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Christian Ruck / Bernd Rill (Hrsg.)

## Der Weg Pakistans – Rückblick und Ausblick



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Verantwortlich: Dr. Reinhard C. Meier-Walser (Chefredakteur)

Redaktion:

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# Vorwort

**Christian Ruck / Bernd Rill**

Mit der Gründung Pakistans vor mehr als 60 Jahren und der Ausrufung der ersten islamischen Republik 1956 entstand ein wichtiger Ankerstaat in der islamischen Welt. Bedingt durch ethnische Vielfalt, die umsiedlungsbedingten Wirren und die fehlende historische Tradition, stand Pakistan von Anfang an vor gewaltigen Herausforderungen – insbesondere bei der Herausbildung einer eigenen Identität. Der Antagonismus zu Indien, besonders ausgeprägt im Kaschmirkonflikt, und die kulturelle Verschiedenheit zu dem bengalisch geprägten Ostpakistan waren von Anfang an eine erhebliche Belastung. Auch die stärkere Betonung des Islam – als bestimmenden Gründungsfaktor für Pakistan – konnte die Abspaltung Ostpakistans 1971 nicht verhindern. Diese Elemente waren in Verbindung mit Strukturdefiziten und fortbestehenden traditionellen Strukturen mit ursächlich dafür, dass Pakistan bis heute keine gefestigten demokratischen Strukturen etablieren konnte. Die daraus resultierende Abfolge von demokratisch geprägten Regierungen mit Militärdiktaturen konnte leider auch wenig beim zukunftsgerichteten Umbau der Gesellschaft und beim Abbau der Strukturdefizite bewirken.

Dieser kurze Rückblick gibt uns Hinweise darauf, welche Ansatzpunkte von großer Relevanz für den Ausblick sein könnten.

Am 17. Mai 2001 wurde ein Antrag in den Deutschen Bundestag eingebracht und mit den Stimmen aller Parteien verabschiedet. Darin wurde Präsident Musharraf aufgefordert, so schnell wie möglich zur Demokratie zurückzukehren. Ihm wurde aber auch der Rücken gestärkt für die überfälligen, notwendigen Reformen in einem zerrütteten Land, das damals am Rand des Zerfalls stand, dessen Demokratie desavouiert war und das sich durch korrupti-

onsbehaftete Politiker wie Benazir Bhutto und Nawaz Sharif in einer Sackgasse befand. Er wurde als damaliger neuer Regierungschef Pakistans in dem Antrag auch dazu aufgefordert, dass er die Unterstützung der Taliban einstellt, dass er sich mit Indien aussöhnt und dass er eine entwicklungsorientierte Politik betreibt, die der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung dient und ihr Perspektiven verschafft.

Wenn wir die heutige Situation mit der damaligen vergleichen, sind viele Parallelen erkennbar. Die Bilanz von Musharraf ist sehr durchwachsen. Ich möchte daran erinnern, dass er am Ende seiner Amtszeit in der Aussöhnungspolitik mit Indien große Fortschritte erzielt hatte. Es gab auch demokratische Reformen und wirtschaftlichen Erfolg, aber vieles ist nur halbherzig umgesetzt worden, und – das ist vor allem zu nennen – der wirtschaftliche Erfolg kam nicht bei der breiten Bevölkerung an.

Man muss jedoch klar sehen, dass der Krieg gegen die Terroristen in Afghanistan und der Kampf um die Wiederherstellung von Demokratie und Frieden in Afghanistan infolge des 11. September 2001 nicht nur die Bedeutung Pakistans regional und international enorm erhöht haben, sondern auch seine Probleme. Es muss sich zeigen, ob die Regierung den Spagat zwischen Islamisten und Feudalisten sowie zwischen echten und falschen Demokraten schaffen kann.

Das Land ist in der Vergangenheit nicht zusammengewachsen. Es sieht leider sogar so aus, dass die zentrifugalen Kräfte stärker denn je offen zu Tage treten. Das hat viele Gründe; es hat hier und da etwas mit halbherzigen Politiken zu tun. Aber wir glauben, dass die tieferen Ursachen dafür in fehlender Entwicklung und fehlender

Perspektive für die breite Bevölkerung zu suchen sind. Denken wir an Stammesgebiete, wo noch archaische Zustände herrschen, an Großstadtlums und an feudalistische Zustände in weiten Teilen des Landes wie zum Beispiel im Pandschab.

Die Stabilität Pakistans und eine positive Entwicklung Pakistans sind für die friedliche Entwicklung in der Region, aber auch insbesondere für die Konsolidierung in Afghanistan entscheidend. Es ist für den Ausblick wichtig und richtig, den Grundgedanken des damaligen Antrags im Deutschen Bundestag noch einmal in Erinnerung zu rufen. Wir sind der Überzeugung, dass es ohne grundlegende Reformen und ohne ein Wirtschaftswachstum, das auch den breiten Schichten der Bevölkerung zugute kommt und bis nach Waziristan und die Grenzgebiete dringt, keine Stabilität und keine positive Entwicklung in Pakistan geben kann.

Die Entwicklungspolitik, die für Pakistan als einen der Hauptempfänger unserer Hilfe in all den Jahren immer eine sehr bedeutende Rolle spielte, muss sich bilateral, aber auch auf internationaler Ebene noch stärker und konzentrierter darüber Gedanken machen, wie wir die Entwicklungs-

und Hilfsangebote verbessern können. Es ist wichtig und richtig, dass die Demokratie insgesamt, die unabhängige Justiz und die Medienfreiheit wiederhergestellt und gestärkt werden müssen.

Es sind jedoch auch die Grunderkenntnisse richtig und wichtig, dass Pakistan viel stärker als bisher eine Bildungsoffensive braucht – gegebenenfalls gegen den Widerstand der Koranschulen. Diesen Wunsch müssen wir mit unseren Appellen verbinden, dass Pakistan ein besser funktionierendes Gesundheitssystem inklusive Familienplanung benötigt, dass in Pakistan eine Landreform unabdingbar notwendig ist, dass Pakistan mit Hilfe von Mikrofinanzierungsinstrumenten viel mehr Wachstum von unten generieren muss und dass Pakistan Hilfe bei seiner Energieversorgung nötig hat.

Wenn wir berechtigte Forderungen an Pakistan stellen, dann müssen wir, ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass die Aussetzung von Neuzusagen zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt das richtige Signal ist, gleichzeitig den Umfang unserer Reform- und Hilfsangebote an Pakistan vergrößern. Das müssen zwei Seiten ein und derselben Medaille sein.

# Einführung

**Paul Lehnrieder**

Aus Anlass der Gründung des Staates Pakistan fand im November 2007 eine Expertentagung der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung in Kooperation mit dem Deutsch-Pakistanischen Forum statt: "60 Jahre Pakistan – Rückblick und Ausblick". Die Vorträge der einzelnen Experten sind die Grundlage für die vorliegende Publikation.

Ziel des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Forums ist es, die vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen Pakistan und Deutschland zu stärken. Es ist im beiderseitigen Interesse, die guten Beziehungen zwischen Deutschen und Pakistanern zu vertiefen und weiter auszubauen. Das Forum versteht sich als Sammelbecken aller Aktivitäten der deutsch-pakistanischen Zusammenarbeit auf unterschiedlichsten Ebenen. Als Präsident ist es mein Wunsch, das Deutsch-Pakistanische Forum mit Leben zu füllen, sei es durch Diavorträge, kulturelle oder auch gesellschaftspolitische Veranstaltungen.

Um die aktuelle Situation einschätzen zu können, möchte ich im Folgenden einen kleinen Rückblick auf die historische Entwicklung Pakistans geben.

Mit der Gründung des Nationalkongresses 1885 nahm die indische Unabhängigkeitsbewegung von der britischen Kolonialmacht Gestalt an. Als Gegenstück zum hinduistisch dominierten Kongress entstand 1906 die Muslimliga, deren Führer Muhammad Ali Jinnah die Mehrheit der indischen Muslime für einen eigenen Staat mobilisierte.

In der im Jahre 1940 verabschiedeten sogenannten Lahore-Resolution wurde dann jedoch endgültig die Gründung eines eigenständigen muslimischen Staates auf

dem Gebiet Indiens beschlossen.

Am 14. August 1947 bildete sich aus den überwiegend muslimischen Gebieten Britisch-Indiens der Staat Pakistan. Über vier Millionen Muslime verließen in dieser Zeit das heutige Indien, während etwa sieben Millionen Hindus und Sikhs nach Indien gingen, ein Flüchtlingsstrom, der durch Gewaltakte und Strapazen über 700.000 Menschen das Leben nahm.

Nach der Teilung bestand Pakistan aus den beiden etwa 1.500 Kilometer auseinanderliegenden Landesteilen West- und Ostpakistan, wobei sich Ostpakistan 1971 unabhängig machte und heute Bangladesh heißt.

Die Zugehörigkeit des Fürstenstaates Kaschmir zu Indien oder Pakistan war dagegen umstritten. Von wenigen überwiegend hinduistischen und buddhistischen Gegenden abgesehen, war die Bevölkerung des Staates überwiegend muslimischen Glaubens. Die herrschende Dynastie war jedoch hinduistisch, weshalb sich der damalige Fürst Indien anschloss. Pakistan erlangte jedoch die Herrschaft über den westlichen und nördlichen Teil dieser Region.

Beide Staaten beanspruchen ganz Kaschmir als ihr Territorium, eine von den Vereinten Nationen vorgeschlagene Volksabstimmung wurde nie durchgeführt. Der Kaschmir-Konflikt prägt seither die Beziehung zwischen Pakistan und Indien und ist in drei Kriegen – in den Jahren 1947, 1965 und 1971 – eskaliert.

Bereits 1948 verstarb Ali Jinnah, der so etwas wie eine Vaterfigur des gerade erst gegründeten Staates Pakistan darstellte.

Unbeständige politische Zustände führten 1958 zum ersten Militärputsch unter General Muhammad Ayub Khan und damit zu einem Wendepunkt in der Geschichte des Landes. Seitdem bestimmten immer wieder Militärdiktaturen die Geschicke Pakistans. Auf das Regime Ayub Khan folgte 1969 die Regierung des Generals Muhammad Yahya Khan. Zudem sah sich der junge Staat von Anfang an vor eine innere Zerreißprobe gestellt. Die große Entfernung zwischen den beiden Landesteilen West- und Ostpakistan erschwerte nicht nur die staatliche und wirtschaftliche Organisation, sondern auch die Entstehung einer gemeinsamen nationalen Identität.

Der Verlust des östlichen Landesteiles veranlasste Präsident Yahya Khan 1971 zum Rücktritt, was eine vorsichtige Demokratisierung Pakistans einleitete. Sein Nachfolger Zulfikar Ali Bhutto erließ 1973 eine neue Verfassung, in der er dem Premierminister die wichtigsten Vollmachten zuerkannte und die Rolle des Präsidenten auf rein repräsentative Aufgaben beschränkte. 1977 scheiterte jedoch die Errichtung einer demokratischen Regierung. Der damalige Armeechef, General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, rief das Kriegsrecht aus und begründete so die dritte Militärdiktatur. Zia ul-Haq leitete anschließend eine Islamisierung Pakistans ein, unter anderem, indem er die Scharia als Rechtsgrundlage einführte.

Belastend auf die politische und wirtschaftliche Stabilität wirkten sich zudem der Bürgerkrieg und die sowjetische Invasion des Nachbarlandes Afghanistan zwischen 1979 und 1989 aus. Nach dem Tod Zia-ul-Haqs 1988 fanden wieder freie Wahlen statt, aus denen mit Benazir Bhutto zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte eines islamischen Staates eine Frau als Siegerin hervorging. Auf sie folgte 1990 die Regierung Nawaz Sharifs. 1993 gelang Benazir Bhutto die Rückkehr an die Macht, bis sie 1997 abermals von Nawaz Sharif abgelöst wurde.

Ende Mai 1998 reagierte Pakistan mit sechs unterirdischen Kernwaffentests auf fünf vorangegangene Atomversuche des Nachbarlandes Indien und bestätigte damit endgültig den erfolgreichen Abschluss seines 1972 begonnenen Atomprogramms. 1999 setzte General Pervez Musharraf die gewählte Regierung Sharifs in einem Militärputsch ab und errichtete die vierte Militärdiktatur Pakistans.

Seit den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 stand Pakistan in verstärktem Maße im Spannungsfeld religiös motivierter Auseinandersetzungen, insbesondere da Musharraf eine enge politische und militärische Allianz mit den USA eingegangen war, welche im Land sehr umstritten war. Unabhängig davon beteiligte sich Pakistan weiter am Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus. Obwohl anfangs im Volk sehr beliebt, unterliefen dem damaligen Präsidenten Musharraf nach Meinung verschiedener Beobachter viele innen- und außenpolitische Fehler in der Amtsführung. So wurden ihm Unregelmäßigkeiten und Manipulationen bei der Parlamentswahl im Jahr 2002 vorgeworfen sowie eine Missachtung der Gewaltenteilung. Seine Entscheidung, den politisch unbequemen Obersten Richter Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry von seinem Amt zu suspendieren, hatte eine Massenbewegung für die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz in Pakistan provoziert. Auch wurde die Ausrufung des "State of Emergency" als Vorwand für die präventive Verhinderung eines Richterspruchs angesehen, welche die Wahl Musharrafs zum Präsidenten für ungültig erklärt hätte. Verschiedene Stimmen nicht nur in Pakistan sahen darin lediglich den Versuch, sich lästiger Kritiker zu entledigen. Die Verhaftungen, der Hausarrest von Führern politischer Parteien, von Juristen, von Vertretern des öffentlichen Lebens waren fragwürdige Mittel, um die Ordnung in Pakistan zu erhalten, denn die Notstandsmaßnahmen richteten sich offensichtlich



gerade gegen die Kräfte, die Pakistan gebraucht hätte, um eine demokratische, rechtsstaatliche und stabile Gesellschaft aufzubauen.

Im Lichte der aktuellen Ereignisse in Pakistan ist der Weltpolitik einmal mehr sehr deutlich geworden, welche extrem wichtige Position Pakistan für die westlichen Sicherheitsinteressen einnimmt. Wenn Pakistan mit seinen über 160 Millionen Einwohnern in Chaos und Gewalt versinkt, dann bedroht dies auch deutsche Sicherheitsinteressen, insbesondere im Nachbarland Afghanistan. Atomwaffen und Raketenysteme in den Händen von islamistischen Terroristen sind nur eine der Gefahren, die oft genannt werden.

Zu konstatieren ist, dass Pakistans bisheriger Präsident Musharraf sich im Kampf gegen den Terror durchaus als wichtiger Verbündeter des gesamten Westens gezeigt hatte. Er hat bis an den Rand seiner innenpolitischen Kräfte nach den Anschlägen vom 11. September 2001 den Kampf gegen al-Qaida und fanatische Taliban unterstützt. Musharraf hat innenpolitisch nach kemalistisch-laizistischem Vorbild die sogenannte "Enlightened Moderation" propagiert und zu Beginn seiner Herrschaft für eine durchaus freie, kritische und pluralistische Medienvielfalt gesorgt.

Eine zivile Regierung, das Prinzip der Gewaltenteilung, die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz, die Freiheit der Medien, das sind die tragenden Säulen jeder Demokratie, und es sind auch die Dämme, die Pakistan vor dem Chaos bewahren. Ein Zeichen für die Rückkehr zur Demokratie waren die bereits am 18. Februar 2008 durchgeführten Wahlen, die die bisherige Oppositionspartei PPP als Sieger hervorbrachten. Konsequenterweise leitete die PPP ein Amtsenthungsverfahren gegen Musharraf ein, worauf dieser zurücktrat und von Asif Ali Zardari als Präsident ersetzt wurde.

Gerade das Image Pakistans in der interna-

tionalen Welt, welches sehr gelitten hat, könnte jetzt wieder eine Verbesserung erfahren. Das Land gilt im Allgemeinen sicherlich zu Unrecht als Unruheherd in Südasien, als Brutstätte des Terrorismus, des islamischen Fundamentalismus, der Talibanisierung und der nuklearen Proliferation. Gerne wird dieses Bild in westlichen Medien von Pakistan gezeichnet; dass dies aber nur zehn Prozent des eigentlichen Pakistans ausmacht, wird leider medial kaum erfasst.

Das Land ist überwiegend säkular ausgerichtet mit einer vorrangig aufgeklärten Bevölkerung, einer sehr vibrierenden und vitalen Kunst- und Kulturszene in Karachi, Lahore und Islamabad sowie einem starken Wirtschaftswachstum von über acht Prozent. Dies macht das andere Pakistan aus, in dem junge pakistanische Ärzte, Ingenieure und IT-Experten in exzellenten Institutionen ausgebildet werden und das große Potenzial dieses Landes darstellen.

Geostrategisch könnte Pakistan in den nächsten 25 Jahren zu einem der wichtigsten Länder Asiens werden. Zu nennen sind die Erdöl- und Gaspipeline, welche von Turkmenistan über Afghanistan und Pakistan in das Arabische Meer münden soll, sowie die Gaspipeline von Iran über Pakistan nach Indien. Folgerichtig gibt es auch zwischen Deutschland und Pakistan eine lange Tradition von sehr positiven Ansätzen der Zusammenarbeit. Zu nennen sind die Hochschulkooperationen der Universität Tübingen mit der Universität Karachi im Bereich der Chemie, aber auch viele andere wie etwa die Kooperation der Humboldt Universität mit der Universität Faisalabad im Bereich Landwirtschaft und die der Universität Bonn im Fachgebiet Geographie. Ein Megaprojekt ist die deutsche Technische Universität in Lahore, welche von pakistanischer Seite mit über 500 Millionen Euro finanziert wird. Auch unsere Entwicklungshilfe ist über die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), die Kreditanstalt für

Wiederaufbau (KfW) und die Senior Experten Service (SES) vertreten und leistet wertvolle Arbeit. Auch wirtschaftlich ist Deutschland in Pakistan präsent. Viele deutsche Firmen haben Niederlassungen in Pakistan, wo Produkte vor allem für den einheimischen Markt hergestellt werden. Zu nennen sind Siemens, BASF, Bayer, Hoechst und die Firma Merk. Lufthansa hat nach einer Pause von zehn Jahren wieder Direktflüge nach Karachi und Lahore

aufgenommen und die Handelskette Metro eröffnete Ende des letzten Jahres in verschiedenen Städten erste Filialen.

Trotz der aktuellen Probleme habe ich als Präsident des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Forums das Ziel, die vielfältigen Beziehungen zwischen Pakistan und Deutschland weiter zu stärken. Ich bin sicher, die vorliegende Publikation wird dazu einen konstruktiven und fruchtbaren Beitrag leisten.

# Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Legacy to Pakistan

M. Aslam Syed

One year ago, an article appeared in an Urdu newspaper with the startling title "We want the Pakistan of 1948". Since 1948, Pakistan has made tremendous progress in industry, technology, health, education, agriculture, and other social and economic fields. What was missing in the Pakistan of 2007 that it had in 1948? The article did indeed show what was missing from the Pakistan of today. The writer had shown a few glimpses from the public and private life of the founder of Pakistan during his brief tenure as the first Governor-General and compared it with the profiles of the present leaders of the country. Jinnah's legacy was missing from the Pakistan of 2007. In view of their relevance to today's topic, the following anecdotes will serve to illustrate some of these insights.

"Sir, should we serve coffee or tea during the cabinet meeting?" Jinnah's aide-de-camp asked. "Plain water should be served. Those ministers who want to have coffee or tea may take whatever they like when they return to their homes. We should be careful about spending public money."

Some items were purchased for the Governor-General's House. After going through the bill which amounted to only 38 rupees, Jinnah asked his secretary to take the money from his sister's account for the things that she had ordered; he would pay for those items that were bought for his personal use, and only those goods that were to remain in the Governor-General's House would be charged to the State Exchequer.

The British High Commissioner asked Jinnah to receive the British King's brother at the airport upon his arrival in Pakistan. "It should be reciprocal," Jinnah told him.

"If my brother visits England, the King should also receive him." During his last days of terminal illness, his physician presented him a new pair of socks. He liked them but when he came to know the price (two rupees), he returned them with the remark that a poor country's head of the state could not afford such luxurious items.

While these and many more events in his public and private life act as reminders to those political leaders of Pakistan who have not been able to hold such standards of honesty, integrity, and respect for public funds, there are more important aspects of Jinnah's legacy that have been compromised. Before discussing those, it would be appropriate to have a brief survey of his life because his legacy and life reflect each other. The first part will look at the Jinnah who strove for the freedom of India and Hindu-Muslim unity, earning him the title of the 'Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity'. The second part will be devoted to his disappointment and frustration in the wake of the changing contours of Indian politics, his brief self-exile to England, and his return to lead the movement for Pakistan. And finally, the manifestation of his vision and legacy after he had achieved the creation of Pakistan.

## 1. The campaign for Hindu-Muslim unity

Jinnah was born on 25 December 1876 in Karachi to a middle-class merchant family. His father was not rich but had a comfortable life and valued education. Jinnah received his early education at the Sind Madrasatul Islam and the Christian Missionary Society High School. After his entrance examination, his father decided to

send him to London in 1893 to study business and accounting at Graham's Shipping and Trading Company, his senior business partners. Within a few months of his arrival, Jinnah left the business firm and joined Lincoln's Inn to pursue a career in law. In order to finance his education, he worked at different places including a brief but important job as an actor in a theatre. He was inclined to pursue this career but his father, however, disapproved. In 1896, he was called to the bar. During his studies, while assisting Dadabhai Nauroji, the first Indian Member of the Parliament, he developed a passion for politics. This passion was guided by two factors: one was the British racist attitude of contempt and humiliation and the other was the slavish and apologetic behaviour of his countrymen towards their masters. Jinnah detested both.

On his return to India, Jinnah started his legal practice and soon emerged as one of the leading barristers of his country. Impressed with his performance Sir Charles Ollivant, judicial member of the Bombay provincial government, offered him a position with an inflated salary of 1,500 rupees a month. This was indeed a handsome amount in 1901 but Jinnah refused, saying that soon he would earn that much in a day. And indeed he did. By this time he had joined the Indian National Congress and attended its 1906 Calcutta session as private secretary to the President of the Congress. His services to the party and his fame as a leading lawyer earned him public fame and he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council in 1910.

During this period, Jinnah's political activities were reflective of his motives to persuade the British to show some respect to the Indians and to give them Home Rule, and to unite the different religious and ethnic communities of India on one platform. While his zeal to achieve these two goals knew no bounds, he was nevertheless constrained by his training

and approach towards such complex issues. He had to work within the British constitutional and legal system.

The Imperial Legislative Council of India was not an active body but just an advisory adjunct to the British colonial rule. Nonetheless, within its framework Jinnah effectively spoke for the rights of his countrymen. Conscious of social evils like child marriage, he was instrumental in the passage of the Child Marriages Restraint Act. The British had appropriated Muslim endowments and trusts. He sponsored the Waqf Validating Bill which freed many Muslim charities from the British clutches and endeared him to the Muslims of India. Perhaps more important was his contribution in exposing British policies towards the Indians in South Africa. While describing the British treatment as "harsh and cruel", he earned the wrath of the viceroy, Lord Minto. The viceroy reprimanded him for using the words harsh and cruel. Jinnah replied: "My Lord! I should feel much inclined to use much stronger language. But I am fully aware of the constitution of this Council, and I do not wish to trespass for one single moment. But I do say that the treatment meted out to Indians is the harshest and the feeling in this country is unanimous".<sup>1</sup>

Jinnah joined the All India Muslim League in 1913 while retaining his membership of the Congress. During the First World War, he actively supported the British in their war hoping that such efforts would be rewarded after the war. In order to give them a clear message that the two main religious communities of India, Hindus and Muslims, were unanimous in their struggle against British colonialism, he convened a joint session of the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League in Lucknow in 1916. It was indeed a landmark in the political history of South Asia, being the first such occasion when the two communities agreed on some principles of co-existence. The same year,

with the help of Annie Besant and others, he founded the All India Home Rule League. He was at the peak of his popularity as a staunch Indian nationalist with no love for sectarian cries. Some highly placed British had to admit his enormous contribution and capabilities. Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, wrote of him in 1917: "Jinnah is a very clever man, and it is, of course, an outrage that such a man should have no chance of running the affairs of his own country".<sup>2</sup>

After the end of the war, the British did not honour India with either Home Rule or even with gratitude for their contribution during the war. On the contrary, oppressive and draconian laws were passed to quell the movement for freedom. Jinnah and his wife led a mass demonstration against the idea of giving a farewell reception to the oppressive and arrogant outgoing governor of Bombay, Lord Willingdon. The citizens of Bombay were so overwhelmed with Jinnah's bold move that they built the Jinnah Memorial Hall to commemorate this event in 1918. It still exists inside the compound of old Congress House as P.J. Hall. The abbreviation P.J. stands for People's Jinnah, perhaps to cover the identity of the man who inspired this monument.<sup>3</sup>

Many of his contemporaries have praised his outlook and vision for India. Stanley Wolpert writes that he was adored by most women at first sight and admired or envied by most men.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps Mrs. Sarojini Naidu paid the best tribute to him in her book "Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity". She wrote: "Tall and stately, but thin to the point of emaciation, languid and luxurious of habit, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's attenuated form is a deceptive sheath of a spirit of exceptional vitality and endurance. Somewhat formal and fastidious, and a little aloof and imperious of manner, the calm hauteur of his accustomed reserve but masks, for those

who know him, a naive and eager humanity, an intuition quick and tender as a woman's, a humour gay and winning as a child's. Pre-eminently rational and practical, discreet and dispassionate in his estimate and acceptance of life, the obvious sanity and serenity of his worldly wisdom effectually disguise a shy and splendid idealism which is of the very essence of the man."<sup>5</sup>

The British rewarded India with the Rowlatt Act, which authorized provincial governments to issue warrants and detain anyone without going through the necessary judicial procedure. Jinnah strongly opposed it on the ground that it was against the law of justice that any man should be denied his rights without a judicial trial. As a protest, he resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council. In his letter of resignation, he echoed the sentiments of Indians: "The passing of the Rowlatt Bill ... has severely shaken the trust reposed by them in British justice".

Gandhi's return to India and his style of politics brought religion into the picture. At about the same time, the British started occupying parts of the defeated Ottoman Empire. They had assured the Muslims that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be maintained. This betrayal of pledge became the starting point of the Khilafat Movement. Paradoxically, it was not Jinnah who would lead this movement, but Gandhi. Jinnah did declare that whereas the Rowlatt Act was an attack on India's liberty, appropriation of the Muslim territories amounted to an attack on their religion. But he was opposed to Gandhi's mass movement in the name of religion. He warned Gandhi that this kind of movement would appeal only to the illiterate and the inexperienced youth of the country, and would have horrible consequences. Jinnah felt that even this issue should be fought constitutionally. In the Congress session of 1920, his was the only voice that opposed the resolution for a

mass movement. He said: "... the weapon will not destroy the British empire ... it is neither logical nor is it politically sound or wise, nor practically capable of being put in execution."

Colonel Wedgwood, who heard Jinnah's speech, was very impressed and commented: "I do not know enough about Mr. Jinnah's politics to say whether I agree with him or not, but I do know that a man who has the courage to come to this audience and tell what he has told you is a man of my money. The first thing in every political leader is not brains, but courage."<sup>6</sup>

## **2. From disillusionment and self-exile to the creation of Pakistan**

This was the beginning of Jinnah's disillusionment with the Congress. The period following the Khilafat Movement witnessed many instances of Hindu-Muslim riots. His legacy of Hindu-Muslim unity had become a victim of the politics of religion. But he still remained active, and in February 1924 introduced an important resolution in the Legislative Council (he was re-elected by the citizens of Bombay) that aimed at the Indianization of the army and including Indian businessmen and manufacturers by inviting tenders in the Indian currency.

Jinnah continued to look for formulas that could bring these two communities together in their struggle against the British imperialism. The Congress was unwilling to accept the separate electorates for the Muslims that it had approved in the Lucknow Pact. Jinnah persuaded the Muslim delegates to give up this demand. Instead, they asked for some guarantees in the so-called Delhi-Muslim Proposals of 1927. The Congress accepted the withdrawal of separate electorates but denied the other demands. Jinnah again extended his co-operation to the Hindu leaders, when the Simon Commission

(1927) visited India, in their demand that some Indian members should be included in the Commission. This co-operation led to a split in the All India Muslim League but Jinnah remained steadfast in his resolve and declared the composition of the Commission a "butchery of our souls". As president of the Muslim League he said: "A constitutional war has been declared on Great Britain. Negotiations for a settlement are not to come from our side ... We are denied equal partnership. We will resist the new doctrine to the best of our powers ... I welcome Pandit Malaviya, and I welcome the hand of fellowship extended to us by Hindu leaders from the platform of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha ... this offer is more valuable than any concession which the British Government can make".<sup>7</sup>

Even this co-operation between the Congress and the Muslim League was short-lived. In 1928, Motilal Nehru presented a constitutional formula which is known as the Nehru Report. These proposals totally ignored Muslim demands and the Congress leadership acted as the only supreme body authorized to shape the future of India. Still, it did not result in a "parting of the ways". Jinnah said: "We are all sons of the soil. We have to live together ... If we cannot agree, let us at any rate agree to differ, but let us part as friends".<sup>8</sup> He tried once again to act as mediator to bring some rapprochement between the two parties but he was not successful. In March 1929, he voiced the concerns of the Muslim League in his Fourteen Points but they also met the same fate as his previous interventions. Motilal Nehru's letter to Gandhi explains the thinking of Congress at this stage: "We agreed that the Hindu opposition to the Muslim demands was to continue and even be stiffened up by the time the Convention was held." He concluded: "You will see that the stumbling block in our way is this question of one-third Muslim representatives and on this point even the

most advanced Musalmans like Dr. M. A. Ansari, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mr. T.A.K. Sherwani and others are all very strongly in favour of the concession. I would therefore ask you to direct your attention now to the Mahasabha, leaving Ali Brothers and Mr. Jinnah to stew in their own juice."<sup>9</sup>

Jinnah decided to leave India and settle in England. In January 1931 he asked his daughter Dina and sister Fatima to join him in London. During his stay in London he kept in touch with the political developments in India and attended two sessions of the Round Table Conferences. Explaining his decision to stay in England to the students of the Muslim University Union, he said: "I received the shock of my life at the Round Table Conference ... I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor make the Musalmans realize their precarious position. I felt so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London. Not that I did not love India; but I felt utterly helpless. I kept in touch with India."<sup>10</sup>

The Indian delegates at the Round Table Conference could not come up with an agreed formula. The British Prime Minister announced the Communal Award on 16 April 1932 promising reforms on the pattern of the Lucknow Pact, which was the only moment in history when the Muslims and the Hindus had agreed upon any issue. However, this Award deprived the Muslims of their majority in important provinces like Bengal and Punjab. Many Muslim leaders visited Jinnah in London and tried to persuade him to return to India. He was reluctant because the Muslims were not only divided in many political factions, but also feudal lords and those who had little understanding of the political developments dominated the Muslim League. It is not known what prompted him to return to India but many historians believe that the celebrated poet,

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, convinced him through his letters. In fact, some of these letters do indeed show that Iqbal was sure that no other leader except Jinnah was capable of leading the Muslims at that juncture. In an interview, Iqbal's son, Dr. Javed Iqbal, was asked: "There were many other Muslim leaders like Maulana Azad, Dr. M. A. Ansari, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, Maulana Hussain Madani who were certainly more devout than Jinnah. Why did Iqbal choose Jinnah, who even didn't know Urdu, to plead for Pakistan?" Dr. Javed Iqbal's answer was: "Because Iqbal felt that Jinnah was more sincere to the cause of Muslims than any other Muslim leader of the sub-continent."<sup>11</sup>

In anticipation of his return, various factions of the Muslim League met in Delhi on 4 March 1934, decided to merge into one party, and elected Jinnah as the President of this united League. Jinnah arrived in Delhi the next month and received an enthusiastic welcome. He reorganized the party and infused it with a new spirit. After three years he returned to Lucknow, the city where he had laid the foundation of Hindu-Muslim unity about twenty years ago, to address nearly five thousand delegates from all over India. His address reflected the enormous changes that had taken place on the political horizon of the sub-continent. The Muslim League did not do well in the elections of 1936. The Congress ministries were viewed as favouring Hindus and ignoring Muslims. Jinnah declared:

"This Session of the All India Muslim League is one of the most critical that has ever taken place during its existence. The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Muslims of India more and more, by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu; they are in a majority, they have by their words, deeds and programme shown, more and more, the Muslims cannot expect

any justice or fair play at their hands. Wherever they were in a majority and wherever it suited them, they refused to cooperate with the Muslim League parties and demanded unconditional surrender."<sup>12</sup>

It was not just the speech that was different from his earlier address in Lucknow, the speaker was no longer in his Savile Row suit or wearing a European head cover; he wore a black long coat (sherwani), traditional white trousers, and a karakul cap. The cap would soon acquire a new name, the "Jinnah cap". One poet addressed him as Quaid-i-Azam (the great leader). This title became so popular that it almost replaced Jinnah. He had indeed emerged as the leader of Muslim India. After this session, the Muslim League also reached unprecedented heights of popularity. Within a few months, more than 170 new branches of the League were established. It is estimated that more than 100,000 Muslims joined the League from the United Provinces (today: Uttar Pradesh) alone. Finally, the Congress Ministries resigned and Jinnah's call to celebrate that moment as the "Day of Deliverance" met with response not only from the Muslims but also the scheduled casts.

Now Jinnah was ready to explain to the world what sort of constitution would suit India. He wrote an article for *Time* and *Tide* of London. It was published on 19 January 1940 under the caption "The Constitutional Future of India". Jinnah argued: "The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither inter-marry, nor inter-dine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. They ... derive their inspirations from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of

one is foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state."<sup>13</sup>

The passing of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940 indicated the road that Jinnah was going to follow. A year later in April 1941 in Madras, he elaborated his vision for the new state: "Our goal is Pakistan. Now what next? No people can ever succeed in anything unless they work for it and work hard." He asked the Muslims to devise a definite and well-considered educational plan. "It is knowledge, information and enlightenment that make a people great", he declared. Secondly, since the Muslims were much further behind than the other communities of India in economic and social fields, great efforts were required to improve their status in these areas. Thirdly, Muslims needed political training that was based on the principles of security, justice and fair play. And finally, he emphasized the promotion of goodwill and harmony with the other peoples on the basis of equality, fair play and reciprocity, with the objective of collective security and orderly development among free states as members of a community pledged to respect each other's rights.<sup>14</sup>

While Jinnah was preparing these formulas for the envisaged state of Pakistan, the British were passing through a difficult phase of the war. France fell in June 1940. By the end of 1941, the United States had joined the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. The Allies desperately needed the goodwill of the Indian leaders. Churchill's arrogance did not allow him to make any commitments regarding the freedom of India. Under the pressure of President Roosevelt, however, he sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India in March 1942.



His arrival coincided with the second anniversary of the Lahore Resolution. After meeting with the Congress leaders, he met Jinnah and told him that he had changed his view about the Muslim League and Pakistan because of the "change in the communal feeling in India and the growth of the Pakistan movement". His declaration that after the war, India would be given a Dominion Status and a newly elected Constituent Assembly would frame the constitution, however, did not please anybody. The Congress was unhappy because he gave an indication that those provinces that did not approve the new constitution could retain the present framework and would be treated at par with the Indian Union. The Congress smelt Pakistan in this proposal while the Muslim League felt that the idea of Pakistan was treated only as a remote possibility.

At this stage of the analysis of Jinnah's legacy, it is crucial to point out that his understanding of the duration and the outcome of the Second World War were largely responsible for his success in the following years. The Congress leaders thought that the war would be short and would result in the British defeat. Their policies towards the British were, thus, reflective of this idea. They wanted the British to leave. In 1939, shortly after viceroy Linlithgow proclaimed British India at war with Germany, Nehru called upon the viceroy to issue an immediate promise of "absolute freedom to India after the war and the right of India to draft her own constitution," as the price for Congress's support. Jinnah, on the other hand, called upon all Muslims to help the British by "honourable co-operation" at this critical and difficult juncture.

The Congress leadership was bitterly engaged with the British over the future of India. They were trying to convince them that there were only two parties to this issue: the British rulers and the Congress. Jinnah insisted that the Muslim League

was the third party equally concerned with the future of India. Furthermore, the Congress claimed that it represented all Indians including Muslims. Jinnah had to prove that the League was the sole representative of the Muslims. The elections of 1946 proved beyond any doubt that the Muslim League indeed represented the Indian Muslims. In many ways, these elections also demonstrated that the Congress did not represent the Muslims, at least in the manner in which it had claimed.

The war ended in 1945 and with that the British also forgot their pledges made to India, especially to the Muslim League. It was indeed a very difficult period for Jinnah. His health had deteriorated to the extent that his sister Fatima would often ask him to take some time off from his busy schedule and rest. Whenever she expressed her concern for his health he would reply that one man's health was insignificant when the very existence of a hundred million Muslims was threatened. "Do you know how much is at stake?" he would ask her.<sup>15</sup>

Some historians and political analysts have argued that Jinnah never wanted Pakistan and that he used the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims as a bargaining ploy. This argument is based on his acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan that called for a loose federation of Indian provinces and princely states. This neither represents a true understanding of the man nor the odds against which he had to work. Jinnah was a constitutionalist and he had always worked within the system. On more than one occasion he had very skilfully used that system to his advantage. He knew the Congress leadership too well to expect that they would agree to a loose federation as stipulated by the Cabinet Mission. Subsequent events proved that he was right. Secondly, it is amazing that none of the stalwarts in the Congress realized that his Pakistan was just a

"bargain ploy". They could have easily used it to their advantage. Just as staunch as he was for a Hindu-Muslim unity that brooked no compromises, he remained steadfast in his struggle for Pakistan, after realizing that an independent Muslim state was the only solution to the complexities of Indian polity, and he never wavered for a moment from that goal. It was not plain sailing and he had to tackle many unexpected and often violent currents, but the fact remains that he successfully completed his voyage.

Even after accepting that the Muslim majority provinces would go to Pakistan, the British partitioned Punjab and Bengal, they held referendums in some Muslim majority provinces to assess whether the population of those provinces would opt for Pakistan or not. Jinnah accepted all these challenges. The demarcation of the boundary between India and Pakistan was so unjust and bereft of all known principles of fairness and justice that even a thousand pledges and oaths would have defied it. Jinnah's reaction, however, is noteworthy: "We have been squeezed in as much as was possible and the latest blow that we have received is the Award of the Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse Award. It may be wrong, unjust and perverse; and it may not be a judicial but a political Award, but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us. As honourable people we must abide by it. It may be our misfortune but we must bear up this one more blow with fortitude, courage and hope."<sup>16</sup>

Time magazine published a survey of the most influential Asian leaders of the last century. In this galaxy, Jinnah occupied the most envious position. The magazine wrote: "After the 1937 elections, when the majority Congress party refused to share power with the Muslim League, Jinnah concluded that under its leadership Muslims would become second-class

citizens. From then on the road led only to Pakistan. 'Think 100 times before you take a decision', Jinnah said at the Muslim League's historic 1940 Lahore Conference, which came down in favor of partition. 'But once that decision is taken, stand by it as one man.' He obeyed his own diktat and refused to be deflected by political expediency. There was no force to back him. He created Pakistan out of sheer will and against enormous odds."<sup>17</sup>

### **3. Jinnah's vision and legacy for the new state of Pakistan**

Pakistan came into existence on 14 August 1947. Mountbatten, the last viceroy of British India, arrived in Karachi to inaugurate the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. On that occasion, he asked the Government of Pakistan to follow the example of the great Mughal ruler, Akbar, in its treatment of the minorities. Jinnah's response is notable: "It will be our constant endeavour to work for the welfare and well-being of all the communities in Pakistan, and I hope that everyone would be inspired by the idea of public service, and they will be imbued with the spirit of co-operation and will excel in their political and civic virtues which go to make a great nation and help to advance its greatness. The tolerance and goodwill that great Emperor Akbar showed to all the non-Muslim is not of recent origin. It dates back thirteen centuries ago when our Prophet not only by words but by deeds treated the Jews and Christians, after he had conquered them, with the utmost tolerance and regard and respect for their faith and beliefs. The whole history of Muslims, wherever they ruled, is replete with those humane and great principles which should be followed and practised."<sup>18</sup>

Three days earlier, in his address to the Constituent Assembly, he had given a manifesto to the legislators of the new state. Because of its guidelines for the

rulers and the legislators, it deserves to be quoted at length. After thanking the members for electing him President of the Constituent Assembly, he said:

"The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan ... Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasize is this: remember that you are now a sovereign legislative body and you have got all the powers. It, therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions. The first observation that I would like to make is this: You will no doubt agree with me that the first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State.

The second thing that occurs to me is this: One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering – I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think our condition is much worse – is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so.

The next thing that strikes me is this: here again it is a legacy which has been passed on to us. Along with many other things, good and bad, has arrived this great evil, the evil of nepotism and jobbery. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. Whenever I will find that such a practice is in vogue or is continuing

anywhere, low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it."

Reflecting on the division of India into two states, he said that he knew that in India and Pakistan many people did not agree that India should have been partitioned. "Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of everyone of us to loyally abide by it and honourably act according to the agreement which is now final and binding on all. But you must remember, as I have said, that this mighty revolution that has taken place is unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two communities wherever one community is in majority and the other is in minority. But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than what has been done, a division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record its verdict in favour of it. And what is more, it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that that was the only solution of India's constitutional problem. Any idea of a united India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster. Maybe that view is correct; maybe it is not; that remains to be seen."

Jinnah's next point was about the future. He asked: "Now what shall we do?" His answer was that if we want to make this great state of Pakistan happy and prosperous, "we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no

matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make."

Citing religious and ethnic discriminations as the greatest curses that enslave nations, he declared: "I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Kshatriyas, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long, long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. We are all citizens and equal citizens of one state, all members of the Nation, and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state. My guiding principle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations of the world."<sup>19</sup>

This, indeed, was the legacy that Jinnah bequeathed to his people. While his speech on 14 August manifests his pride in the Islamic legacy of the Prophet, his address on 11 August lays down the principles of statehood. Some scholars see this as a contradiction in that he literally repudiates the idea of "Two Nations". But this amounts to a superficial reading of his thoughts. The "Two Nations" theory and the separate electorates acted as vehicles in the movement for Pakistan. They were necessary tools for the onerous journey but once one reached the destination, one required implementation of those ideas that are essential for integration and welfare of the different segments of the society. In fact, Jinnah here once again emerges as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. Now that the sub-continent had two states, one with a Hindu majority and the other with a Muslim majority, the minorities on both sides would feel safer. He perceived religion as a private affair of the respective believers or, for that matter, non-believers. As a Muslim, he showed tremendous pride in the intellectual legacy of Islam. But then as a lawyer, he knew the diversities in Islamic legal schools, therefore on many occasions he declared that Pakistan's legal system would be based on the Common Law.

Certain analysts have pointed out that on some occasions he used the term "Islamic State" and that he also referred to Islam as his guiding force in his quest for democracy and modernism. Indeed he did. But those statements have not only been taken out of context but also superimposed on his speech to the lawmakers. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that many political leaders in Pakistan have distorted his words to seek legitimacy and to impose their respective brands of democracy. In

his speech to the Aligarh Muslim Students Association, he took pride in freeing the Muslims from the reactionary elements:

"What the League has done is to set you free from the reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainly freed you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Maulanas. I am not speaking of Maulvis as a whole class. There are some of them who are as patriotic and sincere as any other but there is a section of them which is undesirable. Having freed ourselves from the clutches of the British government, the Congress, the reactionaries and so-called Maulvis, may I appeal to the youth to emancipate our women."<sup>20</sup> In his address to the American people, he declared: "Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Parsis – but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan."<sup>21</sup>

Jinnah was a constitutionalist and remained so even in the face of those moments when rationality and legal norms are invariably sacrificed at the altar of political expediencies. As stated earlier, he had asked the Muslim youths to emancipate women. The sensitivity of this issue can be gauged from a recent event in Baluchistan where five women were buried alive simply because they wanted to marry the men of their own choice, and regrettably this horrible crime was justified by an educated member of the Senate claiming to represent "the norms and values of the Baluch culture". Sixty-one years ago, Jinnah took his sister to the same province and made her sit next to him on the stage at the Sibi Darbar, the grand annual assembly of the tribal chiefs. We need to keep in mind that in this part of Pakistan, even the British shied away from assigning any public role to their women.

Sovereignty of Parliament and rule by the elected representatives of the people were

at the centre of his speech to the Constituent Assembly. He strongly believed in that liberal tradition that had nurtured him. Paradoxically, he was also aware of the socio-cultural milieu of the sub-continent where such liberal traditions were conveniently swept under the rug of parochialism, nepotism, and fanaticism. This awareness, nonetheless, did not diminish his confidence in the people, especially when they had rejected the call of traditional religious leaders and other obscurantist elements and had voted for Jinnah's party. In numerous statements, he had assured curious journalists that he had done his part, and now it would be up to the people of Pakistan to choose whatever style of democracy they wanted; he also stressed that the people would opt for a liberal democracy.

Jinnah's political legacy dwelt on an undiluted democracy, constitutionalism, autonomy of the executive, judiciary, and legislature, a free press, civil liberties, rule of law and accountability. He envisioned Pakistan as a welfare state where feudal lords and capitalists would submit to the demands of peasants and workers. On more than one occasion, he had warned the feudal lords to heed to the call of the poor. Jinnah stood for enforcing law and order, for the elimination of nepotism, bribery, corruption and black-marketeering, for wiping out distinctions of race, religion and colour, for providing equal rights and opportunities to one and all, and for the economic betterment of the masses. "Why would I turn my blood into water, run about and take so much trouble? Not for the capitalists surely, but for you, the poor people", he told his audience at Calcutta on 1 March 1946.<sup>22</sup>

It would be relevant here to see the impressions of an American journalist who visited Pakistan in December 1947. He wrote: "The story is told that when Mumtaz Daultana, the brains of the West Punjab ministry, went to his huge Multan

estate in August, his Moslem tenants, all staunch League members, congratulated him on the achievement of Pakistan, and landlord and tenants feasted together. But a pall was thrown over the festivities when a peasant asked: 'When will the land be given to us?' This question is being asked repeatedly, for agrarian reforms have been promised by the League. Similar resentment against the rich is voiced in the towns. A Moslem clerk who is the local secretary of the League in his ward is made conscious of social differences when he goes from his filthy, overcrowded tenement home to the palatial residence of the provincial leader. At a recent meeting in Lahore a fervent young Leaguer exclaimed: 'The rich are finished! Let us shoot them!' Since Pakistan's establishment, League officers have been cautious about declaring where they stand with respect to the conflict between Russia and the West. Pakistan is nearer to the Soviet border than to either Britain or the United States, and substantial segments of public opinion show an interest in the U.S.S.R. Even orthodox Moslems are watching developments in the Soviet Moslem areas, such as Bokhara, which are close to Pakistan culturally as well as geographically. Not all the League progressives are pro-Communist, but many seem to feel that some sort of socialism, usually referred to as 'Islamic socialism', is necessary to make Pakistan a strong modern state. There would certainly be overwhelming opposition to allowing Britain and the United States to use Pakistan's military strength or strategic position to further their own designs."<sup>23</sup>

That was Jinnah's Pakistan. But as we know, none of this happened. In fact, it seems that the leaders who followed Jinnah did not care much either for his legacy or for that matter, public opinion. No political leader had the audacity to publicly pronounce that Jinnah was wrong. On the contrary, all of them, even the most corrupt, authoritarian, and fundamentalists,

claimed that they were accomplishing what the founder of Pakistan had wished. Why did this happen?

Roses do blossom in deserts but they need constant care and protection from the ferocity of shifting sand dunes as well as nourishment. The areas that constituted Pakistan were the least developed in British India. In order to protect their northern and western frontiers against the imagined or real threat from the Soviet Union, the British patronized feudal lords, tribal chiefs, and big landholders. The federating units of Pakistan had not gone through those educational, economic, and social reforms that were implemented in the other parts of India. With the passage of time, Pakistan's leaders got used to the status quo. They also followed the British policies of control and patronage, and sidelined the masses. Unlike India, Pakistan never initiated the process of decolonizing its economic and social structure. Land reforms were promised and "officially" carried out but did not have much impact on the power of landowners and feudal lords. This trend gradually became so pervasive that even those leaders who did not hail from this class adopted feudal tendencies. Commenting on this phenomenon, a leading political analyst says:

"It is amazing, but a fact nevertheless, that higher education and exposure to the values and ways of modernity do little to overcome the deeply ingrained influences of a feudal upbringing. Daultana, Mamdot, Firoz Khan Noon, Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, Dr Khan Sahib, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his latter day associates, all partook of the same frame of mind. Another deplorable fact about the feudal ethos is that it does not remain confined to the great landlords. It travels to other sections and ranks in society. Thus, personalism became a dominant factor in the outlook of those in positions of power even if they had never been large

landowners. Witness the disposition and style of Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq, and currently Pervez Musharraf (among many others)."<sup>24</sup>

Consequently, nothing mattered to these leaders. They violated the Constitution, physically attacked the Supreme Court of Pakistan, converted political parties into family clubs, looted public money, sought foreign protection for their political survival, misused State institutions for their personal aggrandizement through unholy alliances with dubious religious groups, sold and bought loyalties, resorted to nepotism, and the list goes on and on.

One could argue that politics normally elevates those people who by no means represent the social and cultural values of their people, especially when such leaders are not sure about the fate of their political status. Nor is it necessary for politicians to always follow the road that their great leaders once trod. In Pakistan, however, their performance and integrity is judged by the standards set by Jinnah. It is seldom that pages of history record such glorious tributes to a leader from those who, rightly or wrongly, felt that they did not receive fair treatment from him, as Jinnah did. Dewan Chaman Lall, a close friend for 30 years and a noted Congress MP, recalled Jinnah's efforts for settlement before and after 1940 and said in 1950: "He was a lovable, unsophisticated man, whatever may be said to the contrary. And he was unpurchasable."

Sarojini Naidu did not change her opinion of the man even after he began to advocate partition. She described him at a press conference in Madras on 18 January 1945 as the one incorruptible man in the whole of India. "I may not agree with him, but if there is one who cannot be bought by title, honour or position, it is Mr. Mohammed Ali Jinnah."<sup>25</sup> It is true that although he is remembered as the Quaid-i-Azam (the

Great Leader), Jinnah never courted titles. He had refused a knighthood and even a doctorate in law from the Aligarh Muslim University in 1942. With a polite smile, he said: "I have lived as plain Mr. Jinnah and I hope to die as plain Mr. Jinnah. I am very much averse to any title or honours and I will be more happy if there was no prefix to my name."<sup>26</sup>

Jinnah's legacy fell on narrow shoulders, distorted visions, and those forces that were antithetical to everything that he stood for. Recently, a columnist protested against these leaders by showing them the mirror of Jinnah's leadership: "We started our journey under the leadership of that Muhammad Ali Jinnah whose honesty, devotion, intellectual calibre, trustworthiness, demeanour, fair play and justice had earned the respect of not only his friends but also his foes. That pure soul who never indulged in lies, hypocrisy, greed, double standards, pretensions ... and irrespective of the considerations of remaining popular or otherwise, always said boldly and with clarity, what was right: We were strong and majestic like the rivers; Oh, mother, what happened, we are swimming in the gutters!"<sup>27</sup>

His 11 August speech continues to haunt politicians. For understandable reasons, it is more popular with the minorities. While celebrating the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of this speech, Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs held a rally at the site of the passage of the Lahore Resolution, Minar-i-Pakistan, calling for the implementation of Jinnah's vision in letter and spirit. A member of Parliament, Minocher Bhandara, moved a bill in the National Assembly of Pakistan in February 2007 seeking to enshrine Jinnah's speech in the Constitution. On this occasion, he said: "The speech has been constantly downplayed by the government of Pakistan since 1949. Parts of the speech have been materially altered, or omitted altogether, in the past." He remarked: "On the one hand tremendous respect is shown

for the memory of the Quaid-i-Azam, but on the other hand, his political thoughts are desecrated to appease religious groups."

There is not much that one can say about the present leadership that has succeeded General Musharraf in terms of reviving the Jinnah legacy but if democratic institutions are allowed to flourish with an independent judiciary and a free press, one can anticipate that liberalism and moderation will prevail in Pakistan. The most

important thing is to set the priorities right. The people of Pakistan come first and if decisions are made to appease any group or any foreign power at the expense of the masses, then it would be a different story. Jinnah's warning to the British rulers of India stands good for Pakistani rulers also: "One degrading measure upon another, disappointment upon disappointment, and injury upon injury, can lead a people only to one end. It led Russia to Bolshevism. It has led Ireland to Sinn Feinism."<sup>28</sup>

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Wolpert, Stanley: Jinnah of Pakistan, Oxford 1984, p.33.
- <sup>2</sup> Sayeed, Khalid bin: Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948, Karachi 1960, p.86.
- <sup>3</sup> The citizens of Bombay also presented him 30,000 rupees which he returned. The people started a trust, the Jinnah Hall Trust, which is still operational. "Though the trust calls it the People's Jinnah Hall, political parties [holding sessions there] refer to it as just The People's Hall ... Attempts were made by the Sena and BJP to pressure trustees to rename the trust. Yagnik, a Gujarati, and other trustees, none of them a Muslim, refused." Singh, Vijay: "Look, What is Jinnah doing in Mumbai", <http://www.rediff.co.in/news/2005/Jun/13spec1.htm>
- <sup>4</sup> Wolpert: Jinnah of Pakistan, p.40.
- <sup>5</sup> Quoted in Bolitho, Hector: Jinnah. Creator of Pakistan, London 1954, pp.21-22.
- <sup>6</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/politician6-2.htm>
- <sup>7</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/politician9.htm>
- <sup>8</sup> Noorani, A.G.: Assessing Jinnah, in: Frontline, 17/2005.
- <sup>9</sup> Letter to Gandhi, August 14, 1929, B.N. Pandey ed. The Indian Nationalist Movement: 1885-1947: Select Documents, London 1979, pp.63-64.
- <sup>10</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/politician14.htm>
- <sup>11</sup> Khan, Danish: An interview with poet Iqbal's son, <http://www.paklinks.com/gs/allviews/167004.allama-iqbal.html>
- <sup>12</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/speech03.htm>
- <sup>13</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/leader5/htm>
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> Jinnah, Fatimah: My Brother, Karachi 1987, p.2.
- <sup>16</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/leader18.htm>
- <sup>17</sup> Time Magazine, 8/1999.
- <sup>18</sup> <http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/Quaid/speech05.htm>
- <sup>19</sup> Jinnah, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, 1947-1948, Karachi, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1962, pp.6-10.
- <sup>20</sup> Ahmad, Jamil-ud-Din: Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 2 vols., Lahore, Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1952, Vol. I, pp.39-43.
- <sup>21</sup> Jinnah's broadcast address to the people of the United States of America, February 1948.
- <sup>22</sup> Ahmad: Some Recent Speeches.
- <sup>23</sup> Roth, Andrew: Jinnah's New Republic, The Nation, 13.12.1947.
- <sup>24</sup> Syed, Anwar: Feudalism bane of the Punjab, Dawn, 30.12.2006.



<sup>25</sup> Noorani: Assessing Jinnah.

<sup>26</sup> Zaidi, Z.H.: Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah Papers, Oxford 1993, Vol. I, xlv.

<sup>27</sup> Nisar, Hassan: Daily Jang, 31.8.2008.

<sup>28</sup> Noorani: Assessing Jinnah.

# Gewalt und Instabilität in der Innenpolitik Pakistans

Jochen Hippler

Die pakistanische Gesellschaft steht gegenwärtig zumindest drei zentralen Herausforderungen gegenüber: einer bedrohlichen Wirtschaftskrise, dem schwierigen Übergang zur Demokratie nach den Wahlen vom Februar 2008 und einer Welle massiver Gewalt, die 2002/2003 begann, inzwischen aber stark eskalierte. Vor allem die blutige Erstürmung der "Roten Moschee" in Islamabad, eine Reihe darauffolgender Bombenanschläge, der Mordanschlag auf die ehemalige Ministerpräsidentin Benazir Bhutto und die Kämpfe an der afghanischen Grenze ließen dies 2007 verstärkt ins Bewusstsein der europäischen Öffentlichkeit dringen. Tatsächlich werfen die in den letzten Monaten noch massiv angewachsene Welle der Gewalt, die Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes Ende 2007 und der politische Neubeginn nach den Wahlen vom Februar 2008 Fragen nach der Stabilität Pakistans auf. Diese ist umso bedeutsamer, als das Land seit 1998 über Atomwaffen verfügt und ein Schlüsselverbündeter der USA im "Krieg gegen den Terrorismus" ist.<sup>1</sup>

Das Ausmaß politischer Gewalt in Pakistan stellt einen wichtigen Indikator seiner innenpolitischen Stabilität dar. Die Gewalt hat in den letzten fünf Jahren dramatisch zugenommen: Waren im Jahr 2003 weniger als 200 Menschen ein Opfer politischer Gewalt geworden, lag die Opferzahl 2007 bei rund 3.600.<sup>2</sup> In der ersten Jahreshälfte 2008 lagen die Opferzahlen etwa so hoch wie im Vorjahr, um im August und September dramatisch anzusteigen: Allein in diesen beiden Monaten kamen in Pakistan mehr als 2.500 Menschen durch politische Gewalt ums Leben, mehr als 3.700 wurden verletzt.<sup>3</sup>

Die Gewalt besteht in Pakistan nicht aus einem einzigen, alles prägenden Grund-

konflikt, sondern aus unterschiedlichen Konflikten, die nicht immer etwas miteinander zu tun haben. Wenn wir hier von der staatlichen Gewalt in der Form von Menschenrechtsverletzungen (Folter, "Verschwindenlassen" oder Misshandlung von Oppositionellen, etc.) und der Verwicklung Pakistans in Gewaltkonflikte jenseits seiner Grenzen (Afghanistan, Kaschmir) einmal absehen, lassen sich in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten die folgenden, sehr unterschiedlichen Konfliktlinien identifizieren:

- überregionale, interkonfessionelle Gewalt zwischen sunnitischen und schiitischen Extremisten und in geringerem Maße auch Gewalt gegen religiöse Minderheiten (Ahmadis, Christen, Hindus);
- eine latente Bürgerkriegssituation in Karachi, die sich im letzten Jahrzehnt entspannt hat, allerdings gelegentlich immer wieder bei Attentaten, Massakern oder anderen Gewaltakten aufflammt;
- Aufstände und Aufstandsbekämpfung in Belutschistan sowie
- eine mit Afghanistan und dem "Krieg gegen den Terror" verknüpfte Situation des Terrorismus und Bürgerkrieges in der Nordwestprovinz, die sich auf andere Regionen auszudehnen droht und heute mit Abstand die meisten Opfer fordert.

## 1. Konflikte zwischen Sunniten und Schiiten

Seit Mitte der 1980er- und verstärkt in den 1990er-Jahren kam es in verschiedenen Landesteilen (schwerpunktmäßig im Punjab) zu inter-konfessioneller Gewalt, vor allem zu Attentaten und Massakern sunnitischer und schiitischer Extremistengrup-

pen. Ihre Wurzeln reichen in die Zeit der Diktatur General Zia ul-Haq (1977-1988) zurück, als dessen Regime aufgrund der Islamischen Revolution im Iran befürchtete, der schiitische Radikalismus könnte auf Pakistan übergreifen. Die Diktatur förderte sunnitische Extremisten, die zum Teil gewaltsam gegen Schiiten vorgingen, was zu Gegengewalt schiitischer Extremisten gegen Sunniten führte. Der Ausgangspunkt dieses Konflikts lag im zentralen Punjab (vor allem dem Bezirk Jhang), wo die "feudalen" Großgrundbesitzer<sup>4</sup> meist schiitisch, die abhängige Landbevölkerung dagegen sunnitisch war, weshalb auch soziale Konflikte die Form konfessioneller Auseinandersetzungen annahmen. Von dort weitete sich die Gewalt auf andere Regionen aus.

Der sunnitisch-schiitische Grundkonflikt bleibt auch heute latent vorhanden. Zwar führt er nur in Ausnahmefällen zu Gewalt, er kann allerdings aufgrund lokaler Konflikte immer wieder instrumentalisiert werden, um Eskalationen herbeizuführen, wie etwa 2005 in Gilgit oder bei Anschlägen im Punjab, in Karachi oder der Nordwestprovinz. Ein erster Höhepunkt der Welle dieser konfessionellen Gewalt zwischen sunnitischen und schiitischen Extremisten wurde Mitte der 1990er-Jahre erreicht, danach flaute sie für fast ein Jahrzehnt ab, ohne allerdings zu verschwinden. In den letzten Jahren hat sie wieder massiv zugenommen: Fielen ihr 2003 noch 102 Menschen zum Opfer, so waren es 2007 bereits 441.<sup>5</sup> Die Zahlen für 2008 dürften noch höher liegen.

## 2. Bürgerkrieg in Karachi

Auch in der Wirtschaftsmetropole Karachi (ca. 14 Mill. Einwohner) reichen die Ursprünge der Gewalt in die Zeit der Militärdiktatur Zia ul-Haq zurück. Der Hintergrund dieser Auseinandersetzung ist mit der demographischen Entwicklung in der Provinz Sindh und ihrer Hauptstadt Kara-

chi verknüpft. Der Anteil der sindhi-sprachigen Bevölkerung in Karachi sank auf vermutlich unter 10 Prozent, während die Muhajir (urdu-sprachige Einwanderer und Flüchtlinge aus der Zeit der Teilung von Britisch-Indien) bereits seit der Staatsgründung die Mehrheit stellen. Die wirtschaftlich bedingte Zuwanderung einer großen Zahl von Paschtunen aus der Nordwestprovinz (und von Punjabis, Belutschen sowie von Afghanen und Iranern) trug zur Verschiebung der demographischen Struktur der Stadt bei. Damit ergab sich im Sindh eine Situation, in der die Sindhi (vorwiegend ländlich geprägt, oft unter noch "feudalen" Bedingungen und mit geringem Bildungsgrad) zwar die Mehrheit in der Provinz stellen, aber in der ökonomisch dominierenden Riesenstadt Karachi nur noch eine kleine Minderheit ausmachen. Die Muhajir sind rein städtisch geprägt und werden politisch von einer erstarkenden – und überwiegend säkularen – Mittelschicht mit relativ hohem Bildungsgrad geführt. Sie blieben in der Provinz in der Minderheit, während sie in Karachi die große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung darstellen.

Die Muhajir hatten sich nach der Staatsgründung vor allem als "Pakistaner" betrachtet, also als außerhalb der ethnischen und konfessionellen Strukturen des Landes stehend. Seit Ende der 1970er-Jahre bildete sich bei ihnen zunehmend eine eigene "ethnische" Identität heraus, die aus dem wachsenden Gefühl einer Benachteiligung entsprang, insbesondere im Bildungswesen und öffentlichen Dienst des Sindh. 1984 wurde die säkulare Partei MQM gegründet (Muhajir Qaumi Movement, später umbenannt in Muttahida Qaumi Movement). Bis Anfang der 1990er-Jahre errang sie eine dominierende Position in den Großstädten des Sindh, insbesondere in Karachi und Hyderabad. Dieser Aufstieg richtete sich auch gegen die starke Stellung der – ebenfalls säkularen – Pakistan People's Party (PPP), die im ländlichen Sindh sehr stark bleibt. Da das Regime Zia ul-Haq die PPP

als die größte Bedrohung ihrer Macht wahrnahm, unterstützte es trotz aller ideologischen Unterschiede den Aufstieg der MQM durch den Militärgheimdienst ISI. Ohne Wohlwollen der Regierung wäre es unter dem damals geltenden Kriegsrecht nicht möglich gewesen, eine solche Partei zu gründen und in wenigen Jahren zur stärksten in Karachi und Hyderabad werden zu lassen.

Die MQM bemühte sich mit allen Mitteln, auch durch politische Morde, Massaker und Folter politischer Gegner, ihre Kontrolle Karachis zu festigen, was die Wirtschaftsmetropole in eine Phase der Unsicherheit und Instabilität stürzte. Viele Kritiker werfen der MQM bis heute einen "faschistischen" Charakter vor.<sup>6</sup> Mitte der 1990er-Jahre kam es in der Stadt zu einem faktischen Bürgerkrieg, in dem bis zu 2.000 Menschen pro Jahr aus politischen Gründen getötet wurden. Als Teil dieser Auseinandersetzungen unterstützten staatliche Stellen auch die Spaltung der MQM, was zu massiver Gewalt beider Fraktionen gegeneinander führte. Eine Politik der harten Repression, die auch vor Morden durch die Polizei nicht zurückschreckte, vermochte das Gewaltniveau in Karachi zwar deutlich zu senken, die politische Dominanz der MQM in den Großstädten des Sindh blieb allerdings erhalten.

Die Lage in Karachi bleibt angespannt: Einzelne Gewaltausbrüche (Bombenan-

schläge, Attentate) kommen immer wieder vor, auch im Rahmen konfessioneller Zusammenstöße. Besonders blutig war etwa der Mai 2004, als in Karachi 62 Menschen durch politische Gewalt starben und über 200 verletzt wurden. Die MQM bemüht sich seit 1997 um ein gemäßigteres Image und zugleich um die Ausweitung ihrer sozialen/ethnischen Basis über die Mujahir hinaus. Inzwischen sind "Pragmatismus" und "Realismus" Schlüsselbegriffe des MQM-Programms. Nach den Wahlen von 2002 trat die Partei als Juniorpartner in die Regierung ein und wurde damit zu einer wichtigen Stütze des 1999 an die Macht geputschten Präsidenten und Generals Musharraf. Die Wende der MQM zur Mäßigung ist nicht bruchlos: So spricht vieles dafür, dass die Gewaltexzesse in Karachi im Mai 2007 (über 40 Tote) anlässlich eines Besuchs des abgesetzten Verfassungsrichters Iftikhar Chaudhry von der MQM organisiert waren.

### 3. Aufstand in Belutschistan

Die Provinz Belutschistan hatte bereits in den 1970er-Jahren (in der Regierungszeit Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos) einen Aufstand gegen die Zentralregierung erlebt, den diese aber mit großer Härte durch die Armee niederschlagen ließ. Zu Beginn der 2000er-Jahre begann ein neuer Aufstand. Nach Zahlen der Polizei<sup>7</sup> kam es seitdem zunehmend zu terroristischen Anschlägen:

Jahr	Zahl der Anschläge	Zahl der Todesopfer
2002	5	3
2003	35	61
2004	127	98
2005	225	106
2006	415	158

In diesen Zahlen sind die Opfer militärischer Operationen nicht enthalten.

Wie in den 1970er-Jahren spielt Religion bei dieser Gewalt keine Rolle. Vielmehr stehen die Missachtung und Benachteiligung der Provinz durch die Zentralregierung im Mittelpunkt, was sich insbesondere an verschiedenen Großprojekten entzündet. Im Zentrum des Konflikts steht vor allem der Bau des Tiefseehafens in Gwadar. Obwohl der Ort in Belutschistan liegt, haben weder die Provinzregierung noch die lokale Bevölkerung irgendwelche Mitsprachemöglichkeiten. Die Menschen von Gwadar und Umgebung wurden gegen ihren Willen umgesiedelt, können wegen des Hafens und des damit verbundenen Sperrgebietes nicht mehr fischen (ihr Haupterwerbszweig) und verloren ihr Land.

Ähnlich verhält es sich mit den Gasvorkommen Belutschistans. Die Provinz soll über 500 Milliarden Kubikmeter an Erdgasvorkommen und 6 Billionen Barrel Erdöl verfügen.<sup>8</sup>

Das Gas trägt seit den 1950er-Jahren zur Energieversorgung Pakistans bei, wobei es der Provinz selbst kaum zugutekommt. Auch die Verkaufspreise für Erdgas betragen für Belutschistan nur einen Bruchteil dessen, was der Sindh und vor allem der Punjab für ihr Gas erhalten. Das wird verständlicherweise als schwere Benachteiligung empfunden. Die Situation wurde zusätzlich dadurch angeheizt, dass die Armee in Belutschistan begann, ohne Rücksprache mit der Provinzregierung oder der Bevölkerung neue Kasernen anzulegen, die erkennbar auf die Kontrolle der Bevölkerung in sensiblen Regionen zielen, etwa in Gwadar und Dera Bugti oder Kohlu, wo traditionell regierungskritische Stämme siedeln, die bereits früher für die Autonomie und Rechte ihrer Provinz gekämpft hatten.

Im Hintergrund des Konflikts steht auch die Befürchtung vieler Belutschen, in der eigenen Provinz zur Minderheit zu werden. In der Hauptstadt Quetta und entlang der

afghanischen Grenzen bilden Paschtunen bereits die Mehrheit, und nun befürchtet man, dass durch Riesenprojekte wie den Hafen von Gwadar eine ganz neue Migrationsdynamik in Gang gesetzt wird. Belutschische Politiker weisen auf das Beispiel Karachis hin, wo durch dessen wirtschaftliche Dynamik – und den bis vor kurzem einzigen Hochseehafen des Landes – die ursprünglichen Einwohner des Sindh zu einer kleinen Minderheit in der Stadt wurden. In Belutschistan mit seinen nur fünf bis sieben Millionen Einwohnern sei die Gefahr noch größer. Sollte Gwadar einmal die Größe Karachis annehmen, wäre die einheimische Bevölkerung nicht nur dort marginalisiert, sondern in der gesamten Provinz hoffnungslos in der Minderheit.

Die Regierung hätte den gegenwärtigen Aufstand sicher vermeiden können, wenn sie die Provinz an der Nutzung der Gasvorkommen beteiligt und einen angemessenen Preis – vergleichbar dem für den Punjab – gezahlt, die Provinz und ihre Bevölkerung am Hafenprojekt von Gwadar beteiligt hätte und vor allem Belutschistan insgesamt politisch ernst nehmen würde. Der Mangel an föderaler und demokratischer Mitsprache sowie der Streit um Ressourcen sind die Ursachen der Gewalt. Religiöser Extremismus spielt hier kaum eine Rolle, und wenn, dann höchstens provinziell intern durch sunnitische Extremisten gegen Schiiten (oft durch Paschtunen verursacht). Der Aufstand gegen die Regierung erfolgt vor dem ideologischen Hintergrund ethnischer und nationaler Identität und Selbstbehauptung, nicht eines islamischen Radikalismus, der in der Provinz relativ gering ist und nur einen Teil der paschtunischen Bevölkerung erfasst hat.

Aber anstatt die säkulare belutschische Politik zum Partner des Kampfes gegen den religiösen Extremismus im benachbarten Afghanistan und der Nordwestprovinz zu machen, brachte Präsident Musharraf durch einen rücksichtslosen Zentralismus

und quasi-koloniale Politik die gesamte Provinz gegen die Zentralregierung auf.

#### 4. Bürgerkrieg in den Stammesgebieten der Nordwestprovinz

Zum mit Abstand blutigsten Konfliktherd Pakistans hat sich allerdings die Nordwestprovinz entwickelt, die im Wesentlichen von Paschtunen besiedelt ist und an Afghanistan grenzt. Nach dem Sturz der Taliban durch US-Truppen und ihre afghanischen Verbündeten im Herbst 2001 flohen viele der – paschtunischen – Taliban und 600 bis 700 internationale Kämpfer von al-Qaida (nach anderen Angaben bis zu 2.000)<sup>9</sup> in die Stammesgebiete der pakistanischen Nordwestprovinz. Dort wurden sie meist freundlich aufgenommen, da man sich ihnen seit der gemeinsamen Kampfzeit des anti-sowjetischen Jihad verbunden fühlte. Damals waren auch durch Eheschließungen familiäre Bindungen entstanden, die eine positive Wahrnehmung begünstigten. Schließlich bestanden auch ideologische Sympathien, da die jihadistische Umformung des deobandischen Islam in den Grenzgebieten seit dem Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion eine positive Bewertung religiöser Kämpfer bewirkt hatte. Deshalb – und aufgrund finanzieller Zahlungen der ausländischen Jihadisten an die Stämme oder ihre maliks (Stammesführer) – wurden die Jihadisten nicht nur in den Stammesgebieten akzeptiert, sondern konnten die Region auch zur Vorbereitung von Überfällen und Anschlägen in Afghanistan nutzen.

Daraus ergab sich eine Situation, bei der neben den Stämmen und den bedeutsamer gewordenen religiösen Führern nun auch Hunderte usbekischer, tschetschenischer und arabischer Kämpfer zu politischen Machtfaktoren in den Stammesgebieten wurden. Zwischen diesen Ausländern und den traditionellen Stammesstrukturen bildeten sich auch einheimische, paschtunische Gruppen jihadistischer Kämpfer, die

sich zuerst Mujahedin (religiöse Krieger), bald aber Taliban nannten. Diese Gruppen bildeten einerseits eine Brücke der lokalen Gesellschaft zu den ausländischen Jihadisten, zugleich aber untergruben sie die Macht der bereits in den letzten Jahrzehnten geschwächten Stammestradiation in einigen Regionen, da sie die Stammesführer nur noch akzeptierten, wenn diese ihren religiösen Vorstellungen entsprachen. Sie begannen bald, in bestimmten Gebieten selbst quasi-staatliche Strukturen aufzubauen, was die Macht der maliks ideologisch, aber auch durch Einschüchterung und Gewalt einschränkte. Auch der ohnehin geringe Einfluss der pakistanischen Behörden in der Region wurde so noch weiter zurückgedrängt.

Die lokalen Jihadisten begannen in einigen Regionen mit der Verfolgung und Hinrichtung Krimineller (Räuber, Vergewaltiger, etc.), was ein erneutes Indiz für die Untergrabung der Stämme darstellt, die ja eigentlich für Sicherheit zuständig waren. Ihre shuras (Ratsversammlungen der Führer) setzten Männer unter Druck, sich Bärte wachsen zu lassen, und bedrohten Geschäftsleute, die CDs, DVDs oder Videos verkauften, da Musik und Filme die Moral untergruben und durch den Islam verboten seien. Wurde diesen Anweisungen nicht gefolgt, sprengten sie entsprechende Geschäfte (selbst Friseurläden, die Männern die Bärte rasierten) nicht selten in die Luft. Nichtregierungsorganisationen – insbesondere solche mit ausländischer Unterstützung oder zur Förderung von Frauen – wurden bedroht und zum Teil angegriffen und vertrieben, da ihre Arbeit subversiv sei, westliche Werte propagiere und letztlich im Auftrag Washingtons erfolge.

Zugleich standen die Bewohner der FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) nicht allein unter dem Druck jihadistischer Gruppen, sondern auch der Behörden und des Militärs. Diese nahmen oft ganze Dörfer oder Stämme in Haftung, um einzelner Verdächtiger oder extremistischer Gruppen

habhaft zu werden. Wenn ein Stamm nicht bereit oder in der Lage war, Verdächtige oder Gewalttäter an die Regierung auszuliefern, wurden sein Siedlungsgebiet abgeriegelt oder Kollektivstrafen verhängt.

Die skizzierten Entwicklungen beschränkten sich nicht allein auf die Stammesgebiete, auch wenn sie dort ihren Ursprung hatten und besonders intensiv auftraten. Die politische Gewalt dehnte sich selbst in größere Städte aus, wie nach D.I. Khan und Peshawar. Allerdings erreichte sie dort nicht das Niveau eines offenen Krieges, sondern nahm die Form von Attentaten und einzelnen Terrorakten an.

Die pakistanische Armee unternimmt seit 2002 – und verstärkt ab 2004, als etwa 80.000 Soldaten eingesetzt wurden, eine Zahl, die später noch deutlich anstieg – militärische Operationen gegen die Jihadisten in den Stammesgebieten. Diese Einsätze waren nur mäßig erfolgreich, auch weil die lokale Bevölkerung die Präsenz und die Gewaltanwendung von Soldaten in ihrer autonomen Region überwiegend ablehnte. Die pakistanische Armee erlitt teilweise schwere Verluste und reagierte mit einer Eskalation der Operationen, die nun auch massive Luftangriffe beinhalteten. Die resultierenden zivilen Opfer führten zu verstärktem Widerstand der betroffenen Stämme, was die ausländischen und insbesondere lokalen extremistischen Kämpfer politisch stärkte und ihre Zusammenarbeit förderte. Dazu kamen vereinzelt, aber politisch oft verheerende Angriffe durch US-Kräfte. Das wichtigste Beispiel war 2006 ein Raketenangriff auf eine Medresse im Dorf Chingai (Bajaur Agency, Tribal Areas) durch – sehr wahrscheinlich – US-Truppen aus Afghanistan, bei dem 82 Menschen starben, darunter viele Frauen und Kinder. Einige Tage später kam es zu einem Vergeltungsangriff durch einen Selbstmordattentäter, bei dem 40 pakistanische Soldaten getötet wurden. Insgesamt starben bei den Kämpfen bis 2007 vermutlich mehr als 1.000 Soldaten und eine un-

bekannte Zahl an jihadistischen Kämpfern und Zivilisten. Die militärischen Rückschläge, das Unbehagen, gegen Teile der eigenen Bevölkerung und "gläubige Muslime" vorgehen zu müssen, das Gefühl, eigentlich im Auftrag der USA Gewalt anzuwenden, und die Opfer unter der Zivilbevölkerung beeinträchtigen außerdem die Kampfmoral vieler Soldaten. Ein Beispiel dafür stellte ein Zwischenfall im August 2007 dar, bei dem eine kleine Gruppe von örtlichen Taliban rund 250 Soldaten gefangen nahm, die sich nicht einmal verteidigten.<sup>10</sup>

Zugleich kam es immer wieder zu Versuchen, die Konflikte in den Stammesgebieten durch Gespräche, Verhandlungen und Vereinbarungen beizulegen, wobei häufig Politiker der – mit den Taliban sympathisierenden – JUI (Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam) und Stammesversammlungen (Jirgas) zur Vermittlung genutzt wurden. Meist bestand der Ansatz darin, die Stämme zu verpflichten, lokale und internationale Kämpfer selbst zu disziplinieren oder terroristische Täter der Regierung auszuliefern oder an Angriffen zu hindern – im Gegenzug sollten das Militär sich zurückziehen und die zivilen Behörden finanzielle Zuwendungen leisten oder Entwicklungsprojekte durchführen. Da allerdings in einigen Regionen die lokalen Machtverhältnisse dies nicht mehr zuließen – die militanten Gruppen waren bereits so stark, dass sie durch die Stämme nicht mehr kontrolliert werden konnten –, in anderen der politische Wille fehlte, kam es auch zu direkten Verhandlungen und Vereinbarungen der Behörden mit lokalen Taliban. In diesen Fällen legitimierte und stärkte sie dies offensichtlich gegenüber den nichtextremistischen Kräften. Lokale Abkommen brachen auch zusammen, weil häufig weder das Militär noch die Aufständischen sich daran hielten. Verhandlungsprozesse mit den lokalen Akteuren waren prinzipiell sinnvoll, erfolgten allerdings unter Umständen, die sie immer wieder zum Scheitern brachten. Teilweise wurden während laufender Ver-

handlungen größere Militäroperationen durchgeführt – so erfolgte auch das Raketenmassaker von Bajaur genau an dem Tag, als in der Region ein Friedensabkommen unterschrieben werden sollte. In solchen Fällen ist offensichtlich, dass die militärische Aufstandsbekämpfung Ansätze friedlicher Konfliktregelung zum Scheitern brachte.

## 5. Gewalt und instabiler Autoritarismus in Pakistan

Die oben skizzierten Gewaltkonflikte sind alle, wenn auch auf unterschiedliche Art, mit der spezifischen Form von Staatlichkeit in Pakistan verknüpft. Zwar ist nicht diese allein für die Konflikte verantwortlich (zum Beispiel ist der Krieg in Afghanistan von entscheidender Bedeutung für die Gewalteskalation im Nordwesten Pakistans), aber sie hat oft einen auslösenden oder verschärfenden Einfluss. Dabei lässt sich das Paradoxon feststellen, dass in der wissenschaftlichen und politischen Diskussion Pakistan häufig als *failing state* diskutiert wird, während bezüglich der oben behandelten Konflikte eine "starke" oder robuste Politik staatlicher Stellen für die Gewalt zumindest mitverantwortlich ist. Es fällt auf, dass Elemente defizitärer Staatlichkeit unvermittelt mit solchen einer "überentwickelten" verknüpft sind. Hinweise auf geschwächte staatliche Handlungsfähigkeit finden sich im partiellen Verlust der Kontrolle über – wenn auch marginale – Teile des Territoriums (Waziristan, z.T. auch Swat, Dir, etc.) und in den Defiziten bei der sozio-politischen Integration der unterschiedlichen Provinzen und ethnischen und religiösen Gruppen. Dazu kommen die für unsere Beispiele weniger bedeutsame allgemeine Funktionsschwäche vieler staatlicher Behörden, die Schwäche des Parteiensystems und die Korruption. Vor dem Hintergrund dieser Probleme sah sich Pakistan seit der Staatsgründung schwierigen Aufgaben bezüglich seiner Sicherheit und gesellschaftlichen

Integration gegenüber – insbesondere einer außenpolitischen Bedrohungssituation. Deren Ausdruck waren drei Kriege gegen Indien bis 1971, seitdem mehrere Beinahe-Kriege, die Nichtanerkennung der gemeinsamen Grenze durch Afghanistan und die später instabile Situation dort, die nach Pakistan ausstrahlt. Dazu kam im Inneren die beträchtliche ethnische Heterogenität der Bevölkerung, die 1971 bereits mit zur Abspaltung der früheren Ostprovinz (heute Bangladesh) geführt hatte. Die staatlichen Eliten reagierten auf diese Kombination struktureller Schwäche und komplexer Herausforderungen, indem sie die auf Kontrolle zielenden Teile der Staatlichkeit überentwickelten, was sich in einer zentralistischen und autoritären Kontrolle der Gesellschaft und der dominierenden Rolle des Militärs niederschlug. So wurden in den ersten zwölf Jahren seiner Existenz in Pakistan durchschnittlich rund 60 Prozent des Staatshaushalts für das Militär ausgegeben – und Pakistan mehr als die Hälfte seiner Geschichte vom Militär regiert. Der Staat geriet so in eine Schieflage, bei der manche seiner Teile leistungsschwach blieben (Sozialpolitik und soziale Dienste, Infrastruktur, politische Integration), während andere durch ihre Stärke die Gesellschaft in ein stählernes Korsett zwingen wollten, um so Stabilität zu gewährleisten (Streitkräfte, repressiver Zentralismus, Beschränkung politischer Partizipation).

Der pakistanische Staat insgesamt ist demzufolge weder stark noch schwach, sondern asymmetrisch beides zugleich, was sich immer wieder als krisenauslösend oder krisenverschärfend erweist. So führte die autoritäre Überzentralisierung – also der Versuch, einen starken und stabilen Zentralstaat auf Kosten der Provinzen und Minderheiten durchzusetzen – zu einer teilweisen Delegitimierung des Staates und zu Widerstand vor allem in Belutschistan, zum Teil auch im Sindh und Karachi sowie der Nordwestprovinz. Manche Ethnonationalisten sprechen dort von einem durch den Punjab kontrollierten Staat, der eine



"Versklavung" der kleineren Provinzen bedeute.

Ein zweiter Faktor besteht in der weitgehenden Verhinderung politischer Partizipationsmöglichkeiten der Bevölkerung, die angesichts der neuen, aufstrebenden Mittelschichten und gestärkten Bourgeoisie auf Dauer nicht durchzuhalten ist. Politische Partizipation und Aktivismus suchen sich wegen der staatlichen Blockade zunehmend außerhalb der etablierten politischen Strukturen andere, auch militante Ausdrucksformen – was sich nicht allein in Karachi und der krisengeschüttelten Nordwestprovinz zeigt. Der Autoritarismus des politischen Systems unter Präsident Musharraf brachte in den letzten Jahren fast die gesamte Bevölkerung gegen das Regime auf und wirkte so massiv auf die ohnehin bestehenden Konflikte in den Provinzen und die religiös geprägten Formen von Politik zurück.

Drittens schließlich erweisen sich die häufigen Versuche staatlicher, insbesondere militärischer Stellen zur Manipulation gesellschaftlicher und politischer Konflikte als mittel- und langfristig zentraler Faktor der Destabilisierung. Diese haben in Karachi (Aufstieg und Spaltung der MQM), in der Nordwestprovinz und vor allem bei der taktischen Förderung religiöser und sogar jihadistischer Gruppen durch das im Kern säkulare Militär (auch durch säkulare zivile Parteien wie die PPP) eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Auslösung und Eskalation gewaltsamer Konflikte gespielt, die der Staat dann nicht mehr kontrollieren konnte.

Diese drei konfliktfördernden Faktoren des Autoritarismus sind eng miteinander verknüpft. Das zeigt sich unter anderem darin, dass der Kampf für Partizipation, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie in Pakistan fast immer mit dem für die Rechte der Provinzen und Minderheiten verknüpft war. Umgekehrt bedeutete die Zentralisierung staatlicher Macht immer zugleich

auch ihre Konzentration in den Händen einer schmalen gesellschaftlichen und politischen Elite. Eine Kultur des Autoritarismus dieser Eliten opferte immer wieder die Ansätze gesellschaftlicher und politischer Integration dem Interesse persönlichen Durchregierens bis auf die Provinz- und Kommunalebene. Auf diese Weise wurde einer hochgradig pluralistischen und heterogenen Gesellschaft ein zentralistischer Staat übergestülpt, der sich föderal maskiert. Zugleich allerdings erwies sich gerade dieser die Gesellschaft dominierende Staat als schwach, soweit es nicht um seine bloße Kontrollfunktion ging, sondern um die Bereitstellung sozialer Dienstleistungen und politischer Integration.

Vor diesem Hintergrund müssen die Entwicklungen seit den Wahlen vom Februar 2008 betrachtet werden. Der Übergang zur Demokratie allein wird die Instabilität und die strukturellen Defizite des politischen Systems ebenso wenig überwinden wie die politische Gewalt. Aber es gibt doch einige Bereiche, die zur Hoffnung Anlass bieten, mittel- und längerfristig eine politische Reform zustandezubringen: Insbesondere die breite Mobilisierung der Juristen und anderer Sektoren der Gesellschaft, die in den letzten Jahren die Frage der Rechtsstaatlichkeit mit Nachdruck auf die Tagesordnung setzte, demonstriert, dass die pakistanische Gesellschaft sich nicht länger ohne Widerspruch staatlicher Willkür zu unterwerfen gedenkt. Hier deutet sich ein größeres Selbstbewusstsein der wichtiger gewordenen Mittelschichten an, was eine entscheidende Voraussetzung der Durchsetzung demokratischer, partizipativer und rechtsstaatlicher Staatlichkeit darstellt. Solange allerdings der Demokratisierungsprozess unter Kontrolle der alten politischen Eliten und im Rahmen eines weitgehend korrupten und undemokratischen Parteiensystems erfolgt, dürften sich die Chancen auf eine grundlegende Korrektur der strukturellen Defizite des Staatsapparates in Grenzen halten.

In einem solchen Fall allerdings wären die Aussichten gering, die innenpolitische Instabilität Pakistans in absehbarer Zeit zu

überwinden. Dann stünde dem Land eine längere Phase des Durchlaviens in einer schwierigen Situation bevor.

### Anmerkungen

- <sup>1</sup> Dazu Hippler, Jochen: Das gefährlichste Land der Welt? Pakistan zwischen Militärherrschaft, Extremismus und Demokratie, Köln 2008.
- <sup>2</sup> Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Pakistan Assessment 2008, [www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/index.htm). Es handelt sich um Mindestzahlen, da nicht alle Todesopfer von der Regierung veröffentlicht wurden oder auf andere Art bekannt wurden. Das dürfte insbesondere für die Provinz Belutschistan und die Stammesgebiete der Nordwestprovinz gelten.
- <sup>3</sup> Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Azam, Muhammad: South Asia Conflict Report, august 2008, <http://san-pips.com/PIPS-SAN-Files/SAN-SouthAsia/SAN-SouthAsia-Article47/San-SA-A47-D.asp>
- <sup>4</sup> "Feudal" ist hier nicht im Sinne des europäischen Feudalismus des Mittelalters gemeint, sondern bezeichnet landestypische Formen ländlicher Abhängigkeitsverhältnisse und die damit verbundene Mentalität.
- <sup>5</sup> Institute for Conflict Management, South Asia Terrorism Portal, Sectarian Violence in Pakistan, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/sect-killing.htm>
- <sup>6</sup> Z.B. der ehemalige Cricket-Spieler und heutige säkulare Politiker Imran Khan, siehe: Imran seeks UK justice for Karachi killings, in: Daily Times, June 3, 2007, [www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C06%5C03%5Cstory\\_3-6-2007\\_pg7\\_1](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C06%5C03%5Cstory_3-6-2007_pg7_1)
- <sup>7</sup> Interne Zahlen der Polizei, persönliche Information für den Autor, September 2007.
- <sup>8</sup> Grare, Frédéric: Pakistan: The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism, in: Carnegie Papers, No. 65, Washington, January 2006, S.5.
- <sup>9</sup> Hussain, Zahid: Frontline Pakistan – The Struggle with Militant Islam, New York 2007, S.120, 143.
- <sup>10</sup> Khan, Ghafar Ali: High Cost of Low Morale, in: The Herald, October 2007, S.64f.

# Sixty years of India-Pakistan relations

Tanvir Ahmad Khan

Ever since their independence, India and Pakistan, the two successor states of the British Indian Empire, have remained locked in a conflictual relationship. Historical factors that culminated in the partition of 1947 and a host of problems left behind by a hasty and untidy transfer of power by Great Britain combined to frustrate the hope that partition would usher in a period of cooperation between two essentially satisfied nation states that had to make up for more than a century of alien rule. There were formidable challenges of nation building and economic development. India and Pakistan would have found it easier to meet them by working together. Instead, their first military conflict in Jammu and Kashmir took place in less than three months after independence. It was to be the prelude of future wars that led to momentous consequences for them and for the region. Mutual hostility contributed to both of them becoming national security states committed to large defence outlays. It delayed India's emergence as an important actor on the global stage. For Pakistan, the consequences were even more serious. It was a major factor in the secession of East Pakistan. It skewed the international balance of political forces and made its democratic polity vulnerable to military interventions. By the mid-1980s, this antagonism had raised the spectre of a mushroom cloud over more than a billion people.

The present time is a time of hope that costly but inconclusive wars and military stand-offs have eventually led to a realization that their problems cannot be resolved by the use of force. In January 2004, the leaders of India and Pakistan made a joint declaration to resolve their differences and disputes by peaceful negotiations. It was the beginning of by far the most sustained

effort, described as a comprehensive composite dialogue, to resolve outstanding issues by holding multifaceted structured talks in joint standing committees. Nearly four years later, assessments of progress made in this peace process vary but both sides claim that the process is irreversible.

## 1. Historical background

Politeness, prudence and political restraint ensure that interlocutors make only a minimal reference in the present dialogue to the roots of estrangement between the two successor states of the British Raj. But the factors that created a bitter legacy of distrust and conflict in the past have not disappeared completely. What has doubtless happened is a remarkable transformation of attitudes. Instead of a passive resignation to endless antagonism, the two sides are finally fighting the historical determinism of their past relations to a proactive quest for a better future of choice and hope. The political imagination of the two nations is preoccupied less with regression into the era of military confrontations and more how and when they can put on the ground an architecture of enduring peace and cooperation. It is a long and hazardous journey but India and Pakistan have commenced it.

The anti-colonial struggle in the British Indian Empire was far more complex than in many other more homogeneous colonies. The divide-and-rule stratagems of an alien power had sharpened the communal cleavage in the Indian society and weakened the consensus noticeable in the early years of the Indian National Congress. But it would be wrong to attribute the great split that lay ahead only to British machinations; there was a more potent intrinsic reason for it.

The upsurge for freedom in India was accompanied by strong revivalist religious movements amongst the Muslims and the more numerous Hindus. There was a continuous semantic overlap between the political and religious discourses of each and every community living in India under the British Crown. As the political and religious mingled, each community became more differentiated from the other, and self-determination for which they were battling the British acquired a different meaning for growing majorities in their respective rank. Mohammad Ali Jinnah parted from Mahatma Gandhi because he concluded that Gandhi was moving away from political syncretism to defining a future Indian nation in terms emanating from Hindu revivalist movements. Much of Muslim insecurity in the days ahead sprang from this fear and in turn fuelled their separatist politics.

## 2. Diverging aspirations

The first four decades of the twentieth century inexorably established different trajectories of aspirations that widened disagreements and led to the partition of 1947. Gradually, a more equitable and credible historiography is discarding the propagandist over-simplifications dominating the two national narratives crafted in the terminal years of the Raj. The historical process which led Mohammad Ali Jinnah to ground his demand for Pakistan in a two-nation theory is better understood as more and more Indian researchers affirm that right up to the end Jinnah was open to a compromise confederal solution with a viable Centre. Even as Gandhi and Nehru defined independence in quasi-secular terms, Savarkar, the most effective exponent of what in current Indian politics is called Hindutva, declared in 1937 that

"there are two antagonistic nations living side by side in India". While sections of Indian Muslim dreamt of the lost glory of their empires, Savarkar maintained that "Hindus, Hindusthan and India mean one and the same thing". The idea of two nations leading parallel lives in the subcontinent was not particular to a single community. More significantly Savarkar's thinking had permeated into the Congress where Patel used it continuously to counter-balance Nehru's secularism.

The western principle of majority rule was probably the only organizing concept that the paramount power could use for a gradual introduction of constitutionalism and self-rule in a continental land mass of great human diversity. And yet, the same idea fanned the fear of Indian Muslims that their post-independence fate would be of a hapless minority. In the run-up to freedom, the liberal moderates from both sides lost control, and the communalists vented their ancient hatreds and atavistic urges in massive ethnic cleansing. The eventual partition was deeper than the great leaders of the mainstream political parties had ever envisaged. It was traumatic enough to sunder a thousand-year-old interaction insofar as the citizens of the two post-colonial states were concerned. Interstate relations became increasingly susceptible to misperceptions as the international border became an epistemological barrier. India and Pakistan exacerbated their differences by attributing the worst possible motives to each other. Pakistan's early history is haunted by the fear that India aimed at annulling partition. On its part, India was determined to limit Pakistan by ensuring that under no circumstances would the Muslim majority state of Jammu and Kashmir accede to it. Part of Nehru's rationalization of this decision came from his allegation that by signing military pacts

with the United States, Pakistan was re-opening the gateway of the subcontinent to foreign influence.

### 3. Legacy of a discriminatory partition

Pakistan's sense of victimhood began when the last British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten abandoned imperial impartiality and prevailed upon Lord Radcliffe, the final arbiter in the Joint Boundary Commission, to award to India some territories that the eminent jurist had earlier marked out as Pakistan territory. Stanley Wolpert's hook "Shameful Flight" reveals the degree of indifference to Pakistan's needs that had developed in implementing the partition plan. Generations of Pakistanis have attributed this bias to Jinnah's refusal to accept Lord Mountbatten as the Governor General of both the dominions. Mountbatten's influence strengthened Nehru's resolve to intervene militarily in the growing disorder in Jammu and Kashmir. A similar counter-move by Jinnah was blocked when the British commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army, General Gracey, reported it to Mountbatten and threatened Jinnah with mass withdrawal of all the British officers in his armed forces. If the intention was to prevent a war between the emerging states, it was only partly successful as Gracey later led the Pakistani military contingent in Jammu and Kashmir to stop the Indian army from overrunning the entire state in the spring of 1948. The fatally delayed induction of regular Pakistani troops into the battle for Kashmir meant disproportionate sacrifices by them to stem that Indian offensive, sacrifices that were to sow the seeds of militarism in Pakistani politics.

Indian independence was an epoch-making event but it is still being debated if in that sublime hour, leaders of both sides rose to the high level of statesmanship warranted by history. The accession of princely states to either dominion was not always consid-

ered by them within the parameters of principles on which India had been divided. Nehru's intense preoccupation with Kashmir, a large sprawling state that should have joined Pakistan under the guiding principles for the accession of states to India and Pakistan was a case in point. Apart from frequently cited sentimental reasons, Nehru wanted Kashmir to establish the Indian outreach in what had been a sensitive strategic region for almost a century. He had approached the British government in London at least two years before independence to persuade it to entrust the defence of that strategic border, where India, China, Russia and North West Asia formed a fateful junction, to New Delhi in whatever political dispensation was eventually worked out for transfer of power. Pakistan interpreted his push into Kashmir as a flanking movement aimed at isolating and strangulating it in its infancy. Jinnah's readiness to countenance an independent Hyderabad, a princely state with a decisive Hindu majority in the heart of southern India, and his acceptance of the instrument of accession from the Muslim ruler of predominantly Hindu Junagadh well inside the Indian border were provocative to India which used force in both the cases to merge them into the Indian Union.

The new rulers of India tried to overcome their trauma of partition by expressing the hope that it would only be a short interlude before full reunification. In his private musings recorded on loose sheaves of paper, the father of the Pakistani nation did not countenance an iron curtain between two sovereign states and pondered over areas of continuing cooperation such as common customs. The Kashmir war and the perceived threat of forcible absorption into India, however, intensified Pakistan's desire to escape the gravitational pull of the bigger neighbour from which it had separated. This feeling of insecurity created antagonistic dynamics. Nehru thought of South Asia – a vast bureaucratic conti-

mental construct engineered by an imperial power – to be self-enclosed, with India its pre-eminent nation. Pakistan saw him prescribing limited sovereignties for India's neighbours and embarked upon a long and arduous quest for sovereign equality. The almost spontaneous acceptance by Pakistan of the invitation to join CENTO in the Middle East and SEATO in South East Asia came less from an ideological fear of communism and more from the opportunity to attain strategic equivalence with India.

Nehru had made Indian military intervention in Kashmir categorically conditional upon ascertaining the wishes of the people. India took the dispute to the United Nations. The first ceasefire in that embattled state came in the context of U.N. resolutions under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter requiring a plebiscite under the U.N. auspices after the Security Council's directive for demilitarization and other administrative measures had been fulfilled. India had installed a government headed by pro-India Sheikh Abdullah, an icon of the Kashmiri struggle against the Dogra rulers of the state, in the territories under its control, including the populous Kashmir Valley. Abdullah had agreed only to a limited accession with a large measure of autonomy guaranteed by the famous article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The 1952 agreement between Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru which had set out in considerable detail the special position of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian state broke down soon and Abdullah was incarcerated for many long years. Article 370 got seriously eroded by a whole series of amendments curtailing state autonomy. The recourse to the United Nations became a victim of the unfolding Cold War being waged across the globe. As the Soviet Union paralysed the Security Council with vetoes cast on behalf of India and the U.N. Commission on Jammu and Kashmir failed to make any headway, it became evident that India would com-

pletely resile from its commitment to a plebiscite under UN-auspices.

Sino-Indian differences on their long border erupted into a short war in 1962 in which India lost territory. President Ayub desisted from taking advantage of Indian difficulties, settling instead for the western offer of diplomatic support for a resolution of India-Pakistan disputes. The Chinese disengaged and withdrew quickly but not before alarm bells rang all over the western world. Major western powers probably saw in the encounter an opportunity to dilute Nehru's non-alignment and rushed in with large consignments of sophisticated military hardware. When Pakistan complained that western assistance was disturbing the fragile balance of power between the two countries, the U.K. and U.S mediated to bring about several rounds of Indo-Pakistan negotiations focused on Kashmir. Two astute negotiators, Pakistan's future prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the future foreign minister of India, Swarn Singh explored solutions other than the one envisaged in the stalemated plebiscite plan but eventually lost a real opportunity to make a new beginning in India-Pakistan relations. The negotiations were notable for a detailed exchange of views on partitioning Jammu and Kashmir but failed because India was not willing to cede much of the Kashmir Valley which had the bulk of the Muslim population. Inasmuch as their failure became a contributory factor in the war of 1965, the parleys were counter-productive; Pakistan concluded that Indian occupation could not be loosened or reversed through talks.

#### **4. Drums of war**

Pakistan's determination to challenge the resultant status quo led to a protracted crisis in relations with India and led straight to the first major subcontinental war in 1965. Henceforth India could hold Kash-

mir only by the force of superior arms, a compulsion that eventually radicalized the people of the hapless state. Ironically for Pakistan, the 1965 war also fanned separatist sentiments in East Pakistan creating an unprecedented opportunity for protracted interference and eventual military intervention to help establish the independent state of Bangladesh.

Consolidation of Indian military power in Kashmir brought geography back to the centre stage of Pakistani concerns. All the major rivers of Pakistan flow into it from Kashmir and as the lower riparian, it viewed the situation with alarm. The Radcliffe partition line running through a naturally integrated river system of the Indus Basin made the Indian East Punjab a stakeholder in the system. Pakistan faced considerable problems when India withheld water from some of its canals from head works awarded to India. In 1950, it proposed arbitration and on Indian refusal, drew international attention to the brewing crisis. The World Bank offered its good offices two years later and initiated negotiations lasting eight years. The landmark Indus Basin Treaty, one of the few significant agreements in the region, gave India the eastern rivers but compensated Pakistan by financing link canals in its own territory to sustain its vast irrigation system. Perhaps it is in the nature of the partition of 1947 that most agreements between India and Pakistan turn out to be imperfect but this treaty has the distinction of surviving two major wars and many military confrontations. In more recent years, India has started some upstream projects in Kashmir leading to Pakistani allegations of treaty violations. India denies that its projects entail consumptive use of water. The issue is high on the agenda of bilateral negotiations but friction over water may cast a dark shadow on cordial relations in the years ahead.

For the better part of a decade, the two countries relied on the threat of use of

force or an actual resort to it. India stepped up encouragement for separatist politics in East Bengal that gathered momentum as Pakistan's military regime continued to curb Bengali sub-nationalism with repressive measures. In the western half, India and Pakistani fought a brief localized battle over the demarcation of frontier in the Rann of Kutch. The Pakistani province of Sindh is separated from the Indian territory by marshland which becomes flooded for several months every year. The British era agreement on the border which located the separation line on the eastern rim of the marshland was no longer acceptable to India. The conflict led to international arbitration which has not resolved all the allied issues including the maritime boundary to this day. In 1965, Pakistan sponsored a revolt in Indian-held Kashmir by infiltrating guerrillas. India broadened the conflict and attacked Pakistan across the international frontier. It took the United Nations almost three weeks to bring about a ceasefire. It was, however, Russian mediation that restored peace. The leaders of India and Pakistan agreed upon a number of measures to normalize disrupted relations and reaffirmed in the Tashkent Declaration issued at the end of the conference sponsored by the Soviet Union that they would not have recourse to force and would settle their disputes through peaceful means. Having alternately proposed and turned down proposals for a non-aggression pact since the 1950s, the two countries now seemed to renounce the use of force. No more than five years later, they reverted to a posture of belligerence over a fateful internecine conflict over internal autonomy in East Pakistan.

The Bangladesh crisis bedevilled relations as much as the Kashmir dispute had done in the wake of independence. The 1965 war had given a sharper edge to the perception in East Pakistan that it was not an equal partner in the federation and that it was discriminated against both in politics and economics. The Bengali intellectual

class played an important part in propagating the demand for maximum provincial autonomy. In the course of time, the objective plan for realizing it, now the matrix of the politics of the Awami League, pointed to a restructuring of the state of Pakistan as a virtual confederation.

For much of their history, India and Pakistan have been prone to exacerbating each other's political problems. India saw in the widespread alienation of the Bengali-speaking population of its neighbour 'an opportunity of a century' to fan separatism in it. The emergence of a group of hardliners in the Awami League that was destined to lead an armed struggle for liberation made accommodation with the military government in the federal capital difficult. Confident of Indian support, this group demanded a solution too radical for the Pakistani army. When negotiations turned into an outright confrontation and the province of East Pakistan was plunged into mass agitation, the Pakistan army took the fateful decision to use military force. India helped the forces of resistance generously and contemplated military intervention almost immediately. By November 1971, the armies of two countries were battling each other in the border area. Bangladesh emerged as a sovereign state when India delivered a coup de grace in December 1971.

The loss of a whole province which had more than half of Pakistan's total population and the humiliating circumstances in which the Pakistani forces there had to surrender were seminal events that vitiated relations for the next two decades. In a landmark summit called the Simla Conference, the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who had picked up the pieces in Pakistan after a shattering military defeat, argued hard for an equitable framework of relations for future and the victorious prime minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi reciprocated with enough magnanimity to arrive at a workable agreement. The Simla Pact of 2 July 1972 stated that 'the two countries are

solved to settle their differences through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between them'. This echo of the old idea of a non-aggression pact was fortified by a further undertaking that 'pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall prevent the organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations'. When the Indian army moved into the Siachin Glacier in mid-1980s, Pakistan considered it a grave violation of the Simla Agreement and carried out a counter-deployment in the icy wastes of the Karakorum range of mountains. More recently, the two sides have observed a ceasefire there but are yet to agree upon a plan of demilitarization in this highest theatre of war in the world.

## 5. Composite Dialogue

Against this unfolding regional backdrop, India and Pakistan have made efforts to open a new chapter in their unhappy relations. A joint Statement made at the end of a summit in February 1999 held out the promise of a sustained and structured dialogue to resolve differences. The initiative was derailed by the fighting in the Kargil mountains in Kashmir and the military coup d'etat in Pakistan that followed it. By the end of 2003, however, General Pervez Musharraf, who had emerged as Pakistan's strongman, sought restoration of that aborted dialogue with signals of accommodation on the core dispute of Jammu and Kashmir that were unprecedented in Pakistan's history. He has offered to give up the demand for a plebiscite if India were to agree to a package of proposals including self-rule for the disputed territory and its demilitarization. He envisages a soft line of control and some mechanism for a joint control of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.



Meanwhile, India and Pakistan have completed three rounds of meetings with committees constituted to address a comprehensive agenda. The process has produced new confidence-building measures, considerable reduction in tension, modest increase in trade and ritual reaffirmation of resolve to remain engaged in negotiations overtly and in the secret channel established in 2004. However, a real breakthrough on Jammu and Kashmir awaits progress where India continues to ponder the risks of demilitarization and the degree of autonomy required to bring to an end an 18-year-old insurgency. There are fears that without the coercive power of the two subcontinental states, the people of Jammu and Kashmir may make a bid for independence on lines similar to what was witnessed in Eastern and Central Europe. What seems to be more credible is that the people of Kashmir are aware of the strategic implications of being at the junction of India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Afghanistan and that they would prefer to anchor their long-term security in honourable arrangements with India and Pakistan. Kashmir, in the final analysis, is a challenge to the creativity and ingenuity of these two states; they need to evolve a framework of relations compatible with Kashmiri aspirations and conducive to their own reconciliation.

It is not a good time to speculate on whether the two countries possess the quality of statesmanship to rise to this challenge. There are significant imponderables that can influence the ongoing dialogue either way. There were apprehensions in Pakistan all along that India might just aim at conflict management and not its resolution unless Pakistan would settle on Indian terms. India is also being seen to be holding out even on easier issues like the long overdue demilitarization of the Siachin region and the delimitation of the boundary in Sir Creek which would have a bearing on the maritime boundary. It is also seen as gradually eroding the Indus

Basin Treaty, the one international agreement that has otherwise withstood periodic conflict, by creating new facts in the rivers flowing into Pakistan from the Indian-held Kashmir. Reluctance to make substantive progress on Kashmir and the aforementioned less intractable problems had already slowed down the peace process when Pakistan started sliding into a period of political turbulence several months ahead of the expected uncertainty in the winter of 2007, the point of time for fresh presidential and parliamentary elections. Since March 2007 India has not pursued a much awaited summit between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf on the grounds that it is waiting to see the outcome of the political tussle in Pakistan. India itself is not free of political uncertainty as its polity stands divided by serious issues including, rather prominently, considerable internal disagreements on the deal with the United States that would open the doors for unprecedented cooperation in nuclear technology and supply of nuclear fuel to India. Fears that these disagreements may precipitate a premature General Election have made the dialogue with Pakistan a secondary concern in New Delhi.

## 6. Nuclearization

The military conflicts of 1965 and 1971 were to accelerate the quest for nuclear weapons in South Asia. Arguably, India has regarded nuclear capability as an essential attribute of a major state with valid global ambitions. It also needed nuclear equivalence with China. Pakistan on the other hand has avowedly sought this capability to attain nuclear deterrence entirely in the context of India-Pakistan hostility. After the Bangladesh debacle, Pakistan increasingly anchored its ultimate security in it and has to this day retained the first use option. Both the countries have pursued weaponization and sophisticated missile development programmes while supporting

universal disarmament. Pakistan has also frequently claimed moral high ground by proposing a South Asian nuclear free zone and an outright abandonment of ballistic missiles.

The overt nuclearization marked by multiple nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998 ended the ambiguity maintained till then. Paradoxically, the tests dramatized the need to work out nuclear risk reduction measures in an environment where early warning has no meaning. Adoption of a strategic restraint regime is now on the bilateral agenda though agreements reached so far are of the order of preliminary confidence-building measures. The present strategic stability is vulnerable to several national and international factors. Foremost amongst them is the attitude of the international community. In particular, the United States differentiates between the nuclear programmes of the two countries because of what it describes as their 'different histories'. It has made the United States offer sophisticated technology and services for the Indian civil nuclear programme while denying the same to Pakistan. The Indo-U.S. agreement that regulates this cooperation would free considerable quantities of indigenous fissionable material in India for possible diversion to a much larger nuclear arsenal capable of deployment on land, sea and in the air. Pakistan aims at a minimum credible deterrent but its size may get expanded if India opts for a large stockpile of warheads and delivery vehicles.

The impact of nuclear capability on conventional confrontations has been ambiguous. It is widely believed to have been a restraining factor in recent crises between the two countries. On the other hand, India has occasionally alleged that it has enabled Pakistan to act provocatively as in the Kargil sector of the line of control in Kashmir in 1999. India also ascribes Pakistan's support for a separatist insurgency in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir since

the winter of 1989 to its belief that nuclear weapons rule out a total war. A mirror image is found in the Pakistani assessment that India has contemplated sub-strategic limited wars against Pakistan under a nuclear umbrella. India and Pakistan massed large forces along the international frontier and the Kashmir line of control in 1986, 1990 and 2001. Each of them could have led to a catastrophic conflict. That it did not take place is probably equally attributable to the maturity of leadership in both the countries that is mindful of nuclear risks and a more proactive role played by the international community in defusing tensions in a dangerous nuclear environment.

Nuclear ambiguity in the subcontinent ended with nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, in that order, in 1998. This demonstration of nuclear weapons capability sent a shock wave around the world. It also added urgency to their quest for stability in nuclear deterrence, the stated principle of nuclearization. Apart from a mutual understanding on nuclear threshold in situations of tension and conflict, there is a whole host of issues related to miscalculation, misperception, accidental crises and deployment and targeting policies. Pakistan has a long history of describing its weapons programme as purely reactive and therefore of launching proposals such as a nuclear free and zero missile zone in South Asia. Since 1998, it has reformulated them as a consolidated proposal for 'strategic restraint' tabled under the rubric of 'peace and security' item in the composite dialogue. The two sides have made limited progress in negotiating nuclear confidence measures such as prior notification of tests, including missile tests and non-attack on nuclear installations. Pakistan's hope of holding nuclear arsenals at agreed levels is not likely to be accepted by India as the nuclear triad – land, air and sea – inevitably demands freedom to manufacture and deploy warheads determined unilaterally by India. There is, how-

ever, a good prospect of arriving at mutually acceptable confidence measures that enhance trust and reduce risks.

## 7. Energy as a factor of rapprochement

India embarked upon highly rewarding economic reforms in the 1990s. It has maintained a high rate of economic growth which gives substance to its desire to emerge as a major global power. There is a fresh realization that conflict with Pakistan delays important milestones in this historic journey. Pakistan, on its part, has become all too aware of the social and economic cost of strained relations with India. The information age has also made people conscious that misperceptions of the past were often misplaced or exaggerated and that their interests could actually converge in the years ahead. India wants a land bridge to Afghanistan and Central Asia which becomes feasible only if relations with Pakistan are friendly.

India and Pakistan are developing at a rate that in the years to come will require an almost exponential increase in their consumption of energy. The gap between available energy and energy needed in milestones 2015 and 2025 is large enough to threaten sustained growth. At present, natural gas and oil meet 80% of Pakistan's energy needs. It has sizeable gas reserves for the immediate future but its domestic oil accounts for only 18% of oil consumption. Currently only 40% of Pakistani homes are connected to the electricity grid. In less than twenty years Pakistan's overall energy needs will increase by 350% and the country would meet no more than 38% of this need from indigenous sources.

Corresponding figures for India are not much better. Both countries have a portfolio of mixed strategies for increasing energy security by tapping indigenous resources such as coal and hydroelectric

power. Both want to build more nuclear reactors. If it finally goes through, the Indo-U.S. agreement on civilian nuclear uses will bring about a notable rise of nuclear energy in the Indian energy profile. But even in the best case scenarios, the import of energy from outside sources will have to be a significant component of national strategies for meeting the shortage. Current plans include an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline which is eminently feasible but is opposed by the United States. This pipeline has strong support in Pakistan as it will create strategic interdependence between major regional countries. India and Pakistan will, in particular become stakeholders in an important external source of energy. Washington, however, prefers projects such as gas from Turkmenistan and electricity from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. With a new deep sea port at Gwadar not far from the Strait of Hormuz, which it has developed with Chinese assistance, Pakistan is positioning itself to become an energy corridor between West and East Asia. It is not clear as yet if India looks favourably at Pakistani aspirations though it is keen to have overland access through Pakistan to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

## 8. Implications of India's rise as a major power

The nuclear deal is per se of great importance but in the region it is also being viewed as part of larger developments by which India is being enabled by the United States to assume the mantle of a global power partly to act as a counter-balance to China. There is little doubt about India's rise but it is not clear as to how its economic and military power will locate itself in the international system. The nuclear deal will earn billions of dollars for the US energy companies and the larger strategic partnership of which it is but one facet will make it possible for Martin Lockheed and the Boeing Company to break into the In-

dian market with a supply of 126 state-of-the-art fighter planes. Opinions on how India will project its power vary considerably partly because of differences in reading Indian intentions.

The complexity of Indian intentions lies partly in the debate in the Indian strategic community. Not very long ago a vocal part of it lobbied hard for a doctrine of limited war with Pakistan waged below an imaginary nuclear threshold. This was dangerous thinking as Pakistan's red lines are deliberately ambiguous. On a bigger canvas, many Indian strategic thinkers argue passionately that India must back the soft power of its high economic growth with hard military power. They maintain that other economically successful countries, in particular Germany and Japan did not possess "national attributes" to become global powers in as much abundance as India does. India, according to them, should project hard power that is not only respected but feared. This argument revives fears of Indian hegemonic ambitions in an area larger than the traditional swathe of territory known as South Asia particularly because it wilfully ignores the fact that Germany and Japan have consciously avoided paths to hard power, especially the one provided by nuclear weapons. In Pakistan, it creates the apprehension that India's quest for glory may make it downgrade the need for a grand compact in South Asia and that India may instead opt for dominance and coercive diplomacy in the region while staking a claim to strategic partnership with the United States.

An article which appeared in *The Washington Quarterly* in summer 2007 maintained that it is a valid question whether India qualifies as a global stakeholder, either as a partner to help set international norms or to bear resource burdens:

"As a norm-setting partner, New Delhi is already valuable. India is a multiethnic and

multireligious democracy with a strong military; great diplomatic influence, particularly within the developing world; and rising soft power. Its interests are not dissimilar to those of the United States. Its principal foreign policy concerns include terrorism, energy, nonproliferation, narcotics, and managing China as well as Pakistan."

But the question if the United States can look to India as a burden-sharing partner on the international stage and a responsible international stakeholder is not simple and may even be problematic. This article suggests that "India's recent emergence as a norm-setting partner of the United States should not be taken for granted" and that "historically, India has not been a strong supporter of U.S. interests". In Pakistan's perception, India has positioned itself well to retain its autonomy of action. India may be reluctant to concede the American view that having signed the U.S.-Indian Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act on 18 December 2006, India is no longer entirely outside the international nonproliferation architecture. The non-proliferation lobby in the United States wants to establish clear benchmarks such as joining the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) as an earnest indication of India's good intentions but the Indian nuclear establishment, backed by considerable political forces, is fighting a dour rearguard action to ensure that the agreement does not put any constraints on the country's civil or military nuclear programme.

India has made some symbolic gestures to Washington's preferences on policy towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and relations with Iran. It has slightly distanced itself from Iran on the nuclear issue and from both Iran and Pakistan on the strategic Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. It has not gone down well with important segments of India's political class.

India's relations with China have gained a fresh impetus since President Hu Jintao's visit to India in November 2006. The exponential rise in bilateral trade has become a factor of the Indian economy which India will not throw away easily. In fact, development of stronger linkages is also taken by the people of India as a marker of their sovereignty. It is likely that India will not act as a counterweight to China in a simplistic sense of the word and that its policy will continuously explore the space between cooperation and competition. When it comes to "burden-sharing" with the West on Pakistan policy, the issue may turn out to be more complex than a mere declaration by the United States that its relations with India and Pakistan stand 'de-hyphenated'. For one thing, Pakistan has a strategic location vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia and is already paying a disproportionate price in the lives of its soldiers and its internal political stability; it is already in a "burden-sharing" arrangement while India as yet only holds a promise of entering it. India's best option would be to successfully persuade Pakistan, with help from the United States, to open the overland route for it to Afghanistan and Central Asia. This may need a certain accommodation on Kashmir's self-rule that President Musharraf defines as something more than autonomy and less than outright independence. It has probably not been lost on Washington that pressure on the Musharraf government to play a more proactive role in assisting counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan has actually weakened the Islamabad regime. Washington will have to calibrate its pressure on Pakistan to make unilateral concessions such as overland transit rights to India. Opposition to such transit facilities for India will diminish if India and Pakistan can first do better than at present in building up their formal bilateral trade. A substantial part of it still gets conducted through third country ports such as Dubai while negotiations on direct trade remain subject to bureaucratic caution and fears. If

this indirect trade gets diverted to cheaper subcontinental land routes and short haul sea lanes connecting Karachi and Gwadar in Pakistan to the major Indian ports on India's western sea board, the gains for both the economies would be of a substantial nature.

## 9. Conclusion

There is little doubt that a paradigm shift is underway in India-Pakistan relations. It is not likely to bring about a dramatic rapprochement but there are fair chances of it being manifested in slow incremental gains. Again, progress may not be a linear process. In a deteriorating international security environment, both countries will continue to invest in sophisticated weapons systems. Unless they can together devise a security architecture that de-links their military acquisitions from bilateral threat perceptions, as for instance by procurement and deployment of arms specific to aggressive action against each other, the peace process will remain vulnerable to apprehensions about the intent behind the constant upgrading of their offensive capabilities. Recent Indian efforts to create a new infra-structure of forward military facilities closer to Pakistan's border has caused much concern in Pakistan as the task is located in Pakistan-specific "Cold Start". It is, however, not an insurmountable problem; the two countries can negotiate CBMs focusing on variables of time and space in their deployment and adopt transparent targeting policies to create mutual trust. Such measures will lengthen the fuse and thus provide more time for conflict prevention diplomacy.

Despite a historic concession made on Jammu and Kashmir by President Pervez Musharraf by virtually giving up a U.N.-sponsored plebiscite stipulated in Security Council resolutions, the composite dialogue has not so far produced a road map for the final settlement. Secret negotiations

are said to have brought the two sides closer to a package that includes autonomy for parts of Kashmir respectively held by them, a soft line of control across which the people could move freely and trade and a possible programme of gradual demilitarization. There is some opposition to the unilateral concessions made by the Pakistani president but the Indian government faces greater difficulties in implementing the solution being discussed in the secret negotiations. First and foremost, India is unable to come up with a measure of autonomy that will make the people especially in the Kashmir Valley accept a permanent association with the Indian Union. The autonomy considered adequate by Sheikh Abdullah in the period 1947-52 has been so drastically eroded by numerous amendments of Article 370 that any government in New Delhi would counter strong domestic opposition to putting the clock back. A communal divide between the valley and the Hindu-majority districts of Jammu and Ladakh complicates this question further. Secondly, even on demilitarization, India is clearly apprehensive that loosening of the iron grip of the Indian military may create a popular upsurge analogous to the movements that brought down pro-Soviet governments in Eastern and Central Europe. Third, the dynamics of Indian politics in the next few years make it highly improbable that the Congress, the BJP and the parties of the left would arrive at a consensus on a final compact with Pakistan.

India and Pakistan stand to gain a huge peace dividend if they reduce defence expenditures entailed in antagonistic relations. A liberal climate for trade and investment can bring about a radical restructuring of inter-state relations in South Asia. But so far India has not allayed apprehensions of neighbouring countries that its much larger economy would not seek to overwhelm their smaller economies. The smaller manufacturing sectors are particularly fearful of being wiped out if the door

to India is opened too wide. After two decades of SAARC, the intra-regional trade is still no more than five percent. Pakistan has repeatedly pointed out that the aims of the projected free trade area (FTA) are defeated by the complicated multi-layered Indian tariffs. The bilateral composite dialogue has not come to grips with matters of detail. India and Pakistan need a radically different approach to economic cooperation that ensures that its rich harvest is equitably shared and promotes the economic capacity of both the nations.

Terrorism is another area that will have to be freed from its present ambivalence. Ever since 1989 when the Kashmiris took up arms, India has sought to attribute the conflict entirely to cross-border infiltration sustained by Pakistan. It has exploited the worldwide abhorrence of terrorism to depict this phase of Kashmiri struggle as Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. A terrorist act within the parliament complex in New Delhi led to one of the most protracted military confrontations between the two countries in 2001-2002. The current dialogue became possible only when during a 2004 visit to Pakistan, the then prime minister of India, Vajpayee and President Musharraf undertook to fight terrorism together. Since then India has often acknowledged that Pakistan has stopped cross-border movement of militants though occasionally reviving old allegations. On its part, Pakistan has accused India of fomenting an insurgency in the Baluchistan province. President Musharraf and the Indian Prime Minister resolved to improve their cooperation through an institutionalized joint mechanism to combat terrorism when they met on the sidelines of the Non-aligned Summit in Havana. Since both the countries face considerable challenges of militancy and insurgency, suspicions arise and vitiate the atmosphere from time to time. The fact of the matter is that mutual mistrust inhibits whole-hearted collaboration between their intelligence agencies and law enforcement authorities.

As they readjust the historically skewed balance between state-centric military security and what has come to be known as human security, they would discover the benefits of cooperation in combating new threats of alienation, violence and cross-border crime emerging from their internal ungovernable spaces. There is an even

chance that bilateral initiatives and regional cooperation envisaged in SAARC combine to offer a much better prospect for the future. In developing such cooperation, India and Pakistan would be returning to the dream of the founding fathers who did not envisage a relationship of enduring hostility.

# Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations

Asad Durrani

## 1. Introduction

Relations between neighbouring states must not be judged by the same criteria that we use for other countries. Such relations are burdened by history, constrained by geography, and are a reflection of the perceptions that have taken root in the region. The national interests of these states are not only intertwined but also interdependent. Politics that benefit one country at the cost of another cannot be considered *realpolitik*. In due course the benefits will prove to be temporary. Very often these policies will cause more harm than good.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations can therefore best be understood by studying the regional environment and the evolution of this relationship over the last six decades – that is, from the time Pakistan was created through a bifurcation of the subcontinent following the departure of the British imperial power. In this paper, an attempt has been made to briefly define the geostrategic context of the two countries and the history of their bilateral relations. The last part contains a few salient conclusions.

## 2. The region

The region which constitutes Afghanistan and Pakistan was described by the distinguished historian Toynbee as the "eastern crossroads of history". It lies at the junction of three important geopolitical regions: South, Central and West Asia (the latter sometimes called "the Middle East"). Its territory borders Iran, three of the new central Asia states (once part of the Soviet Union), China, India and the Indian Ocean. Throughout its history, it has been traversed and trampled on by migrating communities and invading armies, most of

them intent on discovering, plundering or conquering India.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Russian and British Empires were poised for an epic battle for influence in this region, an endeavour famously called the "Great Game". To prevent the clash that would have been disastrous for both, they agreed that Afghanistan could serve as a buffer between them. This may have saved Afghanistan from becoming the battle ground of two great powers, but in due course it extracted a price. The Russian consolidated their power in the North along the Oxus river so as to be able to resume their southwards thrust – presumably towards warm waters – if they ever found a power vacuum. Eventually they did. And the British annexed some areas on the Indo-Afghan frontier "to ensure the security of their Indian empire". The new boundary, the Durand Line (named after Sir Henry Mortimer Durand who led the British Indian Boundary commission), became perhaps the most contentious issue between Afghanistan and Pakistan, when the latter inherited the North-Western Frontiers of British India in August 1947.

Notwithstanding the burden of inheritance, both Pakistan and Afghanistan had a sound basis upon which their relationship could be built. The predominantly Pashtun populations straddling the Durand Line are of the same ethnic stock and have no religious or sectarian divisions. Often they are from the same tribe, and not infrequently from the same community. The Durand Line therefore exists only on maps. Until recently, Afghanistan's land access to the outside world was almost exclusively through Pakistan. It therefore depended on Pakistan for its foreign trade and for most of its essential needs for sustenance and



survival since it is an arid country with few natural resources. Pakistan depends on Afghanistan for peace on its borders and today for access to the emerging markets of Central Asia.

The list could be extended but the fact is that bilateral relations between the two countries in the last sixty years could at best be described as a motley mixture.

### **3. The history of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations**

#### **3.1 The earlier decades (1947-79)**

As soon as it emerged that Pakistan would become the successor state of British India in the North-West, Afghanistan denounced the Durand Line Agreement of 1893 and claimed the tribal areas it had ceded under this treaty. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan's membership of the United Nations, making its recognition conditional on the right of self-determination for the Pashtuns of Pakistan to create an "independent Pashtunistan". Diplomatic relations were eventually established in 1948 but the ill will thus created led to many unsavoury incidents in bilateral relations.

Relations remained strained throughout the 1950s. In 1955, when Pakistan integrated all its provinces in the western wing into "one unit", large-scale demonstrations were organized in Afghanistan against the merger of the Pashtun majority province. Pakistan's embassy in Kabul was ransacked and its consulates at Kandahar and Jalalabad were also attacked. In response, the crowd in Peshawar attacked the Afghan consulate. Diplomatic relations were severed and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border remained closed for almost five months. Iran mediated to restore normality.

In the meantime, displeased with Pakistan joining the U.S.-sponsored defence pacts

SEATO and CENTO, the Soviet Union had started wooing Afghanistan. On a visit to Kabul, Khrushchev, the then Soviet premier, supported the Afghan demand for an independent Pashtunistan. Diplomatic relations were suspended once again. What made this nexus between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan especially troubling for Pakistan was that both countries had special ties with India – and Pakistan had had an adversarial relationship with India right from its inception.

In 1963 Pakistan-Afghanistan relations took a positive turn with the departure from office of Sardar Daud who up till had been Afghan Prime Minister and had made the Pashtunistan issue the main focus of his policy towards Pakistan. During the two Indo-Pakistan wars that followed in 1965 and 1971, Afghanistan did not create any problems for Pakistan on its western borders. Acting possibly on assurances by the Afghan king Zahir Shah, Pakistan moved its forces from the Durand Line and deployed them against India.

Daud's departure was not the only reason for the magnanimity of King Zahir Shah. Regardless of any historical, political or personal factors, the ground realities compel all Afghan rulers to find an adequate if not friendly modus vivendi with Pakistan. Afghanistan depends on Pakistan for its economic well-being. More importantly, the Afghans are pragmatic enough not to push their conflicts over the limit even though they may not always agree with Pakistan's actual or perceived policies. Sardar Daud, who deposed King Zahir Shah in a Soviet-backed putsch in 1973, came to terms with this reality when back in power and started mending fences with Pakistan. He paid with his life. The Soviets were angered by his overtures towards Pakistan and sponsored another coup, this time led by Noor Mohammad Tarakai, who as well as his successor Hafizullah Amin met the same fate when they too were seen as reluctant to follow the Soviet diktat to

maintain, among other things, a hostile posture towards Pakistan. Frustrated with indirect measures, the Soviets moved in with their military might in December 1979, and installed Babrak Karmal to head a puppet government in Kabul.

### 3.2 The Soviet occupation (1980-89)

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought about a qualitative change not only in global and regional politics but also in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Contrary to the largely prevalent view, Pakistan did not join a U.S.-sponsored war against the Soviet occupation. The reverse may be a more accurate description. Traditionally resistant to foreign forces, the Afghans were indeed the first to take up arms against the Soviet troops and their Afghan collaborators. Pakistan's decision to lend covert support to the Afghan resistance followed soon, while the remaining countries of the "free world" had not yet recovered from the shock and were still undecided how to respond. Most countries eventually settled for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

Pakistan's logic in helping the Afghan resistance was simple. If the Soviets consolidated their hold over Afghanistan, Pakistan would be squeezed between two hostile powers: the Soviet Union, which was one of the only two superpowers of that time, and India, which was by all accounts a power to be reckoned with. All the same it was a risky decision, perhaps even a desperate one. The questions rightly asked were: what were Pakistan's chances against the Soviets, even if they were not yet in control of Afghanistan? And more importantly, what chance did the resistance have to force the Soviets to give up their aggression? There was just a remote possibility that with Pakistan's help the Afghan resistance would survive long enough to give some miracle a chance to happen. Which it finally did, but not before a decade-long

"war of liberation" in which a million and a half Afghans lost their lives, and not without the even more significant factor of external help from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan played a key role in the organization and direction of the war. It also paid a price by having to host millions of Afghan refugees, and by suffering the consequences of the backflow of weapons provided by generous foreign help that had become surplus in Afghanistan. The Durand Line which had never been much of an obstacle to the movement of men and material was now more violable than ever. The major basis of the Afghan economy, opium poppy cultivation, was now also needed to finance the resistance, some of which found its way into Pakistan. In return, the country gained considerable goodwill amongst the Afghans and created important assets to help its long-term interests. However, it was not able to retain all the goodwill or exploit all its assets after the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989.

### 3.3 Post-Soviet Afghanistan (1989-95)

After the Soviet withdrawal Pakistan had three broad policy options: first, to follow a hands-off policy and let the resistance groups that were supported by Pakistan (and had now formed an Afghan Interim Government or the AIG) battle it out with the PDPA regime installed by the USSR before their departure; second, to mediate between the two Afghan factions, the AIG and the PDPA, to form a government of national consensus; or third, to help the AIG remove the PDPA regime.

The history of Pakistan's support of the resistance made the first option – which virtually meant abandoning old allies to take on a regime still backed by the USSR – not only difficult but also a dishonourable one: honour still remains important for the Afghans. Moreover, it would have meant

losing much of the goodwill that Pakistan had created amongst the Afghans. And of course there was always the refugee factor to consider. Millions of Afghans who had taken refuge in Pakistan resented the USSR's Afghan legacy (the PDPA regime) more than they hated the Soviets. Essentially, Pakistan took the third option but also tried some back-channel contacts with Kabul to assess the prospects for a mediated settlement.

Removing the PDPA by military means also seemed a more feasible option. As the resistance had succeeded against the Soviets, defeating its puppet regime should have been an easy victory. In practice it turned out to be much tougher. It took three years before the AIG could form a government in Kabul, and that only when the regime collapsed from within in March 1992. But with that, some of the worst fears of Afghanistan's observers started to come true.

Now that the common enemy – the Soviets and their puppets – were out of the way, it was time for the various Afghan factions to start the final battle for their share of power in Kabul. Pakistan tried twice to broker an agreement: in April 1992 (Peshawar Accord), and then again six months later (Islamabad Accord). These efforts failed to prevent a destructive civil war that raged for over three years between the two largest former resistance groups: one predominantly non-Pashtun led by Rabbani with Ahmad Shah Masood as his main military commander, which was entrenched in Kabul; and the other, a Pashtun group led by Hikmatyar. Because of its large Pashtun population, Pakistan was seen rightly or wrongly by the non-Pashtuns as the force behind Hikmatyar. Non-Pashtuns constitute almost fifty percent of the Afghan population and are concentrated mostly in the North. Pakistan thus lost its goodwill and influence in half of the country. This perception was further reinforced when Pakistan threw its weight

behind the Taliban, almost entirely a Pashtun entity, when in the mid-1990s it took control of most of the Afghan territory.

### 3.4 The Taliban era (1995-2001)

Credit for the emergence and rise of the Taliban goes in first place to the infighting amongst former resistance groups. It is true that the Taliban's support base was primarily in the Pashtun areas, but the real reason for their appeal was their ability to disarm armed factions and restore peace and order. Pakistan decided to throw its weight behind this movement not so much due to its ethnic character but because of its potential to reunite Afghanistan. And that was precisely Pakistan's post-Soviet Afghan policy: to support any group or groups that had the best chance to restore Afghanistan's integrity. Pakistan may have made errors of judgment in its assessment or in the execution of its policy, but the fact is that it had even supported a Tajik-led government (Rabbani) when it had the majority of the Afghan groups on board.

The Taliban were also supported by two other external powers, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, though not for the same reasons as Pakistan. The Taliban controlled the western regions of Afghanistan and this territory was vital for a pipeline project to transport gas from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and beyond. Both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had stakes in this venture.

The Taliban did succeed in enforcing peace in the areas that they brought under control: nearly eighty percent of the country before they were overthrown. However, they did not belong to the acceptable ruling classes in Afghanistan: the tribal chiefs, or exceptionally successful military commanders. Their centralized system of governance too did not suit Afghan tribal society, and their harsh attitude on issues such as women's rights did not sit well with

their traditions. Most of the Afghans including the Pashtuns tolerated the Taliban since the alternative would have been chaos, a far worse option. Typically of the Afghans, they were waiting for an opportunity to get rid of them, probably until the Taliban defeated the non-Pashtun alliance in the North and reunited the country.

Pakistan's support to the Taliban was not only in line with its longstanding Afghan policy but was also pragmatic. No other option looked better. However, Pakistan was not assertive enough on matters where as patron it could have legitimately insisted on a consensus. It was not likely to make much impression on the Taliban on human rights, but Pakistan could have played a more active and constructive role in mediating peace between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Even if such efforts were not to succeed, it would have made post-Taliban Pakistan-Afghanistan relations less unfriendly. The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddha statues provided a good opportunity for Pakistan to express its displeasure, but its leadership of that time did not understand the use of pressure in international relations: how to apply pressure and how to respond to it. This inadequacy took a heavy toll not only on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations but also when Pakistan was pressurized by the U.S. to become a reluctant partner in its war on Afghanistan.

### 3.5 Post 9/11 (2001-to date)

Pakistan's basic decision to cooperate with the U.S.-led coalition was understandable. The UNSC had authorized the mission, the atmosphere in America was not conducive to rational discourse, and Pakistan was ruled by a military junta that was inherently in no position to take institutional decisions. All the same, the regime did not even attempt to negotiate the terms of engagement that were its right as an important ally, and agreed to provide "unstinted

support" (as stated by Musharraf). That dealt a severe blow to Pakistan's credentials as a 'reliable ally', an important factor in a society as traditional as the Afghan. And indeed, it made Pakistanis generally and Pashtuns especially very unhappy. The accord with the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and also with the new Karzai-led government did not last very long.

Afghanistan was attacked with the aim of capturing the Al-Qaeda leadership. Removing the Taliban from power was its implied objective. Since air power was the main instrument employed, the operation resulted in heavy civilian casualties, almost exclusively amongst the Pashtun population. As traditional resistance fighters, they responded by starting an insurgency that soon became a war of liberation engulfing Pakistan's tribal areas where the people have close ties with the Afghans across the Durand Line. Pakistan, already under suspicion of providing support and succour to the Pashtun insurgency (erroneously called the "Taliban" insurgency), was now under pressure to crack down on the militants on its territory and prevent their movement across the Durand Line.

Pakistan once again gave in under pressure and used military action against its tribesmen. This gave rise to an uprising that soon spread to most of the frontier regions. Indeed, there was no way Pakistan could have sealed the Pakistan-Afghanistan borders because of the difficult and in places inaccessible terrain, and also because nearly two hundred thousand people cross it every day, most of them as part of their daily routine. The Pakistani response therefore only aggravated matters without exonerating it from the charges that it was not doing enough to help fight the insurgents.

Some other developments too did not help rapidly deteriorating relations. The Pakistani province of Balochistan has often been restless, its population never quite satisfied that it was getting due benefits

from its rich mineral resources. As a result of the war in Afghanistan, the area has received more than its usual share of attention. A combination of external and internal factors resulted in some of the Baloch tribes – especially the Bugtis, the largest amongst them – starting a movement against the development policies of the government. Pakistan blamed foreign involvement, mostly Afghan and Indian. Afghanistan was also accused of permitting India to open too many consulates which were involved in anti-Pakistan activities.

In the last few years though, some damage control seems to be taking place. There is a marked decline in mutual incrimination. More substantially, a bi-national mechanism to control militancy along the Pakistani-Afghan borders has been instituted. Most crucially perhaps, the realization has sunk in that because of the American pressure the two countries do not have to persist with the use of force against their own people. In both countries, the concept of reaching out to the "Taliban" has gained primacy. As a result, the U.S. opposition to this approach has been considerably muted.

#### **4. Some concluding thoughts**

A wise Afghan who had spent many years in Pakistan as an Afghan refugee described the worsening (at that time) state of bilateral relations a result of "misunderstanding". He was being polite. The fact is that despite being neighbours and having lived with each other for centuries as communities, there are considerable numbers of decision- and opinion-makers, even scholars, who have a problem "understanding the other". As the larger and in many respects the more fortunate of the two, Pakistan should take more of the blame for not showing more sympathy for the difficulties in Afghanistan. To illustrate:

After 9/11, many Pakistanis, especially in decision-making circles, naively believed that with the Afghans in such a dire state and "our friends" the Americans exercising plenty of influence in Kabul, it was the right time to coerce the Afghans into recognizing the Durand Line as an international border. They were obviously unaware of the thinking behind the Afghans' acceptance of the Durand Line: they had ceded only the administrative control of some areas to the British, not the affinity of the tribesmen. Pakistan did well to win over their loyalties and therefore the Afghans know that they have no realistic chance of regaining this territory. They are also aware of the economic and other benefits (taking refuge when necessary, for example) of the status quo. But since they do believe that the areas were taken away unjustly, they will not give this arrangement any legitimacy.

When Pakistan came under pressure to curb the movement of the militants across its borders with Afghanistan, it offered to "fence and mine" the Durand Line. That the terrain would have made such measures futile, if not impractical, was not that important. More damaging for bilateral relations was the concern it caused on the Afghan side: "it was a Pakistani ploy to change the status of the Durand Line".

The Afghans are usually generous in expressing their gratitude for Pakistan's support during their resistance against the Soviets and for hosting millions of Afghans who sought refuge there. However, when Pakistanis recall all these favours, the Afghans retort by reminding them that but for the Afghan resistance, the Soviets might at the very least have swallowed up Balochistan. What is certainly unhelpful for bilateral relations are repeated Pakistani threats that the refugees would be sent back. Afghanistan is obviously not in a position to bear their burden.

People in Pakistan are understandably upset when the country is blamed in certain Afghan quarters. Some of the criticism may be politically inspired, or stem from a misplaced belief that Pakistan wanted a pliant regime in its backyard (and therefore inflames the unrest in Afghanistan). If the Pakistanis were to regard that as signs of Afghan distress in these difficult times, they might be pleasantly surprised at the Afghan expression of regret. After all, there are almost a hundred thousand Pakistanis gainfully employed on various development projects in Afghanistan, and the Afghan markets are awash with Pakistani products.

The Indian factor in Afghanistan has been highly exaggerated in Pakistan. India does indeed have consulates (only four, and they already existed in earlier times) and no doubt indulges in espionage as is the norm. But the Pakistani assets and influence in areas which are its concern outweigh India's capabilities by a wide margin.

It was indeed unwise for Afghan official circles to blame Pakistan for all their troubles, even for the Pashtun uprising. The actual reason for the "re-emergence of the Taliban" was the military strikes in the Pashtun areas, supposedly against the remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Since they affected both countries, instead of a mutual blame game the two governments would have found more support from the

people if they had jointly opposed these strikes.

Under the circumstances, forming a binational jirga to mend relations was the right idea; not only due to its traditional sanctity, but also because it created a mechanism to resolve issues at the local level. In tribal societies, involving the tribes is the only way forward. Pakistan initially suspected that the Afghans would use this forum for some "Pakistan-bashing" in the full glare of the media and the world community. That did not happen. But the logical follow-up and the crux of the concept – tasking the tribes to become responsible for their areas – has not yet happened. Even the meeting of the mini-jirga (50 members from each side) has not taken place, probably because of the instability in Pakistan. Now that the new government is in place in Islamabad, there are good chances for some substantial progress.

The silver lining and the saving grace is that the people on both sides of the Durand Line have long-standing and abiding ties. Even with inept handling by the two governments, relations do not collapse; even when things go wrong, it takes very little to bring the relationship back on track. The problem is that at times, nowadays for example, the bilateral relations are in the hands of those who have very little knowledge and understanding of the other side.

# Pakistan und die USA

Hein G. Kiessling

## Phase 1: Die 50er-Jahre

Das im August 1947 geborene Pakistan suchte schon früh eine politische Annäherung an die USA. Es erlebte dabei, um dies vorweg zu nehmen, im Verlauf der Jahrzehnte Höhen und Tiefen. Nur wenige Wochen nach der Staatsgründung Pakistans sandte Mohammad Ali Jinnah im September 1947 einen persönlichen Emisär nach Washington. Jinnah ersuchte um die Lieferung von Waffen und Munition. Die USA lehnten dies ab, man war sich der aufkommenden Kaschmir-Problematik bewusst. Immerhin, Präsident Truman war klug genug, am ersten pakistanischen Unabhängigkeitstag 1948 eine besonders freundliche Grußbotschaft zu senden, in der er sagte: "I wish to assure you that the Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and the goodwill of the United States of America."

Pakistan vertraute diesen Worten, und die Beziehungen zu den USA entwickelten sich erstaunlich gut. Die Grundlagen hierfür waren Pakistans Bedürfnis nach Sicherung seiner Existenz und die Suche Washingtons nach Alliierten im Kalten Krieg. Auf dieser Basis kam es in den 50er-Jahren zu einer ein Jahrzehnt dauernden ersten Phase enger Kooperation zwischen beiden Staaten. So erklärte Vize-Präsident Richard Nixon während seines Besuches in Pakistan im Dezember 1952: "A strong independent Pakistan is an asset to the free world." Auf diesen Satz verweisen die Pakistaner bis heute gerne, wenn sie sich von den USA im Stich gelassen fühlen.

Im Jahre 1954 kam es zwischen beiden Ländern zu einem ersten Mutual Defence Agreement und Ende 1955 stand Pakistan fest an der Seite der USA. Es war Mitglied in SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Orga-

nisation) und im Baghdad Pakt, der später in CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) umbenannt wurde. 1959 kam ein US-Pakistan Cooperation Agreement hinzu. Die amerikanische Gegenleistung für diese Abkommen und Mitgliedschaften war eine massive wirtschaftliche und militärische Hilfe an Pakistan. Das Land erhielt von 1955-1965 eine Militärlhilfe von 5,7 Mrd. US\$, d.h. durchschnittlich 500 Mio. US\$ pro Jahr.

Diese US-Militärlhilfe erlaubte es Pakistan, mit wenigen eigenen Mitteln seine Streitkräfte aufzubauen. Es bekam in dieser Zeit state of the art equipment, u.a. F-86 und F-104 Flugzeuge, M-47 und M-48 Panzer, Artillerie, Hubschrauber und Radaranlagen. Eine große Anzahl pakistanischer Offiziere wurde an amerikanischen Militärakademien ausgebildet. Aus dieser Zeit stammt denn auch das Wort des damaligen US-Defence Secretary Robert McNamara: "It is beyond price to make friends of such men."

Darüber hinaus assistierten die USA beim Aufbau von intelligence and special operations facilities. Der pakistanische Geheimdienst ISI hatte somit bereits in seinen Anfangsjahren neben britischen auch amerikanische Helfer. Diese Kooperation zwischen CIA und ISI ist allen nachfolgenden Krisen im bilateralen Verhältnis zum Trotz über Jahrzehnte und bis heute intakt geblieben. Insgesamt ist festzustellen, dass das gute Verhältnis Pakistans zu den USA in den 50er-Jahren und der ersten Hälfte der 60er-Jahre die Grundlagen für das pakistanische Militär schuf. Es gab ihm seine professionelle Ausrichtung und wirkte als qualitativer wie quantitativer Verstärker schlechthin. Der Fall des am 1. Mai 1960 über der Sowjetunion abgeschossenen U-2 Piloten Francis Gary Powers steht als

Beweis für die damalige Kooperation Pakistans mit den USA. Powers startete zu seiner geheimen Mission vom pakistanischen Peshawar aus.

Während des Krieges von 1965 zwischen Indien und Pakistan stoppte Washington seine Militärhilfe für beide Seiten, was zu einer ersten Abkühlung der Beziehungen zu Pakistan führte. Nach 1965 kam für Indien die Phase eines verstärkten militärischen Aufbaus mit Hilfe Moskaus. Pakistan dagegen sah sich in der Folge einer Neuorientierung der Politik Washingtons in Südasien mit nachlassendem amerikanischem Interesse konfrontiert. Es kam zu Kürzungen der amerikanischen Wirtschafts- und einem Wegfall der Militärhilfen. Als Reaktion begann Pakistan, sich verstärkt um Hilfen aus der VR China zu bemühen.<sup>1</sup>

Zu dieser Entwicklung trug auch Pakistan selbst bei. Von 1971 bis 1977 stand Zulfikar Ali Bhutto an der Spitze Pakistans, der sich politischen Führern wie Sukarno, Mao, Castro und Ghadaffi nahe fühlte und den Platz seines Landes eher unter den Blockfreien und nicht an der Seite des Westens sah. Er führte eine Mini-Landreform durch und verstaatlichte Betriebe von Industrie, Handel, Versicherungen, Transport und Banken. Wirtschaftlich führte diese Politik bergab. Pakistan sah sich genötigt, vermehrt finanzielle Anleihen im Ausland aufzunehmen, womit seine ökonomische Talfahrt aber nur verzögert wurde. Im Mai 1971 kam es für Pakistan zu einer ersten Situation der faktischen Zahlungsunfähigkeit, ähnlich der in den Jahren 1998-1999. Das Land sah sich gezwungen, um ein Schulden-Moratorium zu bitten. Ein internationales Hilfskonsortium stimmte einer Umschuldung zu, der Zinssatz war mit 2,5% angesetzt, die Rückzahlung auf 30 Jahre festgelegt und eine grace period von 10 Jahren eingeräumt. Dies waren Bedingungen, die sich gegen Ende der 90er-Jahre ähnlich wiederholen sollten.

Limitierte Militärhilfe an Pakistan wurde von der Ford-Administration und dann auch von Carter wieder ab 1975 gewährt, die jedoch 1979 gemäß Section 669 des Foreign Assistance Act erneut eingestellt wurde. Der Grund waren Pakistans geheime Bemühungen um den Aufbau einer Uran-Anreicherungsanlage und den Bau der Bombe. US-Präsident Jimmy Carter begann zudem, die Stärkung und Einhaltung von Human Rights und Democratic Rights als wesentlichen Bestandteil der Politik von den Ländern einzufordern, die US-Hilfe erhielten. An der Spitze Pakistans aber stand mit Zia ul-Haq seit 1977 wieder ein Militärdiktator. Mit dem Hinweis auf die nuklearen Ambitionen Pakistans wurde daher 1979 von der Carter-Administration de facto alle Hilfe an seinen einstigen "most allied ally" eingestellt, Pakistan wurde, wie die Pakistaner noch heute verbittert sagen, zum "pariah state". Das Land erhielt fast keine Hilfe mehr und musste beim IMF anklopfen. Seine Fremdwährungsreserven waren im April 1979 auf 100 Mio. US\$ gesunken.

## Phase 2

Bevor ein ausgehandeltes IMF-Hilfsprogramm gestartet werden konnte, leitete Washington eine Kehrtwende in seiner Pakistanpolitik ein. Militärjunta und Nuklearproblematik, vom Mob angezündete amerikanische Kulturzentren in Karachi und Rawalpindi und eine abgebrannte Botschaft in Islamabad wurden vergessen und Pakistan wieder zum Alliierten gemacht. Ab 1980 begann so eine 10-jährige zweite Phase enger bilateraler Beziehungen. Ursache für den Sinneswandel Washingtons war die 1978/79er-Revolution im Iran. Amerika war dort zum "Großen Satan" geworden. Die Carter-Administration wünschte nun eine Wiederbelebung der Allianz mit Pakistan. Washington besann sich, wie ein Regierungssprecher sagte, auf Pakistans "potential role as an important element in the defence of the



Persian Gulf region". Admiral Robert Long, Kommandeur der US-Pacific-Flotte, sagte bei einer Kongressanhörung: "Pakistan's strategic location requires us to strengthen our security relationship." Und Under Secretary of State James L. Buckley berichtete im September 1981 vor dem Foreign Relation Committee: "Once again Pakistan became an essential anchor of the entire South West Asia region."

Entscheidend war aber auch die Haltung der Staatsführung in Islamabad. Zia verhielt sich pragmatischer als Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Noch vor der Flucht des Schahs im Januar 1979 konnte die operative Leitstelle der CIA für Nah- und Mittelost nach Pakistan verlegt werden. Für die zuvor im Iran installierten elektronischen Horchposten war somit Ersatz gefunden. Zia hatte die sich bietenden Möglichkeiten der Informationsgewinnung erkannt und sofort zugestimmt. In der Folge lieferte die CIA elektronische Ausrüstung und bildete ISI-Spezialisten aus. Gemeinsam horchte man in Richtung der Sowjetunion.

Weihnachten 1979 erfolgte der Einmarsch sowjetischer Truppen in Afghanistan. Bereits Monate zuvor (Juli 1979) hatte Präsident Carter einer verdeckten Unterstützung des afghanischen Widerstandes gegen das kommunistische Regime in Kabul zugestimmt. Sicherheitsberater Brzezinski war hierbei die treibende Kraft gewesen. Anfänglich wurden Propaganda-Materialien und übersetzte Fassungen des Koran geliefert. In Pakistan war die Frontier Constabulary in NWFP (North West Frontier Province) anfänglich für die Verteilung an den afghanischen Untergrund zuständig. Ab Ende 1980 übernahm dann der ISI diese Aufgabe. Brzezinski behauptete später, er habe darauf spekuliert, durch diese schon vor Dezember 1979 eingeleiteten Hilfen eine sowjetische Militärintervention herbeiführen und Afghanistan so zum sowjetischen Vietnam machen zu können. Auf seinen Vorschlag hin wurden der CIA 500 Millionen US\$ für die Operation

Cyclone genehmigt. Cyclone war der Versuch, die Sowjetunion durch die Förderung des Islam in ihren zentralasiatischen Republiken zu destabilisieren. Am Tag des Einmarsches der Roten Armee in Afghanistan schrieb Brzezinski an Carter: "Wir haben nun die Gelegenheit, der UdSSR ihren Vietnamkrieg zu bescheren." Gegenüber einem Journalisten sagte er 1998: "Wir haben die Russen nicht zur Intervention gezwungen, aber wir haben bewusst die Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür erhöht ... diese Geheimoperation war eine hervorragende Idee. Ihr Ziel war, die Russen in die afghanische Falle zu locken." Nur vier Tage nach dem Einmarsch der Roten Armee weitete Präsident Carter das amerikanische Programm für den afghanischen Widerstand aus. Nun wurden auch Waffen und Munition finanziert und geliefert.

In den 80er-Jahren kam es so zwischen CIA und ISI zu einer Kooperation von zuvor ungekanntem Ausmaß. Für Zia ul-Haq war dabei entscheidend, dass eine solche Zusammenarbeit der Stabilisierung seiner Herrschaft diene. Auch waren ihm als gläubigem Moslem die gottlosen Kommunisten suspekt. Und er hatte den Stellenwert seiner Position erkannt. Als Jimmy Carter ihm 1979 eine erste Militärhilfe von 400 Millionen US Dollar anbot, wies Zia-ul-Haq diese noch als "Peanuts" zurück. Er wusste, dass nun mehr möglich war.

Tatsächlich kam Brzezinski im Februar 1980 nach Pakistan, um mit Zia "larger covert efforts" in Afghanistan zu erörtern. Man wurde sich schnell einig. Pakistan wurde für die USA nun der Verteiler für die Lieferung von Waffen und Geld an den afghanischen Widerstand. Der US-Sicherheitsberater flog von Islamabad aus nach Riad. Die Saudis willigten ein, das amerikanische Engagement in Afghanistan ihrerseits Dollar für Dollar zu unterstützen.

Im bilateralen Verhältnis zwischen den USA und Pakistan kam es unter der Reagan-Administration im Juni 1981 zu einem

5-Jahres-Paket von 3,2 Mrd. US\$. Es war fast gleichmäßig aufgeteilt auf wirtschaftliche und militärische Hilfe. Mit dem neuen frontline-Staat Pakistan wurde vertraglich der Verkauf von 71 F-16 Flugzeugen vereinbart, von denen Pakistan die ersten 27 mit 658 Millionen US\$ gleich bar bezahlte. Der US-Kongress gewährte für sechs Jahre eine Freistellung von den US-Non-Proliferation Gesetzen, bekannt als Symington Amendment. Letzteres hatte noch 1979 zur Suspendierung der US-Hilfen an Pakistan geführt.

Ein zweites 6-Jahres-Hilfspaket im Wert von 4,02 Mrd. US\$ wurde von der Reagan-Administration für Pakistan im März 1986 geschnürt. Kurz darauf aber kam ein Special National Intelligence Estimate zu der Schlussfolgerung: "Pakistan had crossed the Nuclear threshold." Trotzdem bescheinigte Reagan im Oktober 1986, so wie es das inzwischen existierende Pressler Amendment verlangte, dass Pakistan "did not possess a nuclear explosive device". Im Jahre 1988 wiederholte Reagan dieses Zertifikat, obwohl inzwischen als allgemeine Feststellung galt, dass Pakistan de facto eine Nuklearmacht war. Im Oktober 1989 erneuerte dann Präsident George Bush das Zertifikat seines Vorgängers.

1990, die Rote Armee war inzwischen aus Afghanistan abgezogen, kam die amerikanische Kehrtwende. George Bush weigerte sich, das Zertifikat zu wiederholen, eine 10-jährige zweite Phase enger Beziehungen zwischen den USA und Pakistan hatte ihr Ende gefunden.

In der Folge sank die internationale Hilfe für Pakistan drastisch. Amerikanische Lieferungen kamen fast völlig zum Erliegen, es gab nur noch vereinzelt "concessional assistance". Als die Sowjetunion endgültig kollabierte, fanden die USA dann schnelle Gründe, das Pressler Amendment strikt anzuwenden. Nach einem Report der Washington Post vom Juli 1995 glaubte man nun unwiderlegbare Beweise zu haben,

dass auf der Sargodha Air Base nordwestlich von Lahore Raketen-Silos (storage crates) für 30 chinesische M-11 Raketen angelegt waren. Die Lieferung der bereits bezahlten F-16 Flugzeuge wurde nun verweigert und die Rückzahlung des Kaufpreises über Jahre blockiert. Es kam zu der grotesken Situation, dass Pakistan jahrelang an den Hersteller hohe Wartungskosten für die geparkten Flugzeuge zahlen musste. Erst gegen Ende der Clinton-Regierung fand man eine Lösung, es kam zur Aufrechnung mit anderen amerikanischen Lieferungen.

Während der gesamten 90er-Jahre kam ein Großteil der "concessional assistance" der USA an Pakistan zum Stillstand. Einzig bei der emergency assistance von Weltbank und IMF legte sich Washington nicht quer. Islamabad sah sich so gezwungen, zu hohen Zinsen auf dem Weltmarkt Kredite aufzunehmen. 1998-1999 kam es trotzdem zu einer de facto Zahlungsunfähigkeit, wie in den 70er-Jahren musste Pakistan um Umschuldungen nachsuchen. Der Paris-Club gewährte diese dreimal, zuletzt zu fast identischen Konditionen wie 1974. Insgesamt zeigten die 90er-Jahre einen starken politischen Druck Washingtons auf Pakistan, der bis an die Grenze des finanziellen Zusammenbruchs ging, zu dem man es letztlich dann doch nicht kommen ließ.

Als nächstes wurden dann die Beziehungen Pakistans zu den USA und dem übrigen Westen durch die politische Machtübernahme Musharrafs am 12. Oktober 1999 erschüttert. Nach nur wenigen Stunden meldete sich James Rubin von State Department mit den Worten: "If there is a coup in Pakistan, we would seek the earliest possible restoration of democracy." Zwei Tage später folgte Präsident Clinton mit der Feststellung: "We don't like it when military leaders displace elected governments." Der IMF kündigte am 13. Oktober an, Pakistan "would receive no further aid from the IMF until democracy

was restored" und Weltbank-Präsident Wolfenson zeigte sich "alarmed by the overthrow of the civilian rule". Die EU verkündete die Zurückstellung der Signatur eines ausgehandelten Abkommens über Handel und Kooperation an, die Handelsbeziehungen zu Pakistan wurden eingefroren. Aus London kam am 15. Oktober die Ankündigung, Entwicklungshilfe von 20 Millionen Pfund einzufrieren. Kanada kündigte eine Initiative an, nach der Pakistans Mitgliedschaft im Commonwealth bis zur Rückkehr zur Demokratie suspendiert werde. Die Initiative wurde am 18. Oktober von einer 8-köpfigen Aktionsgruppe der EU denn auch vollzogen. Pakistan war danach gehindert, am Commonwealth-Treffen im November 1999 in Südafrika teilzunehmen.

In Pakistan wurden von Beobachtern und Kolumnisten die Reaktionen des Westens als "cacophony" empfunden, das politische Monatsmagazin Pakistan Perspective führte aus: "The Nawaz government that masqueraded as a democracy had shown all the signs of a personalised rule where one person wanted to emerge on the ruins of all the institutions as absolute ruler of the state. This is a sad saga of our political history that historians would analyse at a later stage."<sup>2</sup>

Präsident Clinton, der am 26. März 2000 für einige Stunden nach Pakistan kam, sprach mit General Musharraf, Präsident Tarar und über Radio und TV für 15 Minuten auch zum pakistanischen Volk. Seine Forderungen an Pakistan waren: Rückkehr zur Demokratie, Fortschritte bei der Lösung der Kashmirfrage und die Unterzeichnung des CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). Im Gegenzug stellte er die Wiederherstellung voller US-Entwicklungshilfe und eine politische Partnerschaft in Aussicht. Clinton war zuvor für einige Tage zu einem offiziellen Besuch in Indien gewesen, sein touch down in Pakistan für nur wenige Stunden wurde von vielen als Diskriminierung empfunden. Zu seinem

Kurzbesuch hatte er sich auch erst spät bereit erklärt, zu groß war in Washington noch die Verärgerung über:

- die pakistanischen Nukleartests von 1998,
- das Kargil-Abenteuer der pakistanischen Militärs vom Frühjahr 1999 und
- Musharrafs Staatsstreich vom Oktober 1999.

Zudem stand bei Clintons Besuch ein politisches Gespenst im Raum. Osama bin Laden war im Sommer 1996 vom Sudan über Pakistan nach Afghanistan zurückgekehrt. Am 7. August 1998 erfolgten zeitgleich die Anschläge auf die amerikanischen Botschaften in Tansania und Kenia. Bin Laden wurde nun zum erklärten Staatsfeind der USA. Der Versuch Washingtons, ihn am 20. August 1998 mittels Raketen unschädlich zu machen, schlug fehl. Die CIA war naiv genug gewesen, den ISI über den bevorstehenden Schlag zu informieren. Das Nest war folglich leer, als die Cruise Missiles einschlugen. Die Sache belastete die Beziehungen über die nächsten Jahre, zumal vorher während der Regierungszeit von Nawaz Sharif der ISI einen von der CIA ausgearbeiteten Plan zur Gefangennahme von bin Laden abgelehnt hatte.

### Phase 3

Die dritte, bis heute andauernde Rückkehr der USA nach Pakistan fand in der Folge der Attentate des 11. September 2001 statt. Präsident Musharraf vollzog den Schritt an die Seite der USA im Krieg gegen den Terrorismus überraschend schnell. Bis heute wird hinterfragt, ob US-Vize-Außenminister Richard Armitage tatsächlich mit einer Bombardierung Pakistans zurück in die Steinzeit gedroht hat, falls es im "War on Terror" nicht mitzöge. Sicher ist, dass Musharraf und seine Generäle 2001 insbesondere eine Zerstörung ihrer Nuklearwaffen durch die USA fürchteten. Deren Erhaltung hatte für die pakistanischen Mili-

tärs höchste Priorität. Heute sind Pakistans Atomwaffen abgesichert und können weder von den USA noch von Indien in einem Erstschlag voll außer Gefecht gesetzt werden.

Zum anderen aber gab es für Musharraf weitere gute Gründe, unverzüglich an die Seite von George W. Bush zu treten. Geheimdienstberichte, die aufgrund des Freedom of Information Act von Washington inzwischen freigegeben wurden, hatten die Bush-Regierung nach dem 11. September 2001 sehr schnell und genau über Pakistans Verhältnis zu den Taliban und zu Osama bin Laden und al Qaeda informiert. Die Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) des Pentagon hatte am 23. September, d.h. nur 12 Tage nach den Attentaten, wie folgt berichtet: "Bin Laden's al Qaida network was able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan directives. If there is any doubt on that issue, consider the location of bin Laden's camp targeted by US Cruise missiles in August 1998. Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by Pakistan's ISI Directorate and protected under the patronage of a local and influential Jadran tribal leader, Jalaluddin Haqqani. However, the real host in that facility was the Pakistani ISI. If this was later to become Bin Laden's base, then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan's ISI."<sup>3</sup>

Die Gründe für die Entscheidung der Bush-Regierung, Musharraf trotzdem zum wichtigen Alliierten zu erklären, waren:

- der Bedarf an Militärbasen in Pakistan als Ausgangspunkt für Operationen in Afghanistan,
- der Bedarf an Hilfe durch den ISI aufgrund eigener Mängel im Bereich von human intelligence,
- die Befürchtung einer Talibanisierung Pakistans im Falle der Entmachtung

Musharrafs. Insbesondere wurde befürchtet, die pakistanischen Nuklearwaffen könnten in die Hände der Jihad-Terroristen fallen, und

- die Einschätzung Musharrafs als stabilisierende Kraft und als moderner Moslem, der den fundamentalistischen Kräften Paroli bieten könnte.

Musharraf hatte wenig Schwierigkeit, seine Kursänderung in Afghanistan, bei der er die Taliban zuerst einmal fallen ließ, bei seinen Kommandeuren durchzusetzen. Bei der entscheidenden Sitzung im Großen Hauptquartier erhoben nur drei Generalleutnants Einwände, die Musharraf schnell überwinden konnte. Es zeigte sich, dass die Freundschaft gegenüber den USA, zumindest aber eine realistische Einschätzung von deren Stärke, bei der pakistanischen Generalität noch vorhanden war. Die pakistanische Führung traf so zum dritten Mal in der Geschichte des Landes eine pro-westliche Entscheidung, die weiten Teilen der Bevölkerung nur schwer zu vermitteln war.

1956, anlässlich der Suez-Krise, war Pakistan an der Seite des Westens, obwohl große Teile der Bevölkerung protestiert hatten. Während der Golfkrise im Jahre 1991 unterstützte das Land die von den USA geführte internationale Koalition gegen den Irak. Diesmal war die Opposition der Massen noch größer, die Regierung in Islamabad aber blieb fest. Die Geschichte wiederholte sich nun zum dritten Mal 2001. Die Militärregierung in Islamabad stellte sich an die Seite einer von den USA geführten Koalition, diesmal gegen Al-Qaeda und die Taliban.

Kabul ist näher an Islamabad als Suez oder Baghdad. Paschtunen leben auf beiden Seiten der Durand-Linie, enge linguistische und ethnische Affinitäten sind gegeben. Die Musharraf-Regierung hat sich trotzdem an die Seite des Westens gestellt und ihre Zusagen dann zu einem Großteil auch eingehalten. Präsident George W. Bush

seinerseits hob noch 2001 die Sanktionen auf, die gegenüber Indien wie Pakistan nach deren Nukleartests 1998 in Kraft getreten waren. Mit einem executive waiver wurden auch die Sanktionen, die nach dem 12. Oktober 1999 gegen Pakistan erfolgt waren, außer Kraft gesetzt. Eine Hilfe von 50 Millionen US\$ gab Washington sofort frei. Das amerikanische Verhalten hatte Vorbildfunktion für den Paris-Club. Er räumte Pakistan Ende 2001 Konditionen ein, wie sie zuvor nur Ägypten, Polen und Jugoslawien gewährt worden waren. Zwei Drittel aller bilateralen Darlehen in Höhe von 12 Mrd. US\$ wurden auf die nächsten 38 Jahre umgeschuldet. Dabei wurde eine grace period von 15 Jahren eingeräumt. Die Asian Development Bank, Weltbank und IMF zeigten sich offen und generös für neue Hilfspakete, die dann auch zustande kamen. Die Asian Development Bank gab z.B. noch 2001 für den Agrarsektor 350 Millionen US\$ und sagte eine Milliarde für das Folgejahr zu.

Von den USA erhielt Pakistan seit dem 11. September 2001 bis Ende 2007 rund 10 Mrd. US\$ an Wirtschafts- und Militärhilfen. Es bekam die dringend benötigten F-16-Jets für seine Luftwaffe, und sein Nachrichtendienst ISI bekam "highly sophisticated equipment for information through the air".

Musharraf entsprach denn auch in den ersten Jahren einem Großteil der US-Erwartungen, insbesondere in Sachen Al-Qaeda. Spitzen-Kader wie Abu Zubaidah, Ramzi Binalshibh, Khalid Sheik Mohammad und Waleed bin Attash fanden sich ergriffen und an die Amerikaner ausgeliefert. Nach offiziellen pakistanischen Angaben sind 689 Al-Qaeda Leute vom ISI gefasst worden, 237 von ihnen der CIA übergeben. Musharrafs Bekenntnis, der ISI habe Hunderte Millionen US\$ als Kopfgelder kassiert, waren unklug und wirkten kontraproduktiv. In einer Besprechung der jüngst erschienenen Memoiren Musharrafs "In the line of fire" beschreibt ein pakistanischer

Rezensent den ISI denn auch als "purely mercenary agency chasing up bounty money by handing over Al Qaeda suspects to the CIA circumventing all legal channels. Significantly, how many innocents are still being handed over to the CIA for money reasons outside the due process of law?" In der Urdu-Fassung des Buches wurden diese Ausführungen denn auch weggelassen, Musharraf selbst gab später zu, hier einen Fehler gemacht zu haben.

Die Unternehmungen der pakistanischen Truppen in den FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) ab 2002 erfolgten auf Drängen der USA. Washington zeigte sich über das Erstarken der Taliban und von Restteilen von Al-Qaeda besorgt und drohte mit eigenen Maßnahmen. Die in den FATA noch verbliebenen Reste von Al-Qaeda, insbesondere ca. 1000 Usbeken, wurden vom pakistanischen Militär vernichtet oder vertrieben. Was nicht gelang, war eine allgemeine Befriedung der FATA. Die Taliban, die in Pakistan als Gotteskämpfer und nicht als Terroristen gelten und deren Vernichtung ohnehin nicht geplant war, ließen sich nicht mehr ruhig stellen. Sie verfolgen heute das Ziel, über die FATA hinaus auch die NWFP zu kontrollieren. Für die Regierung in Islamabad und insbesondere für Musharraf rächte sich nun, dass man sie über die letzten Jahre zumindest toleriert hat und erstarken ließ.

## Nachtrag

Bei den innenpolitischen Entwicklungen in Pakistan ab Frühjahr 2007 spielten die USA zunehmend die Rolle eines ratlosen Zuschauers. Washington war angesichts der ausbrechenden Protestbewegung der Juristen des Landes genauso überrascht und hilflos wie Musharraf selbst. Als Rettungsweg sah es eine Allianz zwischen dem Präsidenten und Benazir Bhutto. Unter amerikanischem Druck traf sich Musharraf im Jahre 2007 zweimal mit der seit

neun Jahren im Exil lebenden PPP-Führerin. Ein power sharing agreement wurde ausgehandelt, nach dem nach gewonnenen Wahlen im Januar 2008 Benazir Bhutto die Regierung führen und Musharraf als ziviler Präsident amtierend sollte. Mit der Ermordung der im Oktober 2007 zurückgekehrten Politikerin in Rawalpindi am 27. Dezember 2007 stand Washington dann vor einem Scherbenhaufen seiner Politik.

Letzteres umso mehr, als der mit Unterstützung Saudi-Arabiens ebenfalls nach Pakistan zurückgekehrte, von Musharraf im Jahre 1999 gestürzte Ex-Regierungschef Nawaz Sharif sofort in scharfe Opposition zum Präsidenten ging und dessen Entfernung aus dem Amt forderte. Aus den Wahlen vom 18. Februar 2008 ging die inzwischen von Asif Zardari geführte PPP als stärkste Kraft hervor, verfehlte aber die absolute Mehrheit. Die PML des Nawaz Sharif wurde zweitstärkste Partei, weit vor der bisher Musharraf unterstützenden PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League-Qaid-e-Azam).

Seit Ende März 2008 gibt es in Islamabad eine neue, vornehmlich von PPP und PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Group) getragene Regierung. Premierminister ist Yousaf Raza Gillani von der PPP. Die beiden derzeit stärksten politischen Führer des Landes, Asif Zardari und Nawaz Sharif, hatten nicht kandidiert und gehören der National Assembly (noch) nicht an. Sie treffen ihre Entscheidungen im Hintergrund. Zardari traf über die der Regierungsbildung vorangegangenen Wochen verschiedene Repräsentanten Washingtons. Er bekundete zunächst seine Bereitschaft, unter bestimmten Bedingungen mit Mus-

harraf zu kooperieren. Dabei ging er davon aus, dass Pakistan auch künftig auf amerikanische Wirtschafts- und Finanzhilfen angewiesen ist.

Am 6. September 2008 ist Zardari nach dem Rücktritt von Musharraf zum Staatspräsidenten gewählt worden. Die USA haben Musharraf zum Rücktritt gedrängt, nun muss Zardari mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, nicht nur aus Dankbarkeit, sondern weil er sie als Stütze im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus braucht, auf die er nicht verzichten kann: Der äußerst blutige Anschlag auf das Marriott-Hotel in Islamabad am 20. September 2008 hat gezeigt, dass Zardari auch persönlich vom Terrorismus bedroht ist.

Auf der anderen Seite haben die USA durch Angriffe auf Al-Qaida-Kämpfer, die sie auf pakistanischem Territorium lokalisiert hatten, die Souveränität ihres wichtigsten Verbündeten im Anti-Terror-Kampf verletzt. Das erzürnte die Bevölkerung vor Ort und kann auch dem Präsidenten als dem bevorzugten Ansprechpartner der USA schaden. Hier tut sich vor Zardari der Zwang zur politischen Gratwanderung auf, von deren Bewältigung sein Verbleiben im Amt und vielleicht sogar sein Leben abhängt.

Nawaz Sharif hingegen hält für Pakistan Prosperität auch ohne amerikanische Hilfe für möglich und baut auf wirtschaftliche Beziehungen zu China und dem übrigen asiatischen Raum. Da er zudem die bisher betriebene Anti-Terror-Politik ändern will, wird Washington sich auch in dieser Hinsicht auf weitere Probleme in seiner Pakistan- und Afghanistanpolitik einstellen müssen.

## Anmerkungen

<sup>1</sup> Der vormalige pakistanische Armeechef, General Jehangir Karamat, stellt die Entwicklung wie folgt dar: "After the 1965 War, India went through a very deliberate phase of building up and upgrading its military capabilities with Russian assistance and aid. The US response was to curtail and even stop military assistance to Pakistan and it re-evaluated its policies and level of interest in South Asia. Pakistan turned

to China for military equipment and assistance.", in: The Military Dimension in PAK – US Strategic Dialogue, IPRI Paper 3/02, Islamabad 2002, S.8.

<sup>2</sup> Pakistan Perspective, Volume VIII, November 1999, S.12.

<sup>3</sup> <http://ww.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB97/index.htm>

## Autorenverzeichnis

**Chaudhry, Mohammed Saeed, Dr.**

Vizepräsident des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Forums, Berlin

**Durrani, Asad, Lt. Gen. (retd.)**

ehemaliger Botschafter in Bonn

**Hippler, Jochen, Dr.**

Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, Universität Bielefeld

**Khan, Tanvir Ahmad**

ehem. Staatssekretär im Auswärtigen Amt, Islamabad

**Kiessling, Hein G., Dr.**

Pakistanexperte, Politologe und Historiker an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München

**Lehrieder, Paul, MdB**

Präsident des Deutsch-Pakistanischen Forums, Berlin

**Rill, Bernd**

Referent für Recht, Staat, Europäische Integration der Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München

**Ruck, Christan, Dr., MdB**

Vorsitzender der Arbeitsgruppe für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung der CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin

**Syed, M. Aslam, Prof. Dr.**

zur Zeit Gastprofessor am Institut für Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin



**Verantwortlich:**

Dr. Reinhard C. Meier-Walser

Leiter der Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München

**Herausgeber:**

Bernd Rill

Referent für Recht, Staat, Europäische Integration, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen  
in der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, München

Dr. Christian Ruck, MdB

Vorsitzender der Arbeitsgruppe für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung der  
CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, Berlin

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