According to the figure 23, 73% respondents replied in 'yes' while only 27% replied in 'no'.




When asked about their perception of firearms as a status symbol 66% replied in 'no' and 23% replied in 'yes'. Again the credibility of the responses of the respondents is doubtful, as they were reluctant to give exact information.



During questionnaire development it was kept in consideration to know the types of weapons available or used by the local communities. The respondents were asked about what types of weapons are usually used and or owned by the local people. The response is shown in the following **table 12** and **figure 24**. The respondents could identify more than one firearm.

Table 12	
Type of Firearm	No. of Respondents
Rifles	52
Pistols	74
AK 47	53
Guns	10
Kalakov	14
Machine Guns	17
Hand grenades	10
Don't know	15





The next set of questions was focused on conflict prevention/resolution according to respondents' respective environment. The aim behind these questions was to record the perception on the credibility of government institutions as well as indigenous institutions. The respondents' views reflect their suspicions about the judiciary and police department of Pakistan and conversely the respondents' reliance on the indigenous institution of Jirga, which provides speedy justice to the victims and resolve conflicts involving all the stakeholders in the process.

In the first place the respondents were asked that to whom they approach when there is any dispute within their area or community. The result of the question is shown in the following **table 13**. The respondents could provide more than one response.

<b>Table 13</b>	
<b>Institution</b>	<b>Respondents</b>
Government	27
Elders of the community	67
Local bodies	19

Some 27 respondents replied that they would approach government's relevant department for dispute settlement, keeping in view the nature of the dispute. Majority of the respondents replied that they would approach elders of their communities/areas, which means that they always approach elders of the community who, then, decide the case according to the local culture, tradition and norms of the respective area. However, 19 respondents were of the view that they would approach the local bodies for conflict resolution.

Another subsequent and linked question was asked from the respondents that how disputes are resolved in their communities or areas. The respondents could provide more than one response.

<b>Table 14</b>	
<b>Institutions</b>	<b>Respondents</b>
Government	18
Jirga	82
MPA/MNA/Local Bodies	10
Power	1
Money	1

According to the above **table 14**, majority of the respondents i.e. 82 feel that disputes are resolved through Jirga system while only 18 respondents replied that government resolves disputes. One respondent pointed out that power is the only option, which could resolve conflicts/disputes while one respondent said that money can resolve disputes. Only 10 respondents identified political figures like an MPA/MNA/Local Bodies Official who could resolve disputes in their respective areas. According to the local context even MPA/MNA/Local bodies resolve disputes through Jirga and people approach them and want them to resolve their conflicts through Jirga.



## **Lessons Learned and Recommendations for Further Research**

In the initial phase of the survey the researchers faced several difficulties when filling the questionnaire. The most important one was the respondents' reluctance in agreeing to get interviewed, but once they agreed they were open with some of the replies and helped the researcher in completing the survey questionnaire. It would take few minutes to convince the respondents that the questionnaire was harmless and their names would not be disclosed or mentioned in the research paper. However, this should not prevent further such exercise.

Pushtuns are men of guns and having centuries old tradition of keeping guns as an ornament of men, however, it was **surprisingly encouraging** that the researchers have been able to conduct the research, which means that such type of researches are possible. Most of the respondents liked the interview and encouraged the initiatives.

## **Recommendations:**

This research raises several issues for further research and suggests some recommendations, however, Ms. Salma Malik has already given her comprehensive list of recommendations therefore, I would not repeat them but will add some of the following;

- ◆ The research should be conducted not only in other districts but in other provinces as well. There are some limitations in this survey, e.g. that it does not represent the trends and patterns of common perception of the entire country or even the entire province. It will help the policy makers at government level as well as at civil society level to draft policies and take decision on the basis of information provided through a comprehensive research. There is also a need to know the pattern of crimes committed in different districts and provinces of Pakistan. Every province has a different crime pattern e.g. in NWFP majority of the murder cases are linked to family, clan and tribal feuds, while in Punjab majority of murder cases are linked to sectarian or political violence. It will also help the policy makers to respond to the problem according to the local conditions.
- ◆ It is also recommended that a survey should be conducted in jails to document the case studies of jail inmates who are charged with murder, attempt to murder, terrorism and sectarian and ethnic crimes. These case studies will help in educating the general masses regarding the aftermath of SALW use.
- ◆ In order to cope with an environment that is weapons abundant, it is prudent to conduct a basic and on-going assessment or survey of the situation as it pertains to these weapons. This will help in determining the feasibility of a future weapons collection or destruction program and can be used in public education campaign. These research should be mainly based on the following two components;



- i. **Small Arms distribution survey:** A quantitative data should be collected on the types, quantity, ownership and movement of SALW within the country and FATA in particular.
  - ii. **Small Arms Impact Survey:** This will collect the qualitative information on the impact of SALW on civilian and social and economic development. It will also give detailed information on the pattern of crimes in our society at provincial level. A wide range of research methods should be used to assess the distribution and impact of SALW. It includes, but is not limited to, structured questionnaires for interviewing women and men, key informants interviews, Focus Group Discussions (age and gender segregated), national and academic database and other related surveys and reports/literature etc.
- ❖ A very strong perception that emerged in this survey is the suspicion about corruption in police department. This is not a new phenomena and the government is aware of this perception. Efforts should be made to curb corruption in this institution, however some efforts have already been underway and showing some signs of improvement.
  - ❖ The findings of this research clearly indicates that people are still depending on weapons, as majority of the respondents' interviews reflect that guns are important feature of their lives. Efforts and resources should be directed to first stop the flow of arms and then put a ban on issuance of licenses to common citizen.
  - ❖ This survey also shows people's inclination towards the *Jirga* system rather than the modern legal system of the country. Their experience shows that *Jirga* can provide them a timely and respectable justice. On one hand efforts should be made to restore people's confidence in the legal system of Pakistan and on the other hand research on *Jirga* system should be initiated to document its pros and cons so that, if workable in other areas, could be practiced to resolve political, sectarian and other tribal or societal conflicts.
  - ❖ It is also recommended that a comprehensive behavior change strategy is necessary to be formulated to educate people regarding the ill effects of possessing small arms and light weapons. This survey also indicates people's tendency to keep weapons at their homes for self-defense as well as a status symbol. A comprehensive strategy of awareness should be inclusive of three main communication components i.e. SALW Risk Education, 2) SALW Advocacy and 3) Public Information.

To undertake the above-mentioned SALW awareness strategy, it is needed to mobilize, involve and enhance the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) in SALW campaigns. In such a manner it is anticipated that the awareness component would reach maximum population covering major geographical areas of Pakistan. Despite the efforts of individual members and NGOs, there is a dire need for concerted efforts to put the problem



on the screen of both the civil societies and the government. This could be achieved only when a strong campaign on awareness and education of the civil society is implemented.

- ◆ The collection of more than one weapon from civil society should be a part of the arms controlling process. However, to develop common and practical solution and guidelines in a situation other than post-peace mission environment are also fruitful. The problem of arms violence is global, as evidenced by the weapons collection programs being conducted in states from the developed and industrialized world. During the process of formulating the VWCP strategy members and organizations representing civil society, local governments and national government should be involved so that a program is developed in which the consensus of all the stakeholders is taken.
- ◆ This survey shows the majority of the respondents' perception that FATA is the main source of weapons proliferation into other parts of Pakistan. There might be several reasons, which could be responsible for this proliferation. The prominent among them are extreme poverty, lack of developmental activities, lack of education, lack of political, and judicial reforms. First, sustained efforts should be directed towards integrating the tribal areas into the main stream of development. The process should be participatory by bringing together all the stakeholders involved so that a framework should be prepared with consensus of all. Secondly, these efforts should be initiated gradually linking with the efforts directed towards de-weaponization, change of behaviour of the tribesmen towards guns, and demobilization of those that are directly or indirectly involved in weapon production business.



# NOTES

## Part I:

Draft paper for Peshawar based NGO “CAMP” *Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme*. August-October 2004.

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